共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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Kyle S. Swan 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2002,83(3):270-281
The paper investigates different ways to understand the claim that non–cognitivists theories of morality are incoherent. According to the claim, this is so because, on one theory of truth, non–cognitivists are not able to deny objective truth to moral judgments without taking a substantive normative position. I argue that emotivism is not self–defeating in this way. The charge of incoherence actually only amounts to a claim that emotivism is incompatible with deflationary truth, but this claim is based upon a mistake. It relies upon a problematic understanding of both emotivism and the deflationary theory of truth. 相似文献
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Journal of Philosophical Logic - 相似文献
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Carlo Nicolai 《Synthese》2015,192(12):4031-4055
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Sergio Sismondo 《Metaphilosophy》1997,28(3):219-232
The deflationist turn in recent philosophy of science has attracted attention, in part because it promises to end debates about scientific realism. In its recommendation that we leave metaphysics behind to look at practice, deflationism constructs itself as an end-of-philosophy philosophy, accepting knowledge and the evidence for it at face value. Meanwhile, recent work in philosophy, sociology, and history of science that has focused on practice has underscored problems of such an acceptance: much scientific knowledge is not straightforwardly about the natural world, and we would not want it to be. A concrete example from the history of comparative psychology illustrates this point, and illustrates the value of interpretive work on scientific knowledge. A focus on practice, then, does not end metaphysical discussion, but rather regrounds and reshapes it. 相似文献
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This paper examines the question of the extensional correctness of Tarskian definitions of logical truth and logical consequence.
I identify a few different informal properties which are necessary for a sentence to be an informal logical truth and look
at whether they are necessary properties of Tarskian logical truths. I examine arguments by John Etchemendy and Vann McGee
to the effect that some of those properties are not necessary properties of some Tarskian logical truths, and find them unconvincing.
I stress the point that since the hypothesis that Tarski's definitions are extensionally correct is deeply entrenched, the
burden of proof is still on the shoulders of Tarski's critics, who have not lifted the burden.
This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
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Ernest Adams 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2002,83(3):207-222
This paper explores the ways in which truth is better than falsehood, and suggests that, among other things, it depends on the kinds of proposition to which these values are attached. Ordinary singular propositions like "It is raining" seem to fit best the bivalent "scheme" of classical logic, the general proposition "It is always raining" is more appropriately rated according to how often it rains, and a "practically vague" proposition like "The lecture will start at 1" is appropriately rated according to its nearness to exactness. Implications for logic of this "rating system" are commented on. 相似文献
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Frederick Kroon 《The Philosophical quarterly》2001,51(203):165-181
Kant's distinction between things in themselves and things as they appear, or appearances, is commonly attacked on the ground that it delivers a radical and incoherent 'two world' picture of what there is. I attempt to deflect this attack by questioning these terms of dismissal. Distinctions of the kind Kant draws on are in fact legion, and they make perfectly good sense. The way to make sense of them, however, is not by buying into a profligate ontology but by using some rather different tools – surprisingly enough, tools first developed in the area of aesthetics. Once this is done, much of what Kant says begins to look perfectly coherent. In the final part of the paper, I point out that none the less all is not well. Kant's Critical doctrines make it hard for us to accept Kant's own version of this otherwise coherent distinction. 相似文献
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This paper has three main concerns. First, it proposes a deflationary theory of the concept of truth, arguing thatthe concept can be explicitly defined in terms of substitutionalquantification. Second, it attempts to describe and explainthe intuitions that have traditionally been thought tofavor correspondence theories of truth over deflationarytheories. And third, it argues that these intuitions areultimately compatible with deflationism, maintaining,among other things, that the relation of semantic correspondence can itself be characterized in terms ofsubstitutional quantification. 相似文献
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John Peterson 《Ratio》2000,13(3):234-238
Truth implies mind because falsity does and the same analysis must be given of each. Some philosophers (Aristotle, Brentano) express this by saying that 'true' and 'false' apply strictly speaking to judgments and derivatively to everything else. A consequence of this is that all non-judgmental senses of 'true' and 'false' include some relation to a judgment. But counterexamples to this occur. So an alternative assay must be sought which both covers all cases and retains the idea that truth is mind-dependent. Under this correction, something is true if and only if it conforms to an ideal standard or measure.
This broader view of truth is compatible with realism and conceptualism but not with nominalism. If there are independent reasons for rejecting realism, it follows that conceptualism is true and universals exist only in minds. 相似文献
This broader view of truth is compatible with realism and conceptualism but not with nominalism. If there are independent reasons for rejecting realism, it follows that conceptualism is true and universals exist only in minds. 相似文献
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Journal of Philosophical Logic - I apply the notions of alethic reference introduced in previous work in the construction of several classical semantic truth theories. Furthermore, I provide... 相似文献
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