Critique or Misrepresentation? A Reply to Timimi et al.

In rebuttal to Timimi et al., we show that their critique is not a form of reasonable scientific debate with informed, constructive criticism, but merely a misrepresentation of the existing scientific literature on ADHD apparently designed to convince the scientifically uninformed of its nonexistence and of the misuse of medications for its management. We show their argument to be based on faulty logic, selective citation, misreprensentation of individual studies, ignorance of the vast literature on ADHD, and innuendo that maligns the integrity of scientists studying the disorder. Our original International Consensus Statement on ADHD remains untarnished by this faux critique – indeed it was intended to refute just such unsupported and unsupportable criticism that often appears in the popular media.     

Acceptable Contradictions: Pragmatics or Semantics? A Reply to Cobreros et al.

Naive speakers find some logical contradictions acceptable, specifically borderline contradictions involving vague predicates such as Joe is and isn’t tall. In a recent paper, Cobreros et al. (J Philos Logic, 2012) suggest a pragmatic account of the acceptability of borderline contradictions. We show, however, that the pragmatic account predicts the wrong truth conditions for some examples with disjunction. As a remedy, we propose a semantic analysis instead. The analysis is close to a variant of fuzzy logic, but conjunction and disjunction are interpreted as intensional operators.     

Locus of inhibition effects in the priming of lexical decisions: pre- or postlexical access?

The lexical decision task has been employed to investigate the effects of semantic context on word recognition. A frequent finding from the task is that “word” responses are slower when the target is preceded by an unrelated word than when it is preceded by a neutral stimulus. This inhibition effect has been interpreted as indicating that the unrelated prime interferes with word-recognition processes operating on the target. In three experiments, the effects of unrelated primes were compared for a lexical decision and word naming task. Although large inhibition effects were found for the lexical decision task in all experiments, no inhibition effects were observed for the naming task. The results are interpreted as demonstrating that inhibition effects in the lexical decision task are not on recognition processes; rather they are located at processes operating after recognition of the target has occurred.     

Geographic heuristics or shortcuts to failure?: response to Snook et al.

Snook, Taylor, and Bennell, in ‘Geographic profiling: The fast, frugal, and accurate way’ (Applied Cognitive Psychology, January 2004, volume 18, pp. 105–121), suggest that by invoking two simple rules untrained individuals can perform geographic profiling tasks as accurately as sophisticated computer software. While the results are interesting in terms of geographic heuristics, the authors' reach conclusions unsupported by their data and methods. Though they claim to address ‘the ongoing debate about whether individuals can perform as well as actuarial techniques when confronted with real world, consequential decisions,’ their laboratory experiment bears little resemblance to the reality of criminal investigation. Major flaws exist with both data selection (the cases used may not have met the assumptions underlying geographic profiling, and they only involved a series of three locations, too low for pattern detection), and methods of analysis (nonlinear error was measured linearly, and computerized geographic profiling search strategies were distorted). Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are lexical decisions a good measure of lexical access? The role of word frequency in the neglected decision stage

Three experiments investigated the impact of five lexical variables (instance dominance, category dominance, word frequency, word length in letters, and word length in syllables) on performance in three different tasks involving word recognition: category verification, lexical decision, and pronunciation. Although the same set of words was used in each task, the relationship of the lexical variables to reaction time varied significantly with the task within which the words were embedded. In particular, the effect of word frequency was minimal in the category verification task, whereas it was significantly larger in the pronunciation task and significantly larger yet in the lexical decision task. It is argued that decision processes having little to do with lexical access accentuate the word-frequency effect in the lexical decision task and that results from this task have questionable value in testing the assumption that word frequency orders the lexicon, thereby affecting time to access the mental lexicon. A simple two-stage model is outlined to account for the role of word frequency and other variables in lexical decision. The model is applied to the results of the reported experiments and some of the most important findings in other studies of lexical decision and pronunciation.     

What are the cognitive costs of racism? A reply to Gendler

Tamar Gendler argues that, for those living in a society in which race is a salient sociological feature, it is impossible to be fully rational: members of such a society must either fail to encode relevant information containing race, or suffer epistemic costs by being implicitly racist. However, I argue that, although Gendler calls attention to a pitfall worthy of study, she fails to conclusively demonstrate that there are epistemic (or cognitive) costs of being racist. Gendler offers three supporting phenomena. First, implicit racists expend cognitive energy repressing their implicit biases. I reply, citing Ellen Bialystok’s research, that constant use of executive functioning can be beneficial. Second, Gendler argues that awareness of a negative stereotype of one’s own race with regard to a given task negatively affects one’s performance of that task. This phenomenon, I argue, demonstrates that those against whom the stigma is directed suffer costs, but it fails to demonstrate that the stigmatizers suffer cognitively. Finally, Gendler argues that racists are less competent when recognizing faces of other races than when recognizing faces of their own race because, in the first instance, they encode the race of the face (taking up cognitive space that could have been used to encode fine-grained distinctions), whereas in the second instance they encode no race. I argue that in-group/out-group categorization rather than racism is the cognitive cost. I conclude that Gendler has failed to demonstrate that there are cognitive costs associated with being a racist.     

Of two minds or one? A registered replication of Rydell et al. (2006)

ABSTRACT

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is proposed as a mechanism of automatic preference acquisition in dual-process theories of attitudes (Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2006). Associative and propositional processes in evaluation: An integrative review of implicit and explicit attitude change. Psychological Bulletin, 132(5), 692–731. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.132.5.692). Evidence for the automaticity of EC comes from studies claiming EC effects for subliminally presented stimuli. An impression-formation study showed a selective influence of briefly presented primes on implicitly measured attitudes, whereas supraliminally presented behavioural information about the target person was reflected in explicit ratings (Rydell, R. J., McConnell, A. R., Mackie, D. M., & Strain, L. M. (2006). Of two minds forming and changing valence-inconsistent implicit and explicit attitudes. Psychological Science, 17(11), 954–958. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01811.x) This finding is considered one of the strongest pieces of evidence for dual process theories (Sweldens, S., Corneille, O., & Yzerbyt, V. (2014). The role of awareness in attitude formation through evaluative conditioning. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 18(2), 187–209. doi:10.1177/1088868314527832), and it is therefore crucial to assess its reliability and robustness. The present study presents two registered replications of the Rydell et al. (2006) study. In contrast to the original findings, the implicit measures did not reflect the valence of the subliminal primes in both studies.     

Orthogonal factors of mental ability? A response to Hampshire et al.

We respond to the main points raised by Hampshire et al. (2014). First, we note that the simulation study of Hampshire et al. (2012) was based on the assumption that individual differences in the capacities of the three proposed brain networks are mutually independent. However, this orthogonality cannot be assumed even if those networks are anatomically and functionally distinct. We also consider further the implications of our finding that a blended variable or task-mixing model of the structure of mental ability would require nearly every mental ability task to load on nearly every factor of mental ability. We explain that such a result is implausible and favors more parsimonious models that include a g factor.     

Category-specific impairments? No. A critique of Sartori et al.

In this paper we examine the claim by Sartori, Miozzo, and Job (this issue) that their patient Michelangelo exhibits a category-specific deficit in naming living things. We conclude that their data are flawed in many respects and offer no reasonable basis for the conclusions they wish to draw. In addition their further claim that the data reported by Stewart, Parkin, and Hunkin (1992) are artefactual is not supported in any substantial way by examination of the findings.     

Dilution: atheoretical burden or just load? A reply to Tsal and Benoni (2010)

Load theory of attention proposes that distractor processing is reduced in tasks with high perceptual load that exhaust attentional capacity within task-relevant processing. In contrast, tasks of low perceptual load leave spare capacity that spills over, resulting in the perception of task-irrelevant, potentially distracting stimuli. Tsal and Benoni (2010) find that distractor response competition effects can be reduced under conditions with a high search set size but low perceptual load (due to a singleton color target). They claim that the usual effect of search set size on distractor processing is not due to attentional load but instead attribute this to lower level visual interference. Here, we propose an account for their findings within load theory. We argue that in tasks of low perceptual load but high set size, an irrelevant distractor competes with the search nontargets for remaining capacity. Thus, distractor processing is reduced under conditions in which the search nontargets receive the spillover of capacity instead of the irrelevant distractor. We report a new experiment testing this prediction. Our new results demonstrate that, when peripheral distractor processing is reduced, it is the search nontargets nearest to the target that are perceived instead. Our findings provide new evidence for the spare capacity spillover hypothesis made by load theory and rule out accounts in terms of lower level visual interference (or mere "dilution") for cases of reduced distractor processing under low load in displays of high set size. We also discuss additional evidence that discounts the viability of Tsal and Benoni's dilution account as an alternative to perceptual load.     

Which is the real intelligence? A reply to Robinson (1999)

Robinson's ([Robinson, D.L. (1999). The ‘IQ’ factor: implications for intelligence theory and measurement. Personality and Individual Differences, 27, 715–735]) arguments that crystallized intelligence represents the “one valid intelligence factor” are disputed. It is argued that Robinson seriously underestimated the relevance of fluid abilities to “intelligence”, by using an inappropriate criterion for assessing the intelligence-saturation of cognitive ability variables. The relevance of fluid and crystallized abilities to popular, psychometric, and biological conceptions of intelligence is discussed, and the issue of age-related changes in fluid and crystallized intelligence is also addressed.     

More human than others? A critique of Cypryańska et al. (2017)

Cypryańska and colleagues offer a critique of existing work on the self-humanizing effect and present some empirical findings motivated by their critique. In this commentary, I question their overly restrictive understanding of self-humanizing and argue that the phenomenon does not stand or fall on a definition based on a strict analogy to the better-than-average effect. I argue that defining self-humanizing exclusively in these terms is inappropriate: It fails to recognize the relationship between self-humanizing and self-enhancement, as well as the primary role of trait valence in comparative self-ratings. Finally, I observe that Cypryańska et al.’s empirical findings are highly consistent with past work rather than offering the deep challenge that the authors suppose.     

Since when or how often? Dissociating the roles of age of acquisition (AoA) and lexical frequency in early visual word processing

The aim of the study was to investigate the effect of both word age of acquisition (AoA) and frequency of occurrence on the timing and topographical distribution of ERP components. The processing of early- versus late-acquired words was compared with that of high-frequency versus low-frequency words. Participants were asked to perform an orthographic task while EEG was recorded from 128 sites. RTs showed an effect of both word AoA and lexical frequency. ERPs revealed a neuro-functional dissociation between AoA and frequency effects in early word processing. AoA modulated the amplitude of left occipito-temporal selection-negativity, suggesting an effect of AoA on early orthographic and lexical access and revealing the crucial role of AoA in determining how words are neurally represented in the ventral pathway. Lexical frequency modulated the amplitude of left anterior negativity, providing evidence for the involvement of the left inferior frontal cortex in the processing of low-frequency words.     

What is improved if a mental rotation task is repeated – the efficiency of memory access, or the speed of a transformation routine?

The present study contrasts 3 theories which provide explanations for performance improvement in mental rotation tasks. Wallace and Hofelich conjectured that the process as such may be executed more rapidly after training, while Bethell-Fox and Shepard attributed practice effects to the fact that images may be transformed first elementwise, but later as a Gestalt. In contrast, Tarr and Pinker assumed that a transformation of an image will no longer be computed after training but simply be retrieved from memory. Thirty-seven subjects participated in 3 test sessions in which they had to decide on the parity of 3-D block figures presented from different perspectives. Experimental group subjects underwent 4 additional practice sessions in which a subset of the figures and a subset of perspective views were used. Tests adapted to the predictions of the 3 theories revealed specific learning effects but no transfer, neither to old objects presented in new perspectives nor to new objects. This supports an instance-based explanation of practice effects which states that objects are represented in multiple perspective views. Received: 7 May 1997 / Accepted: 6 August 1997     

Interference in memory by process or content? A reply to Neath (2000)

The approach to the irrelevant sound effect by Neath (2000) is discussed in terms of the contrast between content-based and process-based interference. Four themes are highlighted: First, problematic features of the feature model are highlighted; second, results not considered by Neath are presented; third, empirical underpinnings of the feature model not related to the irrelevant-sound effect are questioned; last, the parsimony of the feature model is questioned. The balance of the evidence seems to be in favor of a process-based approach, on the grounds that it provides a comprehensive account of acoustic and taskbased factors within the irrelevant sound effect, for both speech and nonspeech sound.     

Event-based and emergent timing: dichotomy or continuum? A reply to Repp and Steinman (2010)

B. H. Repp and S. R. Steiman (2010) suggested that event-based and emergent timing, usually conceived as mutually exclusive modes of timing, could in fact coexist in a single activity. According to this point of view, rhythmic activities could exploit mixtures of control modes, in which the relative importance of event-based and emergent components could depend on task characteristics. This point of view, in the opinion of the authors of the present article, corresponds to a fundamental misunderstanding of the theoretical basis of the event-based and emergent distinction, and is not supported by any experimental evidence. However, they present some new results that could support new lines of reasoning for the future developments of research in this domain.