The biological foundations of cognitive science

Cognitive Science originated in reactions against behaviorism that were motivated in significant part by the example of the computer. The computer raised the exciting possibility that mind could be understood almost entirely independently of brain: if the operations of the mind are akin to the execution of a program, then almost all the relevant aspects of mind would be captured by that program, independently of whatever was running it, be it transistors or neurons. This presumed independence of cognitive science from biology has waned considerably in recent decades, but in this paper, I argue that there is at least one crucial aspect of biology that has yet to be appreciated for its relevance to mental and other normative processes—the thermodynamics of living systems. In particular, I argue that the emergence of normativity in general—and normative function and representation in particular—depends on special systems that are far from thermodynamic equilibrium; these form the interface between the factual world of atoms and molecules and the normative world of mind. The nature of that emergence, in turn, imposes strong constraints on how the central nervous system functions, and, therefore, on how cognition is realized.     

Bioethics critically reconsidered: Living after foundations

Given intractable moral pluralism, what ought one to make of the bioethics that arose in the early 1970s, grounded as it was in the false assumption that there is a common secular morality that secular bioethics ought to apply? It is as if bioethics developed without recognition of the crisis at the heart of secular morality itself. Secular moral rationality cannot of itself provide the foundations to identify a particular morality and its bioethics as canonical. One is not just confronted with intractable moral and bioethical pluralism, but with the absence of a secular ground that can show why one should act morally rather than self-interestedly. The result is not merely the deflation of much of traditional Western morality to life-style and death-style choices, but the threat of deflating to political slogans the now-dominant secular morality, including its affirmation of human autonomy, equality, social justice, and human dignity. All of this invites one critically to reconsider the meaning and force of secular bioethics.     

Life experience and the value-free foundations of Blumer's collective behavior theory

Herbert Blumer stated throughout his long career that his ideas regarding collective behavior originated with his introduction to pragmatist philosophy under the auspices of G. H. Mead at the University of Chicago. Blumer's biography, however, presents a different picture. Firsthand experiences with mob behavior, collective outrage, and the fallout associated with Blumer's public utterances early in his career may have had significant impact on the eventual corpus of collective behavior.     

Recovering after a Natural Disaster: Differences in Quality of Life across Three Communities after Hurricane Sandy

Applied Research in Quality of Life -     

《周易》自然哲学与生命实践

《周易》蕴涵的自然哲学思想,可谓是一种以生命为隐喻,宇宙论、本体论、价值论统一的生成哲学,它基于道德实践与认识实践统一的生命实践。文章根据《周易》"经"、"传"本身之内涵,按现代哲学表述方法,从源于道德之宇宙论,三才圆通之本体论,知行不二之实践论,生成整体之方法论等方面,阐明中国式自然哲学的特性与意义。指出正是这种独特的自然哲学,不仅开启了中国文化超越的价值之源,为中国古代科学提供了形而上学基础,而且应在21世纪伟大历史转型和中西对话中,共同创造人类不同文化"殊途同归"、"和而不同"的世界生成之序。     

Normative Force and Normative Freedom: Hume and Kant, But Not Hume versus Kant

Our notion of normativity appears to combine, in a way difficult to understand but seemingly familiar from experience, elements of force and freedom. On the one hand, a normative claim is thought to have a kind of compelling authority; on the other hand, if our respecting it is to be an appropriate species of respect, it must not be coerced, automatic, or trivially guaranteed by definition. Both Hume and Kant, I argue, looked to aesthetic experience as a convincing example exhibiting this marriage of force and freedom, as well as showing how our judgment can come to be properly attuned to the features that constitute value. This image of attunement carries over into their respective accounts of moral judgment. The seemingly radical difference between their moral theories may be traceable not to a different conception of normativity, but to a difference in their empirical psychological theories – a difference we can readily spot in their accounts of aesthetics.     

康德与福柯:启蒙与现代性之争

自1784年康德在<柏林月刊>提出并回答什么是启蒙的问题之后,200年来,西方哲学就一直以不同的方式直接或间接地面对启蒙问题,甚至福柯断言:现代哲学,这正是试图对两个世纪以前如此冒失地提出的那个问题(启蒙问题,笔者注)做出回答的哲学[1].然而,福柯更深刻地感受到的是对启蒙的疑惑:所谓‘启蒙'的事件究竟是什么?它至少在某方面决定了我们是什么,我们想的是什么以及我们所做的是什么[2],进而引发了福柯对探寻现代性是否构成启蒙的继续和发展或是否应当从中看到对于18世纪的基本原则的断裂或背离[3]的诉求,公开了当代挥之不去的启蒙与现代性之间的哲学争论.     

Reason and revelation: Kant and the problem of authority

This paper explores the significance of authority for Kant’s understanding of the relationship between reason and revelation. Beginning with the separation of the faculties of Theology and Philosophy in Conflict, it will be shown that Kant sees a clear distinction between the authority of reason and that of revelation. However, when one turns to Religion, it is also clear that Kant sees an important, perhaps necessary, relationship between the two. Drawing on a variety of texts, in particular those concerning the public and private use of reason, this paper then explores the relationship between the authority of reason and that of revelation. From this discussion, several conclusions will be drawn regarding Kant’s understanding of the relationship between reason and revelation, namely that while distinct, the two are not necessarily in conflict and that, ultimately, the proper functioning of public reason must include some reference to revelation.     

Kant and the Conventionality of Simultaneity

In his Third Analogy of Experience, Kant argues that a universal system of mutual causal interaction-at-a-distance is presupposed in the very construction of experience, and thereby also can be assumed to hold of objects of experience qua appearances. This implies in turn a notion of objective simultaneity. I discuss whether Kant's project is rendered wholly obsolete by the relativity and conventionality of simultaneity as it is now understood under the theory of relativity. I conclude that, while major parts of his project are indeed obsolete, there may still be useful insights into time-awareness to be gleaned from his work.     

Post-Established Harmony: Kant and Analogy Reconsidered

This essay is a response to John Milbank’s comparison of Kant and Aquinas’ theories of analogy in ‘A Critique of the Theology of Right’. A critique of Milbank’s essay forms the point of departure for my reconstruction of Kant’s actual theory of analogy. I show that the usual focus on the Prolegomena for this end is insufficient; in fact, the full extent of Kant’s theory of analogy only becomes clear in the Critique of Judgment. I also consider the significance of the Analogies of Experience in the Critique of Pure Reason. In conclusion, I draw on the work of Michel Guérin to designate Kantian analogy, ‘post-established harmony’.