Language versus logic: Responses to misleading classificatory questions

In this study we examined responses to apparent forced-choice questions in which two choices were presented as options and both were correct. The responses suggested by these questions were in conflict with responses based on simple classificatory logic. The results showed that adults, as well as children, were easily misled by the implication of the questions and there was no consistent evidence for increases in the number of logical responses as a function of age. However, when children and adults were initially given set-breaking items designed to sensitize them to the misleading nature of questions, they answered the set-breaking items as well as subsequent test items correctly. The results are consistent with pragmatic theories of language that stress the role of context and intentionality as major determinants of meaning.     

Immediate and persisting effects of misleading questions and hypnosis on memory reports

Immediate and persisting effects of misleading questions and hypnosis on memory reports were assessed. After listening to a story, 52 highly suggestible students and 59 low and medium suggestible students were asked misleading or neutral questions in or out of hypnosis. All participants were then asked neutral questions without hypnosis. Both hypnosis and misleading questions significantly increased memory errors, and misleading questions produced significantly more errors than did hypnosis. The 2 effects were additive, so that misleading questions in hypnosis produced the greatest number of errors. There were no significant interactions with level of hypnotic suggestibility. Implications of these findings for the per se exclusion of posthypnotic testimony are discussed.     

The impact of misleading questions on eyewitness memory in children and adults

The study examined developmental patterns of the negative effect of misleading post‐event information in two different kinds of eyewitness interviews. A total of 284 subjects aged between five and 64 years were shown a short video about a theft and three weeks as well as four weeks later questioned about it. The social pressure in the interview after three weeks was manipulated by asking half of the subjects suggestive and misleading questions. The other half was asked open‐ended and unbiased questions. In the neutral interview four weeks later, all subjects were asked the same set of recognition questions about the event. The results revealed that preschoolers in particular had problems with the interplay between cognitive and social factors (social pressure induced through the wording of the misleading questions) in the interview setting after three weeks. In the neutral recognition test, all age groups were shown to suffer from prior misinformation to about the same extent. However, with an exception in the group of 6‐year‐old children the negative effect of prior misinformation on the accuracy of recognition proved to be due to items that were peripheral to the observed event. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

"Don't know" responding to answerable and unanswerable questions during misleading and hypnotic interviews

"Don't know" (DK) responses to interview questions are conceptually heterogeneous, and may represent uncertainty or clear statements about the contents of memory. A study examined the subjective intent of DK responses in relation to the objective status of information queried, in the context of memory distorting procedures. Participants viewed a video and responded to answerable and unanswerable questions phrased in misleading or nonmisleading formats, while hypnotized or not hypnotized. Subjective meanings of DK responses were queried, and a recognition measure assessed the contents of memory. Lower DK and accuracy rates were consistently associated with unanswerable and misleading questions. One-third of DK responses were statements that the information had no not presented. When these were recoded, accuracy estimates for answerable questions decreased and more so for hypnotized participants. These results demonstrate that DK responses convey different types of information, thus accuracy estimates in studies that permit DK responses may be misestimated. Robust risks associated with asking unanswerable questions and asking questions at all were observed. Implications for working with DK responses during interviews are discussed.     

Appearance questions can be misleading: a discourse-based account of the appearance-reality problem

Preschoolers' success on the appearance-reality task is a milestone in theory-of-mind development. On the standard task children see a deceptive object, such as a sponge that looks like a rock, and are asked, "What is this really?" and "What does this look like?" Children below 412 years of age fail saying that the object not only is a sponge but also looks like a sponge. We propose that young children's difficulty stems from ambiguity in the meaning of "looks like." This locution can refer to outward appearance ("Peter looks like Paul") but in fact often refers to likely reality ("That looks like Jim"). We propose that "looks like" is taken to refer to likely reality unless the reality is already part of the common ground of the conversation. Because this joint knowledge is unclear to young children on the appearance-reality task, they mistakenly think the appearance question is about likely reality. Study 1 analyzed everyday conversations from the CHILDES database and documented that 2 and 3-year-olds are familiar with these two different uses of the locution. To disambiguate the meaning of "looks like," Study 2 clarified that reality was shared knowledge as part of the appearance question, e.g., "What does the sponge look like?" Study 3 used a non-linguistic measure to emphasize the shared knowledge of the reality in the appearance question. Study 4 asked children on their own to articulate the contrast between appearance and reality. At 91%, 85%, and 81% correct responses, children were at near ceiling levels in each of our manipulations while they failed the standard versions of the tasks. Moreover, we show how this discourse-based explanation accounts for findings in the literature. Thus children master the appearance-reality distinction by the age of 3 but the standard task masks this understanding because of the discourse structure involved in talking about appearances.     

Language and persuasion: Tag questions as powerless speech or as interpreted in context

Research in impression formation and persuasion has considered use of tag questions as part of a powerless speech style. However, little research has examined how contextual factors, such as characteristics of the communicator, moderates whether tag questions act “powerless”. The present study manipulated source credibility, tag question use, and argument quality. When the source was low in credibility, tag question use decreased persuasion and biased message processing relative to a control message. However, when the source was credible, tag questions increased message processing in a relatively objective manner. Therefore, it appears that tag questions can have different effects on information processing, depending on who uses the tag questions.     

Metacognitive myopia and the overutilization of misleading advice

Previous research on advice taking has explained the failure to exploit collective wisdom in terms of the egocentric underweighting of advice provided by independent others. The present research is concerned with an opposite and more radical source of irrational advice taking, namely, the failure to critically assess the validity of advice due to metacognitive myopia. Participants could use the advice of one or two experts when estimating health risks. They read sketches of the study samples that experts had drawn to estimate conditional probabilities (e.g., of HIV‐given drug addiction). Whether samples were valid or seriously biased, subsequent judgments were strongly affected by any advice (Experiment 1). Uncritical reliance on any advice persisted when participants were sensitized to the contrast of valid and invalid advice in a repeated measures design (Experiment 2), when participants themselves believed advice not to be valid (Experiment 3), and even after full debriefing about invalid advice (Experiment 4). Lay advice exerted a similar influence as expert advice (Experiment 5). Although these provocative results are independent of numeracy and consensus (Experiment 6), they highlight the impact of metacognitive myopia as an impediment of social rationality.     

Discrepancy detection and vulnerability to misleading postevent information

When people are exposed to misleading details after a witnessed event, they often claim that they saw the misleading details as part of the event. We refer to this as themisinformation effect. In four experiments, involving 570 subjects, we explored the role that discrepancy detection plays in the misinformation effect. Experiment 1 showed that subjects who naturally read a post-event narrative more slowly were more resistant to the effects of misleading information contained in the narrative. In Experiment 2, subjects who naturally read more slowly were more likely to detect a discrepancy between what they were reading and what was stored in their memory. In Experiment 3, subjects who were instructed to read slowly were more likely to detect a discrepancy than were those who were instructed to read quickly. In Experiment 4, subjects who were instructed to read slowly were more resistant to misleading postevent information. Taken together, these results suggest that longer reading times are associated with a greater scrutiny of postevent information. This leads to an increased likelihood that discrepancies will be detected and that the misinformation will be resisted.     

Acceptance of misleading information by children and adults.

A total of 294 subjects from Grades 1, 3, 6, and college viewed a videotape of a birthday party and heard misleading information embedded in three of nine questions they answered about what they had seen. Two days later, the subjects answered six additional questions which tested whether they had accepted the misleading information. Half the subjects had heard misleading information about three of the questions and half heard misleading information about the other three questions. The results indicated that a significant number of both children and adults accepted the misleading information embedded in three of the six questions. For only one question was there any difference in the likelihood that subjects in different grades would accept misleading information.     

Influences of misleading postevent information: misinformation interference and acceptance

Because of the biasing nature of retrieval tests, evidence that the introduction of misleading postevent information will impair the memory for an original event has recently been in dispute. In two experiments, a retrieval test sensitive to both biasing effects of misinformation (misinformation acceptance) and influences of the misinformation on memory (misinformation interference) was used. Both experiments demonstrated misinformation acceptance, and one of the experiments suggested that misinformation interferes with the ability to remember the original event. Two misinformation interference hypotheses are evaluated; they suggest that the misinformation may have either impaired memory or led to confusion regarding what had occurred during the event.     

Retrospective questions and correlations

In survey research it is not uncommon to ask questions of the following type: “How many times did you undertake actiona in reference periodT of length τ?.” The relationship is established between τ and the correlation of the number of reported actions with some background variable. To this end it is assumed that the process of actions satisfies a renewal model with individual heterogeneity. Also a model has to be formulated for possible recall effects. Applications are given in the field of medical consumption.     

'Questions, questions, questions!' A comparison of therapist inferences and parental responses to systemic questions

Using a specially designed questionnaire, we examined the relationship between parental responses to systemic questions, therapists'views based upon these responses and parental reports of dysfunction in a member of the family. The questionnaire was completed by parents of a randomly selected population sample of adolescents and by experienced family therapists. Therapists made inferences that were predictable, coherent and reliable. They gave most salience to the concept of'enmeshment'and least to'hostile-discordant'functioning. Some enmeshed answers were favoured by substantial proportions of parents, suggesting that they may reflect normal variants of family functioning. However no associations between total enmeshment scores and reported mental health problems were found. Hostile-discordant functioning, as assessed in this study, was rare in the general population sample, but was associated with reported problems.     

Existence questions

I argue that thinking of existence questions as deep questions to be resolved by a distinctively philosophical discipline of ontology is misguided. I begin by examining how to understand the truth-conditions of existence claims, by way of understanding the rules of use for ‘exists’ and for general noun terms. This yields a straightforward method for resolving existence questions by a combination of conceptual analysis and empirical enquiry. It also provides a blueprint for arguing against most common proposals for uniform substantive ‘criteria of existence’, whether they involve mind-independence, possession of causal powers, observability, etc., and thus for showing that many arguments for denying entities (numbers, ordinary objects, fictional characters, propositions…) on grounds of their failure to meet one or more of these proposed existence criteria are mistaken.

Inviting questions

Consumers are frequently invited to ask questions in everyday life. The current research provides an initial examination of how inviting consumers to ask questions influences their attitudes and intentions. Two experiments show that inviting questions can have a positive or negative effect depending on whether consumers actually ask them. Experiment 1 shows that merely inviting questions has a positive effect, but that this effect reverses when consumers actually ask questions. Following a similar logic, Experiment 2 shows that inviting questions has a positive effect under low involvement conditions, but a negative effect under high involvement conditions where the likelihood of generating questions is higher.     

Can't stop believing: inhibitory control and resistance to misleading testimony

Why are some young children consistently willing to believe what they are told even when it conflicts with first‐hand experience? In this study, we investigated the possibility that this deference reflects an inability to inhibit a prepotent response. Over the course of several trials, 2.5‐ to 3.5‐year‐olds (N = 58) heard an adult contradict their report of a simple event they had both witnessed, and children were asked to resolve this discrepancy. Those who repeatedly deferred to the adult's misleading testimony had more difficulty on an inhibitory control task involving spatial conflict than those who responded more skeptically. These results suggest that responding skeptically to testimony that conflicts with first‐hand experience may be challenging for some young children because it requires inhibiting a normally appropriate bias to believe testimony.