Health of Organisms and Health of Persons: An Embedded Instrumentalist Approach

In a time when we as a society are in the process of deciding what our basic rights to health care are, it is critically important for us to have a full and complete understanding of what constitutes health. We argue for an analysis of health according to which certain states are healthy not in themselves but because they allow an individual to reach actual goals. Recognizing that the goals of an individual considered from the point of view of biology and the goals of the same individual considered as an agent in the world might be different, we introduce a distinction between the health of an individual qua organism and the health of an individual qua person. We then argue that this distinction characterizes the evaluations made by patients and healthcare providers better than the widely discussed distinction between disease and illness.     

Upward Grounding

Realists about universals face a question about grounding. Are things how they are because they instantiate the universals they do? Or do they instantiate those universals because they are how they are? Take Ebenezer Scrooge. You can say that (i) Scrooge is greedy because he instantiates greediness, or you can say that (ii) Scrooge instantiates greediness because he is greedy. I argue that there is reason to prefer the latter to the former. I develop two arguments for the view. I also respond to some concerns one might have about the view defended. I close by showing that analogous views regarding the truth of propositions (that if the proposition that p is true, then it is true because p) and the existence of facts (that if the fact that p exists, then it exists because p) are supported by analogs of one of these arguments.     

Art as Alchemy: The Bildobjekt Interpretation of Pictorial Illusion

I argue that if we read E. H. Gombrich's Art and Illusion with the charity that it deserves, we will find a much subtler theory of depiction than the illusion theory that is usually attributed to Gombrich. Instead of suggesting that pictures are illusory because they cause us to have experiences as of seeing the depicted objects face to face, I argue that Art and Illusion is better read as making the point that naturalistic pictures are illusory because they cause us to see qualities and properties that the pictures themselves do not possess. Once we appreciate this point, we will be in a better position to appraise the value and limits of naturalistic art.     

Why does decreased likeability not deter adolescent bullying perpetrators?

This study examines why the lower likeability of bullying perpetrators does not deter them from engaging in bullying behavior, by testing three hypotheses: (a) bullying perpetrators are unaware that they are disliked, (b) they value popularity more than they value likeability, (c) they think that they have nothing to lose in terms of likeability, as they believe that their targets and other classmates would dislike them anyway, regardless of their behavior. The first two hypotheses were examined in Study 1 (1,035 Dutch adolescents, M _age = 14.15) and the third hypothesis was examined in Study 2 (601 Dutch adolescents, M _age = 12.92). Results from regression analyses showed that those higher in bullying were not more likely to overestimate their likeability. However, they were more likely than others to find being popular more important than being liked. Moreover, those higher in bullying were more likely to endorse the belief that the victimized student or the other classmates would have disliked a bullying protagonist (in vignettes of hypothetical bullying incidents) before any bullying started. These findings suggest that adolescent bullying perpetrators may not be deterred by the costs of bullying in terms of likeability, possibly because they do not value likeability that much (Hypothesis 2), and because they believe they hardly have any likeability to lose (Hypothesis 3).     

Consumption Effort: The Mental Cost of Generating Utility and the Role of Consumer Energy Level in Ambitious Consumption

We propose that the essence of consumption is the mental process of generating utility from products, that this process expends consumption effort, and that consumers take consumption effort into account in their decision making. In 2 studies, we tested the hypothesis that consumption preferences become more ambitious—individuals become more inclined to choose challenging‐to‐consume products—when consumer energy levels are elevated. In Study 1, energy induced by ingesting caffeine increased participants’ tendency to choose subtitled foreign movies rather than domestic remakes of those same movies. Study 2 demonstrated the same effect with naturally occurring energy levels and with consumption experiences whose effortfulness and quality were varied independently. In choosing among sets of poems to read, participants with higher levels of energy exhibited less effort aversion but neither more nor less quality seeking. A reanalysis of Study 1 showed that the energy effect is not simply a case of consumers using more energy when they have more energy, because the energy effect disappeared when participants were made aware of the energy source, suggesting that a preference‐correction process occurred. The energy dependence of consumer preferences affords tactical opportunities for marketers, but the welfare implications for consumers are intriguingly unclear, because in both studies we found that energy increased participants’ choice of challenging consumption experiences without increasing their liking of those experiences.     

We have travelled a long distance and sorted out the mess in the drawers: Metaphors for moving towards the end in psychotherapy

Aim: To explore the process of ending in psychotherapy, in particular how clients and therapists draw on their notions of client improvements and prepare for the upcoming end. Data: The data comes from an intensive process‐outcome study at the University of Oslo, Norway. The study includes audio‐recording from all sessions and separate post‐therapy interviews with clients and therapists. Twelve psychotherapy dyads were selected because they had reached a ‘good enough’ ending. Therapy duration ranged from 7–43 months. The number of sessions ranged from 10–67. Method and analysis: A hermeneutical‐phenomenological approach analysed and combined the observational and reflexive data. The analysis was carried out using a method for systematic text condensation and through reflexive dialogues with the material and between the researchers. Findings and discussion: The language of improvement towards the end of treatment seemed packed with metaphors conveying growth in both affective and relational management. Metaphors based on travel (how they have moved); cleaning (how they have cleaned up and sorted out things); sensing (how the clients have grown stronger, got their heads above water and see things differently); and the clients’ feeling of having received something (gifts or tools) are widely used. Such metaphors are created in the interaction with a mutual sensitivity to their capacity to confirm and regulate affect towards the end. In this sense, the metaphors celebrate accomplishments in a way that exceeds therapy, and the client can keep them to use afterwards.     

Shattering the illusion of control: Multi-shot versus single-shot gambles

The illusion of control refers to a phenomenon whereby people believe their chances of success at a task are greater than would be warranted by objective analysis. This article raises two questions. First, how robust is the illusion of control? Second, how might the illusion be ‘shattered?’ Previous experimental demonstrations involved situations that can be likened to unique or single-shot gambles. If, however, the phenomenon is robust, it should occur in repeated or multi-shot gambles in which the outcome depends on a series of gambles involving the same underlying random process. It should also appear in single-shot gambles that are framed so as to superficially resemble multi-shot gambles. We label this the strong illusion of control hypothesis. On the other hand, because people have a better appreciation of probabilistic concepts in tasks they are able to represent as relative frequencies, the introduction of a multi-shot or ‘pseudo-multi-shot’ context might cue people to the random nature of the task, thereby shattering the illusion. The weak illusion of control hypothesis holds that the illusion of control will occur in single-shot but not in multi-shot or pseudo-multi-shot gambles. Two studies are reported that support the weak hypothesis. Alternative explanations are considered and implications are discussed.     

Interactive context integration in children? Evidence from an action memory study

Action–object phrases (e.g., “lift the bottle”) are remembered better if they have been enacted rather than learned verbally. This enactment effect is largest in free recall for phrases with objects (e.g., “bottle”) present because these phrases can be interactively encoded with those context objects (interactive context integration) that serve as retrieval cues. The current study investigated whether 6- and 8-year-olds are already capable of interactive context integration. Experiment 1 demonstrated interactive context integration with 8-year-olds. This was hindered in a condition where attention was directed away from context objects. Experiment 2 demonstrated interactive context integration with 6-year-old kindergartners. Taken together, our findings show that even 6-year-olds are capable of incidental context integration through enactment and that this process is attention based.     

Which studies test whether self‐enhancement is pancultural? Reply to Sedikides,Gaertner, and Vevea, 2007

What types of studies test the question of pancultural self‐enhancement? Sedikides, Gaertner, and Vevea (2007) have identified inclusion criteria that largely limit the question to studies of the better‐than‐average effect (i.e. 27 out of 29 effects that they include as ‘validated’ and ‘relevant’). In contrast, other effects which they labelled as ‘unvalidated’ or ‘irrelevant’ used methods other than the better‐than‐average effect (i.e. 24 out of 24 effects). Because Sedikides et al. are drawing conclusions about pancultural self‐enhancement and not the pancultural better‐than‐average effect, these excluded studies are relevant to the hypothesis under question. Ignoring the findings from other methods is highly problematic, in particular because these other methods yield results that conflict with those from the better‐than‐average effect. An analysis of effects from all studies reveals no support for pancultural self‐enhancement.     

Resisting,recognizing, and returning: A three‐component model and review of persistence in episodic goals

According to prior work, persistent goal pursuit is a continuous process where persisting is a matter of resisting the urge to give up. In everyday goals, however, persistence is often episodic, and its causes are more complex. People pause and resume pursuit many times. Whether people persist reflects more than will power and motivation, it also reflects the other goals they pursue, their resources, and the attentional demands of daily life. People can fail to persist not just because they gave up, but also because they failed to act. We propose a general model of persistence that accommodates the complexity of episodic goals. We argue that persistent goal pursuit is a function of three processes: resisting the urge to give up, recognizing opportunities for pursuit, and returning to pursuit. The broad factors that help and hurt persistence can be organized within these components. These components can also explain the mechanisms of four effective strategies for persistence: removing distractions, using reminders, using implementation intentions, and forming habits. The recognizing‐resisting‐returning model integrates and improves on extant theories of persistence and goal pursuit and is consistent with empirical work from laboratory and naturalistic settings.     

The Truthmaking Argument Against Dispositionalism

According to dispositionalism, de re modality is grounded in the intrinsic natures of dispositional properties. Those properties are able to serve as the ground of de re modal truths, it is said, because they bear a special relation to counterfactual conditionals, one of truthmaking. However, because dispositionalism purports to ground de re modality only on the intrinsic natures of dispositional properties, it had better be the case that they do not play that truthmaking role merely in virtue of their being embedded in some particular, extrinsic causal context. This paper examines a recent argument against dispositionalism that purports to show that the intrinsicality of that relation cannot be maintained, due to the ceteris paribus nature of the counterfactuals that dispositions make‐true. When two prominent responses are examined, both are found wanting: at best, they require unjustified special pleading, and at worst, they amount to little more than ad hoc conceptual trickery. 1     

WHIMSICAL DESIRES

To desire is to want, but not necessarily to be disposed to do anything. That is to say, desiring does not necessarily involve having any disposition to act. To lend plausibility to this view I appeal to the example of whimsical desires that no action could help us to realise. What may lead us to view certain desires as whimsical is precisely the absence of any possibility of realizing them. While such desires might seem less than full‐blooded, I argue that we can have full‐blooded desires concerning such matters because of our (non‐whimsical) concern for others. That is to say, whimsical desires can have a borrowed seriousness. The article goes on to strengthen the separability of dispositions and desires by narrowing down the concept of triggering conditions for a disposition. If we allow the triggering conditions to be too broad then it will always make sense to say that someone with a desire simply must have a disposition because, all other things being equal, they would bring about what they desire if they were able to do so.     

The Whole and the Parts: Working in the Analytic Field

Field concepts have been imported from physics into psychology and philosophy, in the work of writers such as Kurt Lewin and Maurice Merleu-Ponty. In psychoanalysis, they are found in the work of Harry Stack Sullivan, Enrique Pichon-Rivière, and Willy and Madeleine Baranger. They are essential for relational analysis, where everything than happens in the analytic situation is considered to depend on both parties of the analytic relationship. The analytic situation is understood as a two-person setup, in which neither party can be conceived without the other, because they are inescapably bound and complementary. This is called a “dynamic field,” and it corresponds to an experiential configuration that changes and evolves in time. Insight is better understood as a restructuring of the field, a gradual development of both parties' understanding of their shared unconscious situation. In this paper I discuss the main ideas posed by the Barangers, as well as my own, and present a clinical vignette to illustrate the phenomenology of the field.     

Defending internalists from acquired sociopaths

People who suffer brain damage to their ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VM patients) have a puzzling psychological profile: they seem to retain high intellect and practical reasoning skills after their brain injuries, but continually make poor decisions in many aspects of their lives. Adina Roskies argues that their behavior is explained by the fact that, although VM patients make correct judgments about what they ought to do, they are entirely unmotivated by those judgments. Roskies thus takes VM patients to be real-world counterexamples to motivational internalism: the thesis that, necessarily, if S judges that she ought to φ in circumstances C, then S is somewhat motivated to φ in C. In this paper, however, I argue that the neuropsychological evidence that Roskies appeals to does not actually show that VM patients are entirely unmotivated by their normative judgments. Rather, I argue, the evidence suggests that VM patients form weaker normative judgments than normals during practical deliberation. And this affords the internalist with a plausible explanation for VM patients’ behavior: because VM patients form weaker normative judgments than normals, they are less motivated by their normative judgments than normals, which allows their decision-making to be overruled by their standing desires for greater and more immediate rewards.     

E-sports are Not Sports

The conclusion of this paper will be that e-sports are not sports. I begin by offering a stipulation and a definition. I stipulate that what I have in mind, when thinking about the concept of sport, is ‘Olympic’ sport. And I define an Olympic Sport as an institutionalised, rule-governed contest of human physical skill. The justification for the stipulation lies partly in that it is uncontroversial. Whatever else people might think of as sport, no-one denies that Olympic Sport is sport. This seeks to ensure that those who might wish to dispute my conclusion might stay with the argument at least for as long as possible. Secondly, the justification for the stipulation lies partly in its normativity—I have chosen an Olympic conception of sport just because it seems to me to offer some kind of desirable version of what sport is and might become. Thirdly, I give examples which show how prominent promoters of e-sports agree with my stipulation, as evidenced by their strenuous attempts to comply with it in order to join the Olympic club. The justification for the definition lies in the conceptual analysis offered—an ‘exhibition-analysis’ which clarifies the concept of sport by offering ‘construals’ of the six first-level terms. The conclusion is that e-sports are not sports because they are inadequately ‘human’; they lack direct physicality; they fail to employ decisive whole-body control and whole-body skills, and cannot contribute to the development of the whole human; and because their patterns of creation, production, ownership and promotion place serious constraints on the emergence of the kind of stable and persisting institutions characteristic of sports governance. Competitive computer games do not qualify as sports, no matter what ‘resemblances’ may be claimed. Computer games are just that—games.     

How to Do Things with Emotional Expressions: The Theory of Affective Pragmatics

It is widely accepted that emotional expressions can be rich communicative devices. We can learn much from the tears of a grieving friend, the smiles of an affable stranger, or the slamming of a door by a disgruntled lover. So far, a systematic analysis of what can be communicated by emotional expressions of different kinds and of exactly how such communication takes place has been missing. The aim of this article is to introduce a new framework for the study of emotional expressions that I call the theory of affective pragmatics (TAP). As linguistic pragmatics focuses on what utterances mean in a context, affective pragmatics focuses on what emotional expressions mean in a context. TAP develops and connects two principal insights. The first is the insight that emotional expressions do much more than simply expressing emotions. As proponents of the Behavioral Ecology View of facial movements have long emphasized, bodily displays are sophisticated social tools that can communicate the signaler's intentions and requests. Proponents of the Basic Emotion View of emotional expressions have acknowledged this fact, but they have failed to emphasize its importance, in part because they have been in the grip of a mistaken theory of emotional expressions as involuntary readouts of emotions. The second insight that TAP aims to articulate and apply to emotional expressions is that it is possible to engage in analogs of speech acts without using language at all. I argue that there are important and so far largely unexplored similarities between what we can “do” with words and what we can “do” with emotional expressions. In particular, the core tenet of TAP is that emotional expressions are a means not only of expressing what's inside but also of directing other people's behavior, of representing what the world is like and of committing to future courses of action. Because these are some of the main things we can do with language, the take home message of my analysis is that, from a communicative point of view, much of what we can do with language we can also do with non-verbal emotional expressions. I conclude by exploring some reasons why, despite the analogies I have highlighted, emotional expressions are much less powerful communicative tools than speech acts.     

Book Reviews

Subjective measures of well-being—measures based on answers to questions such as ‘Taking things all together, how would you say things are these days—would you say you're very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy these days?’—are often presented as superior to more traditional economic welfare measures, e.g., for public policy purposes. This paper aims to spell out and assess what I will call the argument from directness: the notion that subjective measures of well-being better represent well-being than economic measures do because subjective measures (and subjective measures alone) are direct measures of well-being. My main thesis is that the argument begs the question against proponents of economic measures: it is based on a premise that they reject and that is no less in need of justification than the conclusion of the argument, namely, the proposition that well-being is constituted by subjectively experienced mental states. If subjective measures can be defended as valid measures of well-being at all, I will maintain, it is because they are (imperfect) indirect measures of well-being.     

Reactions of Outpatient Schizophrenics to Group Psychotherapy

Preoedipal patients present a special problem in group treatment. This is because their difficulties arose largely before they learned to use words. Such patients are prone to act. rather than talk. They do not respond well to interpretation. They must be approached and influenced through feelings. We can utilize the group to provide them with maturational experiences, helping them reach a more adult level of mental functioning so that our usual technical interventions can be brought into play. The paper discusses methods for enhancing this process, including reflection, emotional communication, using reconstruction to close developmental gaps, and immunization.     

More power to you: Simple power calculations for treatment effects with one degree of freedom

Although numerous computer programs for statistical power analysis are available, power is an under-used aspect of experimental analysis, perhaps because of the perceived difficulty of performing the necessary calculations or because existing computer software can be expensive or complicated to learn. For single-degree-of-freedom tests, however, it is possible to calculate power in a straightforward manner, using thet distribution. Because these calculations are based ont, they use easily understood and readily available quantities. These calculations can be performed with a desk calculator; we also present a simple-to-use program calledMorePower that will perform the necessary calculations. The straightforward nature of the calculations potentially will enable more researchers to consider issues of power when planning and reporting their experiments.     

The Social Bearing of Nature

The claim is that some collective entities can be thought of as part of the moral realm by virtue of their status as objects of moral concern. Collectivities are defined in terms of irreducibly corporate action and distinctive conditions of persisting identity. Their lack of sentience does not preclude moral concern, and their raison d'êtremay render moral concern for them appropriate. Recent attempts by Pettit, McMahon, and Broome to limit the moral realm to individuals are considered. They are rebutted on the grounds that they rest heavily on pre-existing moral intuitions; they ascribe a stronger thesis than is necessary to the sponsors of the moral significance of non-individuals; and they wrongly assume that what has value for individuals must have value becauseit has value for individuals. Collectivities can have moral importance even if they lack the intrinsicmoral importance attaching to human beings, and substantial consequences follow from that fact. In particular, routine appeals to the distinctness of persons become more problematic when collectivities, themselves composed entirely of persons, have independent moral significance which needs to be taken into account. That will affect both assessment of moral consequences and the process of moral decision-making.