Schema‐driven source misattribution errors: remembering the expected from a witnessed event

When recollection is difficult, people may use schematic processing to enhance memory. Two experiments showed that a delay between witnessing and recalling a visual sequence increases schematic processing, resulting in stereotypic memory errors. Participants watched a slide show of a man and a woman performing stereotype‐consistent and stereotype‐inconsistent actions, followed by an immediate or delayed memory test. Over a two‐day delay, stereotype‐inconsistent actions were increasingly misremembered as having been performed by the stereotype‐consistent actor (Experiment 1). All the source errors increased, regardless of stereotype consistency, when the wrong actor was suggested. When we merely suggested that ‘someone’ performed an action (Experiment 2), only stereotype‐consistent source errors were increased. Although visual scenes are typically well remembered, these results suggest that when memory fades, reliance on schemata increases, leading to increased stereotypic memory errors. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Discovery misattribution: when solving is confused with remembering

This study explored the discovery misattribution hypothesis, which posits that the experience of solving an insight problem can be confused with recognition. In Experiment 1, solutions to successfully solved anagrams were more likely to be judged as old on a recognition test than were solutions to unsolved anagrams regardless of whether they had been studied. Experiment 2 demonstrated that anagram solving can increase the proportion of "old" judgments relative to words presented outright. Experiment 3 revealed that under certain conditions, solving anagrams influences the proportion of "old" judgments to unrelated items immediately following the solved item. In Experiment 4, the effect of solving was reduced by the introduction of a delay between solving the anagrams and the recognition judgments. Finally, Experiments 5 and 6 demonstrated that anagram solving leads to an illusion of recollection.     

Transferring voice effects in recognition memory from remembering to knowing

In five experiments, we investigated the effects of voice congruency (same vs. different voices at study and at test) on remembering and knowing in recognition memory. With low- and medium-frequency three- or four-syllable words, a voice congruency effect occurred only in remembering. With nonwords, voice congruency effects occurred both in remembering and in knowing. With nonwords and divided attention at study, the voice congruency effect transferred almost completely from remembering to knowing. By showing a transfer of effects from remembering to knowing as encoding became more impoverished, these findings support a distinctiveness/fluency account of remembering and knowing as well as the theory that remembering and knowing indicate retrieval of events from episodic and semantic memory systems, respectively.     

Islands of memory: Autobiographical remembering in amnestics

In amnestics with anterograde amnesia, memories of post-onset autobiographical experiences, if present at all, are typically barren and impoverished. However, there have been sporadic reports of islands of memory—memories that are vivid, detailed, and specific to time and place. The aim of this study was to verify the presence of such memories and examine their incidence rate. Anterograde amnestics were interviewed in their home using a narrative interviewing strategy with a view to describing memory in everyday life. Each autobiographical memory of a post-onset event was coded for quantity-length, and quality-episodicity. In just over half of the amnestics (8 out of 14), a memory that was lengthy, rich in personal details, and localisable was recollected. The quantitative and qualitative aspects of these island memories were significantly different from the other autobiographical memories that the amnestics supplied. These memories were at odds with what would be expected on the basis of their performance on standardised memory instruments. Our findings suggest there is occasionally more variability in remembering of autobiographical experiences in some amnestics than has traditionally been believed.     

Islands of memory: Autobiographical remembering in amnestics

In amnestics with anterograde amnesia, memories of post-onset autobiographical experiences, if present at all, are typically barren and impoverished. However, there have been sporadic reports of islands of memory--memories that are vivid, detailed, and specific to time and place. The aim of this study was to verify the presence of such memories and examine their incidence rate. Anterograde amnestics were interviewed in their home using a narrative interviewing strategy with a view to describing memory in everyday life. Each autobiographical memory of a post-onset event was coded for quantity-length, and quality-episodicity. In just over half of the amnestics (8 out of 14), a memory that was lengthy, rich in personal details, and localisable was recollected. The quantitative and qualitative aspects of these island memories were significantly different from the other autobiographical memories that the amnestics supplied. These memories were at odds with what would be expected on the basis of their performance on standardised memory instruments. Our findings suggest there is occasionally more variability in remembering of autobiographical experiences in some amnestics than has traditionally been believed.     

Recognition memory with little or no remembering: Implications for a detection model

Remembering and knowing are two states of awareness that reflect autonoetic and noetic consciousness. Recent extensions of signal detection theory have attempted to fitremember andknow responses, which measure these states of awareness, to a continuum of trace strength or familiarity. The model assumes there are two response criteria, a remembering criterion, which is more strict, and a recognition criterion, which is more lenient and leads to any positive recognition response. The most important prediction of this model is that bias-free estimates of memory should be the same whether derived from overall hit and false alarm rates or fromremember hit and false alarm rates. We describe evidence that disconfirms this prediction and discuss other findings that the model cannot accommodate.     

The effects of environmental context on recognition memory and claims of remembering

Recognition memory for words was tested in same or different contexts using the remember/know response procedure. Context was manipulated by presenting words in different screen colors and locations and by presenting words against real-world photographs. Overall hit and false-alarm rates were higher for tests presented in an old context compared to a new context. This concordant effect was seen in both remember responses and estimates of familiarity. Similar results were found for rearranged pairings of old study contexts and targets, for study contexts that were unique or were repeated with different words, and for new picture contexts that were physically similar to old contexts. Similar results were also found when subjects focused attention on the study words, but a different pattern of results was obtained when subjects explicitly associated the study words with their picture context. The results show that subjective feelings of recollection play a role in the effects of environmental context but are likely based more on a sense of familiarity that is evoked by the context than on explicit associations between targets and their study context.     

Implicit memory. Retention without remembering

Explicit measures of human memory, such as recall or recognition, reflect conscious recollection of the past. Implicit tests of retention measure transfer (or priming) from past experience on tasks that do not require conscious recollection of recent experiences for their performance. The article reviews research on the relation between explicit and implicit memory. The evidence points to substantial differences between standard explicit and implicit tests, because many variables create dissociations between these tests. For example, although pictures are remembered better than words on explicit tests, words produce more priming than do pictures on several implicit tests. These dissociations may implicate different memory systems that subserve distinct memorial functions, but the present argument is that many dissociations can be understood by appealing to general principles that apply to both explicit and implicit tests. Phenomena studied under the rubric of implicit memory may have important implications in many other fields, including social cognition, problem solving, and cognitive development.     

The Chancellor's memory: Rhetoric and truth in discursive remembering

This paper explores the notion of truthfulness in research on conversational remembering. It argues that people's accounts of past events, before they can be taken as data on the cognitive workings of memory, need to be examined as contextualized and variable productions that perform pragmatic and rhetorical work; no one version can be taken as a person's real memory. The consequences of this discourse-analytical perspective are examined first through a critical discussion of Ulric Neisser's study of John Dean's testimony to the senate ‘Watergate’ committee. The issues are then explored more deeply in an analysis of reportings of a different event, in which similar (Watergate-like) issues of memory, truth and accuracy are also at issue. It is argued that: (a) all of Neisser's three kinds of memory–verbatim, gist and ‘repisodic’–involve problematical assumptions concerning their relation to some true, original event; and (b) that Dean's accounts of his memory and his displays of memory should be approached as occasioned productions oriented pragmatically to the assignment of guilt and avoidance of scapegoating. Through an analysis of newspaper reports (based on memory) of a controversial briefing given by the then British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nigel Lawson, we then examine: (a) how discourse about what could be used as an arbiter of truth was rhetorically organized; (b) how participants' versions of events were constructed rhetorically, as parts of arguments; (c) that both sides in the dispute maintained the coherence of their positions by a form of error accounting similar to that used by Neisser with respect to Dean. It is suggested that cognitive psychologists, whether working in the laboratory or attempting to do real-world studies of everyday remembering, need to avoid simplistic notions of true original events, and can do so by addressing the rhetorical organization of participants' memory accounts.     

Directed remembering: Subliminal cues alter nonconscious memory strategies

Much research on memory function has focused on changes in recognition performance brought about by differences in the processes engaged during encoding. In most of this work, participants either receive explicit instructions to remember particular items or they perform orienting (i.e., encoding) tasks that support different levels of memory performance. In daily life, however, the retention or dismissal of information often occurs without conscious intent, thereby suggesting an alternative, nonconscious route through which purposive remembering and forgetting can occur. Based on this line of reasoning, we speculated that recognition performance in a standard item-based forgetting paradigm may be moderated by subliminal cues that trigger the automatic activation of different mnemonic strategies. We report the results of two experiments that supported this prediction. In each experiment, the basic item-based forgetting effect was replicated, but via the subliminal presentation of “remember” and “forget” cues. In addition, cue-dependent differences in memory performance were traced to the operation of a covert rehearsal mechanism during encoding. We consider the implications of these findings for the non-conscious operation of memory processes in everyday life.     

Directed remembering: subliminal cues alter nonconscious memory strategies

Much research on memory function has focused on changes in recognition performance brought about by differences in the processes engaged during encoding. In most of this work, participants either receive explicit instructions to remember particular items or they perform orienting (i.e., encoding) tasks that support different levels of memory performance. In daily life, however, the retention or dismissal of information often occurs without conscious intent, thereby suggesting an alternative, nonconscious route through which purposive remembering and forgetting can occur. Based on this line of reasoning, we speculated that recognition performance in a standard item-based forgetting paradigm may be moderated by subliminal cues that trigger the automatic activation of different mnemonic strategies. We report the results of two experiments that supported this prediction. In each experiment, the basic item-based forgetting effect was replicated, but via the subliminal presentation of "remember" and "forget" cues. In addition, cue-dependent differences in memory performance were traced to the operation of a covert rehearsal mechanism during encoding. We consider the implications of these findings for the non-conscious#10; operation of memory processes in everyday life.     

Prospective memory reminders: A laboratory investigation of initiation source and age effects

Prior research indicates that, in some circumstances, reminders may facilitate prospective remembering. However, it remains unclear whether this effect is dependent on the initiation source (self vs. external), whether it is moderated by task type (event vs. time based), or whether the provision of standardized reminders particularly benefits older adults. In the current study, young (n?=?48) and older adults (n?=?47) were tested on a laboratory-based prospective memory task in which they encountered three counterbalanced reminder conditions: no reminders, self-initiated reminders, and experimenter-initiated reminders. The results indicated that while the provision of reminders enhanced prospective memory performance, no difference was seen between self-initiated and experimenter-initiated reminder conditions, nor was there any interaction with age or prospective memory type (event vs. time based). These data support the role of both self- and externally generated external reminders as an aid to prospective remembering. However, the absence of any interaction with age is not consistent with theoretical models of ageing that consider the provision of such reminders to reduce strategic demands (or increase automatic processing).     

Attention during memory retrieval enhances future remembering

Memory retrieval is a powerful learning event that influences whether an experience will be remembered in the future. Although retrieval can succeed in the presence of distraction, dividing attention during retrieval may reduce the power of remembering as an encoding event. In the present experiments, participants studied pictures of objects under full attention and then engaged in item recognition and source memory retrieval under full or divided attention. Two days later, a second recognition and source recollection test assessed the impact of attention during initial retrieval on long-term retention. On this latter test, performance was superior for items that had been tested initially under full versus divided attention. More importantly, even when items were correctly recognized on the first test, divided attention reduced the likelihood of subsequent recognition on the second test. The same held true for source recollection. Additionally, foils presented during the first test were also less likely to be later recognized if they had been encountered initially under divided attention. These findings demonstrate that attentive retrieval is critical for learning through remembering.     

Collaboration inflation: Egocentric source monitoring errors following collaborative remembering

Following collaborative remembering, people may adopt their partner's contributions as their own memory. In two studies, we asked people to study partially overlapping lists of words. During collaborative remembering, dyads either worked to include all words no matter who studied them or limited recall to only words studied by both dyad members. This differential focus on source information during collaborative recall impacted performance on a later source memory test. Nonetheless we found frequent source monitoring errors that displayed an egocentric bias. People were more likely to claim their partner's contributions as their own memories than attribute their memories to their partners. In collaborative remembering, people work to construct an agreed upon version of the past that quickly becomes each individual's memory.     

Rewarded remembering: dissociations between self-rated motivation and memory performance

People often claim that they perform better in memory performance tasks when they are more motivated. However, past research has shown minimal effects of motivation on memory performance when factors contributing to item-specific biases during encoding and retrieval are taken into account. The purpose of the present study was to examine the generality of this apparent dissociation by using more sensitive measures of experienced motivation and memory performance. Extrinsic motivation was manipulated through competition instructions, and subjective ratings of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation were obtained before and after study instructions. Participants studied a series of words, and memory performance was assessed by content recall (Experiment 1) and source recall (Experiment 2). Both experiments showed dissociation between subjective ratings of extrinsic motivation and actual memory performance, so that competition increased self-rated extrinsic motivation but had no effects on memory performance, including source recall. Inconsistent with most people's expectations, the findings suggest that extrinsic motivation has minimal effects on memory performance.     

Directed forgetting and directed remembering in visual working memory

A defining characteristic of visual working memory is its limited capacity. This means that it is crucial to maintain only the most relevant information in visual working memory. However, empirical research is mixed as to whether it is possible to selectively maintain a subset of the information previously encoded into visual working memory. Here we examined the ability of participants to use cues to either forget or remember a subset of the information already stored in visual working memory. In Experiment 1, participants were cued to either forget or remember 1 of 2 groups of colored squares during a change-detection task. We found that both types of cues aided performance in the visual working memory task but that observers benefited more from a cue to remember than a cue to forget a subset of the objects. In Experiment 2, we show that the previous findings, which indicated that directed-forgetting cues are ineffective, were likely due to the presence of invalid cues that appeared to cause observers to disregard such cues as unreliable. In Experiment 3, we recorded event-related potentials and show that an electrophysiological index of focused maintenance is elicited by cues that indicate which subset of information in visual working memory needs to be remembered, ruling out alternative explanations of the behavioral effects of retention-interval cues. The present findings demonstrate that observers can focus maintenance mechanisms on specific objects in visual working memory based on cues indicating future task relevance. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Dynamics of visuo-spatial remembering: a study of information structuring in memory

We studied the process by which learning a pattern of motor activity reaches a steady-state characterized by a reduction in fluctuations. The stimuli consisted of eight visually presented dots that appeared sequentially. In a 20-trial learning phase, participants reproduced the positions of the eight dots after each presentation. Next, they reproduced the pattern 40 times without renewed presentation. In one condition, spatial distances between the dots were proportional to the intervals between their appearances; in the other they were not proportional. We analyzed how the reproduction stabilized at the configuration and dot levels. In proportional as well as non-proportional conditions, stabilization occurs at different time scales for the configuration and dot levels. The stabilization rate differed between proportional and non-proportional conditions. These results are discussed in the framework of dynamical systems.     

Inconsistency effects in source memory and compensatory schema-consistent guessing

The attention–elaboration hypothesis of memory for schematically unexpected information predicts better source memory for unexpected than expected sources. In three source-monitoring experiments, the authors tested the occurrence of an inconsistency effect in source memory. Participants were presented with items that were schematically either very expected or very unexpected for their source. Multinomial processing tree models were used to separate source memory, item memory, and guessing bias. Results show an inconsistency effect in source memory accompanied by a compensatory schema-consistent guessing bias when expectancy strength is high, that is, when items are very expected or very unexpected for their source.     

Internal reinstatement hides cuing effects in source memory tasks

Reinstating source details at test often has no impact on source memory. We tested the proposition that participants internally reinstate source cues when such cues are not provided by the experimenter, thus making the external cues redundant. Participants studied words paired with either a male or a female face and were later asked to specify the gender of the face studied with each word. To disrupt the ability to internally reinstate sources, some participants saw eight male faces and eight female faces throughout the study list (multiple-face condition), making it difficult to determine which face should be internally reinstated for uncued test trials. Other participants saw only a single face for each gender (single-face condition), which should facilitate internal reinstatement. Across three experiments, participants in the multiple-face condition showed improved source discrimination when the studied faces were reinstated at test, as compared to uncued trials. In contrast, participants in the single-face condition showed no effect of the face cues. Moreover, the cuing effect for the multiple-face condition disappeared when the test structure facilitated internal reinstatement. Overall, the experiments support the contention that internal reinstatement is a natural part of source retrieval that can mask the effects of external cues.