Uniting model theory and the universalist tradition of logic: Carnap’s early axiomatics

We shift attention from the development of model theory for demarcated languages to the development of this theory for fragments of a language. Although it is often assumed that model theory for demarcated languages is not compatible with a universalist conception of logic, no one has denied that model theory for fragments of a language can be compatible with that conception. It thus seems unwarranted to ignore the universalist tradition in the search for the origins and development of model theory. This point is illustrated by Carnap’s early semantics and model theory, which he developed within a type theoretical framework and which stand out both for their universalistic treatment and for certain idiosyncratic technicalities by which the construction is supported. One special property is that individuals are context relative in Carnap’s system. This leads to a model theory in which the model domains are more flexible than has been suggested in the literature.     

An extension of the Łukasiewicz logic to the modal logic of quantum mechanics

An attempt is made to include the axioms of Mackey for probabilities of experiments in quantum mechanics into the calculus _x0 of ukasiewicz. The obtained calculusQ contains an additional modal signQ and four modal rules of inference. The propositionQx is read x is confirmed. The most specific rule of inference may be read: for comparable observations implication is equivalent to confirmation of material implication.The semantic truth ofQ is established by the interpretation with the help of physical objects obeying to the rules of quantum mechanics. The embedding of the usual quantum propositional logic inQ is accomplished.Allatum est die 9 Junii 1976     

On the logic of event-causation Jaśkowski-style systems of causal logic

Causality is a concept which is sometimes claimed to be easy to illustrate, but hard to explain. It is not quite clear whether the former part of this claim is as obvious as the latter one. I will not present any specific theory of causation. Our aim is much less ambitious; to investigate the formal counterparts of causal relations between events, i.e. to propose a formal framework which enables us to construct metamathematical counterparts of causal relations between singular events. This should be a good starting point to define formal counterparts for concepts like causal law, causal explanation and so on.Children in their simplicity keep asking why. The person of understanding has given this up; every why, he has long found out, is merely the end of a thread that vanishes into the thick snare of infinity, which no one can truly unravel, let him tug and worry at it as much as he likes.W. Busch,The Butterfly, translated by W. ArndtThe work on this paper was supported by grants from the Humboldt-Foundation, the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh and from the Fulbright-Foundation.This paper concerns a larger project on causal logic, Uwe Scheffler from Humboldt-University and I have been working on for several months. This collaboration explains the usage of plural forms wherever they occur in section 1 and 6. However, all results of this paper, if not stated explicitely otherwise, are due to its (single) author.Presented byJan Zygmunt;     

Emotions as metarepresentational states of mind: Naturalizing the belief–desire theory of emotion

Describes the outlines of a computational explication of the belief–desire theory of emotion, a variant of cognitive emotion theory. According to the proposed explication, a core subset of emotions including surprise are nonconceptual products of hardwired mechanisms whose primary function is to subserve the monitoring and updating of the central representational system of humans, the belief–desire system. The posited emotion-producing mechanisms are analogous to sensory transducers; however, instead of sensing the world, they sense the state of the belief–desire system and signal important changes in this system, in particular the fulfillment and frustration of desires and the confirmation and disconfirmation of beliefs. Because emotions represent this information about the state of the representational system in a nonconceptual format, emotions are nonconceptual metarepresentations. It is argued that this theory of emotions provides for a deepened understanding of the role of emotions in cognitive systems and solves several problems of psychological emotion theory.     

The logic of Simpson’s paradox

There are three distinct questions associated with Simpson’s paradox. (i) Why or in what sense is Simpson’s paradox a paradox? (ii) What is the proper analysis of the paradox? (iii) How one should proceed when confronted with a typical case of the paradox? We propose a “formal” answer to the first two questions which, among other things, includes deductive proofs for important theorems regarding Simpson’s paradox. Our account contrasts sharply with Pearl’s causal (and questionable) account of the first two questions. We argue that the “how to proceed question?” does not have a unique response, and that it depends on the context of the problem. We evaluate an objection to our account by comparing ours with Blyth’s account of the paradox. Our research on the paradox suggests that the “how to proceed question” needs to be divorced from what makes Simpson’s paradox “paradoxical.”     

The secular model of the multi‐cultural state

On what model should a modern multi‐cultural democracy work? Spinosa et al. have argued that the political order should be sustained by a set of common values instilled in the citizens, without, however, any common rank order among these values. I argue that the multi‐cultural state should rather conform to what I call the Secular Model, according to which the citizens need not share any basic values at all. On the Secular Model, people individually stick to the existing constitution (only) as long as they each feel that they have good reasons to do so. To be sure, each citizen of a multi‐cultural state does need a feeling of community identity, a ‘we’ ideology, but it is desirable that each individual can have more than one such identity. It is also important that each individual can shift as he or she pleases, from one such identity to another. So this kind of identity should not be moulded by the state, but by various different free associations, independent of the state.     

The logic and language of Nirvāna: A contemporary interpretation

In contrast to historically orientedapproaches, this paper tackles the concept ofNirvna from the perspective ofcontemporary philosophy of language. It focuseson four propositions: Nirvna exists;Nirvna does not exist; Nirvna existsand does not exist; Nirvna neither exists nordoes not exist. The Buddha's rejectionof these propositions is interpreted by meansof explicit and conditionaldefinitions of existence. Stalnaker's notion ofpragmatic presupposition providesan explanation why the propositions are withoutmeaning. After comparing theword ``Nirvna' with indexicals, propernames and theoretical terms, it is finallyasked what linguistic function the word has.     

The origin of conditional logic: does a cheater detection module exist?

The domain-specific hypothesis of L. Cosmides (1989) and L. Cosmides and J. Tooby (1989, 1992) positing that conditional logic has its origin in the evolution of social exchange and in the detection of potential cheaters was tested against a more domain-general hypothesis positing that adult reasoning is logical and that errors in conditional reasoning arise from misunderstandings, not from a lack of logicality. The results of 5 experiments with undergraduate students (n = 682 for Experiments 1-4; n = 188 for Experiment 5), which involved a series of selection tasks that yielded specific predictions about participant performance, were not consistent with the cheater detection hypothesis. Findings supported the misunderstandings hypothesis and imply that adults possess general-purpose logical competence versus domain-specific modules.     

The activation—selection model of meaning: Explaining why the son comes out after the sun

The activation-selection model (ASM) of determining the meaning of an ambiguous word is unique in that it is able to account for the long-term effects of meaning selection without an explicit mechanism for suppressing the representation of the nonselected meaning. The model assumes that a meaning is selected when a threshold number of attributes associated with that particular meaning are activated. When a meaning is selected, the ASM assumes that the weights of the attributes that are associated with the chosen meaning are increased. This two-phase process (transient activation followed by long-term weight changes) provides a mechanism by which meaning selection at one time can affect meaning selection at a much later time. The ASM can explain the results of the presently reported experiments, in which the meaning selected for a homophone presented in an unbiased context is affected by multiple previous presentations of the homophone in different contexts. In particular, although participants who are initially oriented toward the secondary meaning of a homophone show an increased proportion of dominant responses when next primed by the dominant meaning of the homophone, the proportion of dominant responses decreases to below baseline levels when the homophone is later presented in a neutral context, indicating the lasting influence of the initial secondary meaning context.     

Sharing the ‘now’: Heidegger and the temporal co-constitution of world

In this paper I respond to the view that Heidegger is unable to account for the possibility of immediately experiencing others in their concrete particularity. Critics have argued that since Mitsein characterizes Dasein’s mode of being regardless of the presence or absence of others, Heidegger has essentially granted it the status of an a priori category. In doing so, they argue, Heidegger reduces the other to a mere interchangeable token whose uniqueness is subsumed under the generality of the established category. In contrast, I argue that the Heideggerian ‘a priori’ must be understood as a living responsiveness to particularity, not a top-down imposition of abstract categoriality. The argument further shows that this responsiveness must be understood in terms of temporal particularity. The bulk of the paper then demonstrates the nature of such responsiveness when it is the temporal particularity of the other Dasein that is being encountered. I show that such encounters are a necessary condition for the possibility of world time and the worldly space of shared significance. Because my encounter with the other Dasein is a direct experience of her originary temporality—the fundamental expression of her concrete care-defined way of being—such encounters are not simple subsumptions of the other to an a priori category. They are, rather, a temporal responsiveness to the unique mode of intuitive givenness characterizing other Dasein.