Ripple effects in memory: judgments of moral blame can distort memory for events

Can judging an individual as being morally responsible for a negative act affect memory for details of the act? We presented participants with a story describing an individual (Frank) who committed a crime (he walked out on a restaurant bill). Some participants were told that the negative act was not intentional and that Frank was essentially a good person. Others were told that the negative act was intentional and that Frank actually enjoyed it. Control participants were given no extra information. All the participants then judged Frank’s moral responsibility for walking out on the bill. When asked a week later to recall information about the event, the participants who had received negative information about Frank remembered that Frank had walked out on a larger restaurant bill than he actually had. Moreover, the degree of memory distortion was predicted by the degree of moral blame that had been attributed to Frank.     

Evaluating characteristics of false memories: Remember/know judgments and memory characteristics questionnaire compared

Subjects hearing a list of associates to a nonpresented lure word later often claim to have heard the lure (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). To examine the characteristics of such false memories, subjects completed a memory characteristics questionnaire (MCQ; Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988) or made remember/know (RK; Gardiner & Java, 1993) judgments for previously heard theme associates and nonpresented lures. MCQ ratings indicated that false memories for lures had less auditory detail and less remembered feelings and reactions than memories for presented words. In addition, rates of false recognition for lures were significantly lower than rates of correct recognition when items from various themes were intermixed instead of blocked at acquisition and subjects made MCQ ratings instead of RK judgments. This demonstrates that false memories can be affected both by how they are acquired and by how extensively they are examined at retrieval.     

Inventing stories: Forcing witnesses to fabricate entire fictitious events leads to freely reported false memories

Studies of the forced fabrication effect have shown that participant witnesses are prone to developing false memories for specific items or details that they have been forced to fabricate earlier (e.g., what type of hat someone wore). Building on these earlier findings, the present study assessed whether participants would develop false memories if forced to fabricate entire fictitious events that were more complex and extended in time and involved people, locations, and actions that they had never seen. Participants vehemently resisted fabricating these events, and false memory development over the short term (1-week recognition test) was limited. However, after 8 weeks, participants freely reported their forced fabrications nearly 50% of the time and did so even when they had correctly and publicly rejected them earlier on the 1-week recognition test. This is the first evidence that participant witnesses will freely incorporate into their eyewitness accounts entire fictitious events that they have earlier been forced to fabricate.     

Memory and aging: Implications for theories of memory development during childhood

Research is reviewed suggesting that early school age children and older adults demonstrate a similar pattern of performance deficits (relative to the performance of young adults) on memory tasks, raising the possibility that age-related changes in some common factor might account for both memory development and memory decline. It is argued here that whereas “metamemory” theory of memory development does not provide a viable theory of memory decline, Craik's (F. I. M. Craik & M. Byrd, 1982, in F. I. M. Craik & S. E. Trehub (Eds.), Aging and cognitive processes, New York: Plenum; F. I. M. Craik & E. Simon, 1980, in L. W. Poon, J. L. Fozard, L. S. Cermak, D. Arenberg, & L. W. Thompson (Eds.), New directions in memory and aging, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum) attentional deficit theory of memory decline provides a viable theory of memory development as well. Evidence supporting this position is reviewed, and directions for future research are discussed.     

Creating false memories for events that occurred before versus after the offset of childhood amnesia

We examined whether false images and memories for childhood events are more likely when the event supposedly took place during the period of childhood amnesia. Over three interviews, participants recalled six events: five true and one false. Some participants were told that the false event happened when they were 2 years old (Age 2 group), while others were told that it happened when they were 10 years old (Age 10 group). We compared participants’ reports of the false event to their reports of a true event from the same age. Consistent with prior research on childhood amnesia, participants in the Age 10 group were more likely than participants in the Age 2 group to remember their true event and they reported more information about it. Participants in the Age 2 group, on the other hand, were more likely to develop false images and memories than participants in the Age 10 group. Furthermore, once a false image or memory developed, there were no age-related differences in the amount of information participants reported about the false event. We conclude that childhood amnesia increases our susceptibility to false suggestion, thus our results have implications for court cases where early memories are at issue.     

Creating false memories for events that occurred before versus after the offset of childhood amnesia

We examined whether false images and memories for childhood events are more likely when the event supposedly took place during the period of childhood amnesia. Over three interviews, participants recalled six events: five true and one false. Some participants were told that the false event happened when they were 2 years old (Age 2 group), while others were told that it happened when they were 10 years old (Age 10 group). We compared participants' reports of the false event to their reports of a true event from the same age. Consistent with prior research on childhood amnesia, participants in the Age 10 group were more likely than participants in the Age 2 group to remember their true event and they reported more information about it. Participants in the Age 2 group, on the other hand, were more likely to develop false images and memories than participants in the Age 10 group. Furthermore, once a false image or memory developed, there were no age-related differences in the amount of information participants reported about the false event. We conclude that childhood amnesia increases our susceptibility to false suggestion, thus our results have implications for court cases where early memories are at issue.     

Retelling Is Not the Same as Recalling: Implications for Memory

ABSTRACT— In contrast to laboratory free recall (which emphasizes detailed and accurate remembering), conversational retellings depend upon the speaker's goals, the audience, and the social context more generally. Because memories are frequently retrieved in social contexts, retellings of events are often incomplete or distorted, with consequences for later memory. Selective rehearsal contributes to the memory effects, as does the schema activated during retelling. Retellings can be linked to memory errors observed in domains such as eyewitness testimony and flashbulb memories; in all of these situations, people retell events rather than engage in verbatim remembering.     

On the susceptibility of adaptive memory to false memory illusions

Previous research has shown that survival-related processing of word lists enhances retention for that material. However, the claim that survival-related memories are more accurate has only been examined when true recall and recognition of neutral material has been measured. In the current experiments, we examined the adaptive memory superiority effect for different types of processing and material, measuring accuracy more directly by comparing true and false recollection rates. Survival-related information and processing was examined using word lists containing backward associates of neutral, negative, and survival-related critical lures and type of processing (pleasantness, moving, survival) was varied using an incidental memory paradigm. Across four experiments, results showed that survival-related words were more susceptible than negative and neutral words to the false memory illusion and that processing information in terms of its relevance to survival independently increased this susceptibility to the false memory illusion. Overall, although survival-related processing and survival-related information resulted in poorer, not more accurate, memory, such inaccuracies may have adaptive significance. These findings are discussed in the context of false memory research and recent theories concerning the importance of survival processing and the nature of adaptive memory.     

Individual differences in working memory capacity affect false memories for missing aspects of events

Recently, Gerrie, Belcher, and Garry (2006) found that, when participants watch an event with parts missing, they falsely claim to have seen the missing parts—but they were more likely to claim they had seen less crucial parts than more crucial parts. Their results fit with a source-monitoring framework (SMF; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993) explanation of false memories. In this paper we used individual differences in working memory capacity (WMC) to examine the SMF explanation of false memories for missing aspects of events. An accumulating body of research suggests that WMC is strongly related to controlling attention, including the ability to distinguish between sources of information. The primary purpose of the present study was to examine whether people with larger WMC are better able to ward off false memories for missing information than those with a smaller WMC. We showed that higher WMC reduced false recognition of crucial information, but did not change false recognition of noncrucial information. Additionally, we found that WMC had little effect on participants’ subjective experience of true and false recognition of events, regardless whether the information was crucial or not. These results provide further evidence that people's WMC is related to their source-monitoring ability.     

Individual differences in working memory capacity affect false memories for missing aspects of events

Recently, Gerrie, Belcher, and Garry (2006) found that, when participants watch an event with parts missing, they falsely claim to have seen the missing parts--but they were more likely to claim they had seen less crucial parts than more crucial parts. Their results fit with a source-monitoring framework (SMF; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993) explanation of false memories. In this paper we used individual differences in working memory capacity (WMC) to examine the SMF explanation of false memories for missing aspects of events. An accumulating body of research suggests that WMC is strongly related to controlling attention, including the ability to distinguish between sources of information. The primary purpose of the present study was to examine whether people with larger WMC are better able to ward off false memories for missing information than those with a smaller WMC. We showed that higher WMC reduced false recognition of crucial information, but did not change false recognition of noncrucial information. Additionally, we found that WMC had little effect on participants' subjective experience of true and false recognition of events, regardless whether the information was crucial or not. These results provide further evidence that people's WMC is related to their source-monitoring ability.     

From a passing thought to a false memory in 2 minutes: Confusing real and illusory events

The frequency with which subjects erroneously included a nonpresented word in their recall of a study list was explored in two experiments. The intrusion error was recalled by as many as 80% of the subjects, and when it was perceived to have been presented early in the study list, it was assigned confidence ratings and phenomenological retrieval characteristics equivalent to those for presented words. As a result, subjects were often unable to discriminate memories of real study words from their memories of a related but nonpresented word. Manipulations of encoding, but not of retrieval, conditions altered both the frequencies of illusory memories and their metamemorial characteristics. The results and paradigm are discussed in terms of their relevance to the “memory-recovery” debate.     

How the measurement of memory processes can affect memory performance: the case of remember/know judgments

Relatively little attention has been paid thus far in memory research to the effects of measurement instruments intended to assess memory processes on the constructs being measured. The current article investigates the influence of employing the popular remember/know (R/K) measurement procedure on memory performance itself. This measurement procedure was extensively used in the past to assess the respective contributions of 2 processes to memory judgments, one based on familiarity and the other on recollection. Two experiments using unrelated word pairs showed that the use of an R/K procedure can alter memory performance. Specifically, the R/K procedure improved associative memory among older but not younger adults compared to conditions in which participants were not asked to provide R/K judgments. Such an effect was not observed in item memory performance. Potential mechanisms mediating these differential memory measurement effects are outlined, and the measurement effects' implications for memory and cognitive research are discussed.     

Being the agent: memory for action events

Whoever paid the bill at the restaurant last night, will clearly remember doing it. Independently from the type of action, it is a common experience that being the agent provides a special strength to our memories. Even if it is generally agreed that personal memories (episodic memory) rely on separate neural substrates with respect to general knowledge (semantic memory), little is known on the nature of the link between memory and the sense of agency. In the present paper, we review results from two experiments investigating the effects of agency on both explicit and implicit memory traces. Performance of normal subjects is compared to that of schizophrenic patients in order to explore the role of awareness of action on memory. It is proposed that reliable first-person information is necessary to create a stable and coherent motor memory trace.     

Recalling a floor routine: the effects of skill and age on memory for order

Two studies were conducted to examine gymnasts' memory capabilities in relation to skill level (high and low) and age level (6–8 years and 14–16 years). The first experiment consisted of two trials performed 7 days apart. In the first trial, gymnasts were briefly exposed to a twelve‐element floor routine, and were then required to perform the routine in the same serial order. One week later they were again briefly presented the same sequence, but with the fifth and seventh elements missing. The task was to perform the sequence in order, including the missing elements. The second study involved three trials that were conducted on the same day. A ten‐element sequence was briefly presented on the first trial followed by an immediate test of that sequence. One hour later, participants were asked to perform the sequence again (delayed test). An hour following that, the sequence was again presented with two elements missing. The sequence had to be performed with the missing elements. The results indicate that serial position accuracy of a gymnastic floor routine improves with both age and experience, and that the older experienced gymnasts outperformed all the other gymnasts on all phases of the experiments. These results are interpreted within the Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) theory of Long‐term Working Memory. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

False recall and false memory: the effects of instructions on memory errors

An experiment is reported using a list-learning paradigm in which all the words have a common associate, which is known to be frequently but erroneously recalled. Four experimental conditions were used. One group was instructed to think about the meanings of the words, another to relate them to personal experience, another to create images of the words, and another to chain the words into a sentence. Both thinking about the meaning and chaining increased recall of the words actually presented, but in none of the conditions was there any effect on false recall. The implications and relevance of these findings to the controversy over false memories are discussed. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Direct versus indirect tests of memory for source: judgments of modality

We studied the relation between performance on direct versus indirect tests of memory for modality. Subjects read or heard words in a mixed list and then were tested by visual perceptual identification (the indirect test) and direct report of items as read, heard, or new. There was a dependent relation between perceptual identification performance and modality judgments, in accord with the hypothesis that subjects base their judgments of modality on relative perceptual fluency. In Experiment 2, we attempted to change the degree of dependence by providing subjects with an alternative basis for modality judgments. Subjects given a mnemonic to encode modality exhibited less dependence between perceptual identification performance and modality judgments than did subjects who encoded modality incidentally. The relation between direct and indirect tests of memory for source characteristics depends on the basis used for each.     

Cognitive performance is highly sensitive to prior experience in mice with a learning and memory deficit: failure leads to more failure

The impact of a previously successful or unsuccessful experience on the subsequent acquisition of a related task is not well understood. The nature of past experience may have even greater impact in individuals with learning deficits, as their cognitive processes can be easily disrupted. Mice with a targeted disruption of the alpha and delta isoforms of the cAMP-response element-binding protein (CREB) gene (CREB(alphadelta-)-deficient mice) have a genetic vulnerability to impaired learning and memory that is highly influenced by experimental conditions. Thus, we studied the impact of prior successful and unsuccessful experiences on the degree to which CREB(alphadelta-)-deficient mice exhibit impaired spatial learning and memory in the Morris water maze (MWM). In Experiment 1, we replicated the cognitive deficit of CREB(alphadelta-)-deficient mice when given two trials per day with a 1-min intertrial interval (MWM2), and labeled this experience as a "failure." We rescued the deficit using four trials per day with a 3- to 5-min intertrial interval (MWM4) and labeled this experience a "success." In Experiment 2, a new, naive set of wild-type (WT) and CREB(alphadelta-)-deficient mice were randomly assigned to one of two sequence protocols to assess the influence of a success or a failure on subsequent performance. In Group 1, mice were first exposed to the MWM4 condition, followed by the more difficult MWM2 task. As expected, CREB(alphadelta-)-deficient mice performed well in the MWM4; they also performed well during reversal testing (MWM4R) where the goal location is changed. With this initial successful learning experience, the CREB(alphadelta-)-deficient mice then performed as well as WT mice in the MWM2, the condition in which they are known to be impaired. In contrast, CREB(alphadelta-)-deficient mice in Group 2 had an unsuccessful experience when first exposed to the MWM2 condition, and then also showed impairment in the MWM4, the condition in which they would normally perform well. This deficit was amplified when CREB(alphadelta-)-deficient mice were then tested in the reversal test. Sex differences in learning among CREB(alphadelta-)-deficient mice were amplified upon exposure to an unsuccessful learning experience. These data indicate that, under conditions of cognitive impairment, past experience can-depending on its nature-significantly facilitate or hinder future performance.     

Children’s autobiographical memories across the years: Forensic implications of childhood amnesia and eyewitness memory for stressful events

This is a review of two bodies of research conducted by myself and my colleagues that is relevant to child witness issues, namely childhood amnesia and children’s eyewitness memory for stressful events. Although considerable research over the years has investigated the phenomenon of childhood amnesia in adults, only recently has it begun to be investigated in children. For them, the age of earliest memory is a moving target over their early years. However, there is nonetheless both variation between children in how early their first memories are as well as variation between memories in terms of likelihood of being retained, and some factors influencing both are explored. In terms of eyewitness memory for stressful events, 2–13-year-old children who had been injured seriously enough to require emergency room medical treatment were interviewed. Long-term memory for these stressful events was traced, and factors influencing that retention were investigated. The findings from both areas of research have implications for developmental forensic psychology.     

A model for stochastic drift in memory strength to account for judgments of learning

Previous research has shown that judgments of learning (JOLs) made immediately after encoding have a low correlation with actual cued-recall performance, whereas the correlation is high for delayed judgments. In this article, the authors propose a formal theory describing the stochastic drift of memory strength over the retention interval to account for the delayed-JOL effect. This is done by first decomposing the aggregated memory strength into exponential functions with slow and fast memory traces. The mean aggregated memory strength shows power-function forgetting curves. The drift of the memory strength is large for immediate JOLs (causing a low predictability) and weak for delayed JOLs (causing a high predictability). Consistent with empirical data, the model makes a novel prediction of JOL asymmetry, or that immediate weak JOLs are more predictive of future performance than are immediate strong JOLs. The JOL distributions for immediate and delayed JOLs are also accounted for.