Focused memory search in fact retrieval

Several studies of fact retrieval have shown that the more facts a person learns about a concept, the longer it takes him or her to retrieve any of these facts. This result has been interpreted to mean that retrieval of a fact about a concept involves a search of all facts stored in memory with that concept. In the present study, it is suggested that retrieval involves not an unfocused search of all facts stored with a concept, but rather a focused memory search that examines relevant stored facts and ignores irrelevant information. This argument is supported by three experiments in which subjects first learned simple facts (e.g., “The banker likes horses”) and then made speeded true-false decisions for test probes le.g., “The banker likes elephants”). Specifically, results suggest that facts stored with a concept may be organized into subsets. For example, a person’s knowledge about Richard Nixon might be organized into subsets concerning Nixon’s resignation, his trips to China, his family, and so on. The data further suggest that a person attempting to retrieve a fact about a concept (e.g., the name of Nixon’s wife) may simply decide which subset is most likely to contain the desired fact (e.g., the subset concerning Nixon’s family) and search that subset. If the sought-for fact is found in this subset, the search process terminates. If, however, the desired information is not located, other subsets of facts may be searched before the retrieval attempt is given up. The notion that memory search focuses on relevant stored facts and ignores irrelevant information may help to explain why experts (i.e., people who know a large number of facts about a topic) do not experience great difficulty in retrieving facts in their areas of expertise.     

Bizarreness effects in verbal tasks and subject-performed tasks

Abstract

Recognition and cued recall of ordinary action phrases (e.g. “open the book”) and bizarre ones (e.g. “plant the hammer”) were compared under two encoding conditions: in verbal tasks (VTs), subjects learned the phrases by simply listening to them; in subject-performed tasks (SPTs), subjects learned the phrases by performing the denoted actions (without real objects). Memory performance was better after SPTs than after VTs in recognition and cued recall. In addition to this already established finding, it was observed that recognition was better for bizarre phrases than for ordinary ones after VTs and that bizarreness was unrelated to recognition after SPTs. Cued recall, on the other hand, depended on bizarreness after VTs as well as after SPTs and, in contrast to the recognition findings, ordinary phrases were recalled better than bizarre phrases. This pattern of findings was explained by the assumptions that lexical and conceptual information is encoded after VTs and motor information is additionally encoded after SPTs, and that different kinds of information are used in recognition and cued recall, and after VTs and SPTs.     

Embodied Simulations Are Modulated by Sentential Perspective

There is considerable evidence that language comprehenders derive lexical‐semantic meaning by mentally simulating perceptual and motor attributes of described events. However, the nature of these simulations—including the level of detail that is incorporated and contexts under which simulations occur—is not well understood. Here, we examine the effects of first‐ versus third‐person perspective on mental simulations during sentence comprehension. First‐person sentences describing physical transfer towards or away from the body (e.g., “You threw the microphone,” “You caught the microphone”) modulated response latencies when responses were made along a front‐back axis, consistent with the action‐sentence compatibility effect (ACE). This effect was not observed for third‐person sentences (“He threw the microphone,” “He caught the microphone”). The ACE was observed when making responses along a left‐right axis for third‐person, but not first‐person sentences. Abstract sentences (e.g., “He heard the message”) did not show an ACE along either axis. These results show that perspective is a detail that is simulated during action sentence comprehension, and that motoric activations are flexible and affected by the pronominal perspective used in the sentence.     

Retrieval processes in recognition

Retrieval processes in the long-term recognition of well organized material showed the expected organizational effects on “slow” recognition responses. Ss sorted 100 words into two to seven categories until a stable organization was achieved. The data showed the usual correlations between organization (number of categories used) and recall and recognition. Recognition tests a week after the sorting task revealed no differences between Ss using many or few categories for the “fast” recognition responses, defined as the faster 50% of each S’s latency distribution. The organizational effect was clearly evident for the “slow” 50% of the responses. The data support the retrieval check hypothesis in recognition under the assumption that retrieval operations take additional time during the recognition process.     

Categories,subcategories, and the attenuation of proactive inhibition in free recall

In two experiments, “proactive inhibition” was observed in the free recall of a succession of 15-word lists. Recall performancc declined across lists when all lists were drawn from the same taxonomic category (e.g., occupations). But this decline did not appear when the successive lists were drawn from discrete subcategories (such as “professional” and “skilled manual” occupations). The findings clarify the conditions in which proactive inhibition effects in free recall are likely to occur. Specifically, when the set of items on any one list is more homogeneous than the set of items from all lists taken together, “proactive inhibition” will be attenuated.     

Forgetting our facts: the role of inhibitory processes in the loss of propositional knowledge

Seven experiments are reported that show that retrieving facts from long-term memory is accomplished, in part, by inhibitory processes that suppress interfering facts. When asked to repeatedly retrieve a recently learned proposition (e.g., recalling The actor is looking at the tulip, given cues such as Actor looking t__), subjects experienced a recall deficit for related facts (e.g., The actor is looking at the violin) on a recall test administered 15 min later. Importantly, this retrieval-induced forgetting was shown to generalize to other facts in which the inhibited concepts took part (e.g., The teacher is lifting the violin), replicating a finding observed by M. C. Anderson and B. A. Spellman (1995) with categorical stimuli. These findings suggest a critical role for suppression in models of propositional retrieval and implicate the mere retrieval of what we know as a source of forgetting of factual knowledge.     

Part-set cueing impairment & facilitation in semantic memory

The present study explored the influence of part-set cues in semantic memory using tests of “free” recall, reconstruction of order, and serial recall. Nine distinct categories of information were used (e.g., Zodiac signs, Harry Potter books, Star Wars films, planets). The results showed part-set cueing impairment for all three “free” recall sets, whereas part-set cueing facilitation was evident for five of the six ordered sets. Generally, the present results parallel those often observed across episodic tasks, which could indicate that similar mechanisms contribute to part-set cueing effects in both episodic and semantic memory. A novel anchoring explanation of part-set cueing facilitation in order and spatial tasks is provided.     

Recognition memory and the recall of spatial location

It is argued that memory for events should depend on the ability to recall their attributes. Two experiments suggest that this is so for the attribute of spatial location. When words presented in spatial arrays were later re-presented in a joint test of recognition memory and location recall, it was found that the surer one’s recognition, the greater the accuracy of location recall. Instructions to attend to a word’s location resulted in poorer recognition memory and marginally poorer location recall than were obtained when location was “incidentally” learned. Finally, when words were presented in color as well as in space, recognition memory was best when both attributes were recalled, was better when only location, was recalled than when only color was recalled, and was poorest when neither attribute was recalled.     

Examining the effects of group‐based instruction on emergent second‐language skills in young children

The present study evaluated the emergence of second‐language intraverbals in typically developing young children following a small‐group teaching intervention. Choral responding was employed with a group of 6 primary school children (5‐6 years old) to teach first‐language tacts (e.g., “What is this in English?” [“Hospital”]) and related second‐language tacts (e.g., “What is this in Welsh?” [“Ysbyty”]). A multiple‐probe design across stimulus sets was used to evaluate subsequent emergence of untrained first‐to‐second‐language derived intraverbals (e.g., “What is hospital in Welsh?” [“Ysbyty”]) and untrained second‐to‐first‐language intraverbals (e.g.,”What is ysbyty in English?” [“Hospital”]). Data indicated that the choral responding intervention produced robust increases in derived intraverbal relations for 3 of the 6 participants.     

The effects of emotion on tip-of-the-tongue states

Tip-of-the-tongue states (TOTs) are judgments of the likelihood of imminent retrieval for items currently not recalled. In the present study, the relation of emotion to the experience of TOTs is explored. Emotion-inducing questions (e.g.), “What is the term for ritual suicide in Japan?”) were embedded among neutral questions (e.g., “What is the capital of Denmark?”). Participants attempted to recall the answers and, if unsuccessful, were asked if they were in a TOT and given a recognition test. For unrecalled items, there were significantly more TOTs for the emotional items than for the neutral items, even though the recognition performance was identical. There were more TOTs for questions that followed emotional questions than TOTs for questions that followed neutral questions, suggesting the emotional arousal lasts beyond the specific question. These findings suggest that emotional cues increase the likelihood of TOTs. These data are consistent with a metacognitive view of TOTs.     

Semantic-memory sources of episodic retrieval failure

In a cued-recall paradigm, retrieval blocking was investigated as a source of episodic retrieval failure. Each unrelated-interference (UR-I) word pair (e.g., “nurse-dollar”) had its own “competitive alternative” (e.g., “doctor’), which not only was strongly related to the cue word, but also possessed the same first two letters and final letter as did the target word. None of the unrelated-control (UR-C) word pairs (e.g., “clock-dollar”) had such an alternative. Cued recall substantially increased from the cue-word-only (e.g., “nurse- ”) to the three-letters-also cue condition (e.g., “nurse-do___r”) for the UR-C but not for the UR-I word pairs. Instead, subjects frequently reported the competitive alternatives in place of the UR-I target words in the three-letters-also cue condition. It was suggested that, relying on the primary plausibility judgment, subjects falsely accepted the competitive alternatives while the UR-I target words were blocked from retrieval by the potent retrieval of these plausible alternatives.     

The error protection impact of inhibitory after-effects in a location-based task and its preservation with practice

In location-based tasks, responses related to (prime trial) distractor-occupied locations automatically undergo activation, followed by inhibition, which causes these responses to become execution-resistant (ER). Distractor-response ER takes time to override, delaying target reactions that later require this response (e.g., probe, ignored-repetition trials), causing the spatial negative priming (SNP) phenomenon. We learned in this study that distractor-response ER affords this output a degree of error protection. Specifically, when the probe target appeared at a new location, former (prime) distractor responses were used erroneously significantly less often than their control response counterparts, likely due to their ER feature, which discourages their inappropriate selection (i.e., “ER” provides error protection). This error protection also was evident when a previous distractor response was activated by a distractor on the probe (i.e., distractor-repeat trial). Notably, error protection remained effective over extensive practice, as did SNP size (i.e., ER override time) after an initial decline.     

Affective and normative commitment to organization,supervisor, and coworkers: Do collectivist values matter?

Employees’ commitment to their organization is increasingly recognized as comprising of different bases (affect-, obligation-, or cost-based) and different foci (e.g., supervisor, coworkers). Two studies investigated affective and normative commitment to the organization, supervisor and coworkers in the Turkish context. The results of Study 1 confirmed that employees differentiate between affect versus obligation-based commitment towards the organization, supervisor and coworkers. Study 2 tested the “cultural hypothesis” which argues for the moderating influence of collectivistic values on the relationship between person (local) commitments and organizational-level (global) outcomes. The results failed to support the cultural hypothesis and showed that commitment to organization was predictive of organizational-level outcomes (e.g., turnover intentions), and commitment to supervisor was predictive of supervisor-related outcomes (e.g., citizenship towards supervisor). These findings suggest that the influence of culture may be less straightforward and may require a more sophisticated measurement of the nature of relationships and organizational characteristics in general.     

Effects of testing on subsequent re‐encoding and long‐term forgetting of action‐relevant materials: On the influence of recall type

Testing one's memory of previously studied information reduces the rate of forgetting, compared to restudy. However, little is known about how this direct testing effect applies to action phrases (e.g., “wash the car”) – a learning material relevant to everyday memory. As action phrases consist of two different components, a verb (e.g., “wash”) and a noun (e.g., “car”), testing can either be implemented as noun‐cued recall of verbs or verb‐cued recall of nouns, which may differently affect later memory performance. In the present study, we investigated the effect of testing for these two recall types, using verbally encoded action phrases as learning materials. Results showed that repeated study–test practice, compared to repeated study–restudy practice, decreased the forgetting rate across 1 week to a similar degree for both noun‐cued and verb‐cued recall types. However, noun‐cued recall of verbs initiated more new subsequent learning during the first restudy, compared to verb‐cued recall of nouns. The study provides evidence that testing has benefits on both subsequent restudy and long‐term retention of action‐relevant materials, but that these benefits are differently expressed with testing via noun‐cued versus verb‐cued recall.     

Proactive interference and cuing effects in short-term cued recall: Does foil context matter?

Tehan and Humphreys's (1995, 1996) short-term cued recall paradigm showed that recall in short-term memory is cue driven. In critical trials, the participants studied two blocks of four words each and were required to forget the first block while remembering the second block. A foil in the first block (e.g., orange) was related to a target (e.g., carrot) in the second block. Proactive interference (PI) was evident when a retrieval cue was used that subsumed the foil and the target (e.g., type of juice), but not when a cue was used that subsumed only the target (e.g., type of vegetable). Four experiments were performed to examine the extent to which contextual organization in the foil block would enhance or diminish the foil's efficacy in creating PI. A novel condition was included in which the words in the foil block were studied in a phonologically related context but the target was cued semantically, and vice versa with a semantic context and phonological cue. There were no differences in recall accuracy between conditions with and without contextual organization, but reliable increases in foil intrusions were observed when contextual organization was present. Contextual organization enhanced the foil, rather than diminished it, but the strengthened foil generated PI only when the cue subsumed the foil and the target and had no effect when the cue subsumed only the target. The results are consistent with a cue-driven retrieval interpretation of short-term recall.     

Memory for questions and amount of processing

Two experiments were carried out on how questions are remembered. Subjects watched a videotape of a series of simple events and then answered 18 questions about these events. The questions were all of the same general syntactic form (e.g., “Did the pencil fall against the jug on A?”, where A refers to a particular location). They were designed to elicit three sorts of answer: “yes,” “no” because the event took place at another location, and “no” because the event did not take place at all. After the subjects had answered the questions, they were given an unexpected test of their ability to recall them. A difference in the memorability of the questions was predicted on the basis of a procedural theory of comprehension and a hypothesis about memory subjects should cease to process a question when they realize that it concerns an event that did not take place, and such questions should be harder to remember because they are processed to a lesser degree than the other sorts of question. Experiment 1 confirmed the predictions, but its results in part could be accounted for by assuming that subjects recalled the original events and used them as a cue to remembering the questions. Experiment 2 eliminated this explanation by showing that when subjects do not have to answer certain questions, their recall of them is very poor. However, the same differences in the memorability of the three sorts of question were obtained for both answered and unanswered questions.     

When will is not the same as should: The role of modals in reasoning with legal conditionals

Naïve reasoners reject logically valid conclusions from conditional rules if they can think of exceptions in which the antecedent is true, but the consequent is not. However, when reasoning with legal conditionals (e.g., “If a person kills another human, then this person should be punished for manslaughter”) people hardly consider exceptions but evaluate conclusions depending on their own sense of justice. We show that participants’ reluctance to consider exceptions in legal reasoning depends on the modal auxiliary used. In two experiments we phrased legal conditionals either with the modal “should” (i.e., “ . . . then this person should be punished”), or with “will” (i.e., “ . . . then this person will be punished”) and presented them as modus ponens or modus tollens inferences. Participants had to decide whether the offender should or will be punished (modus ponens) or whether the offender indeed committed the offence (modus tollens). For modus ponens inferences phrased with “should” we replicate previous findings showing that participants select conclusions on the basis of their own sense of justice (Experiments 1 and 2). Yet, when the legal conditional is phrased with the modal “will” this effect is attenuated (Experiments 1 and 2), and exceptions are considered (Experiment 1). The modal auxiliary did not affect modus tollens inferences.     

An irrelevant speech effect with repeated and continuous background speech

The irrelevant speech effect is the impairment of task performance by the presentation of to-be-ignored speech stimuli. Typically, the irrelevant speech comprises a variety of sounds, but previous research (e.g., Jones, Madden, & Miles, 1992) has suggested that the deleterious effect of background speech is virtually eliminated if the speech comprises repetitions of a sound (e.g., “be, be, be”) or a single continuous sound (e.g., “beeeeeee”). Four experiments are reported that challenge this finding. Experiments 1, 2, and 4 show a substantial impairment in serial recall performance in the presence of a repeated sound, and Experiments 3 and 4 show a similar impairment of serial recall in the presence of a continuous sound. The relevance of these findings to several explanations of the irrelevant speech effect is discussed.