不确定性容忍度对跨期选择的影响及其情景依赖性

采用2(不确定性容忍度：高、低)×2(跨期日期：今天/14天、今天/180天)×2(延迟奖赏值：200元、1000元)混合实验设计,探讨不同任务特征下不确定性容忍度对跨期选择的影响。结果表明：跨期日期为180天时,不确定性容忍度主效应边缘显著;不确定性容忍度与延迟奖赏值交互作用显著：在200元时低容忍度个体对延迟奖赏的折扣程度大于高容忍度个体,在1000元时无此效应;跨期日期为14天时,不确定性容忍度的主效应及其与延迟奖赏值交互作用均不显著。这表明,不确定性容忍度对跨期选择存在影响,但这种影响受到跨期日期和延迟奖赏值的调节,具有情景依赖性。     

Good or Bad,We Want it Now: Fixed‐cost Present Bias for Gains and Losses Explains Magnitude Asymmetries in Intertemporal Choice

Intertemporal tradeoffs are ubiquitous in decision making, yet preferences for current versus future losses are rarely explored in empirical research. Whereas rational‐economic theory posits that neither outcome sign (gains vs. losses) nor outcome magnitude (small vs. large) should affect delay discount rates, both do, and moreover, they interact: in three studies, we show that whereas large gains are discounted less than small gains, large losses are discounted more than small losses. This interaction can be understood through a reconceptualization of fixed‐cost present bias, which has traditionally described a psychological preference for immediate rewards. First, our results establish present bias for losses—a psychological preference to have losses over with now. Present bias thus predicts increased discounting of future gains but decreased (or even negative) discounting of future losses. Second, because present bias preferences do not scale with the magnitude of possible gains or losses, they play a larger role, relative to other motivations for discounting, for small magnitude intertemporal decisions than for large magnitude intertemporal decisions. Present bias thus predicts less discounting of large gains than small gains but more discounting of large losses than small losses. The present research is the first to demonstrate that the effect of outcome magnitude on discount rates may be opposite for gains and losses and also the first to offer a theory (an extension of present bias) and process data to explain this interaction. The results suggest that policy efforts to encourage future‐oriented choices should frame outcomes as large gains or small losses. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Decision biases in intertemporal choice and choice under uncertainty: Testing a common account

Two experiments were performed to test a psychophysical account of parallels between biases in risky choice and intertemporal choice. Experiment 1 demonstrated the common difference effect in intertemporal choice and the common ratio effect in risky choice. As was predicted, these two biases were uncorrelated with each other, although each was correlated across monetary/health domains. This result is consistent with the supposition that these two biases result from psychophysical properties of two different dimensions (time and probability, respectively). Experiment 2 examined the magnitude effect in intertemporal choice and the peanuts effect in risky choice. These two biases were correlated with each other but were uncorrelated across monetary/health domains. This result is consistent with the supposition that these two biases result from psychophysical properties of the same dimension (utility of money or health).     

Heaven can wait. How religion modulates temporal discounting

Evidence suggests that religious systems have specific effects on attentional and action control processes. The present study investigated whether religions also modulate choices that involve higher-order knowledge and the delay of gratification in particular. We tested Dutch Calvinists, Italian Catholics, and Atheists from both countries/cultures using an intertemporal choice task where participants could choose between a small immediate and a larger delayed monetary reward. Based on the Calvinist theory of predestination and the Catholic concept of a cycle of sin–confession–expiation, we predicted a reduced delay tolerance, i.e., higher discount rate, for Italian Catholics than for Dutch Calvinists, and intermediate rates for the two atheist groups. Analyses of discount rates support our hypotheses. We also found a magnitude effect on temporal discounting and faster responses for large than for small rewards across religions and countries/cultures. We conclude that temporal discounting is specifically modulated by religious upbringing rather than by generic cultural differences.     

Compared to Dematerialized Money,Cash Increases Impatience in Intertemporal Choice

When it comes to trading time for money (or vice versa), people tend to be impatient and myopic. Often dramatically so. For illustration, half of people would rather collect $15 now than $30 in 3 months. This willingness to forego 50% of the reward to skip a 3‐month wait corresponds to an annual discount rate of 277%. This article investigates how money's physical form biases intertemporal choice. We ask, what happens to (im)patience (i.e., discount rates) when time is traded against cash rather than against an equivalent sum of dematerialized money? We find that intertemporal decisions pitting time against cash (rather than against dematerialized money) increase impatience. The underlying mechanism relates to the pain of parting from money. Letting go of cash (dematerialized money) we can have now is psychologically more (less) painful, which in turn reduces (increases) our willingness to wait for larger‐later payoffs. Importantly, heightening prevention focus (i.e., concerns for safety and security) moderates this bias. The article concludes by discussing the implications of the research, particularly for the psychology of saving behavior.     

Integrated versus segregated accounting and the magnitude effect in temporal discounting

Temporal discounting rates in humans generally decrease as the amount of reward increases, a phenomenon known as themagnitude effect. In the present study, we examined whether temporal discounting and the magnitude effect are related to segregation of choices in terms of gains or losses for waiting for or expediting receipt of a reward. Subjects (N = 24) responded to a series of hypothetical choices about amounts of money available either immediately or after a delay. The immediate and delayed amounts either were presented as integrated amounts in the baseline condition or were segregated as differential gains or losses for choosing delayed or expedited consumption (delay and speedup conditions, respectively). Temporal discounting rates decreased in the segregated conditions, in accord with the standard discounted utility model but contrary to the hypothesis that the subjects were choosing on the basis of reward differentials in the baseline condition. The size of the magnitude effect was comparable in the baseline and the delay conditions but decreased in the speed-up condition. These results challenge explanations of the magnitude effect in terms of an increasing proportional sensitivity property of the utility function (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992) and the hypothesis that subjects choose on the basis of differentials even when the rewards are presented as integrated amounts.     

Evidence for a magnitude effect in temporal discounting with pigeons

A magnitude effect in human intertemporal choice is well established-larger rewards or outcomes are discounted over time at a lower rate than are smaller rewards. However, many recent studies have failed to find a corresponding effect in nonhuman animals. Here we report a magnitude effect in temporal discounting for pigeons' choices involving a tradeoff between reward delay and amount. Pigeons chose between a small reward (1-s access to food) after a 2-s delay, and a large reward (4.5-s access to food) after a 28-s delay. Across conditions, the delays to the small and large rewards were increased or decreased, respectively. Temporal discounting functions obtained through a value-estimation procedure showed clear evidence of a magnitude effect: The value of the large reward decreased more slowly with increasing delay than the value of the small reward. We linked this result to a nonlinear relationship between choice and the delays associated with the small and large rewards. The nonlinearity was contrary to the generalized matching law but was predicted by the contextual choice model. Our results confirm the existence of a magnitude effect in nonhuman temporal discounting, showing that this adaptation is not unique to humans.     

负折扣现象:跨期决策中的自我-他人决策差异

负折扣现象作为一种违背时间折扣假定的现象越来越多地引起研究者关注。本文通过两种指标考察了为自己决策和为他人决策在负折扣现象上的差异。实验1运用二择一选择范式考察人们在为自己决策和为他人决策时对于何时发生负性事件的时间偏好。结果发现,相比较于为他人决策,为自己决策时被试更倾向于选择早些发生负性事件,即更容易产生负折扣现象。实验2运用测量时间折扣率的经典范式考察了人们在为自己决策和为他人决策时的时间折扣率。结果发现,为自己决策时比为他人决策时的时间折扣率更小,更容易出现负折扣率。总体结果表明,为自己决策比为他人决策更容易出现负折扣现象。从情绪卷入的角度看,我们推测,为自己决策时由于更多的预期负性情绪卷入,从而导致更容易产生负折扣现象。     

Valuing Environmental Outcomes: Preferences for Constant or Improving Sequences

Experimental results on individuals' preferences for temporal sequences of environmental outcomes related to air quality and near-shore ocean water quality are compared with preferences for sequences of health and monetary outcomes. Generally, graduate business student participants gave significantly lower ratings to environmental and health sequences (with equal means) that worsened over time, relative to the ratings they gave to sequences that either remained the same or improved over time. This pattern was reversed by the participants when they faced sequences of monetary payments. This preference structure held for both short (5-year) and long (50-year) time horizons, and it was confirmed with choice data. A model proposed by Loewenstein and Prelec for the valuation of sequences of outcomes was applied to the current data set and compared to the traditional discounting model. In all cases, the model that incorporated “Gestalt” features of the sequence (slope and uniformity) performed better than the net present value discounting model at predicting the mean ratings for the sequences in the different domains.     

得失框架效应的分离—— 来自收益与损失型跨期选择的研究

本研究通过创设收益和损失跨期选择情境, 采用不同表征方式(得框架、失框架)的跨期选择任务, 分别探讨了收益和损失情境下的跨期选择是否存在得失框架效应, 及其是否会受任务难度的影响。结果发现：(1)收益型跨期选择只在任务容易时存在得失框架效应, 与失框架相比, 被试在得框架下选择即时获益的概率更高; 任务困难时得失框架效应消失(实验a); (2)损失型跨期选择中不存在得失框架效应(实验b)。结果表明, 得失框架效应在损、益型跨期选择中出现了分离, 收益型跨期选择中的得失框架效应的内在认知机制很可能与风险决策中的框架效应类似并且是一种较为初级的认知加工过程。     

更优更耐心：质量结果对跨期选择的影响

跨期选择以往的研究集中于金钱数量结果。基于维度加工的模型,本文探究了在跨期选择中,人们面对质量差异的结果(如,今天的低配版手机还是六个月后的高配版手机)vs.相对应的金钱结果(如,今天的5000元还是六个月后的6000元)的选择偏好差异。3个实验结果表明：人们面对质量结果(相比于金钱结果)的跨期选择表现得更耐心,而这种现象是由于人们面对选择时在结果维度差异感知不同所致。与金钱结果跨期选择相同,质量结果跨期选择的心理加工过程同样遵循维度间差异比较。本研究为基于维度的跨期选择模型提供了新的证据。     

敬畏对跨期选择的影响：时间洞察力和时距敏感度的作用

本研究考察了情绪(敬畏、愉悦和中性)对跨期选择的影响机制,以及时距敏感度和时间洞察力在其中的作用。结果显示：(1)相比中性,敬畏情绪下个体的折扣率更大;(2)相比中性,敬畏情绪下折扣率降幅更大;(3)对于未来取向者,敬畏情绪下折扣率比中性条件下更大;(4)对于现在取向者,敬畏情绪下折扣率降幅比中性条件下更大。结果表明,敬畏情绪通过未来时距的敏感度影响跨期选择偏好,使个体更加偏好延迟奖赏,同时,个体的时间取向在其中起调节作用。     

金钱崇拜对个体跨期决策偏好的影响

采用经典跨期选择任务范式,以个体的金钱喜好差异为切入点,通过问卷调查和行为实验考察金钱崇拜对个体跨期决策偏好的影响。结果发现:(1)个体的金钱崇拜水平与其跨期折扣倾向显著负相关;(2)无论跨期决策任务的难易和兑现时间的长短,高金钱崇拜者更倾向于选择较大的延迟奖赏,而低金钱崇拜者更倾向于选择较小的即时奖赏;(3)高、低金钱崇拜者的跨期决策反应时没有明显的差异,但二者的反应时都明显地受到任务难度的影响,即在容易条件下的反应速度显著快些。结果表明,个体的金钱崇拜水平在跨期决策过程中发挥着重要的作用,致使高金钱崇拜者更愿意等待延迟大奖赏的到来。     

得失情境下的图形框架对跨期选择倾向的影响

为分离言语表述的干扰,实验采用简单选择任务,通过2(图形框架)×2(跨期选择)×2(得失情境)被试内实验设计探讨得失情境下图形框架对个体跨期选择的影响。结果发现:(1)在突出时间条件下,被试更倾向于选择小而即时的选项,而在突出金额条件下,被试选择小而即时和大而延时的概率没有差异;(2)收益情境中,个体更多地选择大而延时的选项,而在损失情境中,个体选择即时损失的概率更高。结果表明,跨期选择中个体的决策偏好会随着得失情境及决策选项描述方式的变化而变化。     

多时点结果跨期选择的决策效应及其心理机制

多时点结果跨期选择涉及两个及两个以上多个时点结果的权衡, 正日益成为跨期选择的研究重点。现有研究主要从两时点结果和序列结果两方面深入探讨了多时点结果跨期选择中的诸多决策效应, 包括：隐藏的零效应、象征效应、额外金额效应、前端金额效应以及序列效应, 并运用序列模型和权衡模型对上述决策效应进行阐释。未来还应深入探索同时涉及损益结果混合的多时点结果跨期选择, 运用决策过程追踪技术揭示决策效应的过程机制。     

Effects of self–other decision-making on time-based intertemporal choice

The effects of self–other decision-making on intertemporal choice have been revealed in many studies using a monetary outcome. However, the outcome of intertemporal choice is not restricted to money; time is also a scarce and nonrenewable resource outcome. Thus, we conducted a series of experiments to address the effects of self–other decision-making on time-based intertemporal choice, a type of intertemporal choice that uses time as an outcome. Over the course of three experiments, differences in self–other decision-making were evidenced. Participants who made decisions for others were more likely to prefer the smaller but sooner (SS) option over the larger but later (LL) option and considered the gain of the SS option to be significantly greater than that of the LL option. Participants who made decisions for themselves were likely to prefer the LL option over the SS option. However, they considered the gains of the LL and the SS option to be indifferent. Changing the role of decision-making could affect the ability of individuals to consider the future consequences of their decisions. The effects of self–other decision-making on time-based intertemporal choice could be explained by the accounts of economic reasoning and construal level theory. The findings indicated that the effects of self–other decision-making on time-based intertemporal choice, which could be generated simply by rewording questions, can help individuals make optimal long-term choices without the need for increased control.     

Perpetrators' Freedom of Choice as a Determinant of Responsibility Attribution

Abstract

In the present study, a swindler had high versus low freedom of choice while deciding to commit a crime. He actually swindled Polish university students (involved observers) out of a large versus a small amount of money (high vs. low loss). Other students (noninvolved observers) were informed about the swindler's action. All students suggested the punishment that they believed the swindler deserved (the punishments chosen were used as an index of responsibility attribution). Involved students assigned more severe punishments than noninvolved students did. In the high-loss condition, involved observers were more punitive than they were in the low-loss condition. The judgments of the swindler's victims were determined by the magnitude of their loss; they ignored information about the swindler's freedom of choice. In contrast, the responsibility attributed by the noninvolved observers was influenced by the swindler's freedom of choice, but only in the low-loss condition. Noninvolved observers informed that the swindler had high freedom of choice were insensitive to information about the magnitude of the consequences for the victim.     

问题启动对跨时选择的影响研究

本研究采用2×3混合实验设计,通过控制时间距离和表征的建构水平,对不同问题启动下的跨时选择进行对比研究。实验结果显示,问题启动是影响跨时选择的重要因素,不同问题启动下的未来结果价值折扣存在显著差异。Why问题启动使个体的时间距离敏感度降低,How问题启动使个体的时间距离敏感度提高。     

心理距离对跨期选择和风险选择的影响

通过考察时间距离、社会距离和概率距离对跨期选择和风险选择的影响, 探究跨期选择和风险选择心理过程的相似性, 并检验不同心理距离影响决策的相似性。结果发现, 无论是时间距离(实验1)、社会距离(实验2)、还是概率距离(实验3), 心理距离越远, 被试在跨期选择中越倾向于延迟选项, 在风险选择中越倾向于风险选项。研究认为, 在跨期选择和风险选择中, 选项的表征结构和选项整体评价时不同选项特征的相对权重具有相似性。随着心理距离增加, 与高识解相联系的金额特征的相对权重增加, 与低识解相联系的时间和概率特征的相对权重降低, 这使得被试更倾向于选择金额较大的延迟和风险选项。同时, 研究发现三类心理距离对两类决策有相似影响, 进一步验证了不同心理距离的本质相似性。