Field and observer viewpoint in remember-know memories of personal childhood events

This experiment examined the viewpoint and other phenomenal characteristics of childhood memories based on both personal recollections and self-knowledge. Participants were asked to provide examples of remember, know, and uncertain memories, and to rate each memory on a number of dimensions. Remembered events were generally viewed from a field perspective, while known-about events were generally viewed from an observer perspective. In line with earlier research, remembered events received the highest ratings for sensory and contextual detail, emotional content, and memory accuracy, while known-about events were given the lowest ratings. The results are discussed with reference to their possible implications for memory recovery or enhancement techniques that ask people to adopt a different viewpoint. Consideration is given as to whether a switch to a field perspective might encourage the acceptance of suggested details or events.     

Memories of early childhood: Qualities of the experience of recollection

Memories judged to be recollections were contrasted with memories known to be based on second-hand sources in order to investigate the phenomenological qualities that underlie the experience of recollection. Adults rated the qualities of their recollections of an early childhood experience. Their ratings were compared with ratings of the qualities of memories of a similar autobiographical experience where the information was known to derive from other sources. Reported recollections were rated higher than memories based on other sources for many qualities, including sensory and spatial detail, location, thoughts, feelings, completeness, event detail, and pictorial representation. Comparison of the ratings of memories dating from different ages suggests that a memory may be judged to be recollected even if only a subset of the qualities characterizing recollections are present. This provides partial support for and clarification of Rubin's multiple-systems model of autobiographical memory.     

Field and observer viewpoint in remember-know memories of personal childhood events

This experiment examined the viewpoint and other phenomenal characteristics of childhood memories based on both personal recollections and self-knowledge. Participants were asked to provide examples of remember, know, and uncertain memories, and to rate each memory on a number of dimensions. Remembered events were generally viewed from a field perspective, while known-about events were generally viewed from an observer perspective. In line with earlier research, remembered events received the highest ratings for sensory and contextual detail, emotional content, and memory accuracy, while known-about events were given the lowest ratings. The results are discussed with reference to their possible implications for memory recovery or enhancement techniques that ask people to adopt a different viewpoint. Consideration is given as to whether a switch to a field perspective might encourage the acceptance of suggested details or events.     

“Owning” the personal past: Adolescents’ and adults’ autobiographical narratives and ratings of memories of recent and distant events

Adults and adolescents are characterised as having different perspectives on their personal or autobiographical memories. Adults are recognised as having vivid recollections of past events and as appreciating the meaning and significance of their autobiographical memories. In development, these qualities are noted as absent as late as adolescence. To evaluate the assumption of developmental differences, we directly compared autobiographical memories of adults and adolescents drawn from each of several periods in the past, using measures of narrative quality (coded independently) and participants’ own subjective ratings of their memories. Adults’ narratives of events from the previous year and for the “most significant” event of their lives were coded as more thematically coherent relative to those of adolescents’; the groups did not differ on thematic coherence of narratives of early-life events (ages 1–5 and 6–10 years). The ratings that adults and adolescents provided of their autobiographical memories were similar overall; differences were more apparent for early-life events than for more recent events and indicated stronger mnemonic experiences among adolescents than adults. The pattern of findings suggests that whereas adults have more sophisticated narrative tools for describing the significance of events and their relation to the corpus of autobiographical memories, adolescents as well as adults have vivid recollective experiences as well as personal and subjective perspective on the events of their lives and their memories thereof.     

Proust nose best: Odors are better cues of autobiographical memory

The Proust phenomenon is an enduring piece of folk wisdom that asserts that odors are particularly powerful autobiographical memory cues. We provide a more formal exposition of this phenomenon and test it in two experiments, using a novel double-cuing methodology designed to negate less interesting explanations. In both studies, recall of an autobiographical event was initially cued by a verbal label (an odor name) for a fixed period, following which a second, extended recall attempt was cued by the same verbal label, the relevant odor, an irrelevant odor, or a visual cue. The focus of Experiment 1 was participants' ratings of the emotional quality of their autobiographical memories. In Experiment 2, content analysis was employed to determine the quantity of information in participants' recollections. Results revealed that odor-cued autobiographical memories were reliably different in terms of qualitative ratings and reliably superior in the amount of detail yielded. Moreover, visual cues and incongruent olfactory cues appeared to have a detrimental effect on the amount of detail recalled. These results support the proposal that odors are especially effective as reminders of past experience.     

Accuracy and perspective in involuntary autobiographical memory

This study investigated accuracy (veridicality) and perspective (point of view) in everyday involuntary memories (i.e. spontaneous recollections of the past). Using the naturalistic diary method, subjects were asked to give confidence ratings on the accuracy of their involuntary memories as well as contact others who were present in them, having them also give confidence ratings. Memory perspective was assessed by asking subjects to indicate whether their memories had a field (original) or observer (the perspective of another) point of view. The results showed subjects assigning high confidence ratings to involuntary memories, which did not differ from the confidence ratings given by others, or from the confidence ratings that they had assigned to their voluntary memories. The perspective query showed that involuntary memories come with both field and observer perspectives, and that their relative proportions did not differ from those reported for their voluntary memories. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Conflict and metacognitive control: the mismatch-monitoring hypothesis of how others' knowledge states affect recall

Information about others' success in remembering is frequently available. For example, students taking an exam may assess its difficulty by monitoring when others turn in their exams. In two experiments, we investigated how rememberers use this information to guide recall. Participants studied paired associates, some semantically related (and thus easier to retrieve) and some unrelated (and thus harder). During a subsequent cued recall test, participants viewed fictive information about an opponent's accuracy on each item. In Experiment 1, participants responded to each cue once before seeing the opponent's performance and once afterwards. Participants reconsidered their responses least often when the opponent's accuracy matched the item difficulty (easy items the opponent recalled, hard items the opponent forgot) and most often when the opponent's accuracy and the item difficulty mismatched. When participants responded only after seeing the opponent's performance (Experiment 2), the same mismatch conditions that led to reconsideration even produced superior recall. These results suggest that rememberers monitor whether others' knowledge states accord or conflict with their own experience, and that this information shifts how they interrogate their memory and what they recall.     

Collaboration reduces the frequency of false memories in older and younger adults

Older (mean age = 74.23) and younger (mean age = 33.50) participants recalled items from 6 briefly exposed household scenes either alone or with their spouses. Collaborative recall was compared with the pooled, nonredundant recall of spouses remembering alone (nominal groups). The authors examined hits, self-generated false memories, and false memories produced by another person's (actually a computer program's) misleading recollections. Older adults reported fewer hits and more self-generated false memories than younger adults. Relative to nominal groups, older and younger collaborating groups reported fewer hits and fewer self-generated false memories. Collaboration also reduced older people's computer-initiated false memories. The memory conversations in the collaborative groups were analyzed for evidence that collaboration inhibits the production of errors and/or promotes quality control processes that detect and eliminate errors. Only older adults inhibited the production of wrong answers, but both age groups eliminated errors during their discussions. The partners played an important role in helping rememberers discard false memories in older and younger couples. The results support the use of collaboration to reduce false recall in both younger and older adults.     

Mood effects on eyewitness memory: Affective influences on susceptibility to misinformation

Does mood influence the accuracy of eyewitness recollections, and people’s susceptibility to misleading information in particular? Based on recent affect-cognition theories and research on eyewitness memory, three experiments predicted and found that positive affect promoted, and negative affect inhibited the incorporation of misleading information into eyewitness memories. This effect was obtained for both positive and negative events (Experiment 1), and for recorded as well as real-life incidents (Experiment 2). Participants had no meta-cognitive awareness of these mood effects, and affect-control instructions were ineffective in preventing them (Experiment 3). The cognitive mechanisms responsible for mood effects on eyewitness memories are discussed, and the implications of these findings for everyday memories, forensic practice and for current affect/cognition theorizing are considered.     

Argentines’ collective memories of the military Junta of 1976: differences and similarities across generations and ideology

Although memories about a nation's past usually are semantic in nature, a distinction needs to be made between lived and distant semantic collective memories. The former refers to memories of community-relevant events occurring during the lifetime of the rememberer, whereas the latter to memories of distant events. Does the content of lived and distant semantic collective memories differ? Employing both free and cued recall, we examined the memories of younger and older Argentines of the Military Junta of 1976. We also examined the effects of political ideology. Content analysis indicated that (1) lived semantic collective memories were more likely to contain personal recollections than distant semantic collective memories, even though those with distant semantic collective memories could have incorporated memories of the parent's personal experience in their recollections, (2) lived semantic collective memories contained more causal statements, and (3) those on the Right with distant semantic collective memories were more likely to claim that they “Don't know” or offer positive accounts of the Junta, suggesting a need to “defend” the reputation of those on the Right. The results are discussed in terms of the goals and plans different generations might have when recollecting their nation's past.     

Dreams and reality monitoring

Experiment 1 tested the counterintuitive prediction that memories for one's own dreams should not be particularly easy to discriminate from memories for someone else's dreams. Pairs of people reported dreams to each other that they had either dreamed, read, or made up the night before. On a test requiring subjects to discriminate events they had reported from those reported by their partner, subjects had more difficulty with real dreams than with dreams they read or made up. Experiment 2 provided evidence that real dreams do not simply produce overall weaker memories; the deficit for dreams was eliminated with more time to respond and with more detailed cues. In addition, subjects' ratings of various characteristics of their memories (e.g., vividness, personal relevance) indicated that dreams were not generally weaker or impoverished. The results are interpreted within the framework for reality monitoring described by Johnson and Raye (1981): Memories for real dreams are proposed to be deficient in conscious cognitive operations that help identify the origin of information generated in a waking state. At the same time, real dreams are embedded in a network of supporting memories that can be drawn on for reality monitoring decisions under appropriate circumstances. Finally, a comparison of recognition and recall indicated that dreams may leave persisting memories that are difficult to access via free recall.     

A New Solution to the Recovered Memory Debate

ABSTRACT— The controversy regarding recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse (CSA) has been characterized by two perspectives. According to one perspective, some people repress their memories of abuse because these experiences have been so emotionally traumatic, and they become capable of recalling the CSA only when it is psychologically safe to do so many years later. According to the other perspective, many reports of recovered memories of sexual abuse are false memories, often inadvertently fostered by therapists. In this article, we provide evidence for a third interpretation that applies to a subset of people reporting recollections of CSA; it does not require the concepts of repression, trauma, or false memory. These people did not experience their CSA as traumatic; they either failed to think about their abuse for years or forgot their previous recollections, and they recalled their CSA spontaneously after encountering reminders outside of psychotherapy. Their recovered memories are corroborated at the same rate as those of people who never forgot their abuse. Hence, recalling CSA after many years is not the same thing as having recalled a previously repressed memory of trauma.     

Vantage point in traumatic memory

Abstract— Persons with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) spontaneously recalled the traumatic event that led to their condition from either a field or an observer vantage point. In the former case, participants recollected the event as if they were seeing it again through their own eyes; in the latter case, the event was recalled from the perspective of a detached spectator. Analysis of the two types of recollections revealed marked differences in their contents. Whereas field memories afforded richer accounts of the affective reactions, somatic sensations, and psychological states that participants experienced during the focal trauma, observer memories contained more information about participants' physical appearance and actions and the spatial layout of the traumatic scene. Observer trauma memories were also experienced as less emotional and anxiety provoking than field trauma memories. The discussion focuses on the clinical implications of these findings and prospects for future research on traumatic memory.     

On the prevalence of directly retrieved autobiographical memories

In this study, we used process measures to understand how people recall autobiographical memories in response to different word cues. In Experiment 1, participants provided verbal protocols when cued by object and emotion words. Participants also reported whether memories had come directly to mind. The self-reports and independent ratings of the verbal protocols indicated that directly recalled memories are much faster and more frequent than generated memories and are more prevalent when cued by objects than emotions. Experiment 2 replicated these results without protocols to eliminate any demand characteristics or output interference associated with the protocol method. In Experiment 3, we obtained converging results using a different method for assessing retrieval strategies by asking participants to assess the amount of information required to retrieve memories. The greater proportion of fast direct retrievals when memories are cued by objects accounts for reaction time differences between object and emotion cues, and not the commonly accepted explanation based on ease of retrieval. We argue for a dual-strategies approach that disputes generation as the canonical form of autobiographical memory retrieval and discuss the implication of these findings for the representation of personal events in autobiographical memory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Past in the present: the way parents remember their own school years relates to the way they participate in their child’s schooling and remember his/her school years

This study set out to explore the contribution of parents’ own school memories to the way they remembered their child’s school years and took part in his/her schooling. The respondents were a group of academically and vocationally educated fathers and mothers (N =  326), who participated in a full 9-year follow-up study of their child’s schooling. The parents’ own school memories were found to direct their recollection of their child’s school years in a selectively and evaluatively consistent way, especially among the fathers and the vocationally educated parents. For example, the parents with negative recollections tended to help their child to prepare for tests more frequently than parents with more positive recollections did. Parental school memories seem to function like a general educational attitude in that they relate widely to the parents’ perceptions and actions concerning their child’s schooling.     

Assessing the effectiveness of warnings and the phenomenological characteristics of false memories

The phenomenology of false memories was investigated in three experiments in which participants heard two experimenters read lists of items that were related to critical nonpresented items. In Experiments 1, following a recognition memory test, participants rated the phenomenological characteristics of their memories immediately and after a 48-hour delay. False recognition was prevalent and on several dimensions participants rated their true memories as more vivid than their false memories. In Experiments 2 and 3, following the study phase, participants were warned about the phenomenological differences between true and false memories and were instructed to use this information to avoid reporting nonpresented items. This type of warning was ineffective at reducing false recall (Experiment 2) and false recognition (Experiment 3) relative to unwarned participants. Importantly, the inability of explicit warnings to impact illusory recollections demonstrates that the false memories cannot be attributed simply to a criterion shift.