Statistical testing and null distributions: what to do when samples are not random.

Selected literature related to statistical testing is reviewed to compare the theoretical models underlying parametric and nonparametric inference. Specifically, we show that these models evaluate different hypotheses, are based on different concepts of probability and resultant null distributions, and support different substantive conclusions. We suggest that cognitive scientists should be aware of both models, thus providing them with a better appreciation of the implications and consequences of their choices among potential methods of analysis. This is especially true when it is recognized that most cognitive science research employs design features that do not justify parametric procedures, but that do support nonparametric methods of analysis, particularly those based on the method of permutation/randomization.     

It's not you,it's them: Social influences on trust propensity and trust dynamics

Scholars agree that trust primarily has two bases: trustworthiness—the extent to which a trustee is competent, honest, and has goodwill toward the trustor—and trust propensity—a stable trait reflecting the trustor's generalized belief that others can be trusted. Due to this trait characterization, the literature has largely reached a consensus that trust propensity is only an important base of trust in the earliest stage of a relationship—before information on trustworthiness has been gathered. Additionally, the trait conceptualization of trust propensity inhibits it from being modeled as an explanatory mechanism. Drawing on accessibility theory, a theory of trait activation, we argue that trust propensity has state‐like characteristics that are “activated” by the daily treatment an employee receives from coworkers. Our model highlights that the social context—predominantly ignored in prior trust research because of its lack of relevance to dyadic perceptions of trustworthiness—can have a substantial impact on dyadic trust. Across two multisource experience sampling methodology studies, we provide evidence that state trust propensity transmits the effects of citizenship and deviance received to trust in a focal coworker, whether that focal coworker is a source of that treatment or not. We also address how general levels of workplace unfairness—a between‐person construct—influence these dynamics. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these within‐person dynamics for fostering trust within organizations.     

The incremental validity of psychological testing and assessment: conceptual, methodological, and statistical issues

There has been insufficient effort in most areas of applied psychology to evaluate incremental validity. To further this kind of validity research, the authors examined applicable research designs, including those to assess the incremental validity of test instruments, of test-informed clinical inferences, and of newly developed measures. The authors also considered key statistical and measurement issues that can influence incremental validity findings, including the entry order of predictor variables, how to interpret the size of a validity increment, and possible artifactual effects in the criteria selected for incremental validity research. The authors concluded by suggesting steps for building a cumulative research base concerning incremental validity and by describing challenges associated with applying nomothetic research findings to individual clinical cases.     

The Prospective and Retrospective Memory Questionnaire: A population-based random sampling study

The Prospective and Retrospective Memory Questionnaire (PRMQ) has been shown to have acceptable reliability and factorial, predictive, and concurrent validity. However, the PRMQ has never been administered to a probability sample survey representative of all ages in adulthood, nor have previous studies controlled for factors that are known to influence metamemory, such as affective status. Here, the PRMQ was applied in a survey adopting a probabilistic three-stage cluster sample representative of the population of São Paulo, Brazil, according to gender, age (20–80 years), and economic status (n=1042). After excluding participants who had conditions that impair memory (depression, anxiety, used psychotropics, and/or had neurological/psychiatric disorders), in the remaining 664 individuals we (a) used confirmatory factor analyses to test competing models of the latent structure of the PRMQ, and (b) studied effects of gender, age, schooling, and economic status on prospective and retrospective memory complaints. The model with the best fit confirmed the same tripartite structure (general memory factor and two orthogonal prospective and retrospective memory factors) previously reported. Women complained more of general memory slips, especially those in the first 5 years after menopause, and there were more complaints of prospective than retrospective memory, except in participants with lower family income.     

On the statistical and theoretical basis of signal detection theory and extensions: Unequal variance, random coefficient, and mixture models

Basic results for conditional means and variances, as well as distributional results, are used to clarify the similarities and differences between various extensions of signal detection theory (SDT). It is shown that a previously presented motivation for the unequal variance SDT model (varying strength) actually leads to a related, yet distinct, model. The distinction has implications for other extensions of SDT, such as models with criteria that vary over trials. It is shown that a mixture extension of SDT is also consistent with unequal variances, but provides a different interpretation of the results; mixture SDT also offers a way to unify results found across several types of studies.     

Potential, propensity, and categorical realism

I argue that categorical realism, contrary to what most believe today, holds for quantum (and indeed for all) objects and substances. The main argument consists of two steps: (i) the recent experimental verification of the AB effect gives strong empirical evidence for taking quantum potentials as physically real (or substantival), which suggests a change of the data upon which any viable interpretation of quantum theory must rely, and (ii) quantum potentials may be consistently taken as the categorical properties of quantum objects so that categorical realism can be restored.     

Random without replacement is not random: Caveat emptor

The vast majority of psychology labs rely on prepackaged software applications (e.g., E-Prime) for the programming of experiments. These programs are often used for stimulus selection, and many use a selection method referred to as random without replacement. We demonstrate how random without replacement deviates from random selection, and we detail selection biases that result. We also demonstrate, in a simple experiment, how these selection biases, if left unchecked, can influence behavior. Recommendations for reducing the impact of these biases on performance when random without replacement is used are discussed.     

Ferenczi's "Teratoma": A Result,not a Process

In Martin Stanton's 1990 monograph Sandor Ferenczi: Reconsidering Active Intervention , one of six exegetical chapters was titled "Teratoma", using Ferenczi's own word for malformations of (psychic) development. Since then, there has been a tendency in the larger Ferenczi literature to use "teratoma" as a metaphor, leading to the creation of many odd readings and contexts for this very specific, medical, anatomic term. When Stanton becomes expansive in viewing the teratoma as a "transitional object" which "negotiates a relationship between the growth of ideal-ego ideas in oneself and the outside 'influence' of inner systems of thought" (p. 176), he is entering the play-space that opened between Ferenczi and Groddeck during the 20s as Ferenczi's relationship with Freud became increasingly constricted. What this misses is that Ferenczi was a physician, as was Groddeck. For all their fanciful explorations of mind and body relatedness, for both Ferenczi and Groddeck there would be a shared background of certain basic terminology. In that medical terminology, "teratoma" refers to variable numbers of primordial germ cells in the embryo, which in the course of development become displaced, sequestered and grotesquely overgrown; they can never become the tissues they were meant to be. Their potential is forever squandered. "Monsters" they may be; "doubles" they may seem; but they are utterly non-viable. In his metaphorical application of the term "teratoma" to the natural history of (psychic) trauma, Ferenczi proposes a biological and psychological isomorphism that is both clinically illuminating and intuitively prophetic of the course of treatment of trauma, which he was discovering. Clinical and literary material are used to explore the gap between the anatomic teratoma and the psychic teratoma.     

Process, not representation: reply to Radvansky (1999).

The size of fan effects is determined by processes at retrieval, not by whether or not information is represented as situations. Evidence contradicts G. A. Radvansky's (1999) claim that time to retrieve information from a situation does not depend on the number of elements in the situation. Moreover, Radvansky's principles for ascribing situational models to experiments appear to be post hoc ways of redescribing the data. On the other hand, the evidence does support the Adaptive Control of Thought--Rational (ACT-R) assumption that participants can adjust their attentional weightings and so produce differential fan effects. Moreover, the ACT-R theory of the fan effect is consistent with many other findings.     

Interpreting Dreams: Joseph, Freud and the Judaic Tradition

This essay focuses upon the biblical texts concerning Joseph, in order to review the moral, cultural, and historical differences in approaches to dreams.     

Interpreting Rawls: An Essay on Audard,Freeman, and Pogge

This review essay on three recent books on John Rawls’s theory of justice, by Catherine Audard, Samuel Freeman, and Thomas Pogge, describes the great boon they offer serious students of Rawls. They form a united front in firmly and definitively rebuffing Robert Nozick’s libertarian critique, Michael Sandel’s communitarian critique, and more generally critiques of “neutralist liberalism,” as well as in affirming the basic unity of Rawls’s position. At a deeper level, however, they diverge, and in ways that, this essay suggests, go astray on subtle questions of interpretation: Freeman overemphasizes reciprocity, Pogge miscasts Rawls as a consequentialist, and Audard exaggerates the Kantian aspect of Rawls’s core, continuing commitment to “doctrinal autonomy.”     

Random utility models with equality: An apparent,but not actual,generalization of random utility models

A probabilistic model for choice, and preference, is introduced that includes (Tversky's) elimination by aspects model, and the random utility model, as special cases. The model is based on a covert sequential elimination process, the element that is finally chosen in a simple choice experiment being the eventual lone survivor of the elimination process. The model leads us to question the usual form of simple choice experiments, in which a subject must (eventually) choose one of the currently available alternatives, and to suggest that a much more realistic experimental design would allow the subject the no-choice option, i.e., he may refuse to accept any of the currently available alternatives.     

A sampling approach to biases in conditional probability judgments: beyond base rate neglect and statistical format

Conditional probability judgments of rare events are often inflated. Early accounts assumed a general deficit in using statistical base rates. More recent approaches predict improvement when problems are presented in frequency format or refer to natural categories. The present theory focuses on sampling processes. Experiment 1 showed that a seeming advantage of frequency over probability formats is due to a confounded factor, the need to mentally transform stimulus samples. An information search paradigm was used in Experiment 2. When sampling by the predictor, the probability to be estimated, p(criterion/predictor), was conserved in the samples and judgments were quite accurate. However, when sampling by the criterion, the low base-rate event was strongly overrepresented, accounting for the entire bias. Judgments were quite sensitive to the sampled data, but failed to take sampling constraints into account, as shown in Experiments 3 and 4.     

神意、理性与权利——一种关于洛克自然法理论的解读

洛克对自然法的性质进行了详细的阐述,得出了自然法具有神意法和理性法双重属性的结论.这种性质界定具有模糊性,而且神意法与理性法在一定程度上是互相冲突的,因此受到后来学者的诟病;但洛克自然法理论中的这种模糊性源自其对于由理性所开启的现代性进程之谨慎态度.尽管洛克在一定程度上似乎更重视理性的作用,但理性也存在诸多问题:自然法是人类理性无法独证的,对于理性的偏执会在认识论上因缺乏根基而显得武断,而且自然法在政治上的应用及其说服力,仅仅依靠理性推演也是不够的.这些考虑最终使洛克走向一种谨慎的平衡策略-自然法既是神意法,也是理性法.此外,洛克还从上帝存在这一基本背景出发,引申出了人类应当服从的三类自然法义务,并从这三类自然法义务中推导出了人类的三大基本权利:生命、财产与自由,近代权利思想实发轫于此.     

Integrity Testing, Personality, and Design: Interpreting the Personnel Reaction Blank

Companies and organizations use integrity tests to screen job applicants, and the fakability of these tests remains a concern. The present study uses two separate designs to analyze the fakability of the Personnel Reaction Blank (PRB) and the personality constructs related to integrity test scores. The results demonstrate that the PRB can be successfully faked. Moreover, a within-participants design resulted in significantly greater faking than the between-participants design. The personality constructs conscientiousness, agreeableness, and neuroticism were significantly correlated with honest scores on the PRB, and there was a significant negative correlation between conscientiousness and magnitude of faking.

Sleep quality, sleep propensity and academic performance

We examined associations between measures of sleep propensity on the Epworth Sleepiness Scale, sleep quality on the Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index and academic performance by GPA and grades in introductory psychology for 414 students. In the total sample, neither sleep propensity nor sleep quality correlated with GPA or introductory psychology grades. However, among students carrying a full course load, those reporting poor sleep quality performed less well on academic measures than those reporting a better quality of sleep. Further research is needed to assess the moderating influence of overall demands of daytime functioning on the association between sleep quality and academic performance.     

Knowledge,safety, and Gettierized lottery cases: Why mere statistical evidence is not a (safe) source of knowledge

The lottery problem is the problem of explaining why mere reflection on the long odds that one will lose the lottery does not yield knowledge that one will lose. More generally, it is the problem of explaining why true beliefs merely formed on the basis of statistical evidence do not amount to knowledge. Some have thought that the lottery problem can be solved by appeal to a violation of the safety principle for knowledge, i.e., the principle that if S knows that p, not easily would S have believed that p without p being the case. Against the standard safety‐based solution, I argue that understanding safe belief as belief that directly covaries with the truth of what is believed in a suitably defined set of possible worlds forces safety theorists to make a series of theoretical choices that ultimately prevent a satisfactory solution to the problem. In this way, I analyze several safety principles that result from such choices—the paper thus gives valuable insights into the nature of safety—and explain why none solves the lottery problem, including their inability to explain away Gettierized lottery cases. On a more positive note, I show that there is a viable solution in terms of safety if we get rid of the unquestioned assumption that safe beliefs directly track the truth. The alternative is a conception of safe belief according to which what safe beliefs directly track is the appropriateness of the circumstances and, indirectly, the truth. The resulting safety principle, I argue, explains why mere statistical evidence is not a safe source of knowledge.