Cognitive Self‐Enhancement as a Duty to Oneself: A Kantian Perspective

Recently some bioethicists and neuroscientists have argued for an imperative of chemical cognitive enhancement. This imperative is usually based on consequentialist grounds. In this paper, the topic of cognitive self‐enhancement is discussed from a Kantian point of view in order to shed new light on the controversial debate. With Kant, it is an imperfect duty to oneself to strive for perfecting one's own natural and moral capacities beyond one's natural condition, but there is no duty to enhance others. A Kantian approach does not directly lead to a duty of chemical cognitive self‐enhancement, but it also does not clearly rule out that this type of enhancement can be an appropriate means to the end of self‐improvement. This paper shows the benefits of a Kantian view, which offers a consistent ideal of self‐perfection and teaches us a lesson about the crucial relevance of the attitude that underlies one's striving for cognitive self‐improvement: the lesson of treating oneself as an end in itself and not as mere means to the end of better output.     

Sacrificing Value

ABSTRACT

When is sacrifice – and particularly self-sacrifice – called for? This question turns out to be difficult to answer, for it tends to arise when values conflict, and hence the answer to it depends on how conflicts of values are to be resolved. If values are constructed, and if there is no single right way to construct them or prioritize them when they conflict, though there are identifiable ways in which the construction of values can go wrong, we may be left in a position of ambivalence about what should be sacrificed. In cases of conflict in which self-sacrifice is one of the options, ambivalence may be particularly appropriate. In part this is because there may be in such cases special sources of plurality and incommensurability of values, because the conflict is likely to be between something that is valued by a social group, and something that is valued particularly by an individual who has to consider self-sacrificing. And in part it is because individuals may have trouble balancing self-regarding and other-regarding concerns in the process of value construction. This paper elaborates these complications, and presents cases in which we might suspect that someone has self-sacrificed too much or too little.     

Seven Paths of the Hero in Lord of the Rings: The Path of Transcendence

Frodo's path transcends that of any other hero in literature. He is seemingly the least, always aware of his own fears, his own limitations, yet he accomplishes more than any of the apparently greater figures such as Elves and Dwarves, Kings and Wizards. When the great quest is complete, and everyone is satisfied at the accomplishment, Frodo alone knows no peace, for he can never again be whole. The Lord of the Rings is wise enough to recognize that there can be no happy ending for Frodo. Like Hamlet, Frodo can find no peace on earth. He has been too damaged in the process and has passed beyond all the normal hopes and desires of our world. At the end he is left to journey away with the Elves to a world that will undoubtedly fit him no better than this one. Beyond that, we presume he must find some new answer unique to Frodo, some way to transcend the limitations of life, as must each of us.     

Defending Double Effect

According to the doctrine of double effect(DDE), there is a morally significantdifference between harm that is intended andharm that is merely foreseen and not intended.It is not difficult to explain why it is bad tointend harm as an end (you have a ``badattitude' toward that harm) but it is hard toexplain why it is bad to intend harm as a meansto some good end. If you intend harm as a meansto some good end, you need not have a ``badattitude' toward it. I distinguish two ways inwhich you can treat something that is yourchosen means to your ends. You can pursue yourends directly, and treat X as a mere means thatyou pursue for the sake of your end. Or you canpursue your ends indirectly, and treat X as a``plan-relative end' that you pursue for its ownsake. I argue that much of the time we pursueour ends indirectly, and treat our means asplan-relative ends. There are significantanalogies between intending harm as an end, andintending harm as a plan-relative end. So,under certain circumstances, it is morallyworse to intend harm as a means or an end thanto foresee bringing about the same amount of harm.     

The Limits of Principlism and Recourse to Theory: The Example of Telecare

Principlism is the approach promoted by Beauchamp and Childress for addressing the ethics of medical practice. Instead of evaluating clinical decisions by means of full-scale theories from moral philosophy, Beauchamp and Childress refer people to four principles—of autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. Now it is one thing for principlism to be invoked in an academic literature dwelling on a stock topic of medical ethical writing: end-of-life decisions, for example. It is another when the topic lies further from the mainstream. In such cases the cost of reaching for the familiar Beauchamp and Childress framework, with its formulaic set of concerns, may be to miss something morally important. After discussing an example of the sort of academic literature I have in mind, I propose to distinguish the uses of the formulaic from the uses of the more unapologetically theoretical in applied ethics, and to suggest that the latter can make up for some of the limitations of the former. This is not to say that the more theoretical literature has no limitations of its own, or that it should take the place of the formulaic. On the contrary, there is room in applied ethics and a use in applied ethics for both. But there is a sense in which there is a greater dependence of principlism on theory than the other way round, and at the end I try to spell out the significance of this fact.     

The Virtue of Epistemological Dualism

The article tries to answer the following question: what is the most promising epistemological strategy if my objective is the construction of a theory which gives me the opportunity to decrease the risk of getting to what is actually absolute, that is, to irreversible negative actions (irreversible as a theory might not be, but as an action often is)? The answer proposed is a form of epistemological dualism which means that I metaphysically believe (that is, I programmatically and systematically believe, without certainly knowing it) that the epistemological relationship between any theory and any reality is dualistic. More specifically, I metaphysically believe that the epistemological relationship between any theory and any reality is not saturated: in any theory there is an ideal error, because there is no theory which is totally saturated by reality, and any reality can actualize the ideal error, because there is no reality which is totally saturated by theory.     

On the Edge: Exploring the End of the Analytic Hour

The final moments of the analytic hour are a repetitive reenactment whose symbolic meaning can be both a challenge and an opportunity. Each member of the analytic dyad is vulnerable to the revival of deprivation and loss that is introduced by the end of the hour, and each will handle the experience in a unique way. When this cocreated moment occurs in the absence of awareness, there can be avoidance and enactment. When it occurs in the context of shared understanding, the analytic pair is free to intensify, play with, and confront the limitations and inevitabilities of life that are revived again and again when we approach and reach the end. Integrating theoretical perspectives on mourning, attachment, and self-states, along with clinical vignettes, the paper will show how existential questions are present in many of our analytic encounters. As we help our clients negotiate this moment, we too may acknowledge aspects of ourselves that can intensify our awareness, and facilitate our therapeutic effectiveness. Our capacity to explore this important edge of analytic space with our patients can help them to live and to love and can enrich our work if we can be open to its multifaceted meaning.     

Attention & Inscrutability: A Commentary on John Campbell, Reference and Consciousness for the Pacific APA Meeting, Pasadena, California, 2004

We assemble here in this time and place to discuss the thesis that conscious attention can provide knowledge of reference of perceptual demonstratives. I shall focus my commentary on what this claim means, and on the main argument for it found in the first five chapters of Reference and Consciousness. The middle term of that argument is an account of what attention does: what its job or function is. There is much that is admirable in this account, and I am confident that it will be the foundation, the launching-pad, for much future work on the subject. But in the end I will argue that Campbell’s picture makes the mechanisms of attention too smart: smarter than they are, smarter than they could be. If we come to a more realistic appraisal of the skills and capacities of our sub-personal minions, the “knowledge of reference” which they yield will have to be taken down a notch or two.     

The vascular cerebellopontile angle syndrome]

A cerebellopontine angle tumor cannot be reliably diagnosed from a classical clinicotopographic cerebellopontine angle syndrome. There is also a vascular cerebellopontine angle syndrome which is not too rare an occurrence. In some cases of tumorigenesis, where there is no papilledema and no characteristic increase in total liqour protein, it is not possible to make a clear decision between tumorous growth and vascular syndrome. The extension of the internal auditory meatus cannot be considered to be a symptom clearly indicating the presence of a tumor.     

Who’s Afraid of a Final End? The Role of Practical Rationality in Contemporary Accounts of Virtue

In this paper I argue that excising a final end from accounts of virtue does them more harm than good. I attempt to establish that the justification of contemporary virtue ethics suffers if moved this one step too far from the resources in traditional accounts. This is because virtue, as we tend to describe it, rests on an account of practical rationality wherein the role of the final end is integral. I highlight the puzzles that are generated by the ellipsis that is “the role of a final end” in contemporary theories of virtue. The authors of these theories devise ad hoc solutions for these puzzles, puzzles that do not exist for traditional final end-based accounts. Recent critics of virtue ethics have certainly not been satisfied the explanations being offer in lieu of references to a final end. As a remedy, I recommend that the role of a final end be reintroduced in contemporary virtue ethics. I hope to explain that there is nothing to be frightened of and much to be gained.     

Unity versus multiplicity: a conceptual analysis of the term "self" and its use in personality theories

There is no single answer to the unity-multiplicity problem regarding the self for the simple reason that the term "self" is used by too many different theorists in too many different ways. In fact, there are several important substantive topic areas that need to be distinguished and studied scientifically. The topic areas I examine in this article are reflexivity, unit coherence, agency, and subjectivity. Each of these areas will be evaluated in terms of what it contributes to, and can be interpreted in terms of, the unity-multiplicity issue. It is proposed that we need a more differentiated technical vocabulary if we are to better understand the phenomena we are examining. Matching our technical vocabulary to this empirical detail sharpens the questions being asked and places the empirical facts in better focus. A more elaborate framework of conceptual differentiation provides a better basis for developing an integrated theory.     

Toward an Ecological Theory of the Norms of Practical Deliberation

Abstract: Practical deliberation is deliberation concerning what to do governed by norms on intention (e.g. means‐end coherence and consistency), which are taken to be a mark of rational deliberation. According to the theory of practical deliberation I develop in this paper we should think of the norms of rational practical deliberation ecologically: that is, the norms that constitute rational practical deliberation depend on the complex interaction between the psychological capacities of the agent in question and the agent's environment. I argue that this view does a better job of justifying particular norms for practical deliberation than intrinsic or constitutivist theories. Finally, I argue against the Myth Theory of deliberation, which takes there to be no such norms on deliberation.     

On testing the equality of proportions in the paired case with incomplete data

The problem of testing two correlated proportions with incomplete data is considered by means of Monte Carlo simulations studies. A test proposed in this paper, which can be regarded as a generalization of McNemar's test, is recommended in all cases with incomplete data and not too small samples.     

论虚概念

把外延理解为“具有概念所反映的特有属性的客观事物(或类)”,导致“虚概念没有外延”或“有外延但是空类”此类有问题的结论,应该理解为由概念(思维)中的对象组成;而把虚概念理解为“所指称的对象不存在于客观世界的概念”,又导致把理想模型等科学概念当成虚概念,实际上,对象有虚实,属性也有虚实。实对象、实属性,是无异议的实概念;虚对象、实属性,也是实概念,如思维科学中的概念;实对象、虚属性,是虚概念,如“地心说”中的概念;虚对象、虚属性,是公认的虚概念,如鬼魂。可见,无论对象虚实,只要所指称的对象的主要特征所反映的属性是非客观的概念就是虚概念。     

Syed Ameer Ali: A bridge‐builder?

This paper examines whether there is any truth in the contention that Syed Ameer Ali (to adopt the English formulation of his name that he himself used) was an effective interpreter of Islam between East and West. To that end, it examines his background and early life, his credibility as an interpreter of Islam to the British élite and as a Muslim interpreter of Christianity. It concludes that he was far more at home in Western intellectual assumptions of his day than in Islamic scholarship and was not the effective interpreter he aspired to be. This raises on‐going questions about whether there is any future for Islamic modernism or whether it is too tainted by association with imperialism and other Western phenomena.     

Intelligibility and conflict resolution in the lifeworld

This paper examines the role of Habermas's concept of the lifeworld in processes of reaching mutual understanding. This concept is shown to be ultimately too amorphous to bear the theoretical weight Habermas places on it. He conceives the lifeworld both as diffuse and holistic, yet also as structured; as a set of taken-for-granted and counterfactual presuppositions, yet also as a kind of knowledge. In the end, he presupposes what the lifeworld is supposed to explain: mutual intelligibility of subjects in interaction. These conceptual tensions affect the explanatory power of the lifeworld and the usefulness of the theory of communicative action for conflict resolution. Where conflict resolution is aimed at mediating radical disagreements with minimal concord between parties, presuming consensus may not be possible or optimal. The present analysis argues for the need to develop other means of establishing a sufficient level of background consensus against which communicative action can take place.     

Probabilizing the end

Reasons transmit. If one has a reason to attain an end, then one has a reason to effect means for that end: reasons are transmitted from end to means. I argue that the likelihood ratio (LR) is a compelling measure of reason transmission from ends to means. The LR measure is superior to other measures, can be used to construct a condition specifying precisely when reasons transmit, and satisfies intuitions regarding end-means reason transmission in a broad array of cases.     

R?ume der Gewalt

Violence is everywhere, just as love and the need for sexual satisfaction are omnipresent, nowadays just as it was 1,000 years ago. However, one is taken for granted as a part of fundamental human behavior and needs no explanation, while violence is considered an anomaly which should disappear from our lives. People who live in peace are irritated when they hear of massacres and violent acts which do not occur in their world. They cannot believe that people kill, abuse and sexually assault each other for no apparent reason and that some actually gain pleasure from this. Then the belief that violence is abnormal behavior under any circumstances helps them to imagine its reality as a space in which argumentation triumphs over fists. Humans, however, will not be what they are: they have always been complete. Violence is a human capability: that was always so and everywhere. It is a resource for action which is not only available for everybody but can also be used by everyone. Even the smallest can achieve an increase in power and gain respect by the use of the fists. The source of violence lies in the fundamentals of the powers of imagination. All atrocities can be imagined and what has once become engraved in the memory can never be removed. When one has understood what violence does to man and what man does with violence, it can no longer only be comprehended as an expression of ideas, intentions and programs, as a deviation which can be redressed by moral persuasion but as a consequence of an unlocking of safety measures which protect people from killing and injuring each other. Even in the future violence will be part of our lives. The belief in the healing powers of civilization is nothing more than romantic idealism. It always concerns only situations and people. Undoubtedly a depressing outlook but when one has comprehended that violence is an integral part of life, measures can also be taken to enclose it. Violence is an experience which creates order because death means the end of everything. For dreamers who crave eternal peace, this recognition is depressing but for realists it is a comfort.     

Can desires determine ends?

According to a common view of human agency, desires determine at least some of the ends that agents set for themselves. In this paper, I argue that this view is false. I show that without reason’s ability to determine the means to an end it is impossible to determine ends. Furthermore, even when an end is determined in light of a desire, only reason can make sense of the distinction between an end and merely a means to that end. In fact, in many cases the end which is determined in light of desires is to remove these desires, rather than to “serve and obey” them. Hence, reason is necessary for determining our ends, and thus explaining the teleological aspect of agency.