Sources of the discontinuity effect: Playing against a group versus being in a group

Intergroup relations tend to be more competitive than relations between individuals. This difference, called the “discontinuity effect,” has been demonstrated under a wide variety of conditions. Two separate explanations for the discontinuity effect were explored in our research. The first explanation is that something about playing against a group leads people to compete. The second explanation is that something about being in a group leads people to compete. The results supported both explanations, although the evidence more strongly favored the effect of being in a group. Distrust mediated both effects.     

Reduction of interindividual-intergroup discontinuity: the role of leader accountability and proneness to guilt

Two experiments contrasted interactions between group leaders with interactions between individuals in a mixed-motive setting. Consistent with the idea that being accountable to the in-group implies normative pressure to benefit the in-group, Experiment 1 found that accountable leaders were more competitive than individuals. Consistent with the idea that being unaccountable to the in-group implies normative pressure to be cooperative and that high guilt proneness provides motivation to be moral, Experiment 2 found that when guilt proneness was high, unaccountable leaders were less competitive than accountable leaders and did not differ significantly from individuals. In other words, the robust interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect was eliminated when groups had unaccountable leaders who were high in guilt proneness.     

A comparison of human aggression committed by groups and individuals: An interindividual-intergroup discontinuity

Experimental research comparing aggressive behavior committed by groups and individuals is important but sparse. This experiment compared aggressive behavior (i.e., amount of hot sauce allocated for others to consume) in four types of interactions: intergroup, interindividual, group-to-individual, and individual-to-group. The results revealed that intergroup interactions were significantly more aggressive than interindividual interactions. In addition, groups allocated and received significantly more hot sauce than individuals. These effects were not explained by diffusion of responsibility or trait aggressiveness. The experiment reveals two noteworthy conclusions: (1) the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect extends to aggressive behavior and (2) interactions in which a group is either the source or target of aggression are situational influences that can increase it.     

How to share a mind: Reconsidering the group mind thesis

Standard accounts in social ontology and the group cognition debate have typically focused on how collective modes, types, and contents of intentions or representational states must be construed so as to constitute the jointness of the respective agents, cognizers, and their engagements. However, if we take intentions, beliefs, or mental representations all to instantiate some mental properties, then the more basic issue regarding such collective engagements is what it is for groups of individual minds to share a mind. Somewhat surprisingly, this very issue has not received much attention in the respective debates and when it has, typically the outlook has been skeptical or outright negative. In this paper, I argue that it is epistemologically possible for a group of individuals to literally share a single mental unit. In particular, I will put forward and defend what I shall call the zombie conception of group minds.     

Beyond pluralism: psychoanalysis and the workings of mind

Subjects that Freud excluded or incompletely explored have been sites of theoretical expansion in over a century of observation: the role of the other, the self, the preoedipal period, action, the countertransference, limits to neutrality/anonymity/abstinence, the loci of the analytic drama, effects beyond interpretation, agency, and basic needs (versus wishes). These developments have led to conflicting theories and sect-like groupings within the field. Group psychological processes underlying this are discussed; and a broad and inclusive view of psychoanalysis is proposed under the heading of the study of the workings of mind. Additionally, substantial integrative proposals are offered with respect to the central tasks of individual development, theories of mind, the relational turn, and aspects of technique.     

The group-member mind trade-off: attributing mind to groups versus group members

People attribute minds to other individuals and make inferences about those individuals' mental states to explain and predict their behavior. Little is known, however, about whether people also attribute minds to groups and believe that collectives, companies, and corporations can think, have intentions, and make plans. Even less is known about the consequences of these attributions for both groups and group members. We investigated the attribution of mind and responsibility to groups and group members, and we demonstrated that people make a trade-off: The more a group is attributed a group mind, the less members of that group are attributed individual minds. Groups that are judged to have more group mind are also judged to be more cohesive and responsible for their collective actions. These findings have important implications for how people perceive the minds of groups and group members, and for how attributions of mind influence attributions of responsibility to groups and group members.     

Theory of mind tasks and executive functions: A systematic review of group studies in neurology

A growing number of studies have been addressing the relationship between theory of mind (TOM) and executive functions (EF) in patients with acquired neurological pathology. In order to provide a global overview on the main findings, we conducted a systematic review on group studies where we aimed to (1) evaluate the patterns of impaired and preserved abilities of both TOM and EF in groups of patients with acquired neurological pathology and (2) investigate the existence of particular relations between different EF domains and TOM tasks. The search was conducted in Pubmed/Medline. A total of 24 articles met the inclusion criteria. We considered for analysis classical clinically accepted TOM tasks (first‐ and second‐order false belief stories, the Faux Pas test, Happe's stories, the Mind in the Eyes task, and Cartoon's tasks) and EF domains (updating, shifting, inhibition, and access). The review suggests that (1) EF and TOM appear tightly associated. However, the few dissociations observed suggest they cannot be reduced to a single function; (2) no executive subprocess could be specifically associated with TOM performances; (3) the first‐order false belief task and the Happe's story task seem to be less sensitive to neurological pathologies and less associated to EF. Even though the analysis of the reviewed studies demonstrates a close relationship between TOM and EF in patients with acquired neurological pathology, the nature of this relationship must be further investigated. Studies investigating ecological consequences of TOM and EF deficits, and intervention researches may bring further contributions to this question.     

Individual versus group discontinuity: The role of intergroup contact

Following earlier demonstrations of more competitiveness between groups than between individuals in the context of a PDG matrix, two additional conditions were studied. These were a group-all condition in which the intergroup contact involved all the members in both groups (rather than just representatives as in the previously studied group-representative condition), and an interdependence condition in which physically separated individuals shared their winnings with the other subjects on the same side of the suite of rooms (rather than neither giving winnings to nor receiving winnings from other such subjects as in the previously studied individuals condition). The results indicated that there was a large overall tendency for the group-representative and group-all conditions to be more competitive than the individuals and interdependence conditions, that the group-representative condition was more competitive than the group-all condition, and that the interdependence condition and individuals condition did not differ. The difference between the group-representative and group-all condition was interpreted as consistent with a prediction that intergroup contact can reduce competitiveness even when there is conflict and the absence of norms requiring cooperative behavior. The lack of difference between the interdependence condition and the individuals condition was interpreted as inconsistent with an altruisticrationalization hypothesis according to which group members rationalize their competitiveness toward the other group as being enacted for the sake of fellow group members.     

Countertransference and the group therapist's state of mind

In this paper countertransference is discussed as an interference in the psychotherapists' state of mind. For the group psychotherapist the interferences have multiple origins. Oscillating demands for closeness to the group or distance from patients are indicators of complex dynamics. Inherent in group psychotherapy is the requirement of multiple identification with objects covering a developmental range for the therapist. A schematic model for the therapist's state-of-mind is offered in the hope that there can be greater clarity when countertransference is discussed.Paper presented at EGPS annual conference, Nov. 1, 1980.     

Interindividual‐intergroup discontinuity as a joint function of acting as a group and interacting with a group

An experiment assessed the prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) choices of a set of three persons who interacted with another supposed set of three persons. There were four conditions: (1) group‐on‐group (both three‐person sets constrained by a majority vote), (2) group‐on‐one (only own three‐person set constrained by a majority vote), (3) one‐on‐group (only other three‐person set constrained by a majority vote), (4) one‐on‐one (neither three‐person set constrained by a majority vote). The four conditions were compared with three orthogonal contrasts. Consistent with the assumption that interindividual interactions are less competitive than interactions involving groups, the first contrast indicated that there were fewer competitive choices in the one‐on‐one condition than in the other three conditions pooled. Consistent with the assumption that competitiveness can flow either from acting as a group or interacting with a group, the second contrast found no significant difference between the group‐on‐one and one‐on‐group conditions. Finally, consistent with the assumption that the interindividual‐intergroup discontinuity effect is a joint function of acting as a group and interacting with a group, the third contrast revealed that there were more competitive choices in the group‐on‐group condition than in the one‐on‐group and group‐on‐one conditions pooled. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Lost in the crowd: Entitative group membership reduces mind attribution

This research examined how and why group membership diminishes the attribution of mind to individuals. We found that mind attribution was inversely related to the size of the group to which an individual belonged (Experiment 1). Mind attribution was affected by group membership rather than the total number of entities perceived at once (Experiment 2). Moreover, mind attribution to an individual varied with the perception that the individual was a group member. Participants attributed more mind to an individual that appeared distinct or distant from other group members than to an individual that was perceived to be similar or proximal to a cohesive group (Experiments 3 and 4). This effect occurred for both human and nonhuman targets, and was driven by the perception of the target as an entitative group member rather than by the knowledge that the target was an entitative group member (Experiment 5).     

Effects of situational aggression cues: a quantitative review

Meta-analytic procedures were used to assess the degree to which aggression-related cues present in the environment facilitate aggressive responding among negatively aroused subjects. The first study, which examined the so-called weapons effect, the effect of name-mediated cues, and other cue effects, showed clear evidence that aggression cues augment aggressive responses in negatively aroused subjects. This was true for the overall analysis and for name-mediated cues, but confirmation of the weapons effect was restricted to cases wherein subject sophistication and evaluation apprehension were low. A second study used partial correlation analysis to assess independently the effects of seven potential mediators of aggression cue effects. Of these, target-based facilitation and harm capacity of the aggressive response were found to mediate the magnitude of cue-facilitated aggression. A third study showed that these mediators augmented cue effects among neutral as well as negatively aroused subjects. These outcomes are interpreted as emphasizing the role of cognitive factors in the expression of both impulsive and nonimpulsive aggression.