Competition, superstition and the illusion of control

The effects of reinforcement schedule and competition on generating superstitious behaviors and beliefs were examined in 72 people. Superstition was induced by having participants respond to turn on a tone under a concurrent 2—lever Variable Interval (VI) Extinction (EXT) schedule. During the session, stimulus lights would occasionally be illuminated, although they did not signal any change in contingency. Attributing importance to the inactive lever, a pattern of switching between levers, or to the illumination of the lights were considered to be superstitious beliefs. Participants were either run alone or in pairs, and manipulation of the reinforcement schedule resulted in groups which were matched in probability of reinforcement, as well as in groups which were mismatched. Reinforcement schedule (VI 30” versus VI 60”) and competitive situation did not affect degree of superstitious belief, except when people were placed in a “winning” condition. However, Superstition was associated with participants’ belief in improved future performance and with participants’ perceived skill relative to their opponents. Results are discussed in terms of relationships between superstition, the illusion of control, and self-efficacy. Differences between experimentally-induced and commonly held superstitions are also discussed.     

Vitalism,purpose and superstition

Developmental studies have shown that children assign purpose to objects more liberally than adults, and that they explain biological processes in terms of vitalistic causality. This study tested the hypothesis that similar misconceptions can be found among superstitious adults. The results from 116 superstitious and 123 sceptical individuals showed that more than sceptics, superstitious individuals attributed purpose to objects, and explained biological processes in terms of organ intentionality and energy transmission. In addition, they thought of energy as a vital force, attributing life and mental properties to it. These conceptual confusions were positively associated to all types of superstitions as well as belief in alternative medicine. The results support the argument that category mistakes and ontological confusions underlie superstitious and vitalistic thinking.     

Control orientation and the illusion of control

Tested the hypothesis that individuals with an external locus of control are sensitive to the occurrence of noncontingency and will not display the illusion of control. Internals, who view outcomes as response dependent, should succumb to the illusion. One hundred thirty-eight students were asked to judge the amount of control they had over the onset of a noncontingent green light in one of two conditions: 25% green light onset and 75% green light onset. Both internals and externals demonstrated the illusion of control: they rated themselves as having more control when they received a green light on 75% of the trials, despite the fact that green light onset was response independent. These findings suggest that externals are doubly impaired. Their bias toward perceived response-outcome independence is given up when it would be most helpful, that is, when environmental cues suggest control in an objectively uncontrollable situation.     

Keeping the illusion of control under control: Ceilings, floors, and imperfect calibration

Prior research has claimed that people exaggerate probabilities of success by overestimating personal control in situations that are heavily or completely chance-determined. We examine whether such overestimation of control persists in situations where people do have control. Our results suggest a simple model that accounts for prior findings on illusory control as well as for situations where actual control is high: People make imperfect estimates of their level of control. By focusing on situations marked by low control, prior research has created the illusion that people generally overestimate their level of control. Across three studies, we show that when they have a great deal of control, people under-estimate it. Implications for research on perceived control and co-variation assessment are discussed.     

Marking, memory and superstition in the pigeon

Learning is generally poor if reinforcement is delayed, but it improves substantially if a brief stimulus is presented immediately after the response to be learned. The marking hypothesis suggests that the unexpected stimulus triggers a backward memory search, which effectively marks the preceding response in memory, making it more likely that it will be recalled when food is presented. In the present study, pigeons were occasionally reinforced after a 10-sec delay for pecking a split key. Reinforcement was presented regardless of which side was pecked, but for one group a marker followed a peck to the left half of the key during the delay preceding food, and for the other group a peck to the right. On non food trials these contingencies were reversed. Subjects developed a significant preference for the side marked on food trials, despite the absence of any contingency between responding to this side and food. In addition to providing further support for the marking hypothesis, these results favour theories of reinforcement emphasizing contiguity rather than contingency. Contiguity, however, needs to be interpreted within a memory framework. What is crucial is the contiguity of events within working memory, rather than in the real world.     

The illusion of control,superstitious belief,and optimism

Two hundred and seventy five participants each filled out three questionnaires examining the illusion of control, optimism/pessimism, and paranormal belief. The illusion of control was related to overall paranormal belief, an effect primarily due to the superstition and precognition sub-scales on the PBS-R. Optimism was positively and pessimism negatively related to religiosity on the PBS-R, and pessimism was also positively related to the superstition sub-scale. No relationships between optimism or pessimism and the illusion of control were observed. Results are discussed in terms of superstition and the illusion of control both arising from circumstances that are inherently random or uncontrollable, and how multiple definitions of optimism or superstition could have effected the results.     

The illusion of control, superstitious belief, and optimism

Two hundred and seventy five participants each filled out three questionnaires examining the illusion of control, optimism/pessimism, and paranormal belief. The illusion of control was related to overall paranormal belief, an effect primarily due to the superstition and precognition sub-scales on the PBS-R. Optimism was positively and pessimism negatively related to religiosity on the PBS-R, and pessimism was also positively related to the superstition sub-scale. No relationships between optimism or pessimism and the illusion of control were observed. Results are discussed in terms of superstition and the illusion of control both arising from circumstances that are inherently random or uncontrollable, and how multiple definitions of optimism or superstition could have effected the results.     

Skill-set,success outcome,and mania as determinants of the illusion of control

The illusion of control, the tendency for individuals to approach chance tasks with skill-appropriate strategies, was studied. Subjects premeasured on a mania scale were classified as either high (HM) or low (LM) in mania. In the first phase of the study, HM and LM subjects performed 30 trials on either a skill (verbal associates) or chance (coin-toss) task and were given either 20, 50, or 80% success feedback. After Task 1 was completed, subjects filled out an attribution questionnaire. In the final phase of the study, subjects anticipated 30 more trials either on a skill or chance task. Subjects' predicted successes were measured. It was hypothesized that predicted successes on anticipated skill and chance tasks would be affected more by outcomes on a previous skill task than by outcomes on a previous chance task. The results for the anticipated skill task directly supported the hypothesis. On the anticipated chance task, the hypothesis was confirmed for HM subjects only. The results are discussed in terms of how previous skill experiences may induce a set to control ungovernable situations for individuals with manic reactions.     

The Type A behaviour pattern,induced mood,and the illusion of control

This study investigated the hypothesis that mood moderates the illusion of control among Type As and Bs. A facial positioning procedure was used to induce either positive, negative, or neutral moods in Type As and Bs during a control judgment task where no objective control was possible. Type Bs induced to experience a positive mood perceived greater control than did Type Bs experiencing a negative mood. There was no effect of induced mood on judged control for Type As.     

控制幻觉与人格、动机关系研究

目的本研究考察了人格、动机强弱分别与心理控制幻觉之间的关系。方法采用被试内实验设计的方法,用艾森克人格问卷进行测量。结果与结论动机水平的高低与控制幻觉的形成之间存在明确的关系,即前后动机水平的发生变化,信心分差异显著(t=-3.1,p=0.006<0.05),动机越强则产生控制幻觉的倾向性越大;人格中的外倾性,精神质与心理控制幻觉的产生存在显著的正相关(r=0.766,P<0.01;r=0.827,P<0.01);外倾性这一心理特质对控制幻觉的产生有较强的预测作用。     

迷信的悖论

小时年年腊月二十三用麦芽糖给灶王爷上供,奶奶祷告曰:“上天言好事、下界保平安”,用糖瓜把灶王爷嘴粘上,让他说不了坏话,但是我很小即知道,把嘴粘上,不是连好话也不能说了吗?用个糖瓜就把嘴粘上的神,还能有什么灵性和效力吗?可中国人一信就一千年!算命者有推流年一说,从1岁推到60岁,当他煞有介事地推算时,就相信有个神把全世界60亿人每个人的生活都纳入电脑程序中,于是人就成了神的符号,所以算命者即是信神者,能王林/图有这样的神吗?当丛福奎、徐炳松、李真贪污大量人民血汗钱时,他们自己也知道在干着坏事,为了使坏事不暴露,他们向神祷告,…     

Special random numbers: Beyond the illusion of control

Previous research has shown that gamblers prefer numbers they choose themselves because this choice allows them to feel more in control of the (random) outcome. We identify other conditions under which people find numbers “special” (i.e., worthy of betting more on than other numbers). By manipulating gambling task type and assigning participants a number by an endogenous system outside their own control (as is done in numerology, astrology, and other paranormal systems), we find that indeed people prefer to bet on numbers derived from particular special systems. The mechanism underlying this preference is enjoyment with the task—not control. Further, the enjoyment associated with this “specialness” is related to the prevalence of certain types of numbers (i.e., numbers based on dates and names) in the fortune-telling world and not to other factors such as individuality or even belief in the associated system. We replicate these findings using actual money and show that this prevalence-to-enjoyment link already exists in memory for dates and names and is activated and strengthened by priming the fortune-telling systems relevant to those special random numbers. Finally, we present a model of special random numbers that integrates our findings with other determinants of valuation such as regret and subjective probability. Our results expand the realm of special random numbers beyond control. Our enjoyment model has implications not only for understanding gambling, but also for understanding how reasoning under uncertainty is influenced by little-understood phenomena (such as fortune-telling systems) without affecting subjective probability or actual beliefs.     

Avoidance,induction, and the illusion of reinforcement

Environmental events that impact reproductive success may be called phylogenetically important events (PIEs). Some promote reproductive success, like mates and food; others threaten reproductive success, like predators and injury. Beneficial PIEs induce activities that enhance them, and detrimental PIEs induce activities that mitigate or avoid them. Free-operant avoidance relies on electric shock as a proxy for injury, a PIE. One theory takes avoidance behavior to be reinforced by its reducing shock rate. A more complete explanation is that avoidance both reduces shock rate and is induced by the PIEs it usually prevents. Shocks received act in concert with shock-rate reduction, in a feedback system. Four parametric data sets were analyzed to show that avoidance is induced by received shock rate according to power functions. Avoidance is not reinforced at all; avoidance is induced by its failures. Induction explains not only avoidance itself, but also phenomena unique to avoidance, like warmup and effects of unavoidable shock. Induction explains behavior more generally than reinforcement, because induction explains not only food-maintained operant and nonoperant behavior, but also shock-maintained behavior, including avoidance. Reinforcement fails to explain behavior when reinforcement is defined as strengthening by consequences. Induction erases the distinction between consequences and antecedents.     

The effects of desire for control and extrinsic rewards on the illusion of control and gambling

The role of individual differences in the desire to control events in an illusion of control situation was examined. Subjects high and low in the desire for control played several trials of a gambling game under conditions either facilitating or not facilitating the perception that the subject had control over the outcome of the game. Half of the subjects were allowed to trade their winnings in on prizes at the end of the experiment. The other half played the game without extrinsic incentives. It was found that high desire-for-control subjects were more susceptible to the illusion of control, but only when the winnings could be traded in on prizes. Desire for control level and illusion of control manipulations did not appear to affect betting behavior in the absence of extrinsic rewards.     

Shattering the illusion of control: Multi-shot versus single-shot gambles

The illusion of control refers to a phenomenon whereby people believe their chances of success at a task are greater than would be warranted by objective analysis. This article raises two questions. First, how robust is the illusion of control? Second, how might the illusion be ‘shattered?’ Previous experimental demonstrations involved situations that can be likened to unique or single-shot gambles. If, however, the phenomenon is robust, it should occur in repeated or multi-shot gambles in which the outcome depends on a series of gambles involving the same underlying random process. It should also appear in single-shot gambles that are framed so as to superficially resemble multi-shot gambles. We label this the strong illusion of control hypothesis. On the other hand, because people have a better appreciation of probabilistic concepts in tasks they are able to represent as relative frequencies, the introduction of a multi-shot or ‘pseudo-multi-shot’ context might cue people to the random nature of the task, thereby shattering the illusion. The weak illusion of control hypothesis holds that the illusion of control will occur in single-shot but not in multi-shot or pseudo-multi-shot gambles. Two studies are reported that support the weak hypothesis. Alternative explanations are considered and implications are discussed.     

Perception,illusion, and hallucination

Patrick Suppes' set-theoretical approach to the analysis of theories, and Joseph D. Sneed's metatheory are briefly outlined. The notions of observation, illusion and hallucination are reconstructed according to these approaches. It is argued that the terms ‘perception’ and ‘truth’ are theoretical with respect to observation but nontheoretical with respect to illusion and hallucination. Hallucination is construed as a special kind of illusion.     

What is the appropriate control for the tilt illusion?

Recently it has been suggested that when tilt illusions are measured by parallel matching to the test arm of an acute angle, the usual control condition involving a match to the test arm in the absence of the inducing arm is inappropriate. According to Hotopf et al this is so because the pretest contains a second, depth-based illusory effect which is not contained in the test conditions. Whereas Hotopf et al gave indirect evidence for this claim, direct evidence is presented here for their assertion. The results suggest that there is no single stimulus configuration which could serve as a pretest control for all tilt illusion stimuli. Rather, the condition in which the test and inducing lines intersect at 90 degrees probably is the appropriate control for all other inducing-test-line angle displays.