Six-month-olds’ ability to use linguistic cues when interpreting others’ pointing actions

The present research investigated whether six-month-olds who rarely produce pointing actions can detect the object-directedness and communicative function of others’ pointing actions when linguistic information is provided. In Experiment 1, infants were randomly assigned to either a novel-word or emotional-vocalization condition. They were first familiarized with an event in which an actor uttered either a novel label (novel-word condition) or exclamatory expression (emotional-vocalization condition) and then pointed to one of two objects. Next, the positions of the objects were switched. During test trials, each infant watched the new-referent event where the actor pointed to the object to which the actor had not pointed before or the old-referent event where the actor pointed to the old object in its new location. Infants in the novel-word condition looked reliably longer at the new-referent event than at the old-referent event, suggesting that they encoded the object-directedness of the actor’s point. In contrast, infants in the emotional-vocalization condition showed roughly equal looking times to the two events. To further examine infants’ understanding of the communicative aspect of an actor’s point using a different communicative context, Experiment 2 used an identical procedure to the novel-word condition in Experiment 1, except there was only one object present during the familiarization trials. When the familiarization trials did not include a contrasting object, we found that the communicative intention of the actor’s point could be ambiguous. The infants showed roughly equal looking times during the two test events. The current research suggests that six-month-olds understand the object-directedness and communicative intention of others’ pointing when presented with a label, but not when presented with an emotional non-speech vocalization.     

Rapid word learning in 13- and 17-month-olds in a naturalistic two-word procedure: looking versus reaching measures

This study investigated infants’ rapid learning of two novel words using a preferential looking measure compared with a preferential reaching measure. In Experiment 1, 21 13-month-olds and 20 17-month-olds were given 12 novel label exposures (6 per trial) for each of two novel objects. Next, in the label comprehension tests, infants were shown both objects and were asked, “Where’s the [label]?” (looking preference) and then told, “Put the [label] in the basket” (reaching preference). Only the 13-month-olds showed rapid word learning on the looking measure; neither age group showed rapid word learning on the reaching measure. In Experiment 2, the procedure was repeated 24 h later with 10 participants per age group from Experiment 1. After a further 12 labels per object, both age groups now showed robust evidence of rapid word learning, but again only on the looking measure. This is the earliest looking-based evidence of rapid word learning in infants in a well-controlled (i.e., two-word) procedure; our failure to replicate previous reports of rapid word learning in 13-month-olds with a preferential reaching measure may be due to our use of more rigorous controls for object preferences. The superior performance of the younger infants on the looking measure in Experiment 1 was not straightforwardly predicted by existing theoretical accounts of word learning.     

Young infants' eye movements over "natural" scenes and "experimental" scenes

Eye movements of 30 4-month-olds were tracked as infants viewed animals and vehicles in “natural” scenes and, for comparison, in homogeneous “experimental” scenes. Infants showed equivalent looking time preferences for natural and experimental scenes overall, but fixated natural scenes and objects in natural scenes more than experimental scenes and objects in experimental scenes and shifted fixations between objects and contexts more in natural than in experimental scenes. The findings show how infants treat objects and contexts in natural scenes and suggest that they treat more commonly used experimental scenes differently.     

Inferring the goals of a nonhuman agent

Johnson, Slaughter, and Carey [Dev. Sci. 1 (1998) 233.] used infants' ability to follow the ‘gaze’ of novel objects to claim that infants' recognition of mentalistic agents is not isomorphic with person recognition but rather based on a set of nonarbitrary object recognition cues including the presence of a face and the ability to interact contingently with other agents. The current studies extend these findings with data based on infant imitation and the production of communicative gestures. The first study replicated Meltzoff's [Dev. Psychol. 31 (1995) 838.] reenactment of goals paradigm with a novel, nonhuman agent. Fifteen-month-olds were found to reenact both the completed and uncompleted/unseen goals of a novel object that had a face and interacted contingently with the experimenter and infant. Concurrently, infants directed many communicative gestures at the object. A second study excluded the possibility that the communicative gestures apparently directed at the object in Study 1 were in fact imitations of the experimenter's own behavior. The suggestion that novel, nonhuman objects are capable of eliciting such divergent behaviors as gaze-following, goal reenactment, and communicative gestures from infants, supports the claim that all of these behaviors are mediated by a central conceptual notion of mentalistic being, at least by the ages studied, and that that concept is not isomorphic with the concept person.     

Novel labels support 10-month-olds’ attention to novel objects

What is the source of the mutual exclusivity bias whereby infants map novel labels onto novel objects? In an intermodal preferential looking task, we found that novel labels support 10-month-olds’ attention to a novel object over a familiar object. In contrast, familiar labels and a neutral phrase gradually reduced attention to a novel object. Markman (1989, 1990) argued that infants must recall the name of a familiar object to exclude it as the referent of a novel label. We argue that 10-month-olds’ attention is guided by the novelty of objects and labels rather than knowledge of the names for familiar objects. Mutual exclusivity, as a language-specific bias, might emerge from a more general constraint on attention and learning.     

Further evaluation of prompt density,rate of reinforcement,and the persistence of manding

Previous research has evaluated the effects of prompt rates on the rate of communicative behavior. More recent research has suggested that dense prompting can result in communicative behavior that is more resistant to change. However, existing research has not considered the impact that higher response rates had on reinforcement rate, a variable known to impact response persistence. The current study systematically replicated previous research by evaluating communicative responding in contexts associated with dense- and lean-prompt schedules and extended existing research by (a) holding reinforcement rates similar across the two prompting schedules (lean and dense), and (b) evaluating the persistence of communicative responding in the contexts associated with each prompting schedule. The results for Experiment 1 clearly replicated and extended previous research. The results for Experiment 2 were equivocal and suggested that previous reinforcement history and response class size impacted outcomes.     

Increased visual interest and affective responses to impossible figures in early infancy

This research evaluated infants’ facial expressions as they viewed pictures of possible and impossible objects on a TV screen. Previous studies in our lab demonstrated that four-month-old infants looked longer at the impossible figures and fixated to a greater extent within the problematic region of the impossible shape, suggesting they were sensitive to novel or unusual object geometry. Our work takes studies of looking time data a step further, determining if increased looking co-occurs with facial expressions associated with increased visual interest and curiosity, or even puzzlement and surprise. We predicted that infants would display more facial expressions consistent with either “interest” or “surprise” when viewing the impossible objects relative to possible ones, which would provide further evidence of increased perceptual processing due to incompatible spatial information. Our results showed that the impossible cubes evoked both longer looking times and more reactive expressions in the majority of infants. Specifically, the data revealed significantly greater frequency of raised eyebrows, widened eyes and returns to looking when viewing impossible figures with the most robust effects occurring after a period of habituation. The pattern of facial expressions were consistent with the “interest” family of facial expressions and appears to reflect infants’ ability to perceive systematic differences between matched pairs of possible and impossible objects as well as recognize novel geometry found in impossible objects. Therefore, as young infants are beginning to register perceptual discrepancies in visual displays, their facial expressions may reflect heightened attention and increased information processing associated with identifying irreconcilable contours in line drawings of objects. This work further clarifies the ongoing formation and development of early mental representations of coherent 3D objects.     

Infants’ coding of location in continuous space

The ability to code location in continuous space is fundamental to spatial behavior. Existing evidence indicates a robust ability for such coding by 12 months, but systematic evidence on earlier origins is lacking. A series of studies investigated 5-month-olds’ ability to code the location of an object hidden in a sandbox, using a looking-time paradigm. In Experiment 1, after familiarization with a hiding-and-finding sequence at one location, infants looked longer at an object being disclosed from a location 12 inches (30 cm) away than at an object emerging from the hiding location, showing they were able to code location in continuous space. In Experiment 2, infants reacted with greater looking when objects emerged from locations 8 inches (20 cm) away from the hiding location, showing that location coding was more finely grained than could be inferred based on the first study. In Experiment 3, infants were familiarized with an object shown in hiding-and-finding sequences at two different locations. Infants looked longer at objects emerging 12 inches (30 cm) away from the most recent hiding location than to emergence from the other location, showing that infants could code location even when events had previously occurred at each location. In Experiment 4, after familiarization with two objects with different shapes, colors, and sounding characteristics, shown in hiding-and-finding sequences in two locations, infants reacted to location violations as they had in Experiment 3. However, they did not react to object violations, that is, events in which the wrong object emerged from a hiding location. Experiment 5 also found no effect of object violation, even when the infants initially saw the two objects side by side. Spatiotemporal characteristics may play a more central role in early object individuation than they do later, although further study is required.     

On the limits of infants' quantification of small object arrays

Recent work suggests that infants rely on mechanisms of object-based attention and short-term memory to represent small numbers of objects. Such work shows that infants discriminate arrays containing 1, 2, or 3 objects, but fail with arrays greater than 3 [Feigenson, L., & Carey, S. (2003). Tracking individuals via object-files: Evidence from infants' manual search. Developmental Science, 6, 568-584; Feigenson, L., Carey, S., & Hauser, M. (2002). The representations underlying infants' choice of more: Object files versus analog magnitudes. Psychological Science, 13(2), 150-156]. However, little is known about how infants represent arrays exceeding the 3-item limit of parallel representation. We explored possible formats by which infants might represent a 4-object array. Experiment 1 used a manual search paradigm to show that infants successfully discriminated between arrays of 1 vs. 2, 2 vs. 3, and 1 vs. 3 objects. However, infants failed to discriminate 1 vs. 4 despite the highly discriminable ratio, providing the strongest evidence to date for object-file representations underlying performance in this task. Experiment 2 replicated this dramatic failure to discriminate 1 from 4 in a second paradigm, a cracker choice task. We then showed that infants in the choice task succeeded at choosing the larger quantity with 0 vs. 4 crackers and with 1 small vs. 4 large crackers. These results suggest that while infants failed to represent 4 as “exactly 4”, “approximately 4”, “3”, or as even as “a plurality”, they did represent information about the array, including the existence of a cracker or cracker-material and the size of the individual objects in the array.     

Effects of gesture and target on 12- and 18-month-olds' joint visual attention to objects in front of or behind them

Factors affecting joint visual attention in 12- and 18-month-olds were investigated. In Experiment 1 infants responded to 1 of 3 parental gestures: looking, looking and pointing, or looking, pointing, and verbalizing. Target objects were either identical to or distinctive from distractor objects. Targets were in front of or behind the infant to test G. E. Butterworth's (1991b) hypothesis that 12-month-olds do not follow gaze to objects behind them. Pointing elicited more episodes of joint visual attention than looking alone. Distinctive targets elicited more episodes of joint visual attention than identical targets. Although infants most reliably followed gestures to targets in front of them, even 12-month-olds followed gestures to targets behind them. In Experiment 2 parents were rotated so that the magnitude of their head turns to fixate front and back targets was equivalent. Infants looked more at front than at back targets, but there was also an effect of magnitude of head turn. Infants' relative neglect of back targets is partly due to the "size" of adult's gesture.     

Core knowledge and its limits: The domain of food

Adults, preschool children, and nonhuman primates detect and categorize food objects according to substance information, conveyed primarily by color and texture. In contrast, they perceive and categorize artifacts primarily by shape and rigidity. The present experiments investigated the origins of this distinction. Using a looking time procedure, Experiment 1 extended previous findings that rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) generalize learning about novel food objects by color over changes in shape. Six additional experiments then investigated whether human infants show the same signature patterns of perception and generalization. Nine-month-old infants failed to detect food objects in accord with their intrinsic properties, in contrast to rhesus monkeys tested in previous research with identical displays. Eight-month-old infants did not privilege substance information over other features when categorizing foods, even though they detected and remembered this information. Moreover, infants showed the same property generalization patterns when presented with foods and tools. The category-specific patterns of perception and categorization shown by human adults, children, and adult monkeys therefore were not found in human infants, providing evidence for limits to infants’ domains of knowledge.     

Fourteen-month-olds’ imitation is influenced more strongly by a model’s competence than by a model’s certainty

Research has shown that infants are more likely to learn from certain and competent models than from uncertain and incompetent models. However, it is unknown which of these cues to a model’s reliability infants consider more important. In Experiment 1, we investigated whether 14-month-old infants (n = 35) imitate and adopt tool choices selectively from an uncertain but competent compared to a certain but incompetent model. Infants watched videos in which an adult expressed either uncertainty but acted competently or expressed certainty but acted incompetently with familiar objects. In tool-choice tasks, the adult then chose one of two objects to operate an apparatus, and in imitation tasks, the adult then demonstrated a novel action. Infants did not adopt the model’s choice in the tool-choice tasks but they imitated the uncertain but competent model more often than the certain but incompetent model in the imitation tasks. In Experiment 2, 14-month-olds (n = 33) watched videos in which an adult expressed only either certainty or uncertainty in order to test whether infants at this age are sensitive to a model’s certainty. Infants imitated and adopted the tool choice from a certain model more than from an uncertain model. These results suggest that 14-month-olds acknowledge both a model’s competence and certainty when learning novel actions. However, they rely more on a model’s competence than on his certainty when both cues are in conflict. The ability to detect reliable models when learning how to handle cultural artifacts helps infants to become well-integrated members of their culture.     

Eye tracking provides no evidence that young infants understand path obstruction

In two experiments with 47 4-month-olds, we investigated attention to key aspects of events in which an object moved along a partly occluded path that contained an obstruction. Infants were familiarized with a ball rolling behind an occluder to be revealed resting on an end wall, and on test trials an obstruction wall was placed in the ball's path. In Experiment 1, we did not find longer looking when the object appeared in an impossible location beyond the obstruction, and infants did not selectively fixate the object in this location. In Experiment 2, after rolling one or two balls, we measured infants' fixations of a two-object outcome with one ball in a novel but possible resting position and the other in a familiar but impossible location beyond the obstruction. Infants looked longer at the ball in the possible but novel location, likely reflecting a looking preference for location novelty. Thus we obtained no evidence that infants reasoned about obstruction and identified a violation on that basis.     

Infant perception of causal motion produced by humans and inanimate objects

Both the movements of people and inanimate objects are intimately bound up with physical causality. Furthermore, in contrast to object movements, causal relationships between limb movements controlled by humans and their body displacements uniquely reflect agency and goal-directed actions in support of social causality. To investigate the development of sensitivity to causal movements, we examined the looking behavior of infants between 9 and 18 months of age when viewing movements of humans and objects. We also investigated whether individual differences in gender and gross motor functions may impact the development of the visual preferences for causal movements. In Experiment 1, infants were presented with walking stimuli showing either normal body translation or a “moonwalk” that reversed the horizontal motion of body translations. In Experiment 2, infants were presented with unperformable actions beyond infants’ gross motor functions (i.e., long jump) either with or without ecologically valid body displacement. In Experiment 3, infants were presented with rolling movements of inanimate objects that either complied with or violated physical causality. We found that female infants showed longer looking times to normal walking stimuli than to moonwalk stimuli, but did not differ in their looking time to movements of inanimate objects and unperformable actions. In contrast, male infants did not show sensitivity to causal movement for either category. Additionally, female infants looked longer at social stimuli of human actions than male infants. Under the tested circumstances, our findings indicate that female infants have developed a sensitivity to causal consistency between limb movements and body translations of biological motion, only for actions with previous visual and motor exposures, and demonstrate a preference toward social information.     

Young children associate novel words with complex objects rather than salient parts

How do children learn associations between novel words and complex perceptual displays? Using a visual preference procedure, the authors tested 12- and 19-month-olds to see whether the infants would associate a novel word with a complex 2-part object or with either of that object's parts, both of which were potentially objects in their own right and 1 of which was highly salient to infants. At both ages, children's visual fixation times during test were greater to the entire complex object than to the salient part (Experiment 1) or to the less salient part (Experiment 2)--when the original label was requested. Looking times to the objects were equal if a new label was requested or if neutral audio was used during training (Experiment 3). Thus, from 12 months of age, infants associate words with whole objects, even those that could potentially be construed as 2 separate objects and even if 1 of the parts is salient.     

Nine-month-olds’ shared visual attention as a function of gesture and object location

Two factors hypothesized to affect shared visual attention in 9-month-olds were investigated in two experiments. In Experiment 1, we examined the effects of different attention-directing actions (looking, looking and pointing, and looking, pointing and verbalizing) on 9-month-olds’ engagement in shared visual attention. In Experiment 1 we also varied target object locations (i.e., in front, behind, or peripheral to the infant) to test whether 9-month-olds can follow an adult’s gesture past a nearby object to a more distal target. Infants followed more elaborate parental gestures to targets within their visual field. They also ignored nearby objects to follow adults’ attention to a peripheral target, but not to targets behind them. In Experiment 2, we rotated the parent 90° from the infant’s midline to equate the size of the parents’ head turns to targets within as well as outside the infants’ visual field. This manipulation significantly increased infants’ looking to target objects behind them, however, the frequency of such looks did not exceed chance. The results of these two experiments are consistent with perceptual and social experience accounts of shared visual attention.     

Sharing attention and pointing to objects at 12 months: is the intentional stance implied?

The goal of the present research was to assess whether communicative gestures, such as gazing and declarative pointing of 12-month-old infants indicate that infants perceive people as intentional agents, or whether infant communicative behaviors are merely triggered by specific perceptual cues in joint visual attention situations. Two experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, thirty-two 12-month-olds were conditioned to follow the gaze of a contingently interacting person or object. They were then submitted to a paradigm designed to incite them to initiate communicative gestures to the person or object. The temporal coordination between pointing, gazing, and vocalizations occurred at a significantly higher rate in the Person than in the Object condition. In Experiment 2, the effect of the attentional focus of others on the gaze, points and vocalizations of thirty 12-month-olds was investigated. Infants were assessed in conditions where the experimenter vocalized while looking at the same (In-focus), or a different (Out-of-focus) toy than the infants. Infants who pointed produced more co-occurrences of gaze, vocalizations and points in the Out-of-focus condition than in the In-focus condition. Thus, by 12 months, infants are aware of the attentional state of the person. Discussion centers on the implications of these findings for theories of social and cognitive knowing.     

Armed and attentive: Holding a weapon can bias attentional priorities in scene viewing

The action-specific perception hypothesis (Witt, Current Directions in Psychological Science 20: 201–206, 2011) claims that the environment is represented with respect to potential interactions for objects present within said environment. This investigation sought to extend the hypothesis beyond perceptual mechanisms and assess whether action-specific potential could alter attentional allocation. To do so, we examined a well-replicated attention bias in the weapon focus effect (Loftus, Loftus, & Messo, Law and Human Behaviour 1, 55–62, 1987), which represents the tendency for observers to attend more to weapons than to neutral objects. Our key manipulation altered the anticipated action-specific potential of observers by providing them a firearm while they freely viewed scenes with and without weapons present. We replicated the original weapon focus effect using modern eye tracking and confirmed that the increase in time looking at weapons comes at a cost of less time spent looking at faces. Additionally, observers who held firearms while viewing the various scenes showed a general bias to look at faces over objects, but only if the firearm was in a readily usable position (i.e., pointed at the scenes rather than holstered at one’s side). These two effects, weapon focus and the newly found bias to look more at faces when armed, canceled out one another without interacting. This evidence confirms that the action capabilities of the observer alter more than just perceptual mechanisms and that holding a weapon can change attentional priorities. Theoretical and real-world implications are discussed.     

Learning words’ sounds before learning how words sound: 9-Month-olds use distinct objects as cues to categorize speech information

One of the central themes in the study of language acquisition is the gap between the linguistic knowledge that learners demonstrate, and the apparent inadequacy of linguistic input to support induction of this knowledge. One of the first linguistic abilities in the course of development to exemplify this problem is in speech perception: specifically, learning the sound system of one’s native language. Native-language sound systems are defined by meaningful contrasts among words in a language, yet infants learn these sound patterns before any significant numbers of words are acquired. Previous approaches to this learning problem have suggested that infants can learn phonetic categories from statistical analysis of auditory input, without regard to word referents. Experimental evidence presented here suggests instead that young infants can use visual cues present in word-labeling situations to categorize phonetic information. In Experiment 1, 9-month-old English-learning infants failed to discriminate two non-native phonetic categories, establishing baseline performance in a perceptual discrimination task. In Experiment 2, these infants succeeded at discrimination after watching contrasting visual cues (i.e., videos of two novel objects) paired consistently with the two non-native phonetic categories. In Experiment 3, these infants failed at discrimination after watching the same visual cues, but paired inconsistently with the two phonetic categories. At an age before which memory of word labels is demonstrated in the laboratory, 9-month-old infants use contrastive pairings between objects and sounds to influence their phonetic sensitivity. Phonetic learning may have a more functional basis than previous statistical learning mechanisms assume: infants may use cross-modal associations inherent in social contexts to learn native-language phonetic categories.     

The development of a word-learning strategy

Two studies investigated young infants' use of the word-learning principle Mutual Exclusivity. In Experiment 1, a linear relationship between age and performance was discovered. Seventeen-month-old infants successfully used Mutual Exclusivity to map novel labels to novel objects in a preferential looking paradigm. That is, when presented a familiar and a novel object (e.g. car and phototube) and asked to "look at the dax", 17-month-olds increased looking to the novel object (i.e. phototube) above baseline preference. On these trials, 16-month-olds were at chance. And, 14-month-olds systematically increased looking to the familiar object (i.e. car) in response to hearing the novel label "dax". Experiment 2 established that this increase in looking to the car was due solely to hearing the novel label "dax". Several possible interpretations of the surprising form of failure at 14 months are discussed.