Transforming science curricula in higher education: Feminist contributions

Feminist contributions to the science curricula in higher education constitute invaluable but often overlooked resources for truly effective communication about science. Here I share a sampling of feminist science studies and discuss the origins of this effort to create inclusive and less biased science curricula that serve all students and citizens. Challenges from scientists center on assumptions and values about the appropriate relationship between science and politics, while challenges from educators extend to assumptions about how science has been taught. Currently, national and local curriculum transformation efforts are producing useful insights and materials. I want to thank Jinnie Garrett for inviting me to participate in the very exciting conference (Communicating Science held at Hamilton College, Clinton, NY, USA, 3–5 October 1998) and for her encouragement in preparing this paper. I also want to thank Joan Schulz and Patricia Brown for the important discussions and assistance contributing to this work.     

Les pratiques de recherche ouvertes en psychologie

This article aims to provide an overview of the recent developments of research practices in psychology. A review of the different symptoms of the crisis of replicability (and of confidence) that affected psychology will be followed by an in-depth and nuanced discussion of the factors responsible for this situation. Then, the next step will be to demonstrate, using illustrations and resources, the crucial role of open research practices to address these challenges. Knowledge and adoption of these research practices popularized by the open science movement are essential to contribute, through transparency and openness, to the collective effort to improve the reliability and replicability of psychological results.     

When Do Scientific Explanations Compete? Steps Toward a Heuristic Checklist

It's not uncommon for scientists to give different explanations of the same phenomenon, but we currently lack clear guidelines for deciding whether to treat such accounts as competitors. This article discusses how science studies can help create tools and guidelines for thinking about whether explanations compete. It also specifies how one family of discourse rules enables there to be differing accounts that appear to compete but don't. One hopes that being more aware of the linguistic mechanisms making compatible accounts appear to compete will prevent people from wasting resources trying to show which account is right.     

EXPLANATORY MODESTY

Although I certainly have differences with some of my commentators, I am grateful for the time, effort, and attention that each has devoted to my book, Why Religion Is Natural and Science Is Not. They have helpfully pointed out features of my positions that need clarification and elaboration. I am also grateful to the editor of Zygon, Willem Drees, for this opportunity to undertake that task here.     

IS A COMPLETE BIOCOGNITIVE ACCOUNT OF RELIGION FEASIBLE?

The biological and cognitive approach to religion has matured somewhat and reveals interesting results. Nevertheless, some questions arise about its foundation and development. The essay offers a review of current research in the cognitive field, focusing on its conclusions, the internal discussions, and the problems that need more study or correction. Emphasis is placed on a more intricate account of the factors involved in religious experience, discussing the proper use of the discoveries of biocognitive research and the limits that should be placed on said conclusions.     

Whose social values? Evaluating Canada’s ‘death of evidence’ controversy

With twentieth- and twenty-first-century philosophy of science’s unfolding acceptance of the nature of scientific inquiry being value-laden, the persistent worry has been that there are no means for legitimate negotiation of the social or non-epistemic values that enter into science. The rejection of the value-free ideal in science has thereby been coupled with the spectres of indiscriminate relativism and bias in scientific inquiry. I challenge this view in the context of recently expressed concerns regarding Canada's death of evidence controversy. The worry, raised by Stathis Psillos, is that as constructivist accounts of science demoted the previously secure status of evidence for drawing justified conclusions in science, we were left with no rational delineation between the right and wrong values for science. The implication for the death of evidence controversy is that we may have no rational grounds for claiming that the Canadian Government is wrong to interfere with scientific enterprise. But he does offer another avenue for reaching the conclusion that the wrong social values are directing the current stifling of some sectors of Canadian science. Psillos draws from standpoint epistemologies to devise a salient defence of ‘valuing evidence’ as a universalizable social value. That is, government bodies ought to enable scientific research via adequate funding as well as political non-interference. In this paper, I counter that (i) non-epistemic values can be rationally evaluated and that (ii) standpoint epistemology’s universalizable standpoint provides an inadequate framework for negotiating social values in science. Regarding (i), I draw from the evidence-based medicine debate in philosophy of medicine and from feminist empiricist investigations into the science–values relationship in order to make the argument for empirically driven value arbitration. If social values can be rationally chosen in the context of justification, then we can have grounds for charging the Canadian leadership with being ‘at war with science’. (ii) I further argue that my recommended empiricist methodology is preferable to Psillos’s search for universalizable perspectives for negotiating social values in science because the latter method permits little more than the trivial conclusion that evidence is valuable to science.     

“Ethics wars”: Reflections on the Antagonism between Bioethicists and Social Science Observers of Biomedicine1

Social scientists often lament the fact that philosophically trained ethicists pay limited attention to the insights they generate. This paper presents an overview of tendencies in sociological and anthropological studies of morality, ethics and bioethics, and suggests that a lack in philosophical interest might be related to a tendency among social scientists to employ either a deficit model (social science perspectives accommodate the sense of context that philosophical ethics lacks), a replacement model (social scientists have finally found the “right way” of doing ethics), or a dismissal model (ethics should be abandoned all together as a misconstrued veil of power). Increased awareness of differences in styles of reasoning and objects of research interest might help to overcome the hostility, and an anthropological project is presented as an invitation to a dialogue informed by awareness of such differences.This paper was first presented at the 4S/EASST Conference in Paris, August 25–28,2004 in a panel co-convened with Richard Tutton, who came up with ‘‘Ethics Wars’’ as the appropriate title for the state of affairs we wanted to discuss. Bryn William-Jones contributed to the panel and provided detailed and very useful comments to the paper. The project on which the article reports was financially supported by the Swedish Ethics in Healthcare Programme (Grant 2000/56) and the Danish Social Science Research Council (Grant 24-03-0219).     

Evidentiary Symbiosis: On Paraethnography in Human–Microbe Relations

Though microbial infections are central concerns for public health workers in urban Nicaragua, health workers there rarely if ever speak of the existence of a ‘microbiome’ when they address such problems. Among scientists and the public in the United States, on the other hand, the microbiome, seen as the ‘internal ecosystem’ that regulates the workings of human guts, is a regular topic of conversation. This raises questions about how one might go about doing a social study of the microbiome in places where it does not (yet) exist as a category of expert practice or public discourse. Evidence from Nicaragua and the United States highlights two sites at which experts engage people in research and discussion about microbial ecologies. In their work, U.S. microbiome scientists and Nicaraguan public health workers both engage in ‘paraethnography,’ the practice of collecting and analyzing qualitative information that does not fit into statistical or other kinds of scientific models. In the United States, paraethnography has driven both traditional scientific experiments on the microbiome and online, crowd-sourced experimental platforms for collecting and analyzing information about gut microbes. In Nicaragua, hygienists generate paraethnographic evidence through word-of-mouth, radio, and print media. A comparison between the work of U.S. scientists and that of Nicaraguan hygienists suggests three different ways (commensal, parasitic, and mutualistic) in which the cultural/interpretive evidence of paraethnography interfaces symbiotically with the quantitative/statistical evidence of bioscience. Attention to evidentiary symbiosis provides insights into the operations of publicly oriented science under conditions of bodily and planetary uncertainty.     

ASSESSING THE FIELD OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION: ADVICE FROM THE NEXT GENERATION

The field of science and religion is undergoing a transition today requiring assessment of its past movements and identifying its future trajectories by the next generation of science and religion scholars. This essay provides such assessment and advice. To focus efforts on the past, I turn to Ian Barbour's own stock taking of the field some forty years ago in an essay entitled “Science and Religion Today” before giving some personal comments where I argue that much of the field has traditionally focused on the conversation between Christianity and the natural sciences. At present, however, we are beginning to see that the future of the conversation lies beyond the dialogue between the natural sciences and Christianity. I suggest that the future dialogue will and ought to expand in several directions: (1) into non‐Christian religions and theology, (2) into the human sciences, (3) into science and technology Studies, and (4) into the humanities more broadly.     

THE SHAPE OF THIS WONDER? CONSECRATED SCIENCE AND NEW COSMOLOGY AFFECTS

In response to Lisa Sideris's provocative new book Consecrating Science: Wonder, Knowledge and the Natural World and in conversation with voices from feminist technoscience, this article challenges the deracinated wonder of new cosmology encounters in two senses. First, by tracing how it is uprooted from critical perspectives on scientific knowledge production. And second, by contending deracinated wonder is ripped from cultural and historical contexts thus erasing embodied inequalities. Deracinated wonder attached to uncritical forms of science, I argue, solidifies new cosmology as an investment in white environmentalism by directing religion and ecology away from pluralities of encounter and the affective weight of environmental degradation and environmental racism.     

"形而上"与"形而下"的近代分离--《易》与经学时代中国学者的学术兴趣

近代科学在欧洲的产生,乃得益于"文艺复兴"以来欧洲学术上"形而上"与"形而下"的大规模分离.而汉以来"独尊儒术"的实现,<易>作为儒家主要经籍以其"仰观天文,俯察地理,中知人事"的宏大叙事与终极关怀,影响了经学时代中国学者的学术兴趣,导致他们将绝大多数精力投入到了以史学为主的"人事"中而非自然事物的研究对象与形而下的研究路径.两个相对独立的历史进程与历史体系或无何可比性:近代科学在欧洲产生只有在产生近代科学的欧洲自我历史进程与历史体系中才能得到解释,中国没有产生近代科学亦复如此.至于将中国科学落后的原由单一性地归结于<易>或儒家经学,这未必符合历史的因果真相与思维的有效推理.     

COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND HATHAYOGA

Abstract. Cognitive science and hathayoga both make emphatic claims about the relationship between the body and the mind. To examine this complementary relationship I draw upon the five main approaches currently being used by cognitive science and then consider their implications within the context of three specific points of contact with hathayoga theory: the rejection of dualism, the nature of consciousness, and the role of the nervous and circulatory systems in religious experience. This type of comparative analysis can provide additional information about the nature of consciousness and the potential practices that heighten our awareness or knowledge of it. Consequently, cognitive science offers a new and provocative way to dialogue with Indian yoga traditions in terms of the methods and theories of modernity.