Researching learning across cultures

The aim of this paper is to invite readers to share the uncertain beginnings of my PhD in which I am seeking to hold reflexive conversations about learning with a group of international postgraduates studying in the UK. As a higher education lecturer in counselling I want to be able to understand the learning stories of such students, how their stories are affected by the learning experiences they encounter in the UK and how my own story is changing as a result of my involvement with them. My struggle to develop an appropriate conceptual framework within which to conduct cross‐cultural research will be described, paying particular attention to the reflexivity of the research activity and how it relates to the counselling process.     

Borges and the Art of Mourning

In my reply to Susi Federici-Nebbiosi, I emphasize and elaborate on the points of agreement between us, as well as the points where our thinking differs. My primary point of difference regards the suggestion that my accepting Yossi for short-term treatment was acquiescence to his request. This is only partially true. From his point of view, I offered him a treatment substantially longer than the one he wanted, thus I was agreeing and not agreeing to his request simultaneously.

The main idea that I put forth in my paper is that we always construct our setting together with our patients and that this is, in itself, a therapeutic factor. I share Federici-Nebbiosi's observation that the setting has undergone a great deal more change in practice than is reflected in the literature, and that there is unease discussing the issue of setting. I offer some thoughts on this and express the hope that the present exchange of ideas will lead to further discussion.     

On the Path to Knowledge Development

I consider the facilitation of knowledge development to be my central focus as editor. The editor makes the final decision on whether a specific research effort significantly advances our understanding of a substantive phenomenon. To that extent, the editor assumes a leadership role and responsibility in deciding the future direction of the field. Such important decisions should reflect the prevailing norms of the field and transcend the editor's individual research agenda or his/her selective worldview. I strive to make decisions that are shared by reviewers and associate editors with the common goal of moving the field forward in productive ways. As a result, articles published in JCP represent a collective view of what is considered significant theoretical contribution and rigorous methodology. In this note, I highlight some central elements of my philosophy related to knowledge development and share a few observations about policies that I have employed in managing the consensual review process.     

Research ethics and the principle of Justice as Fairness – A restatement

In my recent article, I addressed the question of whether a potential categorical exclusion of decisionally impaired patients from non-therapeutic medical research would be inaccordance with the Principle of Justice as Fairness. I came to the conclusion that a categorical exclusion of decisionally impaired persons from relevant research projects may collide with Rawls’s understanding of Justice as Fairness. Derek Bell has criticized my paper by denying that it is legitimate to apply Rawls to this bioethical problem. In my restatement I try to show that an extrapolation of John Rawls’s thought to such bioethical cases is possible, because Rawls himself has written that his orientation towards decisionally non-impaired persons is an idealized situation that allows extrapolations. In a second part I try to show that Bell hasroughly misunderstood my concept of “presumed consent” which I make a prerequisite for the legitimisation of research on decisionally impaired persons. In using advance consent as a proposal for resolving the problem, Bell has indirectly confirmed my approach because he is using a similar construct of consent, which operates with similar hypotheses and probabilities of error. I see here no categorical difference between Bell’s conclusion and my discussion. Thus, Bell’s reply does not represent a refutation of my thoughts, but rather it is a para phrased confirmation of my central theses. I conclude by showing the relevance of Rawls, pointing out that the discussion between Bell and me illustrates how Rawls’s concept of reflective equilibrium is an appropriate approach to finding a solution to this bioethical problem. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Reply to Reviews of Awakening the Dreamer: Clinical Journeys by Philip M. Bromberg

I reply here to reviews by three inspiring thinkers, Ethel Person, Susan Sands, and Allan Schore who, though uniquely different from one another in their conceptual frames of reference, share a sensibility as clinicians and creative scholars that has led them to engage and appreciate my work in depth while enriching it with their individual perspectives. Ethel Person's review is meaningful to me for many reasons, not the least of which is the fact that we think very much alike about “how we are” with patients despite the diversity in our families of origin. Her thinking, which extends the boundaries established by any one school of thought, transcends doctrine, especially that of “technique.” I am equally grateful to Susan Sands, whose review stimulated a dialogue between us about the similarities and differences in our views of the analyst's personal role in enactments with severe trauma survivors and whether there is reason to distinguish between life-threatening and developmental trauma. My reply to Allan Schore's review satisfies a long-standing wish to engage with him in dialogue about what he refers to in his review as “a remarkable overlap between Bromberg's work in clinical psychoanalysis and my work in developmental neuropsychoanalysis, a deep resonance between his treatment model and my regulation theory” (this issue, p. 755). In my reply I comment from my own vantage point on how our shared commitment to an interpersonal and intersubjective perspective—my interpersonal/relational treatment model and his “Interpersonal Neurobiology” led us to arrive at overlapping views on developmental trauma, attachment, the dyadic regulation of states of consciousness, and dissociation.     

The most good you can do: a response to the commentaries

Anthony Skelton, Violetta Igneski and Tracy Isaacs share my view that our obligations to help people in extreme poverty go beyond what is conventionally accepted. Nevertheless, the other contributors argue that my view is too demanding, while noting some tensions between my different writings on this issue. I explain my position, drawing on Sidgwick’s distinction between what someone ought to do, and what we should praise or blame someone for doing or not doing. I also respond to the position that Skelton considers preferable to mine, drawing this time on an argument that Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and I have made in our recent book, The Point of View of the Universe. I also address Igneski’s concerns about gender inequality, and indicate my broad agreement with Isaacs’ suggestion that effective altruism could benefit from a more co-ordinated approach.     

Diversifying the Social Scientific Study of Religion: The Next 70 Years

Here I argue that we need to diversify the social scientific study of religion and chart a plan for how we are already and will continue to do so. At the time of the 70th anniversary of our association, I reflect on where—as an association—we have come from and where we are going. Our origin story points to an expansive vision for what would become the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion (SSSR), but unfortunately our past has also been marked by an overrepresentation of white male leadership. It was only in 1982 that the society elected its first woman president, Mary Augusta Neal, and only in 2015 that it elected its first person of color, Fenggang Yang. Here, I discuss our hope for a more diverse future: attending to diversity in studies of religion, diversity in the groups of people who are encouraged to study religion, and efforts to translate religion research well to diverse groups of listeners. I share with you pieces of the new SSSR strategic plan, spearheaded in 2018 by Korie Edwards, the first black and woman of color President of the SSSR: particularly the pieces that are most attentive to diversity. I also highlight insights from my own scholarly story about diversity that I have learned through my work with the Religion and Public Life Program at Rice University.     

“There Must be Mouse Dirt with the Pepper”: A Lutheran Approach to Choosing Songs1

Abstract : This paper stems from my doctoral research on the question, “What is a good song?” It is a response to the Praise and Worship movement, which started within the charismatic churches, but also has spread to many mainline churches, including my own in South Africa. While I am supportive of much that is good in this movement, I am also critical of the content and theology of many of the songs. This paper focuses on what we as Lutherans can learn from our founder when it comes to choosing what and how to sing in our services.     

Theoretical Hubris and the Willingness To Be Radical: An Open Letter to James J. Gibson

J.J. Gibson's direct perception thesis is the cornerstone of ecological psychology. Not to understand this is not to understand ecological psychology. Beginning in the summer of 1968, when I first met Gibson, and after working with him for the next year at Cornell, I underwent a conversion crisis. I came to appreciate his thesis through a few philosophical insights that I here share with the reader through an open letter to Gibson, where I seek to illuminate the reasons for my conversion from being a Miller-Chomsky psycholinguist and a Piaget devotee to a radical Gibsonian. This conversion has influenced my work even until the present. Indeed, I am still working through its implications in all that I attempt. I share this intimate portrait of my relationship to Gibson and his profound ideas in hope that others who have struggled with his thesis might be helped along their way as I was.     

Student essay competition prize winner basket weaving: Sharing stories in a group setting

Abstract

Participating in a self-awareness group (in this case for counsellors in training) is an exercise in give and take - an interweaving of stories - through which we share ourselves with our peers. This paper explores some personal discoveries about the processes at work in (a) listening to others, (b) relating my own story - and assessing thereby the extent of my belonging, role and investment in the group. A dream alerted me to our shifting to another dimension of story-sharing by the end of forty sessions. The imagery I use is of basket weaving and creating a mandala.     

发展健康研究

试图讲座在健康研究中,如何适时、恰当并有效地把性别融合于其中,第一,我们应更注意健康研究的结果;第二,在健康研究中注重性别差异的意义;第三,分行性别健康的可持续性研究环境。     

Now and Then

I describe my development as a psychoanalyst from my dream of psychoanalysis as a revolutionary movement battling against ignorance and fixed beliefs to finding in Freud's theoretical framework a reliable, scientific base from which I could pursue my own thinking. I trace the evolution of my thinking through my experiences on the training and at my first post-training job in an antenatal department. I give an account of the culmination of my analytic development in my work at Brent Adolescent Centre where my husband, Moe Laufer, and I developed our theory of developmental breakdown in adolescence. Here we pioneered work and research with adolescents in analysis and at the walk-in center.     

Memoirs of a Mentor: Using Creativity for Counselors in Coping With the Loss of a Mentor

This article was inspired by my (S.S.) own personal loss. My mentor passed away during spring break of my 2nd year postgraduate school after a short battle with systemic lupus. I remember the deep sadness that I felt when it became apparent that she was coming home from the hospital for the last time. No words can describe the emotions; she had helped me through the toughest times in my academic life. How would I ever get the type of mentorship she provided again? She was there when I almost quit as a young student, back when my anger still got the best of me. She talked me down from the edge so many times; I never expected to be on this journey without her.

I dedicate this article to her and mentors like her. Equally, I dedicate this article to mentees who have lost their mentors. I offer my story (in italicized font) in the hopes that it will help others who are dealing with a similar loss. In this article, we attempt to illuminate the true power of mentorship, honor the significance of the relationship between mentor and mentee, and provide a tool useful to anyone who has lost their guide. I share my story in gratitude for my own mentor; I am so thankful that she was a part of my journey and that I can pass on to others the patience she had with me.     

Hegel,grandfather of disjunctivism

In this paper, I shall investigate whether Hegel can be considered as a sort of ancestor of McDowell’s disjunctivism. If this hypothesis turns out to be plausible, then the paper offers two gains. On the one hand, it offers an innovative interpretation of the way in which Hegel conceives of our sensible epistemic access to the world. On the other hand, McDowell's own claim that his own theoretical proposal has a Hegelian sound is supported by a previously unexplored argument. I organize my analysis into three parts: I sketch McDowell’s version of disjunctivism (Section 2); I analyze some passages from Hegel that I believe are important for showing some similarities between his and McDowell’s argumentative strategy (Section 3); in the conclusion (Section 4), I highlight a number of core features that Hegel seems to share with McDowell’s disjunctivism and I submit that they are sufficient to label Hegel the “grandfather” of McDowell's disjunctivism.     

Empathy and the responsiveness to social affordances

The direct perception theory of empathy claims that we can immediately experience a person’s state of mind. I can see for instance that my neighbour is angry with me in his bodily countenance. I develop a version of the direct perception theory of empathy which takes this perceptual capacity to depend upon recognising in what way the other person is responsive to the affordances the environment provides. By recognising which possibilities for action are relevant to a person, I can thereby understand something about the meaning they give to the world. I come to share something of their perspective on the world, and this allows me to grasp based on my perception of them something about their current state of mind. I argue that shared affect plays a central role in this perceptual capacity. Shared affect allows me to orient my attention to possibilities for action that matter to the other person. I end by briefly discuss the implications of this view of empathy for the disturbances in so-called “cognitive empathy” that are found in people diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder.     

On how a child's awareness of thinking informs explanations of thought insertion

Theories of thought insertion have tended to favour either the content of the putatively alien thought or some peculiarity within the experience itself as a means of explaining why the subject differentiates one thought from another in terms of personal ownership. There are even accounts that try to incorporate both of these characteristics. What all of these explanations share is the view that it is unexceptional for us to experience thought as our own. The aim of this paper is to consider the means by which this awareness of the myness of thought occurs. Why is it that I, as the subject of thought, typically experience a thought as mine? Using research which investigates the development of a child's awareness of the act of thinking, I will evaluate leading explanations of thought insertion. It is my contention that by understanding the means by which the awareness of one's ownership of thought develops, we can better assess explanations of thought insertion; and whilst, at present, no theory is fully able to explain the condition, the incorporation of developmental research suggest that we should favour one in particular.     

Locating dialogue a reply to flax

The thoughtful discussions of my paper by Alan Schore, Wilma Bucci, and James Fosshage raise important considerations about the relationship between theory, research, and the micromoment interactions constituting the activity of psychoanalysis. For the opportunity afforded by their contributions, and to Psychoanalytic Dialogues for publishing our exchanges, I express deep gratitude. I am initially impacted by the appreciation shown by my colleagues for the approach I am illustrating to clinical attention and its value for an expanded and, in certain ways, revised scope of psychoanalytic activity. In particular, I am appreciative of the ways that each commentator has taken up my emphasis on expanding psychoanalytic attention beyond symbolic pathways of exchange and has further contributed to understanding how this can occur. As part of a consideration of points of convergence and difference between us, I address how such convergences and differences shape both the values and pitfalls of comparisons across research, theory, and practice.     

The paternal function in Winnicott: The psychoanalytical frame

My first aim has been to identify the implicit assumptions underlying Winnicott's detailed notes on a fragment of an analysis dating from 1955 and published after his death. The importance given by Winnicott to the father figure as early as 1955 is one of my discoveries; another is the deep Freudian roots of his thinking. In this essay I propose a new way of linking together the concepts of ‘paternal function’ and the ‘psychoanalytical frame’. Developing my hypothesis, I compare my reading of Winnicott and my way of reading José Bleger's study on the frame. Like Winnicott, I explore in detail a process of discovery, focusing on what the analyst and the patient are nor fully aware of …'as yet'. I am not proposing to unify Winnicott's and Bleger's thinking. My aim is to avoid the pitfall of eclecticism and, in so doing, to recognize both the related depths they sound in their thinking and their otherness. I want to share with the readers their ‘meeting’ in my mind.     

MAKING SENSE OF GOD: HOW I GOT TO THE BRAIN

Abstract. I describe the development of my work in relating brain research and religion from my personal roots in my family of origin through my professional responsibilities as a pastor, a clinician, and a theological educator to my developing what I call “a neurotheological approach” to faith and ministry. My early correlations gave simplistic attention to bimodal consciousness as an interpretive tool for understanding religion. Subsequently came a more sophisticated exploration of whole-brain functioning and suggested cultural correlates. Currently, I am explicating tae humanizing brain as reflective of our living in an open system, a universe that is unfolding and evolving, a universe in the hands of the whole-making, integrating, emerging God whose reality far exceeds the insights of cultural construction. As we humans relate to this God, attachment and aspiration are reciprocal.     

Murdoch,Moral Concepts,and the Universalizability of Moral Reasons

It is widely held that moral reasons are universalizable. On this view, when I give a moral reason for my action, I take this reason to apply with equal normative force to anyone placed in a relevantly similar situation. Here, I offer an interpretation and defense of Iris Murdoch's critique of the universalizability thesis, distinguishing her position from the contemporary versions of particularism with which she has often been mistakenly associated. Murdoch's argument relies upon the idea that moral concepts may take on idiosyncratic meanings that are unique to a particular individual. Consequently, an agent may conceptualize her situation in such a way that it would not make sense to imagine anyone else facing it. For such an agent, it would be meaningless to say that she took her reasons to apply to anyone other than herself. I defend Murdoch’s argument through an extended analysis of a literary example, and consider and reject four possible lines of objection. Finally, I consider the consequences of the argument for our understanding of the nature of moral reasoning and what Murdoch describes as the ‘endless task’ of love.