Why won’t they participate? Barriers to participation in worksite health promotion programmes

Research suggests that worksite health promotion (WHP) programmes, and specifically health risk assessment (HRA) surveys and health education workshops, can be effective in enhancing employees’ health. However, 50–75% of employees choose not to participate when offered the opportunity to do so. The reasons for nonparticipation and the characteristics of nonparticipants have largely been overlooked. Building on premises of Conservation of Resources (COR) theory, we hypothesize that nonparticipation results from lack or loss of resources, or from the perceived low value of resources. These barriers to participation are expected to be related to employees’ characteristics and beliefs (termed implicit barriers) and reflected in employees’ self-reported reasons for nonparticipation (termed explicit barriers). We surveyed a large random sample of participants and nonparticipants in a WHP programme (n = 1926 employees), which included two steps: a HRA survey and a health education workshop. Participants completed an anonymous web-based questionnaire. Implicit and explicit barriers that reflect resource availability (e.g., age, health status) and valuation (e.g., low value of making a lifestyle change) were identified. The magnitude and nature of these barriers differed between the HRA survey and the workshop. We discuss how future research on WHP programmes can build on these findings and propose practical implications for reducing nonparticipation.     

Why conceptual competence won’t help the non-naturalist epistemologist

Abstract

Non-naturalist normative realists face an epistemological objection: They must explain how their preferred route of justification ensures a non-accidental connection between justified moral beliefs and the normative truths. One strategy for meeting this challenge begins by pointing out that we are semantically or conceptually competent in our use of the normative terms, and then argues that this competence guarantees the non-accidental truth of some of our first-order normative beliefs. In this paper, I argue against this strategy by illustrating that this competence based strategy undermines the non-naturalist’s ability to capture the robustly normative content of our moral beliefs.     

Why the Canberra plan won’t help you do serious metaphysics

Jackson (From metaphysics to ethics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998) argues that conceptual analysis plays a modest, albeit crucial, role in ‘serious metaphysics’: roughly, the project of demystifying phenomena we take to be mysterious by locating them in the natural world. This defence of conceptual analysis is associated with ‘the Canberra Plan’, a philosophical methodology that has its roots in the works of both Lewis (J Philos 67(13):427–446, 1970, Australas J Philos 50:249–258, 1972) and Jackson (Monist 77:93–110, 1994, 1998). There is, however, a distinction to be drawn between conceptual analysis, as it is typically employed in the Canberra plan, and a version of it defended by Jackson himself. In this paper, I elucidate this distinction, and employ examples from the history of science to argue the use of the former, but not the latter, incurs certain problems of conceptual change. Moreover, I also argue neither can be used to undertake serious metaphysics—the former because of the aforementioned problems, and the latter due to the machinery it employs to solve them.     

Why do young infants fail to search for hidden objects?

Recent evidence indicates that infants as young as 3.5 months of age understand that objects continue to exist when hidden (Baillargeon, 1987a; Baillargeon & DeVos, 1990). Why, then, do infants fail to search for hidden objects until 7 to 8 months of age? The present experiments tested whether 5.5-month-old infants could distinguish between correct and incorrect search actions performed by an experimenter. In Experiment 1, a toy was placed in front of (possible event) or under (impossible event) a clear cover. Next, a screen was slid in front of the objects, hiding them from view. A hand then reached behind the screen and reappeared holding the toy. The infants looked reliably longer at the impossible than at the possible event, suggesting that they understood that the hand's direct reaching action was sufficient to retrieve the toy when it stood in front of but not under the clear cover. The same results were obtained in a second condition in which a toy was placed in front of (possible event) or behind (impossible event) a barrier. In Experiment 2, a toy was placed under the right (possible event) or the left (impossible event) of two covers. After a screen hid the objects, a hand reached behind the screen's right edge and reappeared first with the right cover and then with the toy. The infants looked reliably longer at the impossible than at the possible event, suggesting that they realized that the hand's sequence of action was sufficient to retrieve the toy when it stood under the right but not the left cover. A control condition supported this interpretation. Together, the results of Experiments 1 and 2 indicate that by 5.5 months of age, infants not only represent hidden objects, but are able to identify the actions necessary to retrieve these objects. The implications of these findings for a problem solving explanation of young infants' failure to retrieve hidden objects are considered.     

Treating sleep disturbance in infants: What generalizes?

When treating infant sleep problems implementing treatment procedures at bedtime‐only might be easier and more efficient than requiring parents to implement procedures throughout the night, but only if improvements at bedtime generalize to later in the night. This study investigated the immediate and generalized effect of treating bedtime settling problems and later night waking in infants and whether it was parent or child behavior that generalized. Parents recorded sleep problems of seven infants (6–20 months) who exhibited chronic sleep disturbance, then implemented a graduated checking procedure at bedtime‐only (Setting 1). A multiple‐baseline across‐settings and participants design was employed. Immediate (in Setting 1) and any generalized effects (in Setting 2) on wakings and other changes in parent and child behavior were assessed by diary information and all‐night infra‐red video recordings. Clinically significant reductions in sleep problems were evident for five out of seven infants, but these were not consistently observed until parents generalized their use of the procedure throughout the night. There was no evidence that the infants generalized changes in self‐soothing from bedtime to later. It is concluded that changes in infant sleep problems are unlikely to occur unless parents actually alter their management of the problems across all settings in which the problems occur. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why ‘non-mental’ won’t work: on Hempel’s dilemma and the characterization of the ‘physical’

Recent discussions of physicalism have focused on the question how the physical ought to be characterized. Many have argued that any characterization of the physical should include the stipulation that the physical is non-mental, and others have claimed that a systematic substitution of ‘non-mental’ for ‘physical’ is all that is needed for philosophical purposes. I argue here that both claims are incorrect: substituting ‘non-mental’ for ‘physical’ in the causal argument for physicalism does not deliver the physicalist conclusion, and the specification that the physical is non-mental is irrelevant to the task of formulating physicalism as a substantive, controversial thesis.

That dog won’t fit: body size awareness in dogs

Animal Cognition - With very few exceptions, no coherent model of representing the self exists for nonhuman species. According to our hypothesis, understanding of the Self as an object’ can...     

Communication in preterm infants: Why is it different?

The present paper selectively reviews the literature which compares full-term and preterm infants' communication with their mothers in the first year of life. The review is focused not only on what differences are found between full-term and preterm infants, but also why such differences exist. Particular emphasis is placed on the importance of interpreting the findings in the light of the developmental phase of the infants, the heterogeneity of the preterm population and the situation in which communication is studied. Most studies were not designed to consider these issues in any detail. Differences with respect to these factors can be found between studies, however, which may have contributed to the often contradictory findings. Consequently, comparisons between these studies provide clues about the effects of these factors on communicative development. The ultimate goal of this review is to point to important directions for future research on early communication in preterm infants.     

Perceptual reference points for form and orientation in young infants: anchors or magnets?

In some domains, certain stimuli are especially salient and efficiently encoded and are referred to as reference points. One current issue concerns whether reference points are associated with regions of increased or decreased discriminability and function as either perceptual anchors or magnets. In two experiments utilizing the familiarization/novelty-preference procedure, the question of whether 3- to 4-month-old infants' representations of form and orientation information are structured by perceptual reference points and whether such reference points serve as anchors or magnets is examined. In Experiment 1, infants displayed above-chance discrimination performance for pairs of form stimuli that were equivalently distinct on a physical basis, but only when one member of each pair was a "good" form (i.e., diamond, square, or triangle). In Experiment 2, infants displayed above-chance discrimination performance for pairs of stimuli differing by 7.5 degrees of orientation, but only when one member of each pair was either horizontal or vertical. The combined results from the two experiments suggest that "simple" gestalts and main axes (i.e., horizontal and vertical) serve as perceptual anchors in young infants' representations of form and orientation information.     

Why doesn’t feedback correct Vierordt’s law?

Vierordt [(1868). Der zeitsinn nach versuchen. Tübingen: Laupp] observed that participants over-reproduce short durations and under-reproduce long durations within a test range of sample durations (Vierordt’s law). Similar phenomena have been reported for sensory and other processing (e.g. [Helson (1964 Helson, H. (1964). Adaptation-level theory. New York, NY: Harper &; Row. [Google Scholar]). Adaptation-level theory. New York: Harper &; Row; Stevens, and Greenbaum (1966). Regression effect in psychophysical judgment. Perception &; Psychophysics, 1, 439–446]. Performance feedback (knowledge of results) does not correct this performance distortion although it does correct other errors. In Experiment 1, I tested the hypothesis that a random presentation order of the standard durations makes feedback on one trial inappropriate for the next trial preventing correction of the Vierordt effect. In Experiment 2, participants performed two consecutive reproductions after each standard duration. Having the opportunity to immediately utilize the feedback from the first reproduction did not eliminate the Vierordt effect, although participants did attempt to correct the error on the first reproduction. In Experiment 3, the Vierordt effect was reduced in a blocked presentation design. Feedback produced more veridical performance. I conclude that the resistance of the Vierordt effect to correction by feedback may result, in part, from feedback on a given trial being misapplied to correcting performance on the next trial. Ironically, the Vierordt effect, which produced the differing directions and magnitudes of performance errors reported by the feedback, may be what prevents feedback from correcting for the Vierordt effect.     

Why don’t synaesthetic colours adapt away?

Synaesthetes persistently perceive certain stimuli as systematically accompanied by illusory colours, even though they know those colours to be illusory. This appears to contrast with cases where a subject??s colour vision adapts to systematic distortions caused by wearing coloured goggles. Given that each case involves longstanding systematic distortion of colour perception that the subjects recognize as such, how can a theory of colour perception explain the fact that perceptual adaptation occurs in one case but not the other? I argue that these cases and the relationship between them can be made sense of in light of an existing view of colour perception. Understanding colours as ways in which objects and surfaces modify light, perceived through grasping patterns and variations in colour appearances, provides a framework from which the cases and their apparent disanalogy can be predicted and explained. This theory??s ability to accommodate these cases constitutes further empirical evidence in its favour.     

Do production patterns influence the processing of speech in prelinguistic infants?

The headturn preference procedure was used to test 18 infants on their response to three different passages chosen to reflect their individual production patterns. The passages contained nonwords with consonants in one of three categories: (a) often produced by that infant (‘own’), (b) rarely produced by that infant but common at that age (‘other’), and (c) not generally produced by infants. Infants who had a single ‘own’ consonant showed no significant preference for either ‘own’ (a) or ‘other’ (b) passages. In contrast, infants’ with two ‘own’ consonants exhibited greater attention to ‘other’ passages (b). Both groups attended equally to the passage featuring consonants rarely produced by infants of that age (c). An analysis of a sample of the infant-directed speech ruled out the mothers’ speech as a source of the infant preferences. The production-based shift to a focus on the ‘other’ passage suggests that nascent production abilities combine with emergent perceptual experience to facilitate word learning.     

Do diagnostic patterns exist in the sleep behaviors of normal children?

We investigated the factor structure of the Children's Sleep Behavior Scale in an unselected sample of children (N=838), ages 6 to 12.5 years, drawn from an elementary school population. Although no factor emerged that corresponded exactly to the parasomnias, as described by the Association of Sleep Disorders Centers (1979), all of the variables that loaded on Factor 1 were behaviors characteristic of the parasomnias, with the exception of recalled nightmares. Variables that were expected to load on this factor, but did not, were sleeptalking, teeth grinding, and enuresis. Enuresis was not related to any of the sleep behaviors assessed, and teeth grinding shared less than 9% of the variance with any of the other variables. Many of the variables loaded on more than one factor. The second factor, which was labeled bedtime resistance, was the only clearly unambiguous factor. Of the five factors that emerged, the third reflected positive affect, the fourth was a motor factor, and the fifth was an anxiety factor. Nightmares loaded on the anxiety factor as well as the first factor. The results of the study offered no support for the category of Disorders of Initiating and Maintaining sleep (DIMS), which has a childhood onset.This research was supported by a grant from the University of New Brunswick Research Fund.     

Why did adolescents have sleep problems after earthquakes? Understanding the role of traumatic exposure,fear, and PTSD

To examine the relationships between trauma exposure, fear, post‐traumatic stress disorder, and sleep problems in adolescents, 746 adolescent survivors of the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake in China were assessed at 1 year (T1) and 1.5 years (T2) after the earthquake using a trauma exposure questionnaire, a fear questionnaire, a child posttraumatic stress disorder symptom scale, and a subscale on child sleep problems. The results showed that T1 trauma exposure were not directly associated with sleep problems at T1 and T2, but played a positive role in sleep problems at both T1 and T2 indirectly through T1 posttraumatic stress disorder and T1 fear. T1 trauma exposure was also positively and indirectly associated with T2 sleep problems through T1 posttraumatic stress disorder via T1 sleep problems, or through T1 fear via the path from T1 posttraumatic stress disorder to T1 sleep problems. These findings indicated that fear and posttraumatic stress disorder 1 year after the earthquake played a mediating role in the relationship between trauma exposure at 1 year after the earthquake, and sleep problems at both 1 year and 1.5 years after the earthquake, respectively. In particular, posttraumatic stress disorder also had a multiple mediating effect in the path from trauma exposure to sleep problems via fear. Furthermore, the findings indicated that sleep problems were relatively stable between 1 and 1.5 years after an earthquake.     

I won’t do it! Self-prediction,moral obligation and moral deliberation

This paper considers the question of whether predictions of wrongdoing are relevant to our moral obligations. After giving an analysis of ‘won’t’ claims (i.e., claims that an agent won’t Φ), the question is separated into two different issues: firstly, whether predictions of wrongdoing affect our objective moral obligations, and secondly, whether self-prediction of wrongdoing can be legitimately used in moral deliberation. I argue for an affirmative answer to both questions, although there are conditions that must be met for self-prediction to be appropriate in deliberation. The discussion illuminates an interesting and significant tension between agency and prediction.     

Emerging adults’ sleep patterns and attentional capture: the pivotal role of consistency

College students face consistent cognitive demands and often get insufficient and/or irregular sleep. The current study investigated associations of sleep duration and sleep variability with attentional performance. Sleep duration variability was expected to moderate the association between duration and cognitive functioning. College students’ (n = 83) natural sleep patterns were recorded via wristband actigraphy across three consecutive nights during an academic term. The association between sleep duration and attentional capture was strongest for those whose sleep was the most consistent across the three nights preceding the attentional task (i.e., low sleep duration variability). For those with low sleep duration variability, less sleep was associated (B = ?0.25) with reduced ability to ignore irrelevant cues and redirect attention to target locations. In other words, consistently low sleep duration was associated with compromises in attention. Our results indicate the importance of consistent sleep routines as well as sufficient sleep duration in order to optimize attentional performance in college students.     

Why can’t I change Bruckner’s Eighth Symphony?

Philosophical Studies - Musical works change. Bruckner revised his Eighth Symphony. Ella Fitzgerald and many other artists have made it acceptable to sing the jazz standard “All the Things...     

Potentiation in young infants: The origin of the prior knowledge effect?

In two experiments with 6-month-old infants, we found that prior learning of an operant task (remembered for 2 weeks) mediated new learning of a modeling event (remembered for only 1 day) and increased its recall. Infants first learned to associate lever pressing with moving a toy train housed in a large box. One or 2 weeks later, three target actions were modeled on a hand puppet while the train box (a retrieval cue) was in view. Merely retrieving the train memory strengthened it, and simultaneously pairing its retrieved memory with the modeled actions potentiated their learning and recall. When paired 1 week later, deferred imitation increased from 1 day to 4 weeks; when paired 2 weeks later, it increased from 1 day to 6 weeks. The striking parallels between potentiated learning in infants and the prior knowledge effect in adults suggests that the prior knowledge effect originates in early infancy.