“If it's in your mind,it's in your knowledge”: Children's developing anatomy of identity

Recent work has investigated children's developing understanding of the anatomical locus of identity. In two studies, we extend this work by exploring the role of the mind as opposed to the brain in children's conceptualization of identity. In Experiment 1, an analysis of natural language indicated that adults use the term mind more frequently than the term brain with reference to identity-related mental processes. Children's output displayed a similar bias. In Experiment 2, we compared the judgments of 5- and 7-year-old children to those displayed by adults. Participants heard stories in which a magical transformation resulted in either a creature with a mismatch between brain and body or a creature with a mismatch between mind and body. Children were more accurate in recognizing the enduring identity of this transformed creature when the transformation resulted in a mismatch between mind and body as compared to brain and body.     

Modern hermeneutics and psychoanalysis

Contemporary hermeneutics tries to integrate our unique, local sense of things with overarching nature, often by celebrating the concrete phenomenology of the moment at the expense of scientific abstractions. But abstractions are unavoidable. Hermeneuticists point out that we are constantly making new abstractions. But the more optional and variable views, which we call subjective, depend on the old, reliable abstractions, such as time, space, substance, and causality, that constitute our fixed reality. Hermeneutics usefully challenges psychoanalysis to justify its way of slicing up the mind and treatment process.     

When attention matters: The curious incident of the wandering mind

Attention plays an essential role in the construction of the mental models necessary to make sense of ongoing events. In this article, we consider the implications of temporary inattention during reading for the construction and updating of the situation model during text comprehension. We examined how self-reported mind wandering during reading relates to the online construction of the situation model of the narrative, which in this case involved the pseudonym used by a villain in a detective novella. In successful readers, mind wandering without awareness, referred to as zoning out, was less frequent when the text revealed a clue about the villain's identity. Additional analyses indicated that mind wandering interfered with the construction of the situation model independent of the participants' ability to retrieve factual information. The analysis of the temporal consequences of zoning out indicated that lapses had the greatest influence when they occurred early in the narrative. These results confirm the intuition that zoning out during reading is an indication that the construction of the situation model has gone awry, and underscore the fact that our ability to understand ongoing events depends on the ability to pay attention when it matters.     

A lemma science of mind: the potential of the Kegon (Flower Ornament) Sutra

The paper argues for a new perspective on the relationship between Buddhism and European psychology, or sciences of the mind, based in the Kegon Sutra, a text that emerged in the early stages of Mahayana Buddhism (3^rd ‐ 5^th century CE). The basis of European science is logos intellection, formalized by Aristotle as following three laws: the law of identity, the law of contradiction and the law of the excluded middle. Logic in the Buddhist tradition, by contrast, is based in lemma (meaning to understand as a whole not with language, but with intuition). Lemma‐based science born in the Buddhist tradition shows that rational perception is possible even without the three laws of logos. The Kegon Sutra, which explains what Buddha preached only a week after he attained enlightenment, is unified under the logic of lemma and can be seen as an effort to create a ‘lemma science of the mind’. The fundamental teaching of the Kegon Sutra is explored, and its principles are compared with primary process thinking and the unconscious as outlined by Freud and Jung. Jung's research of Eastern texts led him to create a science of the mind that went further than Freud: his concept of synchronicity is given by way of example and can be seen anew within the idea of a lemma‐based science.     

Hume's Reflections on the Identity and Simplicity of Mind1

The article presents a new interpretation of Hume's treatment of personal identity, and his later rejection of it in the “Appendix” to the Treatise. Hume's project, on this interpretation, is to explain beliefs about persons that arise primarily within philosophical projects, not in everyday life. the belief in the identity and simplicity of the mind as a bundle of perceptions is an abstruse belief, not one held by the “vulgar” who rarely turn their minds on themselves so as to think of their perceptions. the author suggests that it is this philosophical observation of the mind that creates the problems that Hume finally acknowledges in the “Appendix.” He is unable to explain why we believe that the perceptions by means of which we observe our minds while philosophizing are themselves part of our minds. This suggestion is then tested against seven criteria that any interpretation of the “Appendix” must meet.     

The Development of Identity. A Critical Analysis from the Perspective of the Self as Subject

In this paper an argument is presented, suggesting that the concept of identity articulated by Erikson and reflected in ordinary pretheoretical understanding includes, as a central feature, a special experience of self, namely, the experience of a unified psychological "essence," from which superficial characteristics of the person are differentiated. However, as is shown through a close analysis of various identity measures, this subjective experiential aspect is typically neglected in identity research, including the many studies that were guided by the identity status paradigm. A new approach is then presented, aimed at recapturing the subjective meaning of identity, by viewing identity as a modality of the self as subject and as characterized by specific experiences of agency, unity, otherness, and individuality. In an effort to empirically ground this approach, a typology of identity experience, derived from Loevinger′s ego development stages, is described. Several studies are then reviewed, that confirm the viability of this typology and illustrate the advantages of studying identity from the perspective of the self as subject.     

From Pink Frilly Dresses to ‘One of the Boys’: A Social‐Cognitive Analysis of Gender Identity Development and Gender Bias

In middle childhood, many girls go through a curious metamorphosis, in which their earlier embrace of all‐things‐feminine appears to transform into an identity as a tomboy. We believe this striking shift, observed in girls but not boys, signifies a critical development in children’s socio‐cognitive functioning, with implications for their understanding of gender as it relates to their identity and their social relationships. In this article, we review the evidence for this identity shift and present a theoretical account that integrates ideas from social cognition and social development. We argue that this identity shift involves the emergence of public regard and status awareness, with concurrent increases in the complexity with which knowledge associated with gender categories is represented in the mind. We then posit that these changes have important implications for the developmental trajectory of implicit and explicit gender attitudes and stereotypes, and we present a set of predictions generated by our theoretical analysis.     

Mind,Soul and Spirit: Conceptions of Immaterial Identity in Different Cultures

The cognitive science of religion has recently focused attention on whether concepts of mind, soul, and spirit derive from the same or different intuitive foundations of immaterial identity. The present research is the first to look at intuitions about these three concepts simultaneously in different cultures. Methodologically, hypothetical transplants or transfers of minds or brains have been commonly used to examine the development of inferences about the continuity of mental identity despite bodily displacement. The present research extends the transfer paradigm to compare inferences about transfers of “soul” and “spirit” as well as the “mind.” American, Brazilian, and Indonesian undergraduate participants were presented with a series of scenarios in which a character's soul, mind, or spirit is transferred to another character's body. Participants made judgments about the consequences of such transfers on behaviors selected to potentially differentiate underlying intuitive categories. Results indicate that intuitions of soul, spirit, and mind do appear to draw from different but overlapping intuitions, which are recruited in different ways depending on religion and country. For American and Indonesian participants, the mind transfer was judged more often to result in a displacement of cognitive attributes compared to bodily, social, and moral attributes. Across the three countries, the transfer of spirit led more frequently to judgments about displacement of passion than of ability; religiosity was associated with giving more weight to the transfer of the soul, thus resulting in a greater displacement of all types of attributes. The results emphasize the importance of considering how different intuitive foundations, such as essentialism, intuitive psychology, and vitalism, might be recruited by culture to highlight different aspects of immaterial identity.     

From Four‐ to Five‐Dimensionalism

Philosophers have long noticed the similarity of identity over time and identity across worlds. Despite this similarity, analogous views on these matters are not always taken equally seriously. Four‐dimensionalism is one of the most well‐known accounts of identity over time. There is a clear modal analogue of four‐dimensionalism, on which objects are modally extended and their trans‐world identity is a matter of having distinct modal parts located in different possible worlds. Yet this view, which we might call ‘five‐dimensionalism,’ is rarely discussed or defended, in comparison to its temporal counterpart. I argue that five‐dimensionalism is at least as plausible as four‐dimensionalism and deserves serious consideration as an account of trans‐world identity. The strategy is to show that arguments typically used in defence of four‐dimensionalism can be adapted to defend five‐dimensionalism as well. A powerful consideration in favour of four‐dimensionalism is the fact that it provides an elegant and unified solution to a variety of puzzles concerning material coincidence. I show that such puzzles come in equally troubling modal varieties and that five‐dimensionalism provides an equally unified and elegant solution to them. 1     

Ambiguity aversion: the explanatory power of indeterminate probabilities

Daniel Ellsberg presented in Ellsberg (The Quarterly Journal of Economics 75:643–669, 1961) various examples questioning the thesis that decision making under uncertainty can be reduced to decision making under risk. These examples constitute one of the main challenges to the received view on the foundations of decision theory offered by Leonard Savage in Savage (1972). Craig Fox and Amos Tversky have, nevertheless, offered an indirect defense of Savage. They provided in Fox and Tversky (1995) an explanation of Ellsberg’s two-color problem in terms of a psychological effect: ambiguity aversion. The ‘comparative ignorance’ hypothesis articulates how this effect works and explains why it is important to an understanding of the typical pattern of responses associated with Ellsberg’s two-color problem. In the first part of this article we challenge Fox and Tversky’s explanation. We present first an experiment that extends Ellsberg’s two-color problem where certain predictions of the comparative ignorance hypothesis are not confirmed. In addition the hypothesis seems unable to explain how the subjects resolve trade-offs between security and expected pay-off when vagueness is present. Ellsberg offered an explanation of the typical behavior elicited by his examples in terms of these trade-offs and in section three we offer a model of Ellsberg’s trade-offs. The model takes seriously the role of imprecise probabilities in explaining Ellsberg’s phenomenon. The so-called three-color problem was also considered in Fox and Tversky (1995). We argue that Fox and Tversky’s analysis of this case breaks a symmetry with their analysis of the two-color problem. We propose a unified treatment of both problems and we present a experiment that confirms our hypothesis.     

Identity Negotiations of Colombian International Students

Research has pointed to challenges and positive aspects of the international student experience, but it has been mainly outcome-oriented and has not addressed the ongoing identity negotiations of these students as they navigate a new cultural setting. The aim of this study was to illustrate the application of a sociocultural/dialogical framework to the analysis of identity processing by international students. Based on interviews with 14 Colombian university students in the United States, the analysis identified meanings (positionings) relative to the experience, tensions between meanings and, for some students, abstractions that served to resolve the tensions. We suggest that this dialogical framework promotes needed attention to the dynamic, ongoing nature of identity meaning creation.     

The politics of mental illness

What is needed today is a biologically grounded explanation of behavior, one that moves beyond the so‐called mind‐body problem. Yet no solution will be found by philosophers who refuse to learn about how brains and bodies work, or by neuroscientists pursuing experimental research based on outmoded or blatantly anti‐biological theories. Churchland's book proposes a solution: to come by a unified theory of the mind‐brain philosophers have to work together with neuroscientists. Yet Churchland's vision of a unified theory is based on an assumption that, while widely held, may not adequately reflect brain functioning in the production of behavior, namely, the assumption that brain processes represent. The present paper proposes an alternative view, suggesting that patterns of neural activity do not ‘represent’ anything, that brains do not ‘read’ or ‘transform’ representations, and that brains do not require representations to produce goal‐directed behavior. Representations are replaced by self‐organizing neural processes that achieve a certain end‐state of interaction between the organism and its environment in a flexible and adaptive manner. Some of the implications of this view for neuroscientific research and the philosophy of mind are outlined.     

心理学危机的实质与解决方案

人们曾在不同层面上讨论心理学的危机,而这种对危机认识的偏离本身又进一步加强了学科本身的分裂。在总结前人对危机认识的基础上,通过分析表明,心理学危机是心理学学科发展中自我同一性危机的表现,其实质在于心理学学科同一性的缺乏,而根源来自于心理学建立之初的理论基础。因此,心理学危机的解决有待于其学科同一性的确立,心理学学科的发展则有待于其学科同一性的展开。     

Academic careers in Asia: A cross-cultural analysis

Using Berry’s (1980) acculturation model as our theoretical foundation, we provide a conceptual framework for the cross-cultural analysis of academic careers in Asia in contrast to the United States. Consistent with Berry’s model, we propose a classification of three approaches to research (Adopted Western, Asian, and Integrationist) that can be selected by Asian academics. An individual’s acculturation level or cultural identity is then proposed as the key factor in influencing his or her decision of which research approach is selected. Next, we examine the cultural contextual factors in the academic environment in Asia that interacts with the three approaches to research and conclude that the Integrationist approach, while quite challenging, is likely to be the most productive in the long run. Finally, we discuss some unanswered questions raised by our analysis.     

On matters of mind and body: regarding Descartes

In this paper the author considers Descartes’ place in current thinking about the mind‐body dilemma. The premise here is that in the history of ideas, the questions posed can be as significant as the answers acquired. Descartes’ paramount question was ‘How do we determine certainty?’ and his pursuit of an answer led to cogito ergo sum. His discovery simultaneously raised the question whether mind is separate from or unified with the body. Some who currently hold that brain and subjectivity are unified contend that the philosopher ‘split’ mind from body and refer to ‘Descartes’ error’. This paper puts forward that Descartes’ detractors fail to recognise Descartes’ contribution to Western thought, which was to introduce the Enlightenment and to give a place to human subjectivity. Added to this, evidence from Descartes’ correspondence with Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia supports the conclusion that Descartes did in fact believe in the unity of mind and body although he could not reconcile this rationally with the certainty from personal experience that they were separate substances. In this Descartes was engaged in just the same dilemma as that of current thinkers and researchers, a conflict which still is yet to be resolved.     

Illusions of Optimal Motion,Relationism, and Perceptual Content

Austere relationism rejects the orthodox analysis of hallucinations and illusions as incorrect perceptual representations. In this article, I argue that illusions of optimal motion (IOMs) present a serious challenge for this view. First, I submit that austere‐relationist accounts of misleading experiences cannot be adapted to account for IOMs. Second, I show that any attempt at elucidating IOMs within an austere‐relationist framework undermines the claim that perceptual experiences fundamentally involve relations to mind‐independent objects. Third, I develop a representationalist model of IOMs. The proposed analysis combines two ideas: Evans' dynamic modes of presentation and Fine's relational semantics for identity.     

CAUSALITY, INTENSIONALITY AND IDENTITY: MIND BODY INTERACTION IN SPINOZA

According to Spinoza mental events and physical events are identical. What makes Spinoza's identity theory tempting is that it solves the problem of mind body interaction rather elegantly: mental events and physical events can be causally related to each other because mental events are physical events. However, Spinoza seems to deny that there is any causal interaction between mental and physical events. My aim is to show that Spinoza's apparent denial of mind body interaction can be reconciled with the identity theory. I argue that Spinoza had both an extensional and an intensional concept of cause and when Spinoza seems to deny mind body interaction he is having in mind the intensional concept of cause. This intensional concept of cause corresponds to that of causal explanation. I will argue that Spinoza anticipated Donald Davidson's view that even though mental events cannot be explained by referring to physical events and vice versa, mental and physical events are causally related to each other.     

The embodied mind

Abstract :  This paper considers Fonagy et al's concept of mentalization and contrasts aspects of this with aspects of Bion's model of the mind. The author argues that although mentalization adds to our understanding of mind it has limitations; that it may tend to over-emphasize certain types of external interaction between infant and carer and under-emphasize internal psychobiological processes. What is at issue here is the way in which an infant's carers facilitate the development of meaning out of experience. Bion's concept supposes a relatively 'interior' model in which, in important ways, the carer enables the infant to derive the meaning of his or her experience, whilst on the other hand Fonagy et al tend to talk more in terms of the ways in which the carer endows the infant's experience with meaning. Reference is made to Fordham's concept of states of 'Identity'. Fordham has pointed out that Freud's model is one in which mind is conceived of as evolving out of an infant's complex identifications with his or her carer(s); Jung's model envisages developmentally early states of identity as the means by which inherent capacities are realized.     

Mind, Self, and Personality: Dynamic Interactions from Late Childhood to Early Adulthood

This paper aims to integrate research on mind, personality, and self-development using a general model which hypothesizes that mind and personality are organized in 3 levels. The first level includes environment-oriented, domain-specific systems that specialize in the representation of and interaction with particular types of relationships in the environment in both the cognitive and the social realms. The second level comprises self-oriented monitoring and representation processes that build maps of the environment-oriented systems. Self and identity derive from the interaction between these 2 levels, which is subject to the constraints and the system's processing capacity at the successive ages. These constraints may be taken as the third level of the self. Efficiency in overcoming these constraints is determined by the self-oriented processes, generating feelings and self-representations of self-worth. These feelings are idiosyncratic, and function as a personal constant, which is applied on self-evaluation and self-representations. This constant is rescaled and differentiated with development. Thus, we have simultaneously both modular and transmodular constructs in the mind and the self, which change with relative independence of each other under the constraints of the general processing capabilities and the personal constant. A series of studies are presented to support this model, and its implications for life-span theories of development are discussed.