Philosophical Hermeneutics and Theological Education

This article explores the resources that the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans‐Georg Gadamer can bring to the challenge of teaching theology to undergraduates. The author offers a sympathetic reading of Gadamer but is influenced by the insights of liberation theology. In this interpretation of his work, Gadamer's contribution lies in his emphases on intersubjectivity and on praxis as the goal of historically conscious understanding — and thus of historically conscious theological education. To suggest what philosophical hermeneutics can tell us about the process of teaching and learning in theology, this essay examines Gadamer's approach to historicity, conversation, truth, objectivity, subjectivity, practical wisdom, and praxis.     

Word as image: Gadamer on the unity of word and thing

Continental Philosophy Review - One of Gadamer's largest and most characteristic concerns has been to show that hermeneutics is a form of practical philosophy. The central task of hermeneutics...     

The theory of justice from a hermeneutic perspective

In this article, I argue that Gadamer's hermeneutics of historical tradition does not imply a conservative stance on ethical and political issues. My essay seeks to show that Gadamer's philosophy leaves ample room for normative criticism, objectivity, and theories of justice at odds with conventional common sense. I critically examine Walzer's Spheres of Justice, reading it as an attempt to obtain a normative account of justice based on a hermeneutical framework of interpretation. I make several criticisms of Walzer's method and results, which I use to develop my own critical model for interpreting, criticizing, and revising traditional understandings, and common sense meanings. My conclusion is that we need to extend Gadamer's philosophy, in order to identify the ways that established traditions of understanding and common sense can result from, or produce, inconsistency, irrationality, hermeneutical incoherence, and meaningless deprivations or suffering. This essay thus seeks to develop an influential continental philosophy in a direction that makes fruitful contact with Anglo-American theories of justice, and normativity.     

A Response to Richard Wolin on Gadamer and the Nazis

Richard Wolin, in his article 'Nazism and the Complicities of Hans-Georg Gadamer: Untruth and Method' ( New Republic , 15 May 2000, pp. 36-45), wrongly accuses Gadamer of being 'in complicity' with the Nazis. The present article in reply was rejected by the New Republic , but is printed here to show that Wolin in his article is misinformed and unfair. First, Wolin makes elementary factual errors, such as stating that Gadamer was born in Breslau instead of Marburg. He relies on a highly questionable source, Teresa Orozco, as 'definitive'. He argues often by misconstruing the evidence and guilt by association. For instance, he associates Gadamer with Werner Jaeger, with whom he disagreed and had little contact. Finally,he misinterprets basic terms in Gadamer's hermeneutics, Vorurteil and authority, attributing to them the popular sense of these terms instead of their place in Gadamer's hermeneutics. Vorurteil , popularly translated as 'prejudice', but better rendered as 'prejudgment', refers to the prior knowledge that one needs in order to understand a situation or a text. In some cases, this is part of the inherited tradition. Authority refers to the respect one pays to those one recognizes as having more knowledge than oneself: one's doctor, or parent, or teacher, a judge, or certain texts. It is not an abject surrender to all authority but the necessary respect for authority in human relationships and in society in general. By misconstruing these terms, Wolin attempts to discredit Gadamer's general philosophy,not just to demonstrate a connection to the Nazis. At the end, his argument turns into a misinformed general political attack on Gadamer as an enemy of Enlightenment values.     

Does Conversation Need Shared Language? Davidson and Gadamer on Communicative Understanding

In a rare discussion of Gadamer's work, Davidson takes issue with Gadamer's claim that successful communication requires that interlocutors share a common language. While he is right to see a difference between his own views and Gadamer's on this point, Davidson appears to have misunderstood what motivates Gadamer's position, conflating it with that of his more familiar conventionalist interlocutors. This paper articulates Gadamer's view of the role of language in communicative understanding as an alternative to both Davidson's and that of the conventionalist writers Davidson critiques. It is argued, first, that Gadamer employs a conception of what individuates a language, and thus of what it means for two speakers to “share” a language, that Davidson never considers. By emphasizing the role of “application” in the historical development of languages, Gadamer develops a view in which languages are distinguished not by their particular semantic or syntactic rules, but by subtle differences between the concepts they express. Second, it is argued that the instances of “asymmetrical” communication—communication between interlocutors who have different sets of concepts at their disposal—that motivate Gadamer's position pose a challenge to Davidson's account of interpretative charity.     

True Identities: From Performativity to Festival

Some feminists have criticized Judith Butler's theory of performativity for providing an insufficient account of agency. In this article I first defend her against such charges by appealing to two themes central to Hans‐Georg Gadamer's hermeneutics. I compare her emphasis on the sociohistorical nature of agency with Gadamer's insistence on the historical nature of knowledge, and I examine the significance Butler assigns to repetition and note its affinities with Gadamer's conception of play. In the final part of the article I argue that in spite of providing an adequate account of agency, Butler's theory of performativity provides no way to allow us to evaluate performances. I show how Gadamer's account of festival, which builds on his concept of play, is useful in helping us make sense of how we might delineate true from false performances, and thus identities.     

The Unknown Before Discovery

Starting from the most important conquests of contemporary post-positivistic epistemology and from its authors such as Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, and Edgar Morin and going through Gadamer's hermeneutics or Wittgenstein and de Mandeville's approaches to scientific and social paradigms, this article focuses on the limits of scientific dogmas and on the overbearing rationalism that claims to explain everything, marginalizing many aspects of human life which cannot be rationalized. The scientific approach cannot be just conceptual. It must be opened to images and unusual connections. The scientist must concentrate his or her attention on limit-matters that are often unpredictable and go beyond the logical-philosophical field toward the metaphysical one. “I did not know I did not know” realized von Foerster, and aware of that, the scientist should become the specialist of the unknown, moving along the border-figures of science and philosophy.     

Inspiration in the Act of Reading: A Discussion of Ulrich H. J. Körtner's Hermeneutics

In German‐language theology, Professor Ulrich H. J. Körtner's theory of inspiration, as it relates to the Bible reader's perspective, is well known. His attempt to gain fruitful insights from contemporary literary hermeneutics while linking them to theological concerns makes his approach a valued yet not uncontroversial example of a reception‐aesthetics twist on the Lutheran sola Scriptura. This article presents Körtner's hermeneutical considerations with special regard to inspiration related to the Bible reader's perspective and shows how this approach may be related to some aspects of the crisis that the Lutheran churches and theology suffer today.     

Russian Phenomenology,or The Interrupted Flight

In this article the author notes that Russian phenomenology has a long history that has contributed to European progress in philosophy. He presents the main ideas of Gustav Shpet, a well‐known Russian thinker and original follower of Husserl. The heart of Shpet's positive philosophy is a special, skeptical state of mind—hermeneutic phenomenology. This positive philosophy, with its synthesis of hermeneutics and phenomenology, opposes Kant's negative, relativistic thought. In his work, Shpet focuses on the concept of a text. A text's meaning is objective and grasped via the nonpsychological methods of hermeneutics. Language largely determines the development of the human spiritual world, and so the problematics of language merge with the problematics of consciousness. Because texts are human products that express the influence of linguistic consciousness, our understanding of texts should be based on the analysis of language consciousness. Shpet characterizes the whole culture as a sign‐symbolical, objectified expression of the human spirit.     

THE SUPERNATURAL AS LANGUAGE GAME

Abstract. For many in the Anglo‐American tradition of language analysis, Ludwig Wittgenstein, the great progenitor of twentieth‐century philosophy of language, showed conclusively that theological terms lack any referent in reality and therefore represent a discourse that can do no more than manifest the existential attitudes that speakers take toward reality as a whole. To think that such terms represent more is to be bewitched by the use of language. Is it possible, however, that theological language references a fundamental human drive? In this article I reexamine the dyad of nature and supernature from the perspective of Wittgenstein's philosophy. Perhaps surprisingly, Wittgenstein's thought on the subject offers much more than his famous, terse aphorism at the conclusion of his first masterwork, the Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus ([1921] 1961, 74, §7): “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.” Furthermore, the basic Tractarian drive to determine the relationship between language and reality, which is redirected but not extinguished in Wittgenstein's second, divergent, opus, the Philosophical Investigations ([1953] 1967), may be the place for a renewed examination of what the supernatural means in human discourse. Does talk of God give expression to the fundamental transcendence of human knowledge? Is it a language game we can eschew?     

Reading Reinhold Niebuhr against Himself Again: On Theological Language and Divine Action

Since 1937, when Reinhold Niebuhr articulated his most developed understanding of the function of theological language, there has been debate about how his approach should be understood. Recent readings of Niebuhr have assumed that Niebuhr's account of theological language rests upon dualistic presuppositions. While acknowledging manifestations of post‐Cartesian dualism in Niebuhr's thought, this article argues that Niebuhr's thought also reflects a more compelling strain of Augustinian/Kierkegaardian anti‐dualism, and that reading Niebuhr through the lens of this anti‐dualism allows for a fruitful account of his treatment of theological language.     

INAUGURATING POSTCRITICAL PHILOSOPHY: A POLANYIAN MEDITATION ON CREATION AND CONVERSION IN AUGUSTINE'S CONFESSIONS

Abstract. Michael Polanyi names Augustine as inaugurates of his "postcritical"philosophy. To understand what this means by exploring creation in the Confessions will clarify complex problems in Augustine and articulate theological implications in Polanyi. Specifically, it will show why an autobiographical account of conversion ends speaking of creation; how creation can thus be understood as "personal" language; how creation can be recovered in a time preoccupied with conversion; how conversion and creation are linked with incarnation, hermeneutics, and confessional rhetoric; and it will suggest a contemporary use of creation language that connects the scientific and the religious.     

Relationality and Existence: Hermeneutic and Deconstructive Approaches Emerging From Heidegger's Philosophy

In this article I discuss the concept of relationality from a philosophical perspective. I focus, in particular, on the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, exploring how his relational concepts of worldhood, being-with, solicitude, and Befindlichkeit were central to his early philosophy, before he extended his ideas and related them to psychotherapy in his later work. I then proceed to focus on the work of other philosophers, influenced by Heidegger, who developed and extended his relational ideas further. In particular, I discuss Hans Georg Gadamer's notions of Horizon and Dialogue, Paul Ricouer's notion of Dialectics with Otherness, and the writings of Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida concerning Otherness, Difference, and Ethics. I develop this philosophical discussion as a foundation for further consideration of the relevance of relational ideas in philosophy to the domains of developmental psychopathology and clinical approaches in the field of psychotherapy.     

PROMETHEUS AND KANT: NEUTRALIZING THEOLOGICAL DISCOURSE AND DOXOLOGY

This essay argues that Kant's writings on religion recapitulate or anticipate many of the theoretical moves we find in Promethean discourses of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The first portion of the article lays out fundamental elements of Promethean discourse from a theological point of view, and distinguishes between "aggressive" and "urbane" Prometheanism. I contend that both types attack divine transcendence and Christian doxology, focus almost entirely on soteriology to the detriment of creation, and advocate a movement from theo-centric discourse to anthropocentric discourse. Yet urbane Prometheanism differs from its aggressive cousin by moving from hatred of God to a non-dialogical mode of indifference to God as an impotent and inconsequential deity. I argue that an urbane Prometheanism is what properly characterizes Kant's philosophy of religion—from his epistemic work in the first Critique , through his way of parsing theological and philosophical discursive responsibilities, to his actual hermeneutics of Christian doctrine.     

Conceptually Downstream: Revisiting Old Tributaries of Thought for “New” Constructivist Ideas and Practices

Contemporary constructivism occurs at the confluence of three tributaries of thought and practice: hermeneutics, phenomenology, and linguistic philosophy. Selectively tracing the contributions of each tributary, or tradition of thought, a case is made for integrating cultural meanings and customs, lived experience, and people's uses of language in a generative and socially grounded approach to constructivism.     

Meaning for Radical Contextualists: Travis and Gadamer on Why Words Matter

Charles Travis and Hans‐Georg Gadamer both affirm radical contextualism, the view that natural language is ineliminably context‐sensitive. However, they offer different accounts of the role linguistic meaning plays in determining the contents of utterances. I discuss the differences between Travis's and Gadamer's views of meaning and offer an argument in favour of the latter. I argue that Travis's view assumes a principled distinction between literal and figurative speech that is at odds with his wider contextualist commitments. By contrast, Gadamer's view, on which meaning is ‘fundamentally metaphorical,’ makes no such assumption and thus avoids the difficulty.     

The Theological Foundation of Hobbesian Physics: A Defence of Corporeal God

In 1668, the octogenarian Hobbes finally affirmed openly a doctrine that was unavoidable given his longstanding embrace of both theism and materialism: God is corporeal. However, this doctrine has generally been downplayed or dismissed by scholars, who have alleged that Hobbes's corporeal theism is irreconcilable with his more orthodox theological pronouncements or with his fundamental metaphysical principles. This paper defends the coherence of Hobbes's corporeal God against particularly vigorous criticisms of Douglas Jesseph and others. The aim of the paper is not, however, to situate Hobbes's deity safely within the boundaries of seventeenth century protestant theology, as defenders of Hobbesian theism have often wanted to do. Rather, the paper places the corporeal God at the metaphysical foundations of Hobbes's natural philosophy. Despite his early reticence about theological speculation, Hobbes eventually relied on God to provide a continuous, resistance-free source of motion or conatus to a material plenum whose parts would otherwise quickly slow to an infinitesimal crawl. Hobbes's late theology, while certainly heterodox in content, is not so different in function from that of contemporaries like René Descartes and Henry More, whose religious sincerity is rarely questioned. Hobbes' corporeal deity deserves a place in the seventeenth century pantheon.     

Logic as a Universal Medium or Logic as a Calculus? Husserl and the Presuppositions of “the Ultimate Presupposition of Twentieth Century Philosophy”

This paper discusses Jean van Heijenoort's (1967) and Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka's (1986, 1997) distinction between logic as a universal language and logic as a calculus, and its applicability to Edmund Husserl's phenomenology. Although it is argued that Husserl's phenomenology shares characteristics with both sides, his view of logic is closer to the model‐theoretical, logic‐as‐calculus view. However, Husserl's philosophy as transcendental philosophy is closer to the universalist view. This paper suggests that Husserl's position shows that holding a model‐theoretical view of logic does not necessarily imply a calculus view about the relations between language and the world. The situation calls for reflection about the distinction: It will be suggested that the applicability of the van Heijenoort and the Hintikkas distinction either has to be restricted to a particular philosopher's views about logic, in which case no implications about his or her more general philosophical views should be inferred from it; or the distinction turns into a question of whether our human predicament is inescapable or whether it is possible, presumably by means of model theory, to obtain neutral answers to philosophical questions. Thus the distinction ultimately turns into a question about the correct method for doing philosophy.     

Differing ways, <Emphasis Type="Italic">Dao</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Weg</Emphasis>: Comparative,metaphysical, and methodological considerations in Heidegger’s “Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache”

This paper critically examines Heidegger’s 1959 dialogue, A Conversation from [von] Language – Between a Japanese and an Inquirer, across three distinct levels: as (1) a cross-cultural comparative exchange, (2) a meta-philosophical/ontological analysis of the fundamental relation between language and thought, and (3) a methodological inquiry into the phenomenology and hermeneutics of conversation. Despite the problematic nature of Heidegger’s explicit comparative engagement, I contend that his questioning of the possibility of “a conversation from house to house” provides a substantial clarification of the meta-philosophical difficulties inherent in comparative and cross-cultural philosophy. At the same time, his thinking with respect to hermeneutics provides a methodological clue to the possibility of and the normative conditions for understanding across such cultural differences.