Re-Interpretation in Historiography: John Dewey and the Neo-Humanist Tradition

Did John Dewey’s ‘new philosophy of education’ really try to dissolve the whole block of tradition or is his debt namely to educational core-concepts of neo-humanism deeper than he was prepared to acknowledge? After some general remarks on the process of reception as productive re-adaptation and its implication for historiography I will deal with Dewey’s own contexts that shape the interpretative grid through which he receives the tradition. Two case studies attempt to illustrate both continuity and discontinuity with a specific part of this tradition, namely two critical perspectives within German neo-humanism: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Johann Friedrich Herbart.     

Dewey and the Question of Realism

An interpretation is given of John Dewey's views about “realism” in metaphysics, and of how these views relate to contemporary debates. Dewey rejected standard formulations of realism as a general metaphysical position, and interpreters have often been taken him to be sympathetic to some form of verificationism or constructivism. I argue that these interpretations are mistaken, as Dewey's unease with standard formulations of realism comes from his philosophical emphasis on intelligent control of events, by means of ordinary action. Because of his views about relations, Dewey's views in this area do risk collapsing into an overly holistic position. I discuss how these problems might be avoided, and consider also how Dewey's views about naturalism and realism might usefully inform ongoing work.     

The Extended Mind Rehabilitates The Metaphysical Hegel

The nonmetaphysical interpretation of Hegel's philosophy asserts that the metaphysical reading is not credible and so his philosophy must be rationally reconstructed so as to elide its metaphysical aspects. This article shows that the thesis of the extended mind approaches the metaphysical reading, thereby undermining denials of its credibility and providing the resources to articulate and defend the metaphysical reading of Hegel's philosophy. This fully rehabilitates the metaphysical Hegel. The article does not argue for the truth of the metaphysical Hegel's claims. Rather, it defends the correctness of reading his philosophy as metaphysical.     

Irrationality and egoism in Hegel’s account of right

ABSTRACT

Many interpreters argue that irrational acts of exchange can count as rational and civic-minded for Hegel – even though, admittedly, the persons who are exchanging their property are usually unaware of this fact. While I do not want to deny that property exchange can count as rational in terms of ‘mutual recognition’ as interpreters claim, this proposition raises an important question: What about the irrationality and arbitrariness that individuals as property owners and persons consciously enjoy? Are they mere vestiges of nature in Hegel’s system, or do they constitute a simple yet valid form of freedom that is not only a part of Hegel’s rational system of right, but its necessary starting point? I will argue the latter: The arbitrary, purely egoist self-definition of property owners is the simplest possible type of freedom for Hegel, which he dissects in order to show how the very arbitrary self-definition implicitly relies on an identity between persons, and hence foreshadows the more social forms of freedom Hegel will discuss later in his book. I make this argument by highlighting Hegel’s references to his discussion of atoms and freedom in his Logic of Being.     

Dewey's philosophy and the experience of working: Labor,tools and language

Although Richard Rorty has done much to renew interest in the philosophy of John Dewey, he nonetheless rejects two of the most important components of Dewey's philosophy, that is, his metaphysics and epistemology. Following George Santayana, Rorty accuses Dewey of trying to serve Locke and Hegel, an impossibility as Rorty rightly sees it. Rorty (1982) says that Dewey should have been “Hegelian all the way” (p. 85). By reconstructing a bit of Hegel's early philosophy of work, and comparing it to Dewey's metaphysics and epistemology we can see that Dewey was indeed “Hegelian all the way” and that Rorty has constructed a false dilemma. We also gain some interesting insight into Dewey's philosophy by viewing it in terms of labor, tools and language.     

"COGITOR ERGO SUM": ON THE MEANING AND RELEVANCE OF BAADER's THEOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF DESCARTES

This paper examines the arguments on the basis of which Franz Baader (1765–1841), the almost forgotten contemporary of Hegel and Schelling, rejected Descartes’ philosophy so decisively, that, at the end of his life, he wrote to a friend that he passionately wanted to put an end to Cartesianism. I defend the thesis that Baader's hostility to Cartesianism was ultimately grounded in a theological idea, and that his holistic and emphatically Christian thought can only be adequately understood in the light of his critique of Descartes and Cartesianism. I also suggest reasons why Baader's work might well be considered as a source of inspiration for contemporary discussions of postmodernism.     

Martin Heidegger's principle of identity: On belonging and Ereignis

This article discusses Martin Heidegger's interpretation of Parmenides given in his last public lecture “The Principle of Identity” in 1957. The aim of the piece is to illustrate just how original and significant Heidegger's reading of Parmenides and the principle of identity is, within the history of philosophy. Thus the article will examine the traditional metaphysical interpretation of Parmenides, and consider G. W. F. Hegel and William James’ account of the principle of identity in light of this. It will then consider Heidegger's contribution, his return to and re-interpretation of Parmenides in his last lecture. Heidegger will, through the Parmenidean claim that “Thinking and Being are one”, deconstruct the traditional metaphysical understanding of the principle of identity, and in its place offer a radically different conception of how our relationship, our “belonging together” with Being can be understood.     

If Reason is ‘in the World’, Where Exactly is it Located?

In his recent book James Kreines argues that for Hegel reason is “in the world”, but how we are to understand the idea of reason's being so located? One answer, suggested by more traditional theocentric readings of Hegel, would be to appeal to the idea of a divine thought, coursing through the world. Another answer, more congenial to modern sensibilities, might locate reason within the rational activities of inter‐subjectively connected human beings, as suggested by Terry Pinkard's idea of the “sociality of reason”. Kreines seems to want to avoid suggestions of the former, but in distancing himself from approaches like the latter, he also seems to refuse the more metaphysically modest alternative. In retracing the contours of Kreines's nuanced attempt to reinflate Hegel's metaphysics as a “metaphysics of reason”, I pose the question as to whether he can avoid reintroducing a more extravagantly metaphysical Hegel than he wishes.     

Healing the physical/spiritual divide through a holistic and hermeneutic approach to education

In this special edition of the journal, attention is being given to the two dimensions of spirituality and physicality. In this particular paper I argue that there is an unhelpful divide that is often assumed to exist between these two dimensions and that this divide can be transcended or ‘healed’ through a holistic and hermeneutic approach to education. Rather than give our focus to narrower concerns such as spiritual education and physical education, we ought instead to pursue education in such a way that it is understood to necessarily be inclusive of both the physical and the spiritual simultaneously. That is, our spirituality is necessarily embodied in the physical. In order to make this argument, references to holistic education shall mainly draw upon the works of Dewey and Gadamer.     

Nature, Education and Things

In this essay it is argued that the educational philosophy of John Dewey gains in depth and importance by being related to his philosophy of nature, his metaphysics. The result is that any experiental process is situated inside an event, an existence, a thing, and I try to interpret this “thing” as schools or major cultural events such as the French revolution. This basic view is correlated to Dewey’s concept of transaction, of experience and finally, it is related to a discussion of methods in education.     

John Dewey and the Role of Scientific Method in Aesthetic Experience

In this paper I examine a controversy ongoingwithin current Deweyan philosophy of educationscholarship regarding the proper role and scopeof science in Dewey's concept of inquiry. Theside I take is nuanced. It is one that issensitive to the importance that Dewey attachesto science as the best method of solvingproblems, while also sensitive to thosestatements in Dewey that counter a wholesalereductivism of inquiry to scientific method. Iutilize Dewey's statements regarding the placeaccorded to inquiry in aesthetic experiences ascharacteristic of his method, as bestconceived.     

Mikhail Lifshits and the fate of Hegelianism in the 20th century

In his essay “Das literarische Erbe Hegels” (“The fate of Hegel’s literary legacy”, 1931) Lifshits addressed the fate of Hegelianism in the first third of the 20th century. He observed a struggle surrounding Hegel’s heritage between Marxism on the one hand, and Neo-Hegelianism or ?the Hegel renaissance“ on the other hand and came to the conclusion that the only legitimate Hegel heir is—Marxism. According to Lifshits, Neo-Hegelianism exploits the “Hegelian state” to justify the modern power state by illegitimately shifting the meaning of the Hegelian concept of the state. Thanks to Kojève’s philosophy, a diffuse yet profound Neo-Hegelian influence continues to have an impact on modern thinking, which gives cause in this essay to examine Lifshits’ verdict on the illegitimacy of the Neo-Hegelian Hegel heritage by confronting his argumentation with Kojève’s Neo-Hegelian concept. So, this essay will update Lifshits’ perspective on the fate of Hegelianism and broaden it beyond the horizon that was available to Lifshits.     

John dewey in france

The present article on John Dewey aims at pursuing the traces of the reception of Dewey’s work in France. It is intended as a survey of the writers who have taken note of Dewey and his ideas, and is meant to function as a sort of additive inventory, with no claim to comprehensiveness. Some of the articles mentioned were unfortunately unavailable for direct examination and are thus listed merely for purposes of information. Although the educational and philosophical writings of John Dewey are actually indivisible, Dewey’s oeuvre has not been read in France and Europe generally as of a piece, but has largely been registered in terms of those parts which have relevance to education and teaching. Indicative of this is the fact that it took until 1975 forDemocracy and Education (1916)-the book which, in Dewey’s own view, most clearly presented his linking of pedagogy and philosophy (Delledalle, 1975; Suhr, 1994) — to be published in France. Gérard Delledalle, the translator ofDemocracy and Education, is the only person so far in France to have dealt systematically with the whole of Dewey’s writings. He has translated other works by Dewey and has written several books on him, dealing expressly with Dewey’s philosophy of pragmatism as the foundation of his theory of education. It is actually inadequate to restrict the reception of Dewey’s work to France alone. Rather, one should speak of francophone Europe, for the first translations of Dewey’s educational writings into French were made by Adolphe Ferrière, Ovide Decroly and édouard Claparède — a Swiss, a Belgian, and a Frenchman. It was thanks to them that Dewey’s thoughts on education began to make an impact on the francophone movement for school reform in the early twentieth century. Discussion of his theory of education is typified in France as well by a division into proponents of a concept of ‘learning by doing’ indebted to Dewey (particularly in France) and representatives of authoritarian forms of education, which reject Dewey. Although French thought has not yet concerned itself closely with pragmatism, Dewey’s opponents believed (and still believe) that they could denounce him and his theories simply by levelling the charge of “pragmatism.” This dualistic mode of thinking which appears to be deeply rooted in France has proved to be an obstacle to the reception of Dewey and has led to neglect and rejection of his theories.     

Growth,Experience and Nature in Dewey's Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy

Growth is an important concept in Dewey's philosophy,and,indeed,its ultimate focus.It is not,however,an easy task to posit growth as an ethical ideal,for here Dewey immediately faces a metaphysical dilemma:whether to offer us an objective standard of growth,which becomes a type of absolutism,or to inevitably fall into relativism.This paper explores how Dewey avoids this dilemma with his concept of experience,which is interrogated through the relationship between human beings and nature.Still,human growth in nature involves the cultivation of virtuosities (de德) in accordance with the rhythm of nature,and requires a completely different way of life other than our technological one.For this reason,I use Chinese philosophy,specifically ideas from the Yijing,to show how growth can be illustrated through the interaction between humans and the natural world.     

John Dewey in France

The present article on John Dewey aims at pursuing thetraces of the reception of Dewey's work in France. Itis intended as a survey of the writers who have takennote of Dewey and his ideas, and is meant to functionas a sort of additive inventory, with no claim tocomprehensiveness. Some of the articles mentioned wereunfortunately unavailable for direct examination andare thus listed merely for purposes of information.Although the educational and philosophical writings ofJohn Dewey are actually indivisible, Dewey's oeuvrehas not been read in France and Europe generally as ofa piece, but has largely been registered in terms ofthose parts which have relevance to education andteaching. Indicative of this is the fact that it tookuntil 1975 for Democracy and Education (1916) –the book which, in Dewey's own view, most clearlypresented his linking of pedagogy and philosophy(Delledalle, 1975; Suhr, 1994) – to be published inFrance. Gérard Delledalle, the translator ofDemocracy and Education, is the only person so far inFrance to have dealt systematically with the whole ofDewey's writings. He has translated other works byDewey and has written several books on him, dealingexpressly with Dewey's philosophy of pragmatism as thefoundation of his theory of education.It is actually inadequate to restrict the reception ofDewey's work to France alone. Rather, one should speakof francophone Europe, for the first translations ofDewey's educational writings into French were made byAdolphe Ferriére, Ovide Decroly and ÉdouardClaparéde – a Swiss, a Belgian, and a Frenchman.It was thanks to them that Dewey's thoughts oneducation began to make an impact on the francophonemovement for school reform in the early twentiethcentury.Discussion of his theory of education is typified inFrance as well by a division into proponents of aconcept of `learning by doing' indebted to Dewey(particularly in France) and representatives ofauthoritarian forms of education, which reject Dewey.Although French thought has not yet concerned itselfclosely with pragmatism, Dewey's opponents believed(and still believe) that they could denounce him andhis theories simply by levelling the charge of``pragmatism.' This dualistic mode of thinking whichappears to be deeply rooted in France has proved to bean obstacle to the reception of Dewey and has led toneglect and rejection of his theories.     

The disclosure of a metaphysical horizon,or how to escape dialectics

Abstract

In a footnote to The Inoperative Community French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy wonders how to escape Hegelian dialectics. Because Nancy in his later work often returns to this attempt of a ‘disclosure of our metaphysical horizon’, we not only consider this note as a crucial one in his attempt to ‘disclose’ our metaphysical horizon; on top of that, we think this note is really worthwhile considering for our philosophical era in general: how to think after the so called ‘end of metaphysics’? Nancy’s work is an explicit confrontation with this horizon. Therefore, in this paper we prefer to reconstruct his line of thought in this, from the influence of Georges Bataille and Maurice Blanchot, over Friedrich Hegel up to Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida. We focus on the way attempts for the disclosure of our metaphysical horizon out from the problem of community, one of the central topics in his work. We conclude with a discussion why Nancy’s ontological framework has the potential to break up the metaphysical horizon of our philosophical era.     

“Bodyheartminding” (Xin 心): Reconceiving the Inner Self and the Outer World in the Language of Holographic Focus and Field

In this essay, inspired by the somatic turn in philosophy initiated by Richard Shusterman, I want to invoke the language of classical Confucian philosophy to think through the best efforts of William James and John Dewey to escape the mind-body and nature-nurture dualisms—that is, to offer an alternative vocabulary that might lend further clarity to the revolutionary insights of James and Dewey by appealing to the processual categories of Chinese cosmology. What I will try to do first is to refocus the pragmatist’s explanation of the relationship between mind and body through the lens of a process Confucian cosmology. And then, to make the case for James and Dewey, I will return to the radical, imagistic language they invoke to try and make the argument that this processual, holistic understanding of “vital bodyminding” is in fact what they were trying to say all along.     

Michel Henry's Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience and Husserlian Intentionality

In his essay 'The Pit and the Pyramid: Introduction to Hegel's Semiology', Jacques Derrida claims that there is a privilege of speech over writing inherent in Hegel's theory of signs. In this paper, I examine Derrida's criticism. While it is to Derrida's credit that he focusses on an area of Hegel's philosophy that has hardly been analysed, his reading is problematic in several regards. After presenting Derrida's main arguments, I pose three questions, the first of which belongs to the realm of subjective spirit, the second to objective spirit, and the third to absolute spirit. I shall then show that Hegel makes several statements in favour of a privilege of writing over speech - statements that are not merely parenthetic or marginal. Moreover, those claims that Hegel makes toward any privilege of speech are in the wrong place, namely, subjective spirit, for them to represent his final point of view.     

Hegel,grandfather of disjunctivism

In this paper, I shall investigate whether Hegel can be considered as a sort of ancestor of McDowell’s disjunctivism. If this hypothesis turns out to be plausible, then the paper offers two gains. On the one hand, it offers an innovative interpretation of the way in which Hegel conceives of our sensible epistemic access to the world. On the other hand, McDowell's own claim that his own theoretical proposal has a Hegelian sound is supported by a previously unexplored argument. I organize my analysis into three parts: I sketch McDowell’s version of disjunctivism (Section 2); I analyze some passages from Hegel that I believe are important for showing some similarities between his and McDowell’s argumentative strategy (Section 3); in the conclusion (Section 4), I highlight a number of core features that Hegel seems to share with McDowell’s disjunctivism and I submit that they are sufficient to label Hegel the “grandfather” of McDowell's disjunctivism.     

Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective

David Lewis is a natural target for those who believe that findings in quantum physics threaten the tenability of traditional metaphysical reductionism. Such philosophers point to allegedly holistic entities they take both to be the subjects of some claims of quantum mechanics and to be incompatible with Lewisian metaphysics. According to one popular argument, the non-separability argument from quantum entanglement, any realist interpretation of quantum theory is straightforwardly inconsistent with the reductive conviction that the complete physical state of the world supervenes on the intrinsic properties of and spatio-temporal relations between its point-sized constituents. Here I defend Lewis's metaphysical doctrine, and traditional reductionism more generally, against this alleged threat from quantum holism. After presenting the non-separability argument from entanglement, I show that Bohmian mechanics, an interpretation of quantum mechanics explicitly recognized as a realist one by proponents of the non-separability argument, plausibly rejects a key premise of that argument. Another holistic worry for Humeanism persists, however, the trouble being the apparently holistic character of the Bohmian pilot wave. I present a Humean strategy for addressing the holistic threat from the pilot wave by drawing on resources from the Humean best system account of laws.