Indirect Effects of Parenting Practices on Internalizing Problems among Adolescents: The Role of Expressive Suppression

Negative parenting practices are thought to be essential for the development of adolescents’ internalizing problems. However, mechanisms linking parental practices to adolescents’ internalizing problems remain poorly understood. A potential pathway connecting parental behaviors to internalizing problems could be through adolescent expressive suppression—the tendency to inhibit the observable expression of emotions.This study examined the indirect effects of three individual parenting practices—poor monitoring, inconsistent discipline and use of corporal punishment—on adolescents’ internalizing problems through adolescents’regular use of expressive suppression in a sample of 1132 adolescents (10–14 years). Structural Equation Modeling indicated that parenting practices were related both directly and indirectly to adolescents’ internalizing problems through their relationship with suppression. Clinical implications and future directions are discussed.     

A typology of personal and environmental sexual harassment: Research and policy implications for the 1990s

Most of the research conducted on sexual harassment over the last decade and a half has used categories that are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive. This has created problems for researchers: it is difficult to compare results from one study to another, harassment types that have scholarly and legal-policy relevance are omitted, and the ability of researchers to inform legal and policy decisions is diminished as a result of these problems. A comprehensive categorization of harassment types that addresses these methodological problems is presented. Specifically, 11 specific types of harassment—4 types of Verbal Requests, 3 Verbal Remarks, and 4 Nonverbal Displays—are presented with examples from research and legal literatures. Recommendations for reconceptualizing research definitions of harassment as well as for diversifying the methodological approaches to the topic are made.     

Innovative problem-solving in a small,wild canid

Animal Cognition - Innovation — the ability to solve problems in a novel way — is not only associated with cognitive abilities and relative brain size, but also by noncognitive traits,...     

Philosophy,Logic, Science,History

Analytic philosophy is sometimes said to have particularly close connections to logic and to science, and no particularly interesting or close relation to its own history. It is argued here that although the connections to logic and science have been important in the development of analytic philosophy, these connections do not come close to characterizing the nature of analytic philosophy, either as a body of doctrines or as a philosophical method. We will do better to understand analytic philosophy—and its relationship to continental philosophy—if we see it as a historically constructed collection of texts, which define its key problems and concerns. It is true, however, that analytic philosophy has paid little attention to the history of the subject. This is both its strength—since it allows for a distinctive kind of creativity—and its weakness—since ignoring history can encourage a philosophical variety of “normal science.”     

The Ineliminability of Epistemic Rationality*

Many writers have recently urged that the epistemic rationality of beliefs can depend on broadly pragmatic (as opposed to truth-directed) factors. Taken to an extreme, this line of thought leads to a view on which there is no such thing as a distinctive epistemic form of rationality. A series of papers by Susanna Rinard develops the view that something like our traditional notion of pragmatic rationality is all that is needed to account for the rationality of beliefs. This approach has undeniable attractions. But examining different versions of the approach uncovers problems. The problems help reveal why epistemic rationality is an indispensable part of understanding rationality—not only of beliefs, but of actions. We may or may not end up wanting to make a place, in our theories of epistemic rationality, for factors such as the practical or moral consequences of having beliefs. But a purely pragmatic notion of rationality—one that’s stripped of any component of distinctively epistemic evaluation—cannot do all the work that we need done.     

On phallic defense

The main theme of this paper is a consideration of some fundamental findings with regard to the oedipus complex and phallicism. By these terms is meant the oedipal sexual wish, the urgent need for defence against it and its attendant problems, and the phallic notion of only one kind of genital—the phallus—existing. The object of investigation is the potential use of phallicism as a defensive organization against the problems of the oedipal phase.     

Adaptive expertise: Effects of type of experience and the level of theoretical understanding it generates

This research investigates the development of transferable—“adaptive”—expertise. The study contrasts problem-solving performance of two kinds of experts (business consultants and restaurant managers) on novel problems at the intersection of their two domains, as well as a group of novices (non-business undergraduates). Despite a lack of restaurant experience, consultants performed better than restaurant managers and undergraduates, even though the problems concerned a restaurant. Process measures suggest this was due to the use of more theoretical reasoning. Analyses show this resulted from differences in work experience and not other factors (e.g., education). We discuss aspects of experience that might be responsible for development of theoretical understanding and, thus, expertise that transfers to novel problems. One possible explanation, consistent with existing research from multiple approaches, is that to transfer to novel problems, experience must include substantive variability. The social context of learning may also play a role.     

Item-specific effects in recognition failure: Reasons for rejection of the Tulving-Wiseman function

The present paper addresses the problems of whether recognition failure of recallable words is a function of both recognition and recall, and whether recognition failure is restricted to a small and specifiable subset of study items. A meta-analysis of the Nilsson—Gardiner database (Nilsson & Gardiner, 1993) showed that recognition given recall was positively correlated with recognition and negatively correlated with recall. Two new experiments are reported, the first one using 48 word pairs for which recognition failure was found in previous studies. An item analysis of the data demonstrated that recognition failure occurred primarily with noun—adjective pairs. The second experiment compared Norwegian—American and American—Norwegian name pairs. Wide deviation from the Tulving—Wiseman function (Tulving & Wiseman, 1975) was observed for the latter condition. In both conditions, recognition failure occurred with only the items for which the beginnings of names shared three or more letters. It is concluded that recognition failure occurs when there exists a relationship between the members of an A—B pair that is independent of their pairing in the study context. The Tulving—Wiseman function is the result of collapsing across items in the analysis of previous studies.     

Greatest surprise reduction semantics: an information theoretic solution to misrepresentation and disjunction

Causal theories of content, a popular family of approaches to defining the content of mental states, commonly run afoul of two related and serious problems that prevent them from providing an adequate theory of mental content—the misrepresentation problem and the disjunction problem. In this paper, I present a causal theory of content, built on information theoretic tools, that solves these problems and provides a viable model of mental content. This is the greatest surprise reduction theory of content, which identifies the content of a signal as the event the surprisal of which is most reduced by that signal. Conceptually, this amounts to the claim that the content of a signal is the event the probability of which has increased by the largest proportion, or the event that the signal makes the most less surprising to us. I develop the greatest surprise reduction theory of content in four stages. First, I introduce the general project of causal theories of content, and the challenges presented to this project by the misrepresentation and disjunction problems. Next, I review two recent and prominent causal theories of content and demonstrate the serious challenges faced by these approaches, both clarifying the need for a solution to the misrepresentation and disjunction problems and providing a conceptual background for the greatest surprise reduction theory. Then, I develop the greatest surprise reduction theory of content, demonstrate its ability to resolve the misrepresentation and disjunction problems, and explore some additional applications it may have. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of a particularly difficult challenge that remains to be addressed—the partition problem—and sketch a path to a potential solution.

     

Synergic inquiry and evolution of consciousness

Challenged by overwhelming social and ecological problems and crises, a new alternative that re‐explains the world is called for to transform human consciousness. The author argues that an alternative should meet the following criteria: (1) corresponding to the total reality, (2) contributing evolution of consciousness, and (3) coming with an adequate action methodology. Based on an understanding of the coherent patterns—the processes of differentiation and integration—through which the universe evolves, the Synergy Principle of the universe is established. Dimensionality of consciousness—the visible, logical, and mythical—is also presented. Further, the Synergic Inquiry methodology designed to guide human action work for consciousness transformation at various levels of human systems is developed. Finally a few levels of synergy are also discussed.     

Knowledge,conservatism, and pragmatics

The apparent contextual variability exhibited by ‘knows’ and its cognates—brought to attention in examples like Keith DeRose’s Bank Case—poses familiar problems for conservative forms of invariantism about ‘knows’. The paper examines and criticises a popular response to those problems, one that involves appeal to so-called ‘pragmatic’ features of language. It is first argued, contrary to what seems to have been generally assumed, that any pragmatic defence faces serious problems with regard to our judgments about retraction. Second, the familiar objection that the pragmatic effects at issue do not seem to be cancellable is considered. Advocates of the pragmatic defence have suggested that cancellability concerns can be dealt with fairly readily. It is shown both that their recent attempts to respond to those concerns, and some other possible attempts, are unsuccessful. Finally, it is argued that the popular relevance-based accounts, found in the work of Jessica Brown, Alan Hazlett, and Patrick Rysiew, fail to provide a satisfactory explanation of our judgments.     

Conceptualizing Religious Practices in Psychological Research: Problems and Prospects

This article addresses the problems and prospects that follow from the conceptualization of religious phenomena and practices for scientific investigation in the psychology of religion. Two Western research traditions—instrumentalism and operationalism—are described and their potential contribution to a mismatch between what researchers intend to study and what they actually study is illustrated through two exemplar studies. The exemplar studies show how researchers’ concern with methodological rigor can compromise the rich and thick meanings of religious practices, resulting in the misrepresentation of the practices and misleading both the psychological and religious research consumer. Several suggestions for dealing with these problems are discussed.     

Dealing with diversity in workgroups: Preventing problems and promoting potential

Diversity is a popular topic among academics and practitioners alike. It is also a topic that is surrounded with controversies and passionate opinions. This makes understanding the ambiguous consequences of diversity a highly interesting and puzzling endeavor. To facilitate understanding of diversity's effects in workgroups, I present an overview of the state‐of‐the‐art in diversity research and discuss the potential problems and benefits that are associated with group diversity. Moreover, I discuss how research on diversity interventions uses this problems versus potential approach to distinguish moderators of diversity's effects. Based on this overview, I argue that similar to the importance of contingencies for predicting diversity's effects, contingencies also play a crucial role in predicting the effectiveness of diversity interventions. As such, the current overview stresses the lack of main effects of both diversity and diversity interventions. Finally, I discuss recent work illustrating these contingencies and conclude that positive diversity mindsets—favorable mental representations of group diversity—are a necessary prerequisite to prevent problems and promote potential of group diversity.     

Other minds embodied

I distinguish three kinds of other minds problems—conceptual, epistemological and empirical. I argue that while Merleau-Ponty believes embodiment helps with tackling the conceptual and epistemological problems, he suggests that it is of no clear use in solving (an important variant of) the empirical problem. I sketch some considerations that could lend support to Merleau-Ponty’s claims about the conceptual and epistemological problems, without claiming that these are conclusive. I then proceed to argue that Merleau-Ponty’s take on the empirical problem is essentially correct.     

The effects of monitoring environment on problem-solving performance

While effective and efficient solving of everyday problems is important in business domains, little is known about the effects of workplace monitoring on problem-solving performance. In a laboratory experiment, we explored the monitoring environment’s effects on an individual’s propensity to (1) establish pattern solutions to problems, (2) recognize when pattern solutions are no longer efficient, and (3) solve complex problems. Under three work monitoring regimes—no monitoring, human monitoring, and electronic monitoring—114 participants solved puzzles for monetary rewards. Based on research related to worker autonomy and theory of social facilitation, we hypothesized that monitored (versus non-monitored) participants would (1) have more difficulty finding a pattern solution, (2) more often fail to recognize when the pattern solution is no longer efficient, and (3) solve fewer complex problems. Our results support the first two hypotheses, but in complex problem solving, an interaction was found between self-assessed ability and the monitoring environment.     

Locus of control as a mediator of the association between attachment and children’s mental health

Locus of control—the expectation that one is in control of one’s outcomes in life—is linked to well-being. The authors explored one of the possible antecedents of locus of control such as secure children’s attachment. The hypothesis was that locus of control acts as a mediator of the association between children’s attachment and their mental health, in terms of depression, anxiety (internalizing problems), and aggression (externalizing problems). Participants were 206 children with ages ranging from 8 to 14 years. The authors obtained data from teachers as well as by self-report. Structural equations modelling yielded significant results for both a direct path from insecure attachment to internalizing problems and an indirect pathway in which locus of control functions as a mediating variable between children’s attachment and internalizing problems. Although the data were consistent with the mediated pathway with regard to internalizing problems, different findings emerged for aggression. Insecure attachment was a significant predictor of aggressive behavior, while locus of control was not a mediator between attachment and aggressive behavior. The authors’ findings confirm the mediating role of the locus of control between attachment and internalizing problems, but not between attachment and externalizing ones.     

A liberal theory of externalities?

Unlike exploitative exchanges, exchanges featuring externalities have never seemed to pose particular problems to liberal theories of justice. State interference with exchanges featuring externalities seems permissible, like it is for coercive or deceptive exchanges. This is because exchanges featuring negative externalities seem to be clear cases of the two exchanging parties harming a third one via the exchange—and thus of conduct violating the harm principle. This essay aims to put this idea into question. I will argue that exchanges featuring negative externalities are not unjust in this straightforward way, i.e. because they would constitute an instance of wrongfully causing or risking a bodily or material harm. In fact, unless we are subscribing to particularly demanding variants of liberalism—e.g. perfectionist liberalism—or unless we are exclusively focusing on borderline cases of externalities—i.e. of effects of exchanges hardly to be called externalities—there is no liberal theory of how exchanges featuring externalities are unjust.     

An Overview of Issues Related to Categorical and Dimensional Models of Personality Disorder Assessment

Despite long-standing efforts to improve the current diagnostic system for Axis II, problems remain with the categorical conceptualization of personality disorders (PDs). Due in part to these problems, interest has developed in dimensional models of PD classification. In this article, we discuss four issues relevant to categorical vs. dimensional assessment of PDs: (a) problems with self-reports in PD patients, (b) methodological issues in behavioral and clinician assessment of PDs, (c) challenges that arise when dimensional models are applied to patient and nonpatient samples, and (d) clinical implications of categorical and dimensional PD models. We suggest that researchers and clinicians address these concerns to avoid implementing a new PD assessment model that—although different from the current system—would otherwise remain fraught with difficulties.     

The Effects of Presenting Multidigit Mathematics Problems in a Realistic Context on Sixth Graders' Problem Solving

Mathematics education and assessments increasingly involve arithmetic problems presented in context: a realistic situation that requires mathematical modeling. This study assessed the effects of such typical school mathematics contexts on two aspects of problem solving: performance and strategy use. Multidigit arithmetic problems presented in two conditions—with and without a realistic context—were solved by 685 sixth graders from The Netherlands. Regarding performance, the same (latent) ability dimension was involved in solving both types of problems, and the presence of a context increased the difficulty level of the division problems but not of other operations. Regarding strategy use, strategy choice and strategy accuracy were not affected by the presence of a problem context. In sum, the presence of a typical context in multidigit arithmetic problems had no marked effects on students' problem-solving behavior, which held for different subgroups of students with respect to language ability and gender.     

Logic or rhetoric in law?

One of the most crucial questions in the philosophy of law deals with the very nature of legal reasoning. Does this reasoning belong to logic or to rhetoric? This debate, increasingly centered on rhetoric, is not merely a question of language use; it covers and indicates a more basic choice between formal legalism — focusing on rational deduction from the law — and pragmatic judiciarism — focusing on reasonable debate in the court. Today, it is necessary to circumscribe the respective fields of logic and rhetoric in the language of law, while showing how they are sometimes complementary in the resolution of legal problems. But, even when we have acknowledged the need for a rhetoric accompanied by logic, we have to define that rhetoric cautiously. I confront a narrow rhetoric, often called argumentation, with a wider one of interrogative nature. There are two conceptions of rationality at stake. Their comparison enables us to raise the question of the foundation of law, as a locus to use arguments, as well as to solve social problems.