Animal Pain: What It is and Why It Matters

The basis of having a direct moral obligation to an entity is that what we do to that entity matters to it. The ability to experience pain is a sufficient condition for a being to be morally considerable. But the ability to feel pain is not a necessary condition for moral considerability. Organisms could have possibly evolved so as to be motivated to flee danger or injury or to eat or drink not by pain, but by “pangs of pleasure” that increase as one fills the relevant need or escapes the harm. In such a world, “mattering” would be positive, not negative, but would still be based in sentience and awareness. In our world, however, the “mattering” necessary to survival is negative—injuries and unfulfilled needs ramify in pain. But physical pain is by no means the only morally relevant mattering—fear, anxiety, loneliness, grief, certainly do not equate to varieties of physical pain, but are surely forms of “mattering.” An adequate morality towards animals would include a full range of possible matterings unique to each kind of animal, what I, following Aristotle, call “telos”. Sometimes not meeting other aspects of animal nature matter more to the animal than does physical pain. “Negative mattering” means all actions or events that harm animals—from frightening an animal to removing its young unnaturally early, to keeping it so it is unable to move or socialize. Physical pain is perhaps the paradigmatic case of “negative mattering”, but only constitutes a small part of what the concept covers. “Positive mattering” would of course encompass all states that are positive for the animal. An adequate ethic for animals takes cognizance of both kinds. The question arises as to how animals value death as compared with pain. Human cognition is such that it can value long-term future goals and endure short-run negative experiences for the sake of achieving them. In the case of animals, however, there is no evidence, either empirical or conceptual, that they have the capability to weigh future benefits or possibilities against current misery. We have no reason to believe that an animal can grasp the notion of extended life, let alone choose to trade current suffering for it. Pain may well be worse for animals than for humans, as they cannot rationalize its acceptance by appeal to future life without pain. How can we know that animals experience all or any of the negative or positive states we have enumerated above? The notion that we needed to be agnostic or downright atheistic about animal mentation, including pain, because we could not verify it through experience, became a mainstay of what I have called “scientific ideology”, the uncriticized dogma taught to young scientists through most of the 20th century despite its patent ignoring of Darwinian phylogenetic continuity. Together with the equally pernicious notion that science is “value-free”, and thus has no truck with ethics, this provided the complete justification for hurting animals in science without providing any pain control. This ideology could only be overthrown by federal law. Ordinary common sense throughout history, in contradistinction to scientific ideology, never denied that animals felt pain. Where, then, does the denial of pain and other forms of mattering come from if it is inimical to common sense? It came from the creation of philosophical systems hostile to common sense and salubrious to a scientific, non-commonsensical world view. Reasons for rejecting this philosophical position are detailed. In the end, then, there are no sound reasons for rejecting knowledge of animal pain and other forms of both negative and positive mattering in animals. Once that hurdle is cleared, science must work assiduously to classify, understand, and mitigate all instances of negative mattering occasioned in animals by human use, as well as to understand and maximize all modes of positive mattering.     

Animal Morality: What It Means and Why It Matters

It has been argued that some animals are moral subjects, that is, beings who are capable of behaving on the basis of moral motivations (Rowlands 2011, 2012, 2017). In this paper, we do not challenge this claim. Instead, we presuppose its plausibility in order to explore what ethical consequences follow from it. Using the capabilities approach (Nussbaum 2004, 2007), we argue that beings who are moral subjects are entitled to enjoy positive opportunities for the flourishing of their moral capabilities, and that the thwarting of these capabilities entails a harm that cannot be fully explained in terms of hedonistic welfare. We explore the implications of this idea for the assessment of current practices involving animals.     

十年坚持话责任

到上一期为止,《科学与无神论》杂志已经走过了十年路程。如果说十年坚持宣传无神论的历程能够说明点什么,那就是本期两篇论文的题目：“宣传科学无神论责任重于泰山”,而“《科学与无神论》的创刊势在必行”。     

考古队员古墓开启祭拜仪式令人震惊

《北京青年报》2006年12月27日报道,南京市博物馆考古队员开启了疑似秦桧墓的西边墓室。“墓室开启前,发掘现场最先映入人们眼帘的是一     

探索真理的目的——科学之树如何四季常青

一个美国研究团队不小心将“病毒”引入了他们正在进行科学研究的第三世界国家。这些“病毒”导致了婴儿死亡率的上升,妇女和儿童健康水     

The Idea of Practice and Why It Matters in the Teaching of Preaching

Abstract. The concept of practice helps us better understand how preaching works, as well as how we can teach that practice more effectively. This essay develops a compact but wide‐ranging view of practices, reflecting the current scholarly discussion. It also argues that preaching is a particular instance of this larger concept of practices. Understanding preaching as a practice gives new perspectives on what preaching is and allows us to consider how to employ broadly recognized standards of excellence to evaluate particular instances of students’ preaching. Further, this essay explores how the teaching of preaching is a practice in its own right. The value of this insight is that it allows us then to explore how the character of the teaching and the character of what is taught can be consonant with one another, and in ways that can guide. This essay is from “Teaching Preaching as a Christian Practice,” edited by Thomas G. Long and Nora Tisdale. Used by permission of Westminster John Knox Press.     

The stroop effect: It is not the robust phenomenon that you have thought it to be

Five experiments demonstrate that context has a powerful effect on the ease with which people can name (Experiments 1-3) or categorize (Experiments 4-5) a stimulus while ignoring another stimulus, irrelevant or conflicting with the target. Selectivity of attention to the target dimension was gauged through Stroop and Garner effects. When the stimulus values along the target dimension and the to-be-ignored dimension were correlated over the experimental trials, large effects of Stroop and Garner influenced performance. However, when random allocation of values created zero dimensional correlation, the Stroop effects vanished. These results imply that when the nominally irrelevant dimension is in fact correlated with the relevant dimension, participants then attend to the irrelevant dimension and thus open themselves up to Stroop interference. Another variable of context, the relative salience of the constituent dimensions, also affected performance with the more discriminable dimension disrupting selective attention to the less discriminable dimension. The results demonstrate the importance of context in engendering the failure of selective attention and challenge traditional automaticity accounts of the Stroop effect.     

坚持科学精神，反对与抵制伪科学作为“科普法”的条文是必要和及时的

"科普法"于2002年6月29日经全国人民代表大会常务委员会第二十八次会议通过并颁布实施。科普法总则第一条中明确指出制定和颁布科普法的     

墨家逻辑学研究何以可能

从1904年梁启超的著作<墨子之论理学>问世以来,中国逻辑史的研究已经百年.梁启超开了在普通逻辑框架下研究墨家逻辑学的先河,这种研究范式效仿者有之,批评者有之,时至今日效仿者与批评者依然争论不断.近几年读了中国逻辑史方面的一些著作和论文,如崔清田的<墨家逻辑与亚里士多德逻辑比较研究>(人民出版社,2004)、周云之主编的<中国逻辑史>(山西教育出版社,2004)和孙中原、程仲棠等先生的论文,他们的学术观点呈现出鲜明的个性,而且分歧颇大,体现出他们对未来墨家逻辑学研究的学术关怀.就墨家逻辑学研究什么,如何去研究,崔著和周著引发我们的思考.     

Qualia that It Is Right to Quine*

Dennett (1988) provides a much discussed argument for the nonexistence of qualia, as conceived by philosophers like Block, Chalmers, Loar and Searle. My goal in this paper is to vindicate Dennett's argument, construed in a certain way. The argument supports the claim that qualia are constitutively representational. Against Block and Chalmers, the argument rejects the detachment of phenomenal from information‐processing consciousness; and against Loar and Searle, it defends the claim that qualia are constitu‐tively representational in an externalist understanding of this. The core of the argument is contained in section 3. In the first part, I contrast a minimal conception of qualia, relative to which their existence is not under dispute, with the sort of view to which I will object. In the second part I set the stage by presenting the facts about (minimal) qualia on which a Dennett‐like argument can be based.     

宣传无神论的必要性

《任继愈宗教论集》于近日出版,我们选取其中一段文字发表,以飨读者。该文最初发表于1988年,载于宁夏人民出版社《宗教·道德·文化》一书。全文标题为《关于宗教与无神论问题》。本文是其中第三段的一部分。     

It is More than Thought that Counts: the Role of Readiness for Aggression in the Relationship Between Ostracism and Displaced Aggression

Research has shown that ostracism results in aggressive behavior towards the ostracising other, but also causes displaced aggression—aggression directed towards an innocent person. Our study investigated whether displaced aggressive responses to ostracism were increased by three types of aggression proneness (readiness for aggression) based on different mechanisms: emotional-impulsive, habitual-cognitive or personality-immanent. Participants (n = 118) played a Cyberball game in which they were either excluded or included, next prepared a hot sauce sample for another person as an indicator of aggression and completed the Readiness for Interpersonal Aggression Inventory. Results showed that ostracism evoked more aggression in participants with high rather than with low emotional-impulsive readiness for aggression. Only this type of readiness moderated the ostracism-aggression relationship indicating that mostly affective mechanisms induce displaced aggressive responses to exclusion.