Recognition trust

Philosophical Studies - Trust is critical for social life, and yet it is alarmingly fragile. It is easily damaged and difficult to repair. Philosophers studying trust have often noted that basic...     

Recognition of multiple-item probes

In the present study, we contrasted models in whichfamiliarity orstrength is the sole basis for recognition judgments (e.g., Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984) with models incorporating retrieval of specific information in a recall-like process (e.g., Humphreys, 1976, 1978; Humphreys & Bain, 1984). We also examined the possibility that an item’s “strength” is determined in part by the match between the verbal encoding contexts at study and at test. In two experiments, study items were presented in triplets. In Experiment 1 recognition was tested with all possible combinations of one-, two-, or three-item targets and distractors; in addition, three different decision criteria were employed in different lists. Experiment 2 included cued recognition among other test conditions. Recognition performance did not increase as more cues were added to the probe, a finding that is inconsistent with Humphreys’s model and other models of that type. Both studies were well fit by a version of the Search of Associative Memory model for recognition (Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984).