The role of construal processes in overconfident predictions about the self and others

Overconfident behavioral predictions and trait inferences may occur because people make inadequate allowance for the uncertainties of situational construal. In Studies 1-3, Ss estimated how much time or money they would spend in various hypothetical, incompletely specified situations. Ss then offered associated "confidence limits" under different "construal conditions". In Study 4, Ss made trait inferences about someone they believed had responded "deviantly"--again with situational details unspecified and construal conditions manipulated. In all 4 studies, Ss who made predictions or trait inferences without being able to assume the accuracy of their situational construals offered confidence limits no broader than those of Ss who made their responses contingent on such accuracy. Only in conditions where Ss were obliged to offer alternative construals did they appropriately broaden their confidence limits or weaken their trait inferences.     

Suspicion of ulterior motivation and the correspondence bias

Three studies examined the hypothesis that when perceivers learn of the existence of multiple, plausibly rival motives for an actor's behavior, they are less likely to fall prey to the correspondence bias than when they learn of the existence of situational factors that may have constrained the actor's behavior. In the first 2 studies, Ss who learned that an actor was instructed to behave as he did drew inferences that corresponded to his behavior. In contrast, Ss who were led to suspect that an actor's behavior may have been motivated by a desire to ingratiate (Study 1), or by a desire to avoid an unwanted job (Study 2), resisted the correspondence bias. The 3rd study demonstrated that these differences were not due to a general unwillingness on the part of suspicious perceivers to make dispositional inferences. The implications that these results have for understanding attribution theory are discussed.     

Examining the world of the depressed: do depressed people prefer others who are depressed?

Two studies were conducted to examine the interpersonal world of the depressed person. In Study 1, depression levels and perceptions of depressed and nondepressed people and their best friend were assessed to test the hypothesis that depressed Ss have best friends who are themselves more depressed than the best friends of nondepressed Ss. The hypothesis was confirmed, suggesting that depressed persons may prefer others who also tend toward depression. To examine this possibility, in Study 2 depressed and nondepressed college students spoke with one another in either depressed-depressed, nondepressed-depressed, or nondepressed-nondepressed pairs. It was found that depressed Ss felt worse than nondepressed Ss after speaking with nondepressed targets, but not after speaking with depressed targets. There were no differences in liking or in perceived similarity between the groups. Implications for the social world of the depressed person are discussed.     

Depression, realism, and the overconfidence effect: are the sadder wiser when predicting future actions and events?

Do depressed individuals make more realistic judgments than their nondepressed peers in real world settings? Depressed and nondepressed Ss in 2 studies were asked to make predictions about future actions and outcomes that might occur in their personal academic and social worlds. Both groups of Ss displayed overconfidence, that is, they overestimated the likelihood that their predictions would prove to be accurate. Of key importance, depressed Ss were less accurate in their predictions, and thus more overconfident, than their nondepressed counterparts. These differences arose because depressed Ss (a) were more likely to predict the occurrence of low base-rate events and (b) were less likely to be correct when they made optimistic predictions (i.e., stated that positive events would occur or that aversive outcomes would not). Discussion focuses on implications of these findings for the depressive realism hypothesis.     

The effects of mood on spontaneous trait inferences about the actor: Evidence from Chinese undergraduates

Prior research has indicated that positive moods increase but negative moods decrease the trait activation of spontaneous trait inferences (STIs). However, it is unknown whether this difference is also present in STIs about the actor. In Study 1, using a false recognition paradigm, we found that Chinese undergraduates made STIs about the actor. In Study 2, we found that the happy Chinese undergraduates were more likely to make STIs about the actor than the sad Chinese undergraduates. These findings showed that Chinese people made STIs about the actor and moods had an influence on their STIs about the actor.     

Processing of ambiguous and unambiguous feedback by depressed and nondepressed college students: schematic biases and their implications for depressive realism

Explored schematic processing as a mechanism for predicting (a) when depressed Ss would be negative relative to nondepressed Ss and (b) when depressed and nondepressed Ss would show biased or unbiased (i.e., "realistic") processing. Depressed and nondepressed Ss performed multiple trials of a task under conditions in which the two groups held either equivalent or different schemas regarding this task. Ss received either an unambiguous or objectively normed ambiguous feedback cue on each trial. In full support of schematic processing, depressed Ss showed negative encoding relative to nondepressed Ss only when their schemas were more negative, and both depressed and nondepressed Ss showed positively biased, negatively biased, and unbiased encoding depending on the relative feedback cue-to-schema match. Depressed and nondepressed Ss' response latencies to unambiguous feedback also supported the occurrence of schematic processing. We discuss the methodological, treatment, and "realism" implications of these findings and suggest a more precise formulation of Beck's schema theory of depression.     

Schema congruence and depression: loss of objectivity in self- and other-inferences

Depressed and nondepressed students judged the plausibility of positive and negative inferences ostensibly made either by themselves or by others. Negative self-inferences were judged by depressed students as more plausible, and positive other-inferences as less plausible. The results were in accord with Beck's (1967) theory of schema-based distortion in depression, which proposes that persons vulnerable to the development of depression are prone to make erroneous negative inferences and to then regard those inferences as plausible and correct. The results also suggested that depressed persons responded differentially depending on whether they were instructed to consider the inferences as their own or another's, whereas nondepressed persons did not.     

Judging others in the shadow of suspicion

Previous research has found that when perceivers have reason to be suspicious of the motives underlying an actor's behavior, they are likely to draw inferences about the actor's true disposition that reflect a relatively sophisticated style of attributional processing. The present research was designed to examine some of the negative consequences that suspicion can have on perceivers' judgments. In each of the three studies reported, some subjects were made suspicious about the motives of an actor on the basis of contextual information surrounding the actor's behavior, rather than the behavior itself. Results of these studies suggest that, particularly when perceivers believe that the actions or motives of the actor could affect them, suspicion may cause perceivers to see the actor in a more negative light, even if the perceivers are not convinced that the actor's behavior was indeed affected by ulterior motives.The authors thank Patrick Carver and Gilbert Fein for their assistance with the stimulus materials for Study 1, and Jessica Cross, Thomas Tomlinson, and Amy Elmore for their assistance with Studies 2 and 3.     

Are shy people reluctant to ask for help?

Examined the help-seeking behaviors of shy and not-shy men and women. In Study 1, Ss worked on an impossible task in the presence of a male or female confederate whom they were told had just successfully completed the task. Shy Ss asked for help no less frequently than did not-shy Ss overall, but they did seek help less frequently from opposite-sex confederates than from same-sex confederates. In Study 2, shy and not-shy men and women were required to call a man and a woman and ask them to complete a questionnaire. All respondents agreed to return the questionnaire. However, when shy Ss (compared with not-shy Ss) called opposite-sex respondents, fewer of the questionnaires were actually returned. When making their calls, shy Ss sounded somewhat less warm and confident than did not-shy Ss, and they also spoke less fluently. Fluency, in turn, predicted response rate for the shy subjects calling respondents of the opposite sex.     

Depression, self-focused attention, and expectancies for positive and negative future life events for self and others

In two studies, we examined depressed and nondepressed persons' judgments of the probability of future positive and negative life events occurring to themselves and to others. Study 1 demonstrated that depressed subjects were generally less optimistic than their nondepressed counterparts: Although nondepressed subjects rated positive events as more likely to happen to themselves than negative events, depressed subjects did not. In addition, relative to nondepressed subjects, depressed subjects rated positive events as less likely to occur to themselves and more likely to occur to others and negative events as more likely to occur to both self and others. Study 2 investigated the role that differential levels of self-focused attention might play in mediating these differences. On the basis of prior findings that depressed persons generally engage in higher levels of self-focus than nondepressed persons do and the notion that self-focus activates one's self-schema, we hypothesized that inducing depressed subjects to focus externally would attenuate their pessimistic tendencies. Data from Study 2 supported the hypothesis that high levels of self-focus partially mediate depressive pessimism: Whereas self-focused depressed subjects were more pessimistic than nondepressed subjects, externally focused depressed subjects were not. The role of attentional focus in maintaining these and other depressive pessimistic tendencies was discussed.     

What will Phil do next? : Spontaneously inferred traits influence predictions of behavior

Past research has shown that perceivers intentionally may make trait inferences about others and use this information to make predictions about these others' future behaviors. Other research has also shown that people can make trait inferences without intent—that is, spontaneously. However, one unexplored avenue is whether spontaneous trait inferences (STI), affect how perceivers predict others' will behavior. Three studies explored this issue. Results from Studies 1 and 2 showed that: (1) exposure to trait-implicative behaviors describing an actor influences subsequent behavior predictions made about the actor in a trait-consistent manner, and (2) predictions occurred regardless of behavior recall, implying that the behavior predictions were derived from prior trait inferences and not from behavior recall. Results from Study 3 bolstered this conclusion by showing that behavior predictions were similar regardless of whether subjects were explicitly instructed to make inferences or not, but that a manipulation known to interfere with inference generation (lie detection instructions) muted behavior predictions. Results from Study 3 also suggested that the prediction effects had both automatic and controlled components, and that reductions observed in the lie detection condition of Study 3 were caused by alterations in the automatic influence of trait knowledge to the behavior predictions. These results suggest that STI may be causal inferences about the actors' dispositions.     

Depressive self-presentation: beyond self-handicapping

An experiment was conducted to examine the notion that depressives' responses would reflect a protective self-presentation style (Hill, Weary, & Williams, 1986), the underlying goal of which would be the avoidance of future performance demands and potential losses in self-esteem. In this study, depressed and nondepressed Ss were asked to perform a relatively simple visual-motor task. Half of the depressed and half of the nondepressed Ss were told that if they were successful at the task, they would be asked to perform a 2nd, similar task. The remaining Ss were given no such expectation of future performance. We predicted and found that depressed compared with nondepressed Ss strategically failed at the task when presented with the possibility of future performance and further losses in esteem. Moreover, this strategic failure was associated with some costs; depressed-future performance expectancy Ss experienced more discomfort or negative affect as a result of their performance. The relationship between this depressive self-presentation and self-handicapping strategies is discussed.     

On some sources of metacomprehension

Metacomprehension is defined as readers' evaluations of their performance on a task, involving inferences derived from a text. In two studies metacomprehension was related to characteristics of the inferences required, in terms of 1) amount of information to be kept in long-term memory (Study 1), 2) amount of information to be kept in short-term memory (Study 2) and 3) existence of negatives (Study 2). In the first study, 41 psychology students read a text and afterwards judged 1) the correctness of a set of pragmatic inference statements, and 2) their confidence in being correct or the difficulty of judging each statement. In the second study, 81 high-school students read a text and simultaneously judged 1) the correctness of a set of logical inference statements and 2) their confidence in being correct and the difficulty of judging each statement. In both studies, metacomprehension was not significantly correlated with actual performance. The results indicate that one important source of metacomprehension consists in information processing load. In Study 1, long-term memory requirements represent this load, in Study 2, the existence of negatives.     

Depressive realism and clinical depression

Depressive realism suggests that depressed individuals make more accurate judgments of control than their nondepressed counterparts. However, most studies demonstrating this phenomenon were conducted in nonclinical samples. In this study, psychiatric patients who met criteria for major depressive disorder underestimated control in a contingent situation and were consistently more negative in their judgments than were nondepressed controls. Depressed patients were less likely than their nondepressed counterparts to overestimate control in a noncontingent situation, but largely because they perceived receiving less reinforcement. Depressed patients were no more likely to use the appropriate logical heuristic to generate their judgments of control than their nondepressed counterparts and each appeared to rely on different primitive heuristics. Depressed patients were consistently more negative than their nondepressed counterparts and when they did appear to be more “accurate” in their judgments of control (as in the noncontingent situation) it was largely because they applied the wrong heuristic to less accurate information. These findings do not support the notion of depressive realism and suggest that depressed patients distort their judgments in a characteristically negative fashion.     

Mediation and production deficiencies in children's judgments of morality

This study investigated the influence of intentions and consequences on moral judgments. Children's and adults' production of inferences about an actor's intentions was assessed separately from their use of intentions as mediators of moral judgments. Two hundred and sixteen kindergarten, fourth grade and adult subjects viewed one of four videotaped episodes in which an actor either intentionally or accidentally produced a positive or negative result. Participants received one of two prompts to produce inferences about the actor's intentions or received no prompt. Each subject rated the actor's intent and the good-ness-badness of the actor. Results supported a mediational deficiency explanation for children's objective moral judgments. Both 6- and 10-year-old children made reliable, adult-like inferences of intentions. However, children's moral evaluations were based primarily on objective consequences while adults' evaluations were based primarily on the intentions of the actor. Young children did have intentionality information available, yet even with prompting this information did not mediate their judgments in an adult-like way; suggesting that there may be a period in development during which the child understands and produces subjective inferences but does not use this information as a basis for moral judgments.     

The role of preschoolers' social understanding in evaluating the informativeness of causal interventions

Preschoolers use information from interventions, namely intentional actions, to make causal inferences. We asked whether children consider some interventions to be more informative than others based on two components of an actor’s knowledge state: whether an actor possesses causal knowledge, and whether an actor is allowed to use their knowledge in a given situation. Three- and four-year-olds saw a novel toy that activated in the presence of certain objects. Two actors, one knowledgeable about the toy and one ignorant, each tried to activate the toy with an object. In Experiment 1, either the actors chose objects or the child chose for them. In Experiment 2, the actors chose objects blindfolded. Objects were always placed on the toy simultaneously, and thus were equally associated with the effect. Preschoolers’ causal inferences favored the knowledgeable actor’s object only when he was allowed to choose it (Experiment 1). Thus, children consider both personal and situational constraints on knowledge when evaluating the informativeness of causal interventions.     

What emotional reactions can tell us about the nature of others: An appraisal perspective on person perception

The present research aimed to assess how people use knowledge about the emotional reactions of others to make inferences about their character. Specifically, we postulate that people can reconstruct or “reverse engineer” the appraisals underlying an emotional reaction and use this appraisal information to draw person perception inferences. As predicted, a person who reacted with anger to blame was perceived as more aggressive, and self-confident, but also as less warm and gentle than a person who reacted with sadness (Study 1). A person who reacted with a smile (Study 1) or remained neutral (Study 2) was perceived as self-confident but also as unemotional. These perceptions were mediated by perceived appraisals.     

Effect of actor depression on observer attributions: existence and impact of negative attributions toward the depressed

This experiment examined whether others explain the successes and failures of depressed versus nondepressed people differently and how these attributions are related to affective and behavioral reactions to a request for psychological help. Ss reported attributions about the success and failure experiences of hypothetical depressed and nondepressed people. Ss also responded to a hypothetical request for psychological help by indicating their attributions, affective reactions, willingness to help, and desire for future social contact. As hypothesized, Ss displayed more negative attributions toward depressed people. Replicating prior research, Ss responded to the depressive's request for help with mixed emotional and behavioral reactions. Path analyses revealed that attributions influenced affective reactions, which influenced willingness to help; but a more complex pattern emerged from the analysis of desire for future social contact. Results are discussed in terms of the interpersonal impact and possible causes of negative attributions about the experiences of depressed people.     

The attributional norm of internality and depressive sensitivity to social information

Two studies examined the existence, within an achievement-related context, of a social norm favoring internal explanations for task performances. In the first study, we investigated the reactions of observers to an actor's high, moderate, or low self-attribution of causal responsibility for his negative performance outcome on an ostensibly standardized aptitude test. The results indicated that the actor was evaluated more positively to the degree that he accepted more personal responsibility for his performance. In the second study, we examined the reactions of depressed and nondepressed observers to an actor's high or low self-attributions of causal responsibility for his poor performance on a test of analytical ability. On the basis of the notion that the chronic lack of control and resultant uncertainty, presumably characteristic of depressed persons, motivates attributional information processing, we expected depressed observers to be more sensitive to the actor's violation of the norm of internality and to respond with more social disapproval than nondepressed observers. Results generally were consistent with this reasoning. Experimental findings are discussed in terms of the interpersonal implications of expressed attributions.