The Animal as Agent of the Sublime in Rembrandt’s Rape Narratives and Ovid’s Metamorphoses

Philosophia - In this article I will explore the relationship between man and animal as presented by Ovid in some of his rape stories narrated in the Metamorphoses. The stories I will discuss are...     

On the Very Idea of Brandom’s Pragmatism

Although Brandom is critical of some features of narrowly conceived classical pragmatism, at the same time he explicitly embraces a version of pragmatism, both in his overall philosophical outlook, and in his philosophy of language. Brandom’s distinctive theoretical approach is based on what he calls rationalist pragmatism, which is a version of fundamental pragmatism. Within the philosophy of language it takes the form of semantic pragmatism. The paper briefly discusses Brandomian version of fundamental pragmatism and its semantic underpinning, and subsequently formulates a basic dilemma it encounters there.     

On the Lack of Direction in Rayo’s The Construction of Logical Space

Abstract

I argue that Agustín Rayo’s symmetric ‘just is’ statements cannot be defined in terms of notions like essence, grounding or metaphysical truth-conditions. I go on to argue that one of these latter notions, which allow us to express an asymmetric relationship between facts, is needed to do some of the work that Rayo intends ‘just is’ statements to do, such as stating reductionist claims.     

On the asymptotic distribution of Pearson’s X 2 in cross-validation samples

In categorical data analysis, two-sample cross-validation is used not only for model selection but also to obtain a realistic impression of the overall predictive effectiveness of the model. The latter is of particular importance in the case of highly parametrized models capable of capturing every idiosyncracy of the calibrating sample. We show that for maximum likelihood estimators or other asymptotically efficient estimators Pearson's X ² is not asymptotically chi-square in the two-sample cross-validation framework due to extra variability induced by using different samples for estimation and goodness-of-fit testing. We propose an alternative test statistic, X _xval ², obtained as a modification of X ² which is asymptotically chi-square with C−1 degrees of freedom in cross-validation samples. Stochastically, X _xval ² ≤ X ². Furthermore, the use of X ² instead of X _xval ² with a χ _C −1² reference distribution may provide an unduly poor impression of fit of the model in the cross-validation sample. This paper is dedicated to the memory of Michael V. Levine. Requests for reprints should be sent to Albert Maydeu-Olivares, Faculty of Psychology, University of Barcelona, P. Valle de Hebrón, 171, 0835 Barcelona, Spain.     

The Art of Living in Otto Rank’s Will Therapy

Otto Rank's approach to psychotherapy, developed after his separation from Freud, encourages living life fully in spite of death and limitation. In his emphasis on the here and now, new experience in the therapeutic relationship, and collaboration and creativity in the therapy process, Rank was ahead of his time. As a theorist of personality and of creativity, his work is well known, but his influence on the practices of humanistic, existential, and post-psychoanalytic relational therapists is largely unacknowledged. Rank's creative legacy is an approach to psychotherapy that calls forth artistry and collaboration between therapist and client.     

On the limits of Kagan’s impulsive reflective distinction

A logical analysis is made of the Matching Familiar Figures (MFF) Test on the basis of which children have been classified as "impulsive" or "reflective." The reflective strategy is implicitly preferred to the impulsive because the reflective child makes fewer errors though generally taking longer to make his first response. We show that the test allows the choice of a number of "game plans" and speed-accuracy tradeoffs which in practice may not be very different. Error rates may not indicate perceptual sensitivity, in any case, since sensitivity and response factors may be confounded in the error rate. Using a visual running-memory-span task to avoid the inherent difficulties of the MFF test, we found that children previously classified on the basis of that test as impulsive or reflective did not differ in recognition accuracy but did differ in response bias and response latency. Accuracy and bias are estimated by way of Luce's choice theory (Luce, 1963), and the results are discussed in those terms.     

On the function of redfronted lemur’s close calls

In order to maintain group cohesion, many social mammals and birds regularly produce close calls. In some primate species, close calls appear to have a dual function: calls addressed at a broad class of targets serve to maintain group cohesion, whereas the same calls directed at a specific target serve to regulate subsequent social interactions. Redfronted lemurs (Eulemur rufifrons) produce different types of close calls: grunts, long grunts, hoos and meows. In order to study the function of these calls, we conducted focal observations and vocal recordings from eight adult males and females out of four social groups in Kirindy Forest, Western Madagascar. Redfronted lemurs produce long grunts, hoos and meows at relatively low rates during foraging, resting or group movements, respectively. Grunts were given most often and more or less constantly during foraging and traveling. Calling rate increased when the risk of separation increased and may thus promote group cohesion. Grunts given during approaches of other group members resulted more often in friendly interactions than approaches that were not accompanied by a grunt. Thus, redfronted lemurs produce specific but also generic contact calls, whereas the latter calls have a dual function that varies depending on the addressed audience: they act as an auditory beacon to maintain group cohesion and serve as signals of benign intent to avoid costly conflicts and facilitating social interactions.     

On the Concept of Fair Competition Prevalent in Today’s European Soccer Leagues

The notion of competition depicted in sport literature appears to be inconsistent with the goals of current European soccer competitions. This paper examines two misconceptions of fair competition which are prevalent in these competitions. First, it aims at refuting the view that professional soccer only requires some basic equality of chances beyond the differences in players’ skills and managers’ knowledge of game strategy. In other words, it refutes the view that professional soccer only demands a notion of fair competition understood as fair play. Second, the paper also aims at refuting the view that fair competition, in professional soccer, is simply a matter of financial viability. Hence, it calls for both genuine legal and ethical reforms, since professional soccer competition requires a notion of equality as both a goal and a right. Such a notion, we argue, must conceive of the differences in players’ skills and managers’ knowledge of game strategy as one of the primary factors in establishing a platform founded in fair competition. Therefore, this paper calls for a radical change of attitude toward or a radical approach to fair competition among European sport fans, policy-makers, and administrators.     

On people’s understanding of the diagnostic implications of probabilistic data

Two lines of prior research into the conditions under which people seek information are examined in light of two statistical definitions of diagnosticity. Five experiments are reported. In two, subjects selected information in order to test a hypothesis. In the remaining three, they selected information in order to convince someone else of the truth of a known hypothesis. A total of 567 university students served as subjects. The two primary conclusions were as follows: (1) When the task is highly structured by the environment, subjects select information diagnostically, and (2) when the task is less structured, so that subjects must seek relevant information not manifest, they select information pseudodiagnostically. Possible relations to other laboratory inference tasks and to clinical judgment are discussed.     

On Simmel’s conception of philosophy

Over the past few decades, the work of Georg Simmel (1858–1918) has again become of interest. Its reception, however, has been fairly one-sided and selective, mostly because Simmel’s philosophy has been bypassed in favor of his sociological contributions. This article examines Simmel’s explicit reflections on the nature of philosophy. Simmel defines philosophy through three aspects which, according to him, are common to all philosophical schools. First, philosophical reasoning implies the effort to think without preconditions. Second, Simmel maintains that in contrast to other sciences, only philosophy is oriented toward constructing a general view of the world. Third, Simmel claims that philosophical work worthy of the name creates a sphere of a typical way of being in relation to world, a third sphere that is between the personal and the objective. According to Simmel, what has made philosophy’s eminent figures great is that they have advanced a type of thinking and developed it into a particularly interesting form, and this type can still correspond with the way we experience the world. It is significant that these three aspects through which Simmel defines philosophical activity emphasize the forms of questioning, not the contents or objects of thought. Still, he thinks that an interaction with concrete examples is always required in order to make philosophy a meaningful activity. This stance is reflected in the wide variety of topics studied by Simmel himself. In his last works Simmel began to emphasize another aspect of philosophy, its nature as a living movement of thought related to fundamental human limitedness: just as life itself ceaselessly reaches beyond its present form, so philosophy constantly strives to overcome the preconditions of thinking.

On Habermas’s Critique of Husserl

Over four decades, Habermas has put to paper many critical remarks on Husserl’s work as occasion has demanded. These scattered critical engagements nonetheless do add up to a coherent (if contestable) position regarding the project of transcendental phenomenology. This essay provides a comprehensive reconstruction of the arguments Habermas makes and offers a critical assessment of them. With an eye in particular to the theme of intersubjectivity (a theme of fundamental interest to both thinkers), it is argued that Habermas’s arguments do indeed show up deficiencies in Husserlian phenomenology and yet that they do not succeed in proving that we must abandon the methods and tasks of phenomenological research. On the contrary, it is argued that phenomenological methods may well be needed in order to investigate certain philosophical questions that Habermas’s theory of communication has thus far only partially addressed.     

On Tarski’s Axiomatization of Mereology

Studia Logica - It is shown how Tarski’s 1929 axiomatization of mereology secures the reflexivity of the ‘part of’ relation. This is done with a fusion-abstraction principle that...     

On Quine’s Philosophy of Mind

Philosophia - In this paper, I offer a systematic account of Quine’s philosophy of mind. In doing so, I respond to an interpretive problem of reconciling Quine’s admission of...     

On Devitt’s Defence of Realism

In this paper I question the view that realism must delineate the basic ontological furniture of the world rather than giving arguments in semantic or epistemic terms for the existence of a mind-independent world. I call this view of stating and defending realism the Ontological Defence of Realism (or ODR) and take Devitt’s account of realism as a paradigmatic case of ODR. I argue that ODR cannot block ‘verificationist antirealism’ because the specific (physical) nature of what exists is not enough to secure the mind-independence of what exists and, additionally, every element purported to achieve this, it compromises seriously the idea that realism is primarily an ontological issue. I also stress that ODR is in tension with a plausible realist insight namely the priority of the world over our theorizing. Because of this tension ODR weakens realism in several domains with no good reason. Specifically, I argue that in these domains ODR faces a dilemma: either to reject realism or to take realism to be dependent on a reductive account violating the realist insight. My point is that we should keep realism and ontology distinct and that compliance with the realist insight initiates a better strategy for the defence of realism. I address three possible objections thereby further clarifying my point. I conclude by presenting my view about the relation between ontology and realism.     

On Li Zhi’s Theory of Growing up in Spirit

The theory of growing up in spirit is the core of Li Zhi’s thought. The theory attempts to get rid of the limit of the rigid ethical doctrine of Confucianism and to encourage growth in a helpful person for the benefit of the country, which demands both a free environment of society and enough courage and insight of the individual. At the same time, the criterion of growing up in spirit indicates the limitation of Li Zhi’s thought. His free exploration, however, provides various revelations for us. Translated from Journal of Wuhan University, 2005:4 by Yang Xu     

On the Hegelian roots of Lukács’s theory of realism

This article attempts two things. First, it aims to reassess the literary criticism that Georg Lukács produced in the 1930s while he was living in the Soviet Union in light of his earlier, and much-esteemed, The theory of the novel. Second, in order to carry out this reassessment, it examines the place of Hegelian aesthetics in Lukács’s theorization of realism in the 1930s criticism, in relation both to contemporary Soviet writings on the subject and to his own earlier, ostensibly Hegelian work. I argue that, at least in terms of the place of art in the historical dialectic, the later work is more consistent with Hegelian philosophy than The theory of the novel.     

Toddlers’ Understanding of Peers’ Emotions

The second year of life sees dramatic developments in infants’ ability to understand emotions in adults alongside their growing interest in peers. In this study, the authors used a social-referencing paradigm to examine whether 12-, 18-, and 24-month-old children could use a peer's positive or negative emotion messages about toys to regulate their own behavior with the toys. They found that 12-month-olds decreased their play with toys toward which a peer had expressed either positive or negative emotion compared with play following a peer's neutral attention toward a toy. Also, 18-month-olds did not respond systematically, but 24-month-old children increased their toy play after watching a peer display negative affect toward the toy. Regardless of their age, children with siblings decreased their play with toys toward which they had seen a peer display fear, the typical social-referencing response. The authors discuss results in the context of developmental changes in social understanding and peer interaction over the second year of life.     

On the role of rarity information in speakers’ choice of frame

In this article, we examine conversational behaviors when people describe the outcomes of uncertain events. We propose a new hypothesis, frame choice based on rarity information, that is built on the basis of one prominent measure of informativeness (i.e., self-information). The hypothesis predicts that when speakers can choose one of two logically equivalent frames for describing the outcome of an uncertain event (e.g., the results of the roll of a die or a medical operation), they prefer the frame denoting an event that is known or perceived to be rare. Four experiments using frame choice tasks provide evidence that speakers’ choice of frame is explained well by the rarity hypothesis.