"八荣八耻"的道德哲学

“八荣八耻”的社会主义荣辱观,把社会主义道德的要求聚焦到荣辱观,集中点击人的良心,可谓四两拨千斤;“八荣八耻”督促人们作出善恶选择,启迪了个人的道德自觉、自主和自律,同时也强调了公民的道德权利和义务;“八荣八耻”的落实重在修养和践行,为社会主义道德建设与和谐社会的构建创造了精神条件。     

大学生羞耻和内疚差异的对比研究

以 48名北京大学本科生为被试 ,检验羞耻和内疚差异的 3种假设 :研究一同时检验“公开化与私人化”和“个人无能与违背道德”两个假设 ;研究二检验“伤害自我与伤害他人”假设。方法是依次呈现一系列不同的负性情境 (情境事先已按要检验的假设加以控制 ) ,要求被试设想自己亲身经历该情境 ,然后回答体验到的羞耻和内疚的程度及理由。结果表明 :①“公开化与私人化”对羞耻和内疚的影响有显著差异 (p <0 0 5 ) :“有他人在场”可以易化羞耻 ,而内疚感的产生一般不需要“观众”在场。②“违背道德”在引发羞耻和内疚感上基本相等 ,而“个人无能”引起更多的羞耻感 (p <0 0 1)。③“公开化与私人化”和“个人无能与违背道德”的交互作用不显著。④“伤害自我”更多引起羞耻感 (p <0 0 5 ) ,而“伤害他人”更多引起内疚感 (p <0 0 1)。     

Moral Psychology of Shame in Early Confucian Philosophy

In Western philosophy and psychology, shame is characterized as a self-critical emotion that is often contrasted with the similarly self-critical but morally active emotion of guilt. If shame is negative concern over endangered or threatened self-image (usually in front of others), guilt is autonomous moral awareness of one’s wrongdoings and reparative motivation to correct one’s moral misconduct. Recently, many psychologists have begun to discuss the moral significance of shame in their comparative studies of non-Western cultures. In this new approach, shame is characterized as a positive moral emotion and active motivation for self-reflection and self-cultivation. If shame is a positive and active moral emotion, what is its moral psychological nature? In this paper, I will analyze shame from the perspective of cultural psychology and early Confucian philosophy. Unlike many Western philosophers, Confucius and Mencius discuss shame as a form of moral excellence. In early Confucian texts, shame is not a reactive emotion of an endangered self but a moral disposition that supports a self-critical and self-transformative process of moral development.     

Defend or repair? Explaining responses to in-group moral failure by disentangling feelings of shame, rejection, and inferiority

Research on shame about in-group moral failure has yielded paradoxical results. In some studies, shame predicts self-defensive motivations to withdraw. In other studies, shame predicts pro-social motivations, such as restitution. We think that this paradox can be explained by disentangling the numerous appraisals and feelings subsumed under the label "shame." In 2 studies, we asked community samples of Norwegians about their in-group's discrimination against the Tater minority. Confirmatory factor analysis validated the measures of the appraisals and feelings used in Study 1 (N = 206) and Study 2 (N = 173). In both studies, an appraisal of the in-group as suffering a moral defect best predicted felt shame, whereas an appraisal of concern for condemnation of the in-group best predicted felt rejection. In both studies, felt rejection best predicted self-defensive motivation, whereas felt shame best predicted pro-social motivation. Implications for conceptualizing and studying shame are discussed.     

Shame,Belonging, and Biopolitics: Agamben Among the Phenomenologists

How are we to understand Agamben’s philosophical anthropology and his frequent invocations of the relation between bios and zoe? In Remnants of Auschwitz Agamben evokes a quasi-phenomenological account of shame in order to elucidate this question thus implying that the phenomenon of shame carries an ontological significance. That shame has an ontological significance is also a belief held in current debates on moral emotions and the phenomenology of intersubjectivity, but despite this common philosophical intuition phenomenologists have criticized Agamben’s account of shame. In this paper, I will try to show how these criticisms often rely on misreadings of Agamben’s (at times rather confusing) terminology. Once Agamben’s analysis of shame have been properly placed in the broader context if his work, I will outline how Agamben’s analysis of shame and his ontology of life feeds into a rethinking of community and belonging.     

Reappraising the Moral Nature of Emotions in Decision Making: The Case of Shame and Guilt

Emotions play a crucial role in moral behavior. The present paper does not contest this point but argues that qualifications of certain feelings such as shame and guilt as moral emotions should not exclusively be based on a proximal analysis of their function. A proximal analysis details how moral emotions produce moral behavior. Emotions are qualified as moral when they are elicited by concerns for others rather than the self and produce prosocial action tendencies. Although researchers have acknowledged that moral emotions may also have an ultimate function that details why it is in the individual interest that these moral effects occur, they have neglected to translate such ideas into testable hypotheses. Using guilt and shame as an example, we show how an analysis of ultimate functions accommodates recent findings, which contest the view that guilt is more moral than shame and provides new insights as to when and why moral emotions will produce moral effects.     

Resolving the paradox of shame: Differentiating among specific appraisal-feeling combinations explains pro-social and self-defensive motivation

Research has shown that people can respond both self-defensively and pro-socially when they experience shame. We address this paradox by differentiating among specific appraisals (of specific self-defect and concern for condemnation) and feelings (of shame, inferiority, and rejection) often reported as part of shame. In two Experiments (Study 1: N = 85; Study 2: N = 112), manipulations that put participants’ social-image at risk increased their appraisal of concern for condemnation. In Study 2, a manipulation of moral failure increased participants’ appraisal that they suffered a specific self-defect. In both studies, mediation analyses showed that effects of the social-image at risk manipulation on self-defensive motivation were explained by appraisal of concern for condemnation and felt rejection. In contrast, the effect of the moral failure manipulation on pro-social motivation in Study 2 was explained by appraisal of a specific self-defect and felt shame. Thus, distinguishing among the appraisals and feelings tied to shame enabled clearer prediction of pro-social and self-defensive responses to moral failure with and without risk to social-image.     

Is Shame an Ugly Emotion? Four Discourses—Two Contrasting Interpretations for Moral Education

This paper offers a sustained philosophical meditation on contrasting interpretations of the emotion of shame within four academic discourses—social psychology, psychological anthropology, educational psychology and Aristotelian scholarship—in order to elicit their implications for moral education. It turns out that within each of these discourses there is a mainstream interpretation which emphasises shame’s expendability or moral ugliness (and where shame is typically described as guilt’s ugly sister), but also a heterodox interpretation which seeks to retrieve and defend shame. As the heterodox interpretation seems to offer a more realistic picture of shame’s role in moral education, the provenance of the mainstream interpretation merits scrutiny. I argue that social scientific studies of the concept of shame, based on its supposed phenomenology, incorporate biases in favour of excessive, rather than medial, forms of the emotion. I suggest ways forward for more balanced analyses of the nature, moral justification and educative role of shame.     

When feeling bad makes you look good: guilt, shame, and person perception

In two studies, we examined how expressions of guilt and shame affected person perception. In the first study, participants read an autobiographical vignette in which the writer did something wrong and reported feeling either guilt, shame, or no emotion. The participants then rated the writer's motivations, beliefs, and traits, as well as their own feelings toward the writer. The person expressing feelings of guilt or shame was perceived more positively on a number of attributes, including moral motivation and social attunement, than the person who reported feeling no emotion. In the second study, the writer of the vignette reported experiencing (or not experiencing) cognitive and motivational aspects of guilt or shame. Expressing a desire to apologise (guilt) or feelings of worthlessness (private shame) resulted in more positive impressions than did reputational concerns (public shame) or a lack of any of these feelings. Our results indicate that verbal expressions of moral emotions such as guilt and shame influence perception of moral character as well as likeability.     

The heteronomous moral value of shame

Recent work in moral theory has argued against according shame any moral value in virtue of its supposed heteronomy. Authors who have defended shame's moral value have generally argued that shame is, in fact, autonomous. In the present article, I draw on the work of Jean-Paul Sartre, Stanley Cavell and Adam Smith to develop an argument for shame's moral worth based on its heteronomy. I then contrast my defence with work that holds shame's moral value to be based on its autonomy. I argue that that view goes wrong by construing shame on the model of private experience. This psychology is unconvincing in its own right and can underwrite moral failings.     

When feeling bad makes you look good: Guilt,shame, and person perception

In two studies, we examined how expressions of guilt and shame affected person perception. In the first study, participants read an autobiographical vignette in which the writer did something wrong and reported feeling either guilt, shame, or no emotion. The participants then rated the writer's motivations, beliefs, and traits, as well as their own feelings toward the writer. The person expressing feelings of guilt or shame was perceived more positively on a number of attributes, including moral motivation and social attunement, than the person who reported feeling no emotion. In the second study, the writer of the vignette reported experiencing (or not experiencing) cognitive and motivational aspects of guilt or shame. Expressing a desire to apologise (guilt) or feelings of worthlessness (private shame) resulted in more positive impressions than did reputational concerns (public shame) or a lack of any of these feelings. Our results indicate that verbal expressions of moral emotions such as guilt and shame influence perception of moral character as well as likeability.     

A study of the comparative structure of guilt and shame in a Chinese society.

On the basis of previous theoretical and empirical analyses of the comparative structures of guilt and shame, the authors hypothesized that antecedent condition (personal inadequacy vs. moral norm violation), audience presence, and personal responsibility attribution would distinguish shame from guilt. Although the subject population was Hong Kong Chinese, evidence from previous studies suggests that the comparative structures of guilt and shame are quite similar across cultures. The subjects were asked to recall either a guilt or a shame incident, and their responses were then coded into the predictor variables. The results of the study indicated that guilt was most likely to emerge when individuals had violated a moral norm and held themselves responsible for their conduct. In contrast, shame emerged more frequently when subjects felt personally inadequate than when they had violated moral norms. Moreover, when a guilt incident was reported, and audience was rarely mentioned, whereas subjects who reported a shame incident would generally feel personally responsible and often mentioned being looked at or evaluated. However, neither personal responsibility nor the presence of an audience seemed to be essential for a person to experience shame.     

Reassessing the dimensionality of the moral emotions

The dimensionality of the moral emotions was tested to examine whether theoretical distinctions between specific emotions were empirically supported. A total of 720 drink‐driving offenders indicated the degree to which they experienced feelings associated with the moral emotions, in an interview conducted after attending court or a restorative justice conference. Expected distinctions between shame and guilt were not found. Instead the principal components analysis identified three factors: shame‐guilt, embarrassment‐exposure, and unresolved shame. The results also show that shame‐guilt was related to higher feelings of empathy and lower feelings of anger/hostility. It is concluded that differences between shame and guilt may be overstated. Furthermore, it is suggested that the relationship between situational experiences of shame and the disposition to feel it may be more complicated than initially thought.     

羞耻情绪对欺骗行为的影响：自我控制的作用

本文通过4个实验考察羞耻情绪对欺骗行为的影响, 并进一步探讨这一影响存在的条件及其机制。实验1考察羞耻情绪对欺骗的影响, 结果发现羞耻组的欺骗行为和欺骗倾向显著低于控制组。实验2将羞耻分为道德失范和能力不足两种情景, 考察羞耻对欺骗产生影响的条件, 结果发现, 道德失范羞耻组的欺骗行为显著低于能力不足羞耻组和控制组。实验3a考察道德失范所引发的羞耻对自我控制资源的影响, 结果发现, 羞耻情绪诱发组的自我控制任务成绩显著高于未诱发组。实验3b考察自我控制资源在羞耻情绪影响欺骗行为中的作用, 结果发现, 自我控制资源在羞耻情绪影响欺骗的过程中起完全中介作用。这些研究结果表明, 当个体的羞耻情绪由道德失范而诱发时, 会遏制其欺骗行为的产生; 羞耻情绪对欺骗行为的影响机制可能是: 感受到羞耻的个体, 为恢复和保护受损的道德自我, 通过调集更多自我控制资源的方法影响欺骗行为的出现。     

Group-based guilt and shame in the context of intergroup conflict: The role of beliefs and meta-beliefs about group malleability

Group-based guilt and shame are part of a wide range of moral emotions in intergroup conflicts. These emotions can potentially motivate group members to make compromises in order to promote conflict resolution, and increase support for reparations and apologies following moral transgressions committed by the in-group. Thus, it is important to understand how to induce these emotions and the mechanisms for their effects. In the present paper, we examined the mechanisms underlying group-based guilt and shame in four studies. Across the first three studies, conducted in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we found that group-based guilt was mostly predicted by individuals’ implicit theories about groups (ITG). Specifically, we found that the more participants believed that groups are malleable, the more they experienced group-based guilt. Group-based shame, however, was found to be dependent upon individuals’ perception of other people’s perceptions about the malleability of groups (i.e., meta-ITG), as the perceived damage to one’s in-group image is a major component in experiencing shame. In Study 4, conducted in the context of gender relations, we differentiated between the two components of shame, that is, moral and image shame. As predicted, while group-based guilt and moral shame showed similar patterns of results, meta-ITG had a moderating effect on the association between ITG and group-based image shame. The theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed in relation to promoting intergroup conflict resolution and reconciliation.     

Paradox explored: Climate shame,moral agency,the church,and the birds

This article explores shame and moral agency in relationship to the climate catastrophe, and the moral situation of the world's relatively high-consuming people who are implicated in greenhouse gas emissions that cause climate change. The author complexifies that situation in the conundrums of climate colonialism, climate racism, structural sin, and the moral ambiguities they raise, including such questions as: “What are the moral demands of climate sin grounded in historically rooted economic systems that one did not create but upon which the material conditions of one's life depend? To what extent, if any, is the individual morally accountable for the social structures of which one is a part and from which one benefits?” From there, the essay moves to its central question. It is whether shame theory might help to enable moral agency for what is desperately needed now by people of climate privilege and economic privilege in the North Atlantic world—wise and courageous action to address climate change and climate injustice. The article probes shame theory for clues to what disables moral agency and what catalyzes it. The author finds in shame theory pathways for transforming shame-based moral inertia into moral agency. Those pathways suggest vital roles for the church.     

A Lover’s Shame

Shame is one of the more painful consequences of loving someone; my beloved’s doing something immoral can cause me to be ashamed of her. The guiding thought behind this paper is that explaining this phenomenon can tell us something about what it means to love. The phenomenon of beloved-induced shame has been largely neglected by philosophers working on shame, most of whom conceive of shame as being a reflexive attitude. Bennett Helm has recently suggested that in order to account for beloved-induced shame, we should deny the reflexivity of shame. After arguing that Helm’s account is inadequate, I proceed to develop an account of beloved-induced shame that rightly preserves its reflexivity. A familiar feature of love is that it involves an evaluative dependence; when I love someone, my well-being depends upon her life’s going well. I argue that loving someone also involves a persistent tendency to believe that her life is going well, in the sense that she is a good person, that she is not prone to wickedness. Lovers are inclined, more strongly than they otherwise would be, to give their beloveds the moral benefit of the doubt. These two features of loving—an evaluative dependence and a persistent tendency to believe in the beloved’s moral goodness—provide the conditions for a lover to experience shame when he discovers that his beloved has morally transgressed.     

Morality‐ and identity‐related antecedents of children's guilt and shame attributions in events involving physical illness

It is theorised that guilt‐ and shame‐related appraisals vary on two separate dimensions. Guilt implies an appraisal that one has either committed a moral transgression or that one has otherwise been involved in the creation of a morally wrong outcome. Shame implies one's appraisal that the current event or condition reflects negatively on one's identity. To test these claims, 206 7‐ to 16‐year‐old children gave shame and guilt ratings of three types of events that were drawn from the domain of physical illness and that were designed to elicit primarily guilt, primarily shame, or both emotions. The 12‐year‐olds and older children's ratings were fully consistent with our hypothesis. Younger children's greatest difficulty was in not attributing shame to protagonists who were involved in causing a moral wrong without there being the threat of an unwanted identity.     

大学生心理控制源与内疚感和羞耻感对反事实思维的影响

研究以128名大学生为研究对象,采用2 (心理控制源: 外控型、内控型)×2 (自我道德感: 内疚感、羞耻感) 两因素被试间实验设计,考察了外控和内控大学生在内疚感和羞耻感两种不同的自我道德情感下反事实思维内容的差异。结果表明:(1) 心理控制源对大学生反事实思维不同内容的诱发具有重要的影响:外控者更倾向于产生行为和情境导向的反事实思维,而内控者更倾向于产生自我导向的反事实思维。内疚感和羞耻感对大学生反事实思维内容的产生没有直接的影响;(2) 反事实思维内容的产生受到了心理控制源与内疚感和羞耻感两种自我道德情感的交互影响:外控者在羞耻感的启动条件下比在内疚感的启动条件下表现出了更多的行为和情境导向的反事实思维,而内控者在内疚感的启动条件下比在羞耻感的条件下表现出了更多的自我导向的反事实思维。研究结果有助于解释以中西方不同被试而得出的内疚感和羞耻感与反事实思维关系的矛盾结论。