Gifting Knowledge for Long Life

During nonemergency appointments at traditional sites of āyurvedic healthcare in Kerala, South India, classically trained Brāhma?a physicians and their patients seldom exchange anything of substance (whether medicinal or monetary). The physician-patient interface instead routinely involves an exchange of knowledge. Interactions between physicians and patients in these meetings evoke the highly theorized notion of the “Indian gift” and the question of prestation in South Indian societies. This article explores the nature of exchange in the supply and reception of healthcare among physicians and patients at traditional sites of āyurvedic treatment (that is, sites not affiliated with governmental or private hospitals or clinics) in contemporary Kerala. Drawing on classical treatises about the dharma of gifts (dānadharma) and the Sanskrit medical classics of āyurveda, it examines reciprocity, ideal preconditions of givers and receivers of gifts, and the possibility of a “pure gift” in the appraisal and production of wellbeing.     

Closure,Contrast, and Answer

How should the contrastivist formulate closure? That is, given that knowledge is a ternary contrastive state Kspq (s knows that p rather than q), how does this state extend under entailment? In what follows, I will identify adequacy conditions for closure, criticize the extant invariantist and contextualist closure schemas, and provide a contrastive schema based on the idea of extending answers. I will conclude that only the contrastivist can adequately formulate closure.     

A special latin square for the use of each subject “as his own control”

When the purpose of the experiment is to compare treatments, the Sequences × Positions Latin Square has been employed to control unwanted effects attributable to individuals, position, and sequence. This particular Latin Square has been subjected to criticism on the grounds there is confounding due to structure, random variables, and subject interactions. Special Latin Square, a subclass of the Sequences × Positions Latin Square, is basically ap ×p factorial design in blocks of sizep. The two factors are treatments (T) and positions (P). Sequence is one component of theTP interaction, and square uniqueness is the sum of the remaining components. This completely replicated factorial design has no structural or random variable confounding; if subject interactions are present, square uniqueness may be used as the error term and the bias in the test of treatments will be conservative.     

Reichenbach on the relative a priori and the context of discovery/justification distinction

Hans Reichenbach introduced two seemingly separate sets of distinctions in his epistemology at different times. One is between the axioms of coordination and the axioms of connections. The other distinction is between the context of discovery and the context of justification. The status and nature of each of these distinctions have been subject-matter of an ongoing debate among philosophers of science. Thus, there is a significant amount of works considering both distinctions separately. However, the relevance of Reichenbach’s two distinctions to each other does not seem to have enjoyed the same amount of interest so far. This is what I would like to consider in this paper. In other words, I am concerned with the question: what kind of relationship is there between his two distinctions, if there is any?     

Determination of the number of independent parameters of a score matrix from the examination of rank orders

Two ordinal consequences are drawn from the linear multiple-factor analysis model. First, the numberR(s, d) of distinct ways in whichs subjects can be ranked by linear functions ofd factors is limited by the recursive expressionR(s, d)=R(s?1,d)+(s?1)R(s?1,d?1). Second, every setS ofd+2 subjects can be separated into two subsetsS* andS ? S* such that no linear function ofd variables can rank allS* over allS ? S*, and vice versa. When these results are applied to the hypothetical data of Thurstone's “box problem,” three independent parameters are found. Relations to Thurstone's suggestion for a non-correlational factor analysis are discussed.     

Prioritizing Parental Worry Associated with Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy Using Best-Worst Scaling

Duchenne muscular dystrophy (DMD) is a progressive, fatal pediatric disorder with significant burden on parents. Assessing disease impact can inform clinical interventions. Best-worst scaling (BWS) was used to elicit parental priorities among 16 short-term, DMD-related worries identified through community engagement. Respondents viewed 16 subsets of worries, identified using a balanced, incomplete block design, and identified the most and least worrying items. Priorities were assessed using best-worst scores (spanning +1 to ?1) representing the relative number of times items were endorsed as most and least worrying. Independent-sample t-tests compared prioritization of parents with ambulatory and non-ambulatory children. Participants (n?=?119) most prioritized worries about weakness progression (BW score?=?0.64) and getting the right care over time (BW?=?0.25). Compared to parents of non-ambulatory children, parents of ambulatory children more highly prioritized missing treatments (BW?=?0.31 vs. 0.13, p?<?0.001) and being a good enough parent (BW?=?0.06 vs. ?0.08, p?=?0.010), and less prioritized child feeling like a burden (BW?=??0.24 vs. ?0.07, p?<?0.001). Regardless of child’s disease stage, caregiver interventions should address the emotional impact of caring for a child with a progressive, fatal disease. We demonstrate an accessible, clinically-relevant approach to prioritize disease impact using BWS, which offers an alternative to the use of traditional rating/ranking scales.     

Scope Processing in Chinese

The standard view maintains that quantifier scope interpretation results from an interaction between different modules: the syntax, the semantics as well as the pragmatics. Thus, by examining the mechanism of quantifier scope interpretation, we will certainly gain some insight into how these different modules interact with one another. To observe it, two experiments, an offline judgment task and an eye-tracking experiment, were conducted to investigate the interpretation of doubly quantified sentences in Chinese, like Mei-ge qiangdao dou qiang-le yi-ge yinhang (Every robber robbed a bank). According to current literature, doubly quantified sentences in Chinese like the above are unambiguous, which can only be interpreted as ‘for every robber x, there is a bank y, such that x robbed y–surface scope reading), contrary to their ambiguous English counterparts, which also allow the interpretation that ‘there is a bank y, such that for every robber x, x robbed y–inverse scope reading). Specifically, three questions were examined, that is, (i) What is the initial reading of doubly quantified sentences in Chinese? (ii) Whether inverse scope interpretation can be available if appropriate contexts are provided? (iii) What are the processing time courses engaged in quantifier scope interpretation? The results showed that (i) Initially, the language processor computes the surface scope representation and the inverse scope representation in parallel, thus, doubly quantified sentences in Chinese are ambiguous; (ii) The discourse information is not employed in initial processing of relative scope, it serves to evaluate the two representations in reanalysis; (iii) The lexical information of verbs affects their scope-taking patterns. We suggest that these findings provide evidence for the Modular Model, one of the major contenders in the literature on sentence processing.     

The logic of how-questions

Philosophers and scientists are concerned with the why and the how of things. Questions like the following are so much grist for the philosopher’s and scientist’s mill: How can we be free and yet live in a deterministic universe?, How do neural processes give rise to conscious experience?, Why does conscious experience accompany certain physiological events at all?, How is a three-dimensional perception of depth generated by a pair of two-dimensional retinal images?. Since Belnap and Steel’s pioneering work on the logic of questions, Van Fraassen has managed to apply their approach in constructing an account of the logic of why-questions. Comparatively little, by contrast, has been written on the logic of how-questions despite the apparent centrality of questions such as How is it possible for us to be both free and determined? to philosophical enterprise.¹ In what follows I develop a logic for how-questions of various sorts including how-questions of cognitive resolution, how-questions of manner, how-questions of method, of means, and of mechanism.     

Quieting the Ego Through Group Activities: A Thematic Analysis of Romanian and Japanese Students’ Positive Group Experiences

Research suggests that quieting the ego (reducing excessive self-focus) can foster well-being. Two exploratory qualitative studies were carried out to investigate the features of ego-quieting group activities. Romanian (N = 140) and Japanese participants (N = 99) read a definition of “self-detachment” and answered several open-ended questions asking them to describe a group situation in which they had experienced a similar state. Thematic analysis showed numerous similarities between the responses of the two samples, as well as cultural-specific features. Participants recalled moments of enjoyment in the company of friends, or challenging group work. For the Romanian sample, the experience was characterized by present-oriented attention, valuing others, positivity, disinhibition and altered perceptions, while for the Japanese sample, valuing others, stress relief, matching challenge and skill and merging self with exterior world were its prevalent features. Both samples identified similar eliciting factors (individual receptiveness, acceptant group, captivating activity, appropriate environment) and similar consequences of the experience (increased closeness, relaxation and self-development). While supporting the existing literature on the importance of communal activities in reducing self-focus and promoting individual well-being, the paper provides new in-depth insights into participants’ subjective experiences and the cultural specifics of positive group activities.     

Modeling Unicorns and Dead Cats: Applying Bressan’s ML<Superscript><Emphasis Type="Italic">ν</Emphasis></Superscript> to the Necessary Properties of Non-existent Objects

Should objects count as necessarily having certain properties, despite their not having those properties when they do not exist? For example, should a cat that passes out of existence, and so no longer is a cat, nonetheless count as necessarily being a cat? In this essay I examine different ways of adapting Aldo Bressan’s ML ^ν so that it can accommodate an affirmative answer to these questions. Anil Gupta, in The Logic of Common Nouns, creates a number of languages that have a kinship with Bressan’s ML ^ν , three of which are also tailored to affirmatively answering these questions. After comparing their languages, I argue that metaphysicians and philosophers of language should prefer ML ^ν to Gupta’s languages in most applications because it can accommodate essential properties, like being a cat, while being more uniform and less cumbersome.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">What is ?Curriculum Theorizing</Emphasis>: for a People Yet to Come

What is ?Curriculum Theory articulates the problematic of difference, diversity, and multiplicity in contemporary curriculum thought. More specifically, this essay argues that the conceptualization of difference that dominates the contemporary curriculum landscape is inadequate to either the task of ontological experimentation or the creation of non-representational ways for thinking a life. Despite the ostensible radicality ascribed to the curricular ideas of difference and multiplicity, What is ?Curriculum Theory argues that these ideas remain wed to an structural or identitarian logic that derives difference from the a priori conditions of the possible. Further, this essay argues that the orthodox conceptualization of difference in contemporary curriculum studies is complicit with the capitalist commitment to quantitative multiplicity, or rather, the proliferation of ‘multiple consumer choices’. Following this problematic, the task of this paper is oriented to the conceptualization of difference adequate to the creation of a people yet-to-come, or rather, a people for which no prior image exists. To accomplish this, What is ?Curriculum Theory draws upon Deleuze’s Bergsonism in order to advance a conceptualization of difference that breaks from modes of dialectical negation and contradiction particular to the tyranny of representational thinking. Articulating an image of difference that no longer accords to the possible, this essay composes a thought experiment conceptualizing a pedagogical life in a manner that explicates the transversal relationship between the actual (what is) and the virtual (what is not-yet).     

Early Feeding,Child Behaviour and Parenting as Correlates of Problem Eating

Mealtimes are a common source of stress for families. Examining factors related to problem eating may provide markers by which to identify families requiring assistance and salient targets for treatment. The current study investigated parenting practices and cognitions, generalisation of child behavioural issues, and early feeding history as they relate to problem eating in typically developing young children. We compared a community sample of 105 parents of 1.5–6-year-old children via survey and observation with 96 parents seeking treatment for their child’s problem eating. History of problems with breastfeeding, χ²(1)?=?3.88, p?=?.049, and the transition to solids, χ²(1)?=?7.27, p?=?.007, were more common among problem eaters than comparisons. Problem eaters had a greater number of problem behaviours outside of mealtimes, F(1181)?=?10.88, p?=?.001, though not more frequently than comparisons and not to clinical levels, F(1181)?=?1.81, p?=?.181. Parents of problem eaters reported more unhelpful mealtime parenting strategies, F(1155)?=?22.59, p?<?.001, yet general parenting style was similar by group, F(1187)?=?0.42, p?=?.527. Parents’ cognitions about mealtimes, F(1155)?=?119.81, p?<?.001, including mealtime-specific self-efficacy, F(1155)?=?171.30, p?<?.001, were poorer amongst problem eaters, and were the only factors to predict problem eating in the total sample. General parenting self-efficacy was poorer in parents of problem eaters (Behaviour: F(1187)?=?42.36, p?<?.001; Setting: F(1187)?=?10.64, p?=?.001). Evidence of feeding issues in infancy may support early detection of and intervention for later problem eating. The significance of broader child behaviour is less clear. Parent factors, particularly those specific to mealtimes, and cognitive in nature (including mealtime parenting self-efficacy) clearly differentiated the groups, and represent important targets for intervention.     

Imperfection,Indecision, and Hoarding

Hoarding disorder is a new DSM-5 disorder that causes functional impairment and affects 2 to 6% of the population (Frost and Steketee 2014). The current study evaluated a multiple mediation model with 243 undergraduate women in which indecisiveness (VOCI; Thordarson et al. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 42(11), 1289-1314, 2004) and decisional procrastination (DPS; Mann 1982) mediated the relationship between dimensions of perfectionism (F-MPS-B; Burgess et al. 2016a) and hoarding behavior (SI-R; Frost et al. Behaviour Research And Therapy, 42(10), 1163–1182, 2004) and excessive acquiring (CAS; Frost et al. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 8, 219–242, 2012). Multiple mediational analyses indicated a significant indirect effect for decisional procrastination, but not indecisiveness, in mediating evaluative concerns (but not striving) to SI-R Total, SI-R Clutter, SIR Excessive Acquisition, and both CAS subscales. Both mediators were significant pathways between evaluative concerns and SI-R Difficulty Discarding. These findings support a cognitive behavioral model of hoarding, suggesting that evaluative concerns produces problems in decision-making that influence acquisition, discarding, and clutter.     

The scope of formal explanation

The existence of multiple modes of explanation means that a crucial step in the process of generating explanations has to be selecting a particular mode. The present article identifies the key conceptual, as well as some pragmatic and epistemological, considerations that license the use of the formal mode of explanation, and thus that enter into the process of selecting and generating a formal explanation. Formal explanations explain the presence of certain properties in an instance of a kind by reference to the kind of thing it is (e.g. That has four legs because it is a dog). As such, this mode of explanation is intrinsically tied to kind representations and is applicable domain-generally. Although it is possible for formal explanation to apply domain-generally, for any given kind it is selective in its application, in that it can explain some, but not all, properties of the instances of a kind. It also appears that different types of properties can receive formal explanations across different domains. This article provides a sketch of a theory of the selectivity of formal explanation that results from the manner in which kinds of different types are distinguished. The present discussion also suggests how the mechanisms underlying formal explanations may contribute to the illusion of explanatory depth Keil (Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7, 368–373,2003), the operation of the inherence heuristic Cimpian & Salomon (Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 37, 461–480, 2014a; Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 37, 506–527,2014b), and psychological essentialism (Gelman, 2003).     

Substance concepts and personal identity

According to one argument for Animalism about personal identity, animal, but not person, is a Wigginsian substance concept—a concept that tells us what we are essentially. Person supposedly fails to be a substance concept because it is a functional concept that answers the question “what do we do?” without telling us what we are. Since person is not a substance concept, it cannot provide the criteria for our coming into or going out of existence; animal, on the other hand, can provide such criteria. This argument has been defended by Eric Olson, among others. I argue that this line of reasoning fails to show Animalism to be superior to the Psychological Approach, for the following two reasons: (1) human animal, animal, and organism are all functional concepts, and (2) the distinction between what something is and what it does is illegitimate on the reading that the argument needs.     

Reasoning defeasibly about probabilities

In concrete applications of probability, statistical investigation gives us knowledge of some probabilities, but we generally want to know many others that are not directly revealed by our data. For instance, we may know prob(P/Q) (the probability of P given Q) and prob(P/R), but what we really want is prob(P/Q&;R), and we may not have the data required to assess that directly. The probability calculus is of no help here. Given prob(P/Q) and prob(P/R), it is consistent with the probability calculus for prob(P/Q&;R) to have any value between 0 and 1. Is there any way to make a reasonable estimate of the value of prob(P/Q&;R)? A related problem occurs when probability practitioners adopt undefended assumptions of statistical independence simply on the basis of not seeing any connection between two propositions. This is common practice, but its justification has eluded probability theorists, and researchers are typically apologetic about making such assumptions. Is there any way to defend the practice? This paper shows that on a certain conception of probability—nomic probability—there are principles of “probable probabilities” that license inferences of the above sort. These are principles telling us that although certain inferences from probabilities to probabilities are not deductively valid, nevertheless the second-order probability of their yielding correct results is 1. This makes it defeasibly reasonable to make the inferences. Thus I argue that it is defeasibly reasonable to assume statistical independence when we have no information to the contrary. And I show that there is a function Y(r, s, a) such that if prob(P/Q) = r, prob(P/R) = s, and prob(P/U) = a (where U is our background knowledge) then it is defeasibly reasonable to expect that prob(P/Q&;R) = Y(r, s, a). Numerous other defeasible inferences are licensed by similar principles of probable probabilities. This has the potential to greatly enhance the usefulness of probabilities in practical application.     

An Interpretation of Łukasiewicz’s 4-Valued Modal Logic

A simple, bivalent semantics is defined for ?ukasiewicz’s 4-valued modal logic ?m4. It is shown that according to this semantics, the essential presupposition underlying ?m4 is the following: A is a theorem iff A is true conforming to both the reductionist (rt) and possibilist (pt) theses defined as follows: rt: the value (in a bivalent sense) of modal formulas is equivalent to the value of their respective argument (that is, ‘ A is necessary’ is true (false) iff A is true (false), etc.); pt: everything is possible. This presupposition highlights and explains all oddities arising in ?m4.     

Absence of evidence and evidence of absence: evidential transitivity in connection with fossils,fishing, fine-tuning,and firing squads

“Absence of evidence isn’t evidence of absence” is a slogan that is popular among scientists and nonscientists alike. This article assesses its truth by using a probabilistic tool, the Law of Likelihood. Qualitative questions (“Is E evidence about H?”) and quantitative questions (“How much evidence does E provide about H?”) are both considered. The article discusses the example of fossil intermediates. If finding a fossil that is phenotypically intermediate between two extant species provides evidence that those species have a common ancestor, does failing to find such a fossil constitute evidence that there was no common ancestor? Or should the failure merely be chalked up to the imperfection of the fossil record? The transitivity of the evidence relation in simple causal chains provides a broader context, which leads to discussion of the fine-tuning argument, the anthropic principle, and observation selection effects.     

Natural,Artifactual, and Moral Goodness

In Natural Goodness, Philippa Foot (2001) aims to provide an account of moral evaluation that is both naturalistic and cognitivist. She argues that moral evaluation is a variety of natural evaluation in the sense that moral judgments of human action and character have the same “grammar” or “conceptual structure” as natural judgments of the goodness (e.g., health) of plants and animals. We argue that Foot’s naturalist project can succeed, but not in the way she envisions, because her central thesis that moral evaluation is a variety of natural evaluation is not entirely correct. We show that both moral and natural evaluation are species of kind evaluation, which encompasses moral, natural, and artifact evaluation. Kind evaluation is a form of evaluation, according to which things are evaluated qua members of a kind, in such a way that the kind into which something is classified informs the standards of evaluation (or norms) for things of that kind. Because the source of the normative standards for moral evaluation is different from the source of the normative standards for natural evaluation, moral evaluation is not a species of natural evaluation. However, both are varieties of kind evaluation. This account of moral evaluation as a variety of kind evaluation is still an effective response to non-naturalism and to non-cognitivism.