Personality and Fears

The contribution to self-reported fears of individual differences in extraversion-introversion (E) and neuroticism (N) was studied in 102 female college students. Four groups of 20 Ss each were constituted - high E high N, high E low N, low E high N, and low E low N. A fear survey schedule and the Eysenck Personality Inventory were employed. By analysis of variance, total fear scores were a significant function of N but not E. Extreme or phobic fears were a significant function of neither personality dimensions, though the N effect approached conventional significance levels. Correlational analyses on the full sample confirmed these findings, except that a statistically significant though slight (6 percent) proportion of extreme fear variance was accountable by N.     

Logical Self-Reference as a Model for Conscious Experience

The structure of autoreferential statements that describe (or serve as a logical model for) the human conscious experience is analyzed. Autoreferential statements are introduced by autoreferential definitions, such as a=F(a, x), where F is a Boolean function and x is some atomic statement describing the content of the experience, or by analogous systems of inter-related definitions, such as a=F(b, x, y) and b=G(a, x, z). It is argued that only "noncreative" (systems of) definitions introduce statements that describe conscious experience, the noncreativeness meaning that no statement with non-tautological content can be derived from these definitions. The structure of such (systems of) definitions is comprehensively characterized in a series of theorems. A potential of the model in addressing empirical data is illustrated by applying it to the choice between two alternatives in the absence of a preference criterion. Copyright 2001 Academic Press.     

Mortality and Re-enchantment: Conscious Dying as Individualized Spirituality

The emergence of conscious dying in modern society suggests that the redefinition of death as consciousness transference not only challenges the fear of death, but also empowers a personal approach to dying moments. It can be considered a form of individualized spirituality, because the meaning of consciousness transference is not exclusively rooted in institutionalized meanings of the sacred, but redefines the sacred in highly individualistic terms. This change in attitudes towards death reflects a process of re-enchantment concomitant with the individualism of the New Age.     

Gender Conscious

Integration has had a bad press in recent years. Feminists and spokesmen for racial and ethnic minorities express concern that the integrationist agenda requires women and members of minorities to divest themselves of features of their identities in order to approximate to a restrictive white male ideal which, they hold, should not be a requirement for fair treatment and social benefits. I argue that this concern is unwarranted and that Integration with respect to gender, as I shall understand it, is overall more conducive to the happiness of both men and women than what I shall call Diversity.     

Conscious Ambivalence

Although ambivalence in a strict sense, according to which a person holds opposed attitudes, and holds them as opposed, is an ordinary and widespread phenomenon, it appears impossible on the common presupposition that persons are either unitary or plural. These two conceptions of personhood call for dispensing with ambivalence by employing tactics of harmonizing, splitting, or annulling the unitary subject. However, such tactics are useless if ambivalence is sometimes strictly conscious. This paper sharpens the notion of conscious ambivalence, such that the above tactics cannot be applied to ordinary moments of explicit and clear ambivalent consciousness. It is shown that such moments reveal ambivalence as an attitude that is part of human life. The argument employs three features of consciousness that together capture its outgoing character (a notion that combines intentionality and self-consciousness). In the last section some of the implications of conscious ambivalence for consciousness and the mind are clarified as the analysis of conscious ambivalence in this paper is compared with Hume’s and John Barth’s phenomenalist conceptions.     

Common Fears: A Comparison of Adolescents' Self-Generated and Fear Survey Schedule Generated Fears

Investigations into normative fear in adolescence have indicated that the most common fears are consistently death-related and danger-related. Assessments have most commonly been made from self-reports on fear survey schedules. The aim of the present study, therefore, was to determine whether adolescents would provide responses comparable to those generated through the use of a fear survey schedule when asked to list their 3 greatest fears. A total of 439 adolescents aged 11 to 18 years (237 girls, 201 boys, 1 sex not reported) listed their greatest fears; then they completed the 78-item Fear Survey Schedule for Children-II (E. Gullone & N. J. King, 1992). Consistent with past research, the 10 most common fears generated via the fear schedule related to death and danger. However, on the whole, the self-generated fears deviated from the death and danger theme, also including fear of failure, fear of animals, and fear of the unknown. A tendency toward global responses in self-generated fears appeared to encompass the majority of specific death-related fears included in the fear schedule, thus allowing for other predominant fears to be listed among the 3 most common.     

Methods of Overcoming Children's Fears

Forty-eight noninstitutionalized elderly were administered Piaget's Conservation of Surfaces Test. Only 13 subjects were designated as conservers in this content domain. A strong relationship existed between conservation ability and educational attainment, but not between sex and performance, and age and performance. Results indicated that cognitive abilities may be subject to qualitative disorganization in the latter portions of the life-span.     

Free Will as the Implied Negation of Our Conscious Physical Actions

In this paper, I have explained free will (classical libertarian version) as the implied negation of our conscious physical actions (routine actions). What we come across is liberty, which is purposive. The existence of free will, if possible, can only be traced in those states where our consciousness is in least connection with external world (eg. dreams or above). The spontaneity and absurdity of free will ensures that it will never accompany any purposive action. I have pointed out that it is important to proceed in the inverted direction (from determining free will in mind, to non-moral and then to moral conditions), rather than taking it for granted in morality. I have also tried to give an explanation for the illusion of free will during moral conditions. The major principles which I have used during this conversation are Anomalous Monism (Donald Davidson), Benjamin Libet’s ‘Half-second short delay’, Decision-making theories of Antonio Damasio and Daniel Dennett, Patricia Churchland’s notion of ‘Self-control’, Frankfurt’s ‘Theory of the Hierarchy of desires’ and occasional references to Freud’s and Jung’s psychoanalytic concepts, and Advaita Vedanta’s ‘states of consciousness’, etc.

     

『鬼』怕书的故事

我的童年是在没有电灯的时光里度过的.记得,当时如果是碰上连月光都没有的晚上,村里一片漆黑,孩子们除了搞一些捉迷藏、老鹰捉小鸡和砍龙纱尾的游戏以外,就只好去听大人们讲故事了.讲的又大都是鬼古,听起来很有味,可听完了就不敢走了.为什么?因为讲的大多是本地鬼,且越讲越近,直到讲到你屋边,有时甚至讲进你屋里,你还敢回家吗?……后来阿爸就慢慢地发现了问题,先是再也不准我们去听那些胡编乱造的鬼古,一边就给我们讲鬼怕书的故事,也不知阿爸是为了鼓励我们用功读书,还是为了驱鬼镇邪,以抵消鬼古的负面影响.     

The Prevention of Children's Maladaptive Fears

The authors address the prophylactic value of behavioral techniques in relation to children's maladaptive fears. The major settings of interest from the viewpoint of preventing children's maladaptive fears are the home, school and health-care settings. Encouraging findings have been reported in the use of film-modeling with children about to undergo dental treatment, tonsillectomies, injections, etc. Several theoretical explanations (stimulus pre-exposure, reciprocal inhibition, reinforcement contingencies, self-efficacy) of the success of such interventions can be advanced to affect the outcome of maladaptive fear prevention programs.     

Predicting Soccer Matches After Unconscious and Conscious Thought as a Function of Expertise

ABSTRACT— In two experiments, we investigated the effects of expertise and mode of thought on the accuracy of people's predictions. Both experts and nonexperts predicted the results of soccer matches after conscious thought, after unconscious thought, or immediately. In Experiment 1, experts who thought unconsciously outperformed participants in all other conditions. Whereas unconscious thinkers showed a correlation between expertise and accuracy of prediction, no such relation was observed for conscious thinkers or for immediate decision makers. In Experiment 2, this general pattern was replicated. In addition, experts who thought unconsciously were better at applying diagnostic information than experts who thought consciously or who decided immediately. The results are consistent with unconscious-thought theory.     

Conscious emotional experience emerges as a function of multilevel, appraisal-driven response synchronization

In this paper we discuss the issue of the processes potentially underlying the emergence of emotional consciousness in the light of theoretical considerations and empirical evidence. First, we argue that componential emotion models, and specifically the Component Process Model (CPM), may be better able to account for the emergence of feelings than basic emotion or dimensional models. Second, we advance the hypothesis that consciousness of emotional reactions emerges when lower levels of processing are not sufficient to cope with the event and regulate the emotional process, particularly when the degree of synchronization between the components reaches a critical level and duration. Third, we review recent neuroscience evidence that bolsters our claim of the central importance of the synchronization of neuronal assemblies at different levels of processing.     

Conscious dream synthesis as a method of learning about dreaming: a pedagogic experiment

Stimulated by Freud's comments on the unique perspectives offered by "building up dreams by synthesis," the authors applied this idea to the St. Louis Psychoanalytic Institute's introductory course on the psychology of dreaming. Each student was assigned the task of purposefully and consciously synthesizing a dream, utilizing certain assigned information and meeting the specified criteria. In the use of this device, it was anticipated that the conscious active effort required to duplicate the usually passively experienced processes of dreaming and the unconscious dream work would lead to a deeper understanding and appreciation of the dream.     

Conscious contributions to subliminal priming

Choice reaction times to visual stimuli (targets) may be influenced by preceding subliminal stimuli (primes). Some authors reported a straight priming effect i.e., responses were faster when primes and targets called for the same response than when they called for different responses. Others found the reversed pattern of results. Eimer and Schlaghecken [Eimer, M. & Schlaghecken, F. (2002). Links between conscious awareness and response inhibition: evidence from masked priming. Psychonomic Bulletin &Review, 9, 514-520.] showed recently that straight priming occurs whenever a prime is not efficiently masked thereby the information provided by the prime is accessible for consciousness. In the present study, a hypothesis is tested that straight priming is due to mediation of consciousness. To test this hypothesis, prime validity was manipulated. We showed that even when no mask was used so that participants could fully and consciously perceive the prime and participants were informed that primes were mostly invalid, for the short prime-target ISI interval (100 ms) straight priming occurred. The priming was inverse when the ISI was 800 ms. This indicates that participants were able to use the information provided by the prime to prepare the response opposite to that cued by the prime but only if the time between the prime and the target was long enough.