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1.
William Mark Goodwin 《Synthese》2010,172(3):361-379
According to Alberto Coffa in The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap, Kant’s account of mathematical judgment is built on a ‘semantic swamp’. Kant’s primitive semantics led him to appeal to
pure intuition in an attempt to explain mathematical necessity. The appeal to pure intuition was, on Coffa’s line, a blunder
from which philosophy was forced to spend the next 150 years trying to recover. This dismal assessment of Kant’s contributions
to the evolution of accounts of mathematical necessity is fundamentally backward-looking. Coffa’s account of how semantic
theories of the a priori evolved out of Kant’s doctrine of pure intuition rightly emphasizes those developments, both scientific
and philosophical, that collectively served to undermine the plausibility of Kant’s account. What is missing from Coffa’s
story, apart from any recognition of Kant’s semantic innovations, is an attempt to appreciate Kant’s philosophical context
and the distinctive perspective from which Kant viewed issues in the philosophy of mathematics. When Kant’s perspective and
context are brought out, he can not only be seen to have made a genuinely progressive contribution to the development of accounts
of mathematical necessity, but also to be relevant to contemporary issues in the philosophy of mathematics in underappreciated
ways. 相似文献
2.
Burleigh T. Wilkins 《The Journal of Ethics》2007,11(2):147-159
This paper explores some of the problems which arise from Immanuel Kant’s commitment to both human rights and the rights of
states. Michael Doyle believed it was contradictory for Kant to defend both human rights and non-intervention by states in
the affairs of other states, but I argue that for Kant there was no such contradiction, and I explore Kant’s claim that the
state is “a moral personality.” I also discuss Kant’s belief that “Nature guarantees” that perpetual peace will obtain, and
I consider Kant as a teleologist. 相似文献
3.
Nature, Interthing Intersubjectivity, and the Environment: A Comparative Analysis of Kant and Daoism
Ann A. Pang-White 《Dao》2009,8(1):61-78
The Kantian philosophy, for many, largely represents the Modern West’s anthropocentric dominance of nature in its instrumental-rationalist
orientation. Recently, some scholars have argued that Kant’s aesthetics offers significant resources for environmental ethics,
while others believe that Kant’s flawed dualistic views in the second Critique severely undermine any environmental promise that aesthetic judgments may hold in Kant’s third Critique. This article first examines the meanings of nature in Kant’s three Critiques. It concludes that Kant’s aesthetic view toward sensible nature is indeed inconsistent. The article, however, also suggests
that the “I” as “transcendental apperception” discussed in the paralogisms of the first Critique holds some promise of “interthing intersubjective” thinking. The second half of the article demonstrates that Daoism with
a dialectic concern similar to Kant’s has something insightful to offer in its idea of interthingness based on a phenomenal
account of nature. The article investigates important Daoist ideas of interthing analogical experience, qi, spiritual exercise, and wuwei in its dialect relation to zizan. By bringing Daoism and Kant into dialogue, the author hopes to bring forth a synthetic approach that is better suited to
today’s environmental concerns. 相似文献
4.
James Scott Johnston 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2006,25(5):385-402
In this article, I examine anew the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant and its contributions to educational theory. I make four claims. First, that Kant should be read as having the Categorical Imperative develop out of subjective maxims. Second, that moral self-perfection is the aim of moral education. Third, that moral self-perfection develops by children habituating the results of their moral maxims in scenarios and cases. Fourth, that character and culture, Kant’s highest aims for humanity, are the ultimate beneficiaries of this process. 相似文献
5.
Philip A. Quadrio 《Sophia》2009,48(2):179-193
This paper explores the Rousseauian background to Kant’s critique of metaphysics and philosophical theology. The core idea
is that the rejection of metaphysics and philosophical theology is part of a turn from theoretical to practical reason influential
on European philosophy of religion, a turn we associate with Kant but that is prefigured by Rousseau. Rousseau is not, however,
a thinker normally associated with the notion of metaphysical criticism, nor the notion of the primacy of practical reason.
The paper draws out this dimension of Rousseau’s thinking and its importance for Kantian thought. It will proceed by discussing
the Kant-Rousseau connection; demonstrate the importance of practical philosophy for Kant and the critical project generally;
overview Kant’s critique of metaphysics; and turn to a consideration of Rousseau, particularly from the text émile. Given the indisputable influence of Rousseau on Kant, the purpose of this paper is to explore the ways that Rousseau’s own
rejection of philosophical theology might be suggestive to those interested in Kant and the way in which it throws new light
on Kant’s philosophy of religion. As well as drawing out the Kant-Rousseau connection, it also, implicitly, defends the general
orientation of these philosophers as one that is important, perhaps vital, to philosophy of religion.
相似文献
Philip A. QuadrioEmail: |
6.
Summary This article is an investigation of parallel themes in Heinrich Hertz’s philosophy science and Kant’s theory of schemata, symbols and regulative ideas. It is argued that Hertz’s “pictures” bears close similarities to Kantian “schemata”, that is, they are rules linking concepts to intuitions and provide them with their meaning. Kant’s distinction between symbols and schemata is discussed and related to Hertz’s three pictures of mechanics. It is argued that Hertz considered his own picture of mechanics (the “hidden mass” picture) as symbolic in a different way than the force and energy pictures. In the final part of the article it is described how Harald H?ffding soon after the publication of Hertz’s Principles of Mechanics developed a general theory of analogical reasoning, relying on the ideas of Hertz and Kant. 相似文献
7.
Ernst Wolfgang Orth 《Synthese》2011,179(1):115-134
The article investigates Cassirer’s developing interest in the cultural sciences to display how his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms constitutes a philosophy of culture. The core concept in such a philosophy of culture is the symbolic formation that both
possesses a structured-structuring dimension and appears as an historical process in which culture shows itself as a temporal
creation. The philosophy of culture displays ‘life in meaning’, that is reality as it exhibits human reality manifested in
and through the medium of linguistic, artistic, religious, scientific “and so on” action and behaviour. This reality, therefore,
is mediation between culture and nature through human spirit. Cassirer’s philosophy of culture connects back to Kant’s transcendental
idealism by emphasizing that any concept of reality establishes itself through a modalization of reality, e.g. that reality
constitutes itself in the mode of interpretation. This makes the basis for Cassirer’s characteristic understanding of hermeneutics
where cultural development is regarded as drama. 相似文献
8.
Garrett Thomson 《Synthese》2008,162(3):373-384
Kolak’s arguments for the thesis ‘there is only one person’ in fact show that the subject-in-itself is not a countable entity.
The paper argues for this assertion by comparing Kolak’s concept of the subject with Kant’s notion of the transcendental unity
of apperception (TUAP), which is a formal feature of experience and not countable. It also argues the point by contrasting
both the subject and the TUAP with the notion of the individual human being or empirical self, which is the main concern standard
theories of personal identity such as those of Williams, Parfit and Nozick. Unlike the empirical self, but rather like Kant’s
TUAP, the subject-in-itself cannot be counted because it is not an object or substance, despite Kolak’s thesis that there
is only one. The paper also maintains that Kolak’s contention that the subject is an entity hinges on a strong and less plausible
interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism. 相似文献
9.
Qiyong Guo 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2007,2(3):345-362
Mou Zongsan uses the highest moral principle “autonomy” to interpret Confucius’ benevolence and Mencius’ “inherent benevolence
and righteousness”, focuses on the self-rule of the will. It does not do any harm to Mencius’ learning, on the contrary, it
is conducive to the communication between Chinese and Western philosophies. If we stick to Kant’s moral self autonomy and
apply it to interpreting Zhu Xi’s moral theory, similarly we will discover the implications of Zhu Xi’s “autonomy” in his
moral learning. Therefore, it is inappropriate for Mou Zongsan to say that Zhu Xi’s ethics belongs to the autonomous one.
__________
Translated from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Researches), 2005, (6): 33–39 相似文献
10.
This paper starts from the presupposition that moral codes often do not suffice to make agents understand their moral responsibility.
We will illustrate this statement with a concrete example of engineers who design a truck’s trailer and who do not think traffic
safety is part of their responsibility. This opinion clashes with a common supposition that designers in fact should do all
that is in their power to ensure safety in traffic. In our opinion this shows the need for a moral philosophy that helps engineers
to interpret their responsibility and think more critically about it. For this purpose we will explore the moral philosophy
of Alasdair MacIntyre, which is particularly interesting because he locates the beginning of moral thinking in the daily practice
of a profession. This is consistent with the history of moral codes, for codes are also the product of moral reflection by
professionals. We will use MacIntyre’s philosophy to (1) explain what is wrong with the designers’ understanding of their
responsibility and (2) show a possible way to bring their reflection to a more self-critical level. We will also inspect MacIntyre’s
proposal critically. 相似文献
11.
Jørgen Huggler 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2010,29(2):129-140
Immanuel Kant’s essay on Perpetual Peace (1795/96) contains a rejection of the idea of a world government (earlier advocated
by Kant himself). In connexion with a substantial argument for cosmopolitan rights based on the human body and its need for
a space on the surface of the Earth, Kant presents the most rigorous philosophical formulation ever given of the limitations
of the cosmopolitan law. In this contribution, Kant’s essay is analysed and the reasons he gives for these restrictions discussed
in relation to his main focus: to project a realistic path to perpetual peace. 相似文献
12.
Michael Wolff 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2010,41(2):359-371
In an earlier article (see J Gen Philos Sci (2010) 41: 341–355) I have compared Aristotle’s syllogistic with Kant’s theory
of “pure ratiocination”. “Ratiocinia pura” („reine Vernunftschlüsse“) is Kant’s designation for assertoric syllogisms Aristotle has called ‘perfect’. In Kant’s view
they differ from non-pure ratiocinia precisely in that their validity rests only on the validity of the Dictum de omni et nullo (which, however, in Kant’s view can be further reduced to more fundamental principles) whereas the validity of non-pure ratiocinia additionally presupposes the validity of inferences which Kant calls consequentiae immediatae. I have argued that Kant’s view is in some (not in all) essential features in accordance with Aristotle’s view concerning
perfect syllogisms and certainly leading to a tenable and interesting logical theory. As a result I have rejected not only
the interpretation of Aristotle adopted by Theodor Ebert, but also the objections he has raised against Kant’s logical theory.
As far as Aristotle is concerned, Ebert has attempted to defend his position in the first part of his reply to my article
published in J Gen Philos Sci (2009) 40: 357–365, and I have argued against this defence in issue 1 of the J Gen Philos Sci (2010) 41: 199–213 (cf. Ebert’s answer
in the same issue pp. 215–231). In the following discussion I deal with Eberts defence of his criticism of Kant published
in the second part of his reply to my article (see J Gen Philos Sci (2009) 40: 365–372). I shall argue, that Kant’s principle ‘nota notae est nota rei ipsius’ and his use of technical vocabulary stand up to the objections raised by Ebert. His attempts to prove that Kant’s logical
theory is defective are based on several misinterpretations. 相似文献
13.
Emer O’Hagan 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(5):525-537
Kant’s duty of self-knowledge demands that one know one’s heart—the quality of one’s will in relation to duty. Self-knowledge
requires that an agent subvert feelings which fuel self-aggrandizing narratives and increase self-conceit; she must adopt
the standpoint of the rational agent constrained by the requirements of reason in order to gain information about her moral
constitution. This is not I argue, contra Nancy Sherman, in order to assess the moral goodness of her conduct. Insofar as
sound moral practice requires moral self-knowledge and moral self-knowledge requires a theoretical commitment to a conception
of the moral self, sound moral agency is for Kant crucially tied to theory. Kant plausibly holds that self-knowledge is a
protection against moral confusion and self-deception. I conclude that although his account relies too heavily on the awareness
of moral law to explain its connection to moral development, it is insightful and important in Kantian ethics. 相似文献
14.
An antinomy of political judgment: Kant,Arendt, and the role of purposiveness in reflective judgment
Avery Goldman 《Continental Philosophy Review》2010,43(3):331-352
This article builds on Arendt’s development of a Kantian politics from out of the conception of reflective judgment in the
Critique of Judgment. Arendt looks to Kant’s analysis of the beautiful to explain how political thought can be conceived. And yet Arendt describes
such Kantian reflection as an empirical undertaking that justifies itself only in relation to the abstract principle of the
moral law. The problem for such an account is that the autonomy of the moral law appears to be at odds with the social cohesion
of Kantian political life. The ensuing contradiction can be deemed the antinomy of political judgment. Kant’s conception of
reflective judgment offers such an inquiry considerably more to work with than Arendt uncovers. In particular, the regulative
principle of the purposiveness of nature that is shown to direct all reflection can be seen to offer the solution to this
antinomy. 相似文献
15.
Brian Ellis 《Sophia》2011,50(1):135-139
A theory of morality acceptable to humanists must be one that can be accepted independently of religion. In this paper, I
argue that while there is such a theory, it is a non-standard one, and its acceptance would have some far-reaching consequences.
As one might expect, the theory is similar to others in various ways. But it is not the same as any of them. Indeed, it is
a radically new theory. Like Hume’s ethics, it is founded on our natural sociability, and feelings of empathy for others.
Like Aristotle’s theory, it incorporates an ethics of virtue. Like Kant’s theory, it regards the set of moral principles as
those appropriate for a socially ideal society. But unlike Kant’s theory, it is essentially utilitarian. I call it ‘social
contractual utilitarianism’. 相似文献
16.
Thomas J. Nenon 《Continental Philosophy Review》2008,41(4):427-439
This article compares the differences between Kant’s and Husserl’s conceptions of the “transcendental.” It argues that, for
Kant, the term “transcendental” stands for what is otherwise called “metaphysical,” i.e. non-empirical knowledge. As opposed
to his predecessors, who had believed that such non-empirical knowledge was possible for meta-physical, i.e. transcendent
objects, Kant’s contribution was to show how there can be non-empirical (a priori) knowledge not about transcendent objects,
but about the necessary conditions for the experience of natural, non-transcendent objects. Hence the transcendental for Kant
ends up connoting a philosophy that claims to show how subjective forms of intuition and thinking have objective validity
for all objects as appearances. By contrast, Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy takes a different set of problems for its
starting point. His quest is to avoid the uncertainty of empirical knowledge about all kinds of objects that present themselves
to us as something other than, something transcendent to, consciousness. Transcendental or reliable knowledge is made possible
through the phenomenological reduction that focuses strictly on consciousness as immediately self-given to itself—reflection
upon “pure” consciousness. The contents of such consciousness are not the same for everyone and at every time, so they are
not necessary and invariant in the way that Kant’s pure forms of subjectivity are. Since Husserl however also claims that
the all objects, as intentional objects, are constituted in and for consciousness, an investigation into the structures of
pure subjectivity can also be called “transcendental” in a further sense of showing the genesis of our knowledge of objects
that are transcendent to consciousness. Moreover, since Husserl’s philosophical interest is precisely upon the structures
of that consciousness, he also concentrates on necessary conditions for the constitution of these objects in his philosophical
work. Hence, there ends up being a great deal of overlap between his own transcendental project and Kant’s in spite of the
differences in what each of them means by the term “transcendental.”
相似文献
Thomas J. NenonEmail: |
17.
Kant’s theory of arithmetic is not only a central element in his theoretical philosophy but also an important contribution
to the philosophy of arithmetic as such. However, modern mathematics, especially non-Euclidean geometry, has placed much pressure
on Kant’s theory of mathematics. But objections against his theory of geometry do not necessarily correspond to arguments
against his theory of arithmetic and algebra. The goal of this article is to show that at least some important details in
Kant’s theory of arithmetic can be picked up, improved by reconstruction and defended under a contemporary perspective: the
theory of numbers as products of rule following construction presupposing successive synthesis in time and the theory of arithmetic
equations, sentences or “formulas”—as Kant says—as synthetic a priori. In order to do so, two calculi in terms of modern mathematics
are introduced which formalise Kant’s theory of addition as a form of synthetic operation.
相似文献
Peter MittelstaedtEmail: |
18.
Kjartan Koch Mikalsen 《Res Publica》2010,16(1):23-40
It is common to interpret Kant’s idea of public reason and the Enlightenment motto to ‘think for oneself’ as incompatible
with the view that testimony and judgement of credibility is essential to rational public deliberation. Such interpretations
have led to criticism of contemporary Kantian approaches to deliberative democracy for being intellectualistic, and for not
considering our epistemic dependence on other people adequately. In this article, I argue that such criticism is insufficiently
substantiated, and that Kant’s idea of public reason is neither at odds with deference to a certain kind of authority, nor
with making judgements of character in rational deliberation. This view is corroborated by recent work on Kant’s epistemology
of testimony. 相似文献
19.
Itay Snir 《Continental Philosophy Review》2010,43(3):407-437
This article offers a new interpretation of Adorno’s “new categorical imperative”: it suggests that the new imperative is
an important element of Adorno’s moral philosophy and at the same time runs counter to some of its essential features. It
is suggested that Adorno’s moral philosophy leads to two aporiae, which create an impasse that the new categorical imperative
attempts to circumvent. The first aporia results from the tension between Adorno’s acknowledgement that praxis is an essential
part of moral philosophy, and his view according to which existing social conditions make it impossible for moral knowledge
to be translated into “right” action. The second aporia results from the tension between the uncompromising sensitivity to
suffering that underlies Adorno’s moral thought, and his analysis of the culture industry mechanisms which turn people into
happy, satisfied customers—an incompatibility which threatens to pull the rug out from under Adorno’s moral philosophy. My
interpretation of the “new categorical imperative” focuses on two characteristics it inherits from the “old,” Kantian one—self-evidence
and unconditionality—in order to present the new imperative as a response to these two aporiae. 相似文献
20.
Kurt Mosser 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):1-20
Kant’s reputation for making absolutist claims about universal and necessary conditions for the possibility of experience
are put here in the broader context of his goals for the Critical philosophy. It is shown that within that context, Kant’s
claims can be seen as considerably more innocuous than they are traditionally regarded, underscoring his deep respect for
“common sense” and sharing surprisingly similar goals with Wittgenstein in terms of what philosophy can, and at least as importantly
cannot, provide.
相似文献
Kurt MosserEmail: |