Predicting individual false alarm rates and signal detection theory: A role for remembering

The relationships between hit, remember, and false alarm rates were examined across individual subjects in three remember-know experiments in order to determine whether signal detection theory would be consistent with the observed data. The experimental data differed from signal detection predictions in two critical ways. First, remember reports were unrelated, or slightly negatively related, to the commission of false alarms. Second, both response types (remembers and false alarms) were uniquely related to hit rates, which demonstrated that the hit rate cannot be viewed as the result of a single underlying strength process. These results are consistent with the dual-process signal detection model of Yonelinas (1994), in which performance is determined by two independent processes--retrieval of categorical context information (remembering) and discriminations based on continuous item strength. Remember and false alarm rates selectively tap these processes, whereas the hit rate is jointly determined. Monte Carlo simulations in which the dual-process model was used successfully reproduced the pattern in the experimental data, whereas simulations in which a signal detection model, with separate "old" and "remember" criteria, was used, did not. The results demonstrate the utility of examining individual differences in response types when one is evaluating memory models.     

Processing fluency affects subjective claims of recollection

Previous studies that have used the remember-know paradigm to investigate subjective awareness in memory have shown that fluency manipulations have an impact on "know" responses but not on "remember" responses (e.g., Rajaram, 1993), a finding typically accounted for by invoking inferential processing in judgments of familiarity but not of recollection. However, in light of several researchers' criticisms of this procedure, as well as findings documenting the influence of processing fluency on various subjective judgments, the present study was conducted in order to investigate whether judgments of recollection might also be subject to inferential processes and not solely the product of conscious retrieval. When the standard remember-know procedure was used (Experiment 1), manipulations of perceptual fluency increased "know" responses but had no effect on "remember" responses, replicating previous findings. However, when an independent ratings method was employed (Higham & Vokey, 2004), manipulations of perceptual fluency (Experiment 2) and conceptual fluency (Experiment 3) reliably increased claims of both familiarity and recollection, suggesting that the conclusion that fluency affects only "know" responses may be an artifact of the standard remember-know procedure.     

Context, remember-know recognition judgements, and ROC parameters

Recent work (e.g., Dunn, 2004; Heathcote, 2003) has questioned the necessity of postulating two processes to explain recognition memory. As part of this trend, strength theories of the remember-know methodology have gained in support. We present three experiments with pictorial material in which we force participants to use differential contextual information at test. Participants were required to give remember-know judgements and confidence ratings for each test stimulus. Hits, false alarms, remember-know data, and discrimination indices indicated systematic variations as a function of the availability and use of contextual information. Moreover, when we normalised the receiver operating characteristic data in terms of z-scores, the slopes were lower than 1 and slightly concave. Additionally, we computed the same set of statistical indices suggested by Wixted and Stretch (2004), with mixed results. Overall, we think that the data support a two-factor theory of remember-know and recognition, although many results fit well signal detection views of the task. Finally, the idea that remember and know responses are pure manifestations of recollection and familiarity seems difficult to sustain. We think that a productive use of the remember-know methodology involves the minimisation of the bias factors that may contaminate the responses, in addition to the introduction of the experimental manipulations needed to promote recollective and/or familiarity processes.     

Positive and negative remember judgments and ROCs in the plurals paradigm: Evidence for alternative decision strategies

Using old-new ratings and remember-know judgments we explored the plurals paradigm, in which studied words must be distinguished from plurality-changed lures. The paradigm allowed us to investigate negative remembering—that is, the remembering of a plural-altered study item; capacity for this judgment was found to be poorer than or equivalent to the conventional positive remembering. A response-bias manipulation affected positive but not negative remembering. The ratings were used to construct ROC curves and test the prediction of the most common dual-process theory of recognition memory (Yonelinas, 2001) that the amount of recollection can be independently estimated from ROC curves and from remember judgments. By fitting the individual data with pure signal detection theory (SDT) models and dual-process models that combined SDT and high-threshold components (HTSDT), we identified two types of subjects. For those who were better described by HTSDT, the predicted convergence of remember-know and ROC measures was observed. For those who were better described by SDT, the ROC intercept could not predict the remember rate. The data are consistent with the idea that all subjects rely on the same representation but base their decisions on different partitions of a decision space.     

Measuring the speed of the conscious components of recognition memory: remembering is faster than knowing

Three experiments investigated response times (RTs) for remember and know responses in recognition memory. RTs to remember responses were faster than RTs to know responses, regardless of whether the remember-know decision was preceded by an old/new decision (two-step procedure) or was made without a preceding old/new decision (one-step procedure). The finding of faster RTs for R responses was also found when remember-know decisions were made retrospectively. These findings are inconsistent with dual-process models of recognition memory, which predict that recollection is slower and more effortful than familiarity. Word frequency did not influence RTs, but remember responses were faster for words than for nonwords. We argue that the difference in RTs to remember and know responses reflects the time taken to make old/new decisions on the basis of the type of information activated at test.     

The<Emphasis Type="Italic">remember</Emphasis> response: Subject to bias,graded, and not a process-pure indicator of recollection

Recognition memory judgments have long been assumed to depend on the contributions of two underlying processes: recollection and familiarity. We measured recollection with receiver-operating characteristic (ROC) data and remember-know judgments. Under standard remember-know instructions, the two estimates of recollection diverged. When subjects were told they might need to justify theirremember responses to the experimenter, the two estimates were more likely to agree. The data support the conclusion thatremember responses are generally based on a continuous underlying process but that specific task instructions can produce data that appear consistent with a high-threshold recollective process. Models based on signal detection theory provide a better account of these data than does the dual-process model (Yonelinas, 1994) or process-pure interpretations.     

Judgments of recency and their relation to recognition memory

Subjects went through a list of 550 high- and low-frequency words (Experiment 1) or concrete and abstract words (Experiment 2) in which individual items were repeated at lags of 5 to 30 other items. They made old versus new recognition decisions on each word and followed each "old" response with a numerical judgment of recency (JOR). Recognition judgments displayed the mirror effect. Conditionalized on recognition, JORs were shorter for low-frequency words than for high-frequency words, and shorter for concrete words than for abstract words. This was true at every lag, suggesting that recognition and JOR may have a common basis. However, recognition confidence ratings obtained in Experiment 3 proved much less sensitive than JOR to test lag. Memory models applicable to multiple judgment tasks will be needed to account for such findings.     

The effect of study modality on false recognition

A number of previous studies have shown that false recognition of critical items in the Deese/Roediger-McDermott paradigm is reduced when study items are presented visually rather than auditorily; however, this effect has not been uniformly demonstrated. We investigated three potential boundary conditions of the effect of study modality in false recognition. Experiments 1 and 2 showed no reduction in false recognition following visual study presentation when the yes-no recognition test was not preceded by a recall test. Experiment 3 showed that visual study presentation can reduce false recognition without a preceding recall test, if the recognition test uses remember-know instructions. The order of the recognition test items did not influence the effect of visual study presentation on false recognition in Experiment 1. In general, the data imply that distinctive processing at study can reduce false memory in recognition if the test demands draw attention to the dimension of distinctive processing.     

Context effects on remembering and knowing: the expectancy heuristic

Three experiments are reported examining the effect of context on remember-know judgments. In Experiments 1 and 2, medium-frequency words were intermixed with high-frequency or low-frequency words at study or at test, respectively. Remember responses were greater for medium-frequency targets when they were studied or tested among high-frequency, as compared with low-frequency, words. The authors proposed a decision-based mechanism called "the expectancy heuristic" to explain why remember responses were more likely when items were studied or tested in the context of words that were relatively less distinct. According to the expectancy heuristic, when items on a recognition test exceed an expected level of memorability they will be given a remember judgment but when they do not, but are still more familiar than new words, they will be given a know judgment. Experiment 3, which varied expectancies about the strength of tested targets, demonstrated the use of the expectancy heuristic, indicating that it operates by selectively influencing the remember criterion rather than by influencing recollection of studied items.     

Recognition memory for valenced and arousing materials under conditions of divided attention

Two experiments are reported that examined the effect of both valence and arousal on recognition memory performance. Each experiment used two classes of negative items that differed in arousal, as well as a neutral and non-arousing set of items. In Experiment 1 a difficult divided attention task was crossed with the learning and test phases of the experiment. In Experiment 2 encoding time was manipulated and remember-know judgements were collected. The emotional enhancement effect often found with verbal materials survived the depletion of cognitive resources, as did the extra benefit accruing from high arousal. Although we found that arousal led to more recollection, the general conclusion that we draw is that the effect of emotion on recognition memory can be attributed to relatively automatic influences.     

Binding of multidimensional context information as a distinctive characteristic of remember judgments

This research investigated the cognitive processes underlying remember-know judgments in terms of contextual binding in multidimensional source memory. Stochastic dependence between the retrieval of different context attributes, which formed the empirical criterion of binding, was observed for remembered items but not for known items. Experiment 1 showed that the qualitative difference in the stochastic relation holds even if quantitative source-memory performance is equated for items with remember and know judgments. Experiment 2 generalized the findings to context information from different modalities, and Experiment 3 ruled out a spurious stochastic dependence due to interindividual differences. Supporting recent dual-process models of remember-know judgments, the findings show that remember and know judgments differ with respect to binding processes that correspond to episodic recollection.     

The dimensionality of the remember-know task: a state-trace analysis

This article addresses the issue of whether the remember-know (RK) task is best explained by a single-process or a dual-process model. All single-process models propose that remember and know responses reflect different levels of a single strength-of-evidence dimension. Thus, across conditions in which response criteria are held constant, these models predict that the RK task is unidimensional. Many dual-process models propose that remember and know responses reflect two qualitatively distinct processes underlying recognition memory, often characterized as recollection and familiarity. These models predict that the RK task is bidimensional. Using data from 37 studies, the author conducted a state-trace analysis to determine the dimensionality of the RK task. In those studies, non-memory-related differences between conditions were eliminated via decision criteria constrained to be constant across all levels of the independent variables. The results reveal little or no evidence of bidimensionality and lend additional support to the unequal-variance signal detection model. Other arguments supporting a bidimensional interpretation are examined, and the author concludes there is insufficient evidence for the RK task to be used to identify qualitatively different memory components.     

When the smile is a cue to familiarity

The question discussed in the two following experiments concerns the effect of facial expressions on face recognition. Famous and unknown faces with neutral or smiling expression were presented for different inspection durations (15 ms vs 1000 ms). Subjects had to categorise these faces as famous or unknown (Experiment 1), or estimate their degree of familiarity on a rating scale (Experiment 2). Results showed that the smile increased ratings of familiarity for unfamiliar faces (Experiments 1 and 2) and for famous faces (Experiment 2). These data are discussed in the framework of current face-recognition models and are interpreted in terms of social value of the smile. It is proposed that the smiling bias found here acts at the level of the decision process.     

Boundaries of the relation between conscious recollection and source memory for perceptual details

The relation between conscious recollection and source memory for perceptual details was investigated in three experiments that combined the remember-know paradigm with a multidimensional source monitoring test. Experiment 1 replicated that source memory for perceptual details is better in the case of "remember" than "know" judgments. Experiment 2 showed that the relation between "remember" judgments and source memory for perceptual details is diminished by a semantic orienting task during encoding. Experiment 3 demonstrated that "remember" judgments are related to enhanced source memory for specific and unique kinds of perceptual source information, whereas memory for incomplete and global perceptual source information does not differentiate between "remember" and "know" judgments. The results show that the attentional focus during encoding and the specificity of retrieved source information form boundary conditions for the use of source memory for perceptual details as a basis of "remember" judgments.     

When the smile is a cue to familiarity

The question discussed in the two following experiments concerns the effect of facial expressions on face recognition. Famous and unknown faces with neutral or smiling expression were presented for different inspection durations (15 ms vs 1000 ms). Subjects had to categorize these faces as famous or unknown (Experiment 1), or estimate their degree of familiarity on a rating scale (Experiment 2). Results showed that the smile increased ratings of familiarity for unfamiliar faces (Experiments 1 and 2) and for famous faces (Experiment 2). These data are discussed in the framework of current face-recognition models and are interpreted in terms of social value of the smile. It is proposed that the smiling bias found here acts at the level of the decision process.     

On predicting the future states of awareness for recognition of unrecallable items

Two experiments were conducted that examined people's predictive accuracy for their future states of awareness. In both experiments, participants learned word pairs and were tested with a cued recall test. When recall failed, predictive judgments were obtained. In Experiment 1, feeling of knowing judgments predicted not only future recognition but also the state of awareness as remembered or known that was associated with that recognition. In Experiment 2, predictive remember-know judgments were found to be accurately diagnostic of future states of awareness as well. One conclusion to be drawn from these data is that recollective details are among the partial knowledge that is retrieved in the absence of successful cued recall. General implications for theories of feeling of knowing are discussed.     

“Remembering” emotional words is based on response bias,not recollection

Recent studies have demonstrated that emotional stimuli result in a higher proportion of recognized items that are “remembered” (e.g., Kensinger & Corkin, 2003; Ochsner, 2000), leading to greater estimates of recollection by the dual-process model (Yonelinas, 1994). This result suggests that recognition judgments to emotional stimuli depend on a recollection process. We challenge this conclusion with receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve data from two experiments. In both experiments, subjects studied neutral and emotional words. During the recognition test, subjects made old-new confidence ratings as well as remember-know judgments. Four models of remember-know judgments were fit to individual subjects’ data: two versions of a one-dimensional signaldetection-based model (Donaldson, 1996; Wixted & Stretch, 2004), the dual-process model (Yonelinas, 1994), and the two-dimensional signal-detection-based model known as STREAK (Rotello, Macmillan, & Reeder, 2004). Consistent with the literature, we found that emotion increases subjective reports of “remembering.” However, our ROC analyses and modeling work reveal that the effect is due to response bias differences rather than sensitivity change or use of a high-threshold recollection process.     

Receiver operating characteristics (ROCs) in recognition memory: a review

Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis is being used increasingly to examine the memory processes underlying recognition memory. The authors discuss the methodological issues involved in conducting and analyzing ROC results, describe the various models that have been developed to account for these results, review the behavioral empirical literature, and assess the models in light of those results. The empirical literature includes studies of item recognition, relational recognition (e.g., source and associative tests), as well as exclusion and remember-know tasks. Nine empirical regularities are described, and a number of unresolved empirical issues are identified. The results indicate that several common classes of recognition models, such as pure threshold and pure signal detection models, are inadequate to account for recognition memory, whereas several hybrid models that incorporate a signal detection-based process and a threshold recollection or attention process are in better agreement with the results. The results indicate that there are at least 2 functionally distinct component/processes underlying recognition memory. In addition, the ROC results have various implications for how recognition memory performance should be measured.     

How many response options? A study of remember-know testing procedures

The remember-know procedure can be conducted in one or two steps. The one-step procedure does not include a recognition response (old-new) prior to the remember-know response. It is observed consistently that the one-step procedure leads to a more liberal placement of the response criterion, but it is unclear whether recognition accuracy is affected by the number of procedural steps. However, previous studies used bias-dependent measures of accuracy (A′ and d′). We manipulated the number of steps and confirmed the finding that the response criterion is more liberal with the one-step procedure. More importantly, we employed a signal detection theory bias-free accuracy measure (d_a) to show that varying the number of steps does not affect recognition accuracy, and we demonstrated that this pattern of results does not change when the dual process signal detection model (Yonelinas, 1997) is applied.     

中国大学生的记忆的自我参照效应

记忆的自我参照效应是指记忆材料与自我相联系时的记忆效果优于其它编码条件的现象,这种优势主要体现在以回忆经验为特征的R反应(“记得”)上。西方一些研究表明,自我参照的记忆成绩优于参照母亲的记忆。本研究以中国大学生为被试,得到参照父亲和母亲的记忆与自我参照有同样好的成绩,显著优于参照名人的记忆,并且父母之间无差异。这支持了独立型／依赖型自我概念模型中的东方文化下的自我概念包括父母的观点。