What Ethics for Bioart?

Living artworks created with biotechnology raise a range of ethical questions, some of which are unprecedented, others well known from other contexts. These questions are often discussed within the framework of bioethics, the ethics of the life sciences. The basic concern of institutionalised bioethics is to develop and implement ethical guidelines for ethically responsible handling of living material in technological and scientific contexts. Notably, discussions of ethical issues in bioart do not refer to existing discourses on art and morality from the field of aesthetics. The latter framework is primarily concerned with how the moral value of an artwork affects its artistic value. The author argues that a successful integration of these two frameworks will make possible an ethics of bioart that is adequate to its subject matter and relevant for practice. Such an integrated approach can give increased depth to understandings of ethical issues in bioart, inspire new ways of thinking about ethics in relation to art in general and give novel impulses to bioethics and technology assessment. Artworks by the Tissue Culture and Art Project and their reception serve as the empirical starting point for connecting perspectives in art with those of bioethics, developing an ethics for bioart. The author suggests that consideration of the effect of these artworks is vital in validating ethically problematical applications of biotechnology for art. It is argued that the affective, visceral qualities of living artworks may spur the audience to adjust, revise or develop their personal ethical framework.     

What is consciousness for?

The answer to the title question is, in a word, volition. Our hypothesis is that the ultimate adaptive function of consciousness is to make volitional movement possible. All conscious processes exist to subserve that ultimate function. Thus, we believe that all conscious organisms possess at least some volitional capability. Consciousness makes volitional attention possible; volitional attention, in turn, makes volitional movement possible. There is, as far as we know, no valid theoretical argument or convincing empirical evidence that consciousness itself has any direct causal efficacy other than volition. Consciousness, via volitional action, increases the likelihood that an organism will direct its attention, and ultimately its movements, to whatever is most important for its survival and reproduction.     

What Are Gay Men for?

Abstract

The question asked in the title is one that Mark Vernon takes from Michael Vasey's own writings on sexuality. Vernon notes that Vasey presents a clearly constructavist account of sexuality in which the nature and meaning of homosexuality will change with historical and social circumstances. This raises the question of what gay men might be for in contemporary society. In order to explore this question Vernon looks at the literature on friendship, drawing on the work of Aristotle and others. He aims to show that the kind of friendship experienced by and shown to others through gay men, is of a particular, perhaps disturbing, kind. It is from this position that Vernon answers Vasey's question by suggesting that gay men may be able to offer a prophetic message to contemporary society about the nature of friendship beyond, and within, the family structures of society.     

What Is Bayesian Confirmation for?

Peter Brössel and Franz Huber in 2015 argued that the Bayesian concept of confirmation had no use. I will argue that it has both the uses they discussed—it can be used for making claims about how worthy of belief various hypotheses are, and it can be used to measure the epistemic value of experiments. Furthermore, it can be useful in explanations. More generally, I will argue that more coarse-grained concepts (like confirmation) can be useful, even when we have more fine-grained concepts (like credences).     

What Makes for a Merry Christmas?

Despite the importance of Christmas within many cultures, researchhas not examined the types of experiences and activities that are associated withholiday well-being. Thus, we asked 117 individuals, ranging in age from 18 to 80,to answer questions about their satisfaction, stress, and emotional state during theChristmas season, as well as questions about their experiences, use of money, andconsumption behaviors. More happiness was reported when family and religiousexperiences were especially salient, and lower well-being occurred when spendingmoney and receiving gifts predominated. Engaging in environmentally consciousconsumption practices also predicted a happier holiday, as did being older and male.In sum, the materialistic aspects of modern Christmas celebrations may underminewell-being, while family and spiritual activities may help people to feel more satisfied.     

Understanding What’s Good for Us

The ancient question of what a good life consists in is currently the focus of intense debate. There are two aspects to this debate: the first concerns how the concept of a good life is to be understood; the second concerns what kinds of life fall within the extension of this concept. In this paper, I will attend only to the first, conceptual aspect and not to the second, substantive aspect. More precisely, I will address the preliminary, underlying question of how to understand what it is in general for something to be good for someone, from which an understanding of the more particular concept of a good life may be derived.

What Accounts for Prosocial Behavior? Roles of Moral Identity,Moral Judgment,and Self-Efficacy Beliefs

Prior research suggests that moral identity influences individuals’ willingness to engage in prosocial behavior. Little attention, however, has been given to the roles of and relations between moral identity and other factors, such as moral judgment, in accounting for types of prosocial behavior in adolescence. The current study examined the extent to which moral identity, moral judgment, and social self-efficacy contribute to prosocial behaviors in adolescence. Approximately 338 adolescents (M_age?=?13.4 years) completed measures of moral identity, moral judgment, social self-efficacy, and prosocial behavior. Teachers rated adolescents’ prosocial behaviors, which largely corroborated the adolescents’ self-reports. Moral identity was found to predict most types of prosocial behavior. Moral judgment and moral identity were related and jointly predicted altruistic prosocial behaviors, but did not predict helping in front of others. Further, moral identity mediated the relationships between moral judgment and some forms of prosocial behavior (e.g., emotional, volunteering). Self-efficacy beliefs were found to predict some types of prosocial behavior (e.g., public), perhaps providing adolescents with confidence to engage in prosocial action. Overall, moral identity was especially effective in directly accounting for prosocial behavior, and may act as a mediator to bridge the moral judgment–moral action gap among adolescents.     

What Can Armstrongian Universals Do for Induction?

Philosophia - David Armstrong (1983) argues that necessitation relations among universals are the best explanation of some of our observations. If we consequently accept them into our ontologies,...     

What Can Feminist Epistemology Do for Surgery?

Surgery is an important part of contemporary health care, but currently much of surgery lacks a strong evidence base. Uptake of evidence‐based medicine (EBM) methods within surgical research and among practitioners has been slow compared with other areas of medicine. Although this is often viewed as arising from practical and cultural barriers, it also reflects a lack of epistemic fit between EBM research methods and surgical practice. In this paper we discuss some epistemic challenges in surgery relating to this lack of fit, and investigate how resources from feminist epistemology can help to characterize them. We point to ways in which these epistemic challenges may be addressed by gathering and disseminating evidence about what works in surgery using methods that are contextual, pluralistic, and sensitive to hierarchies.     

What are randomised controlled trials good for?

Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are widely taken as the gold standard for establishing causal conclusions. Ideally conducted they ensure that the treatment ‘causes’ the outcome—in the experiment. But where else? This is the venerable question of external validity. I point out that the question comes in two importantly different forms: Is the specific causal conclusion warranted by the experiment true in a target situation? What will be the result of implementing the treatment there? This paper explains how the probabilistic theory of causality implies that RCTs can establish causal conclusions and thereby provides an account of what exactly that causal conclusion is. Clarifying the exact form of the conclusion shows just what is necessary for it to hold in a new setting and also how much more is needed to see what the actual outcome would be there were the treatment implemented.     

What Punishment for the Murder of 10,000?

Those who commit crime on a grand scale, numbering their victims in the thousands, seem to pose a special problem both for consequentialist and for non-consequentialist theories of punishment, a problem the International Criminal Court makes practical. This paper argues that at least one non-consequentialist theory of punishment, the fairness theory, can provide a justification of punishment for great crimes. It does so by dividing the question into two parts, the one of proportion which it answers directly, and the other of ‘anchoring points’ which it assigns to a broader theory of enforcement (which may have a non-consequentialist or consequentialist version).     

Response execution, selection, or activation: What is sufficient for response-related repetition effects under task shifting?

Repetition effects are often helpful in revealing information about mental structures and processes. Usually, positive effects have been observed when the stimuli or responses are repeated. However, in task shift studies it has also been found that response repetitions can produce negative effects if the task shifts. Although several mechanisms have been proposed to account for this interaction between task shifting and response repetition, many details remain open. Therefore, a series of four experiments was conducted to answer two questions. First, are motor responses necessary to produce response-related repetition effects, or is response activation sufficient? Second, does the risk of an accidental re-execution of the last response affect the repetition costs? The results show that response activation alone can produce repetition effects. Furthermore, the risk of accidental response re-execution largely modulates these effects.     

What is Psychotherapy for? A Plausible Alternative to Empirically Supported Therapies,Therapy Relationships,and Practice Guidelines

Task forces come up with empirically supported therapies and therapist-client relationships. A careful study of their research provides an empirically supported answer to the long-standing question of what psychotherapy is for. Accordingly, if your way of doing therapy falls outside the empirically based boundary, (a) you can risk declining their practice guidelines; (b) you can develop your own practice guidelines; and (c) you can pursue some exciting implications from having an alternative set of guidelines for how to do psychotherapy. A strategy is proposed as a plausible alternative to the task forces empirically based strategy.     

What causes the spacing effect? Some effects of repetition,duration, and spacing on memory for pictures

Three experiments examined effects of the spacing of repetitions on memory for pictures. In Experiment I, the duration of the first presentation (P(1)) was manipulated, as was P(1)-P(2) spacing. The effect of spacing on judged frequency was independent of P(1) duration. In Experiment II, pictures were given M massed presentations just prior to the P(M)-P(M+1) spacing interval. The form of the spacing curve was independent of M. Neither experiment confirmed the prediction of "overhabituation," derived from the habituation-recovery explanation of the spacing effect. In Experiment III, subjects made both duration and frequency judgments. The duration judgment results were not consistent with the notion that subjects remember multiple massed presentations as single occurrences of especially long duration. Some evidence from Experiments I and III suggests that an interrupted stimulus is recognized better than one that is not interrupted-a finding that, if replicable, would support the habituation-recovery account of the spacing effect.     

Choice theories: What are they good for?

Simonson et al. present an ambitious sketch of an integrative theory of context. Provoked by this thoughtful proposal, I discuss what is the function of theories of choice in the coming decades. Traditionally, choice models and theory have attempted to predict choices as a function of the attributes of options. I argue that to be truly useful, they need to generate specific and quantitative predictions of the effect of the choice environment upon choice probability. To do this, we need to focus on rigorously modeling and measuring the underlying processes causing these effects, and use the Simonson et al. proposal to provide some examples. I also present some examples from research in decision-making and decision neuroscience, and argue that models that fail, and fail spectacularly are particularly useful. I close with a challenge: How would consumer researcher aid the design of real world choice environments such as the health exchanges under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act?     

Simul What? Toward a Grace for the Fearful

The doctrines of forensic justification and simul iustus et peccator assume a primarily moral theo‐cosmology. However, the former constricts the excessiveness of divine grace, while the latter fails to adequately capture the fullness of the human condition. Freeing divine grace and theological anthropology from the moral requires a shift in emphasis toward suffering and an acknowledgment that a deep root of sin is creaturely vulnerability. In this case, the incurved self might symbolize the fearful, pulling goods toward the self for protection. While accountability for sin remains important, the first response to the fearful, who act from a sense of deep vulnerability, is compassion rather than judgment. In this way grace attends to but ultimately exceeds the moral.