Laws of Nature Don't Have Ceteris Paribus Clauses,They Are Ceteris Paribus Clauses

Laws of nature are properly (if controversially) conceived as abstract entities playing a governing role in the physical universe. Dispositionalists typically hold that laws of nature are not real, or at least are not fundamental, and that regularities in the physical universe are grounded in the causal powers of objects. By contrast, I argue that dispositionalism implies nomic realism: since at least some dispositions have ceteris paribus clauses incorporating uninstantiated universals, and these ceteris paribus clauses help to determine their dispositions' ranges of manifestation, there are indeed abstracta which play a governing role in the physical universe. After addressing several objections (including the objection that such ‘laws’ lack sufficient independence/externality from the dispositions to count as genuinely governing), I go on to consider some broader implications of this conclusion for other debates in metaphysics and the philosophy of science. ¹      

Violated Laws,Ceteris Paribus Clauses,and Capacities

It is often claimed that the bulk of the laws of physics –including such venerable laws as Universal Gravitation– are violated in many (or even all) circumstances because they havecounter-instances that result when a system is not isolated fromother systems. Various accounts of how one should interpretthese (apparently) violated laws have been provided. In thispaper, I examine two accounts of (apparently) violated laws, thatthey are merely ceteris paribus laws and that they aremanifestations of capacities. Through an examination of theprimary example that motivated these views, I show that given aproper understanding of the situation, neither view is optimalbecause the law is not even apparently violated. Along the way, Iam able to diagnose what has led to the mistaken belief: I showthat it originates from an element of the standard empiricistconception of laws. I then evaluate the suggestions of how tointerpret violated laws with respect to other examples and findthem wanting there too.     

Ceteris Paribus Laws and Minutis Rectis Laws

Special science generalizations admit of exceptions. Among the class of non‐exceptionless special science generalizations, I distinguish (what I will call) minutis rectis (mr) generalizations from the more familiar category of ceteris paribus (cp) generalizations. I argue that the challenges involved in showing that mr generalizations can play the law role are underappreciated, and quite different from those involved in showing that cp generalizations can do so. I outline a strategy for meeting the challenges posed by mr generalizations.     

Ceteris Paribus Conditionals and Comparative Normalcy

Our understanding of subjunctive conditionals has been greatly enhanced through the use of possible world semantics and, more precisely, by the idea that they involve variably strict quantification over possible worlds. I propose to extend this treatment to ceteris paribus conditionals – that is, conditionals that incorporate a ceteris paribus or ‘other things being equal’ clause. Although such conditionals are commonly invoked in scientific theorising, they traditionally arouse suspicion and apprehensiveness amongst philosophers. By treating ceteris paribus conditionals as a species of variably strict conditional I hope to shed new light upon their content and their logic.     

Ceteris Paribus Laws: A Naturalistic Account

An otherwise lawlike generalisation hedged by a ceteris paribus (CP) clause qualifies as a law of nature, if the CP clause can be substituted with a set of conditions derived from the multivariate regression model used to interpret the empirical data in support of the generalisation. Three studies in human biology that use regression analysis are surveyed, showing that standard objections to cashing out CP clauses in this way—based on alleged vagueness, vacuity, or lack of testability—do not apply. CP laws also cannot be said to be simply false due to the indefinitely many conditions not explicitly stated in their associated model: scientific CP clauses imply that these are, given the evidence, not nomically relevant.     

Manipulationism,Ceteris Paribus Laws,and the Bugbear of Background Knowledge

According to James Woodward’s manipulationism, to explain an event is to show how it could be changed by manipulating its cause. The relevant intervention must be a ‘serious possibility’, distinct from mere logical or physical possibility and approximating something I call ‘scientific possibility’. I argue that background knowledge is indispensable for judgements of scientific possibility and that ‘invariant’ generalisations, the primary vehicles of explanation in manipulationism, are not well adapted to encoding this often implicit knowledge, especially in the social sciences. A survey of key social scientific research methods (case and comparative studies, randomised control trials, ethnography, and structural equation modelling) shows that the output of these methods is generated by causal and non-causal background knowledge meshing in a way that is better encapsulated in an updated theory of ceteris paribus generalisations.     

On Regretting Things I Didn't Do and Couldn't Have Done

One of the lines of investigation opened up by Wallace in The View from Here concerns the notion of regret: what it is, what it is rationally constrained by, and what are the proper objects of regret. A distinctive feature of Wallace's view is that regret is an intention‐like state, which, whilst backward‐looking, is bound up with our future directed practices of value. In this commentary, I set out Wallace's claims on regret, its rational constraints, and its objects, and raise some worries about Wallace's position on each of these three issues.     

创造力有其“阴暗面”

创造力有其“阴暗面”。从产品角度而言,创造力可产出伤害性或消极的产品;从个体角度而言,高创造力者可能具有一些消极特征,如精神疾病易感性强、宜人性差、说谎、不诚信等;从情境角度而言,高创造力表现可能与不信任感、生存危机感、社会拒绝等消极因素有关。未来研究应开发高生态效度的恶意创造力测评工具,改进计算恶意创造力水平的算法,探索消极个体特征和消极情境因素作用于创造性思维的认知与神经机制。     

险些发生的人命案

杀生祭旗,古来有之,留传至今,并非绝迹,说是吉利,无法考证。杀生之事屡见不鲜,尤其是在大年除夕之夜,砍掉猪头祭神灵者,在我们这一带还颇盛行呢！这叫实际的罪恶,更有一种罪恶是虚妄的,这就是闻声摄魂,还真有活人被勾去魂魄的。     

Responsibility,Moral and Otherwise

Abstract

Philosophers frequently distinguish between causal responsibility and moral responsibility, but that distinction is either ambiguous or confused. We can distinguish between causal responsibility and a deeper kind of responsibility, that licenses reactive attitudes and judgments that a merely causal connection would not, and we can distinguish between holding people accountable for their moral qualities and holding people accountable for their nonmoral qualities. But, because we sometimes hold people deeply responsible for nonmoral qualities of behavior and character, these distinctions are not the same. A number of recent accounts of responsibility identify deep responsibility with moral responsibility and in consequence miss some key features of the concept of which they are trying to give an account. A view that distinguishes two levels of responsibility, according to which the conditions of attributability are weaker than the conditions of accountability, might seem to account for a kind of nonmoral responsibility while still conceiving of moral responsibility as involving a deeper kind of agency. This paper considers and rejects this view, suggesting that whether we are ever as deeply responsible for anything as we tend to presume can be as fruitfully asked about our nonmoral successes and failures as about our moral ones.     

Missed Opportunities: Speculation on What Japanese Psychology Could Have Been

Takasuna (Integr. Physiol. Behav. Sci. 41, 2007) mentioned the ease with which evolutionary theory was accepted by Japanese psychologists, and certainly this is admirable. He also mentioned the stubborn force which had to be used to gain an understanding of the (thoroughly Western) subjective–objective distinction. Alas, during the formative years of Japanese psychology, there was much philosophical work afoot attempting to destroy that distinction. It is speculated that only a small change of which books were translated, or with which Americans early Japanese psychologists trained under, would have made Japan into a haven for these still underdog theories.     

It Could Have Been Better or It Might Have Been Worse: Implications for Blame Assignment in Rape Cases

Victim and assailant blame, as well as the perceived injustice and severity of a rape event, were examined as a function of the type of counterfactual alternative to which the identically described event was compared. It was hypothesized that when perceivers imagine an alternative outcome that is even worse than the original rape event, the perceived injustice and severity of the rape will be reduced, rendering the assailant less blameworthy. That is, when an alternative outcome is generated by focusing on the assailant, the hypothetically worse outcome that he could have inflicted on the victim makes the rape appear less tragic by comparison. Conversely, when perceivers imagine an alternative outcome that is better than the original rape event, perceptions of injustice should increase. In two experiments, participants considered how an identical rape event could have been worse for the victim or worse for the assailant by imagining how either the victim or the assailant could have behaved differently. Support for the proposed judgment model was obtained and implications are drawn for trial attorneys who may present alternative outcomes in order to reframe juror interpretations.     

Virtue and Luck, Epistemic and Otherwise

This essay defends virtue reliabilism against a line of argument put forward by Duncan Pritchard. In the process, it discusses (1) the motivations for virtue reliabilism, (2) some analogies between epistemic virtue and moral virtue, and (3) the relation between virtue (epistemic and otherwise) and luck (epistemic and otherwise). It argues that considerations about virtue and luck suggest a solution to Gettier problems from the perspective of a virtue theory.