Differential cognitive cues in pictorial depth perception among Ugandan children

Four pictures from Hudson's Depth Perception Test containing size, super-position or overlap, and linear perspective cues were administered to 240 Ugandan primary school children. The key question asked regarding the relationship of elements in each picture varied in terms of “Which (is/looks) (nearer/farther) to (man/you), the elephant or the antelope?”. Results suggested that depth in pictorial material was perceived significantly higher for the question variation “which is/looks farther” rather than “nearer.” In addition, the main effects of “grades” and “man/you” and the “grade x nearer/farther” interaction were statistically significant. Results are discussed in terms of culturally constituted experience and the effects of attentional factors and lexical markings inherent in the relational concepts used in the key question.     

Infants' distance perception from linear perspective and texture gradients

This study investigated 5- and 7-month-old infants' abilities to perceive objects' distances from pictorial depth cues, the depth cues available to a stationary, monocular viewer. Infants viewed a display in which texture gradients and linear perspective, two pictorial depth cues, created an illusion of two objects resting at different distances on a textured surface. Under monocular viewing conditions, 7-month-olds reached preferentially for the apparently nearer object, indicating that they perceived the objects' relative distances specified by pictorial depth cues. Under binocular viewing conditions, these infants showed no reaching preference. This finding rules out interpretations of the results not based on the objects' perceived distances. The 5-month-olds' reaching preferences were not significantly different in the experimental (monocular) and control (binocular) conditions. These infants, therefore, did not show clear evidence of distance perception from pictorial depth cues.     

Wittgenstein,mindreading and perception

Can we perceive others' mental states? Wittgenstein is often claimed to hold, like some phenomenologists, that we can. The view thus attributed to Wittgenstein is a view about the correct explanation of mindreading: He is taken to be answering a question about the kind of process mindreading involves. But although Wittgenstein claims we see others' emotions, he denies that he is thereby making any claim about that underlying process and, moreover, denies that any underlying process could have the significance it is claimed to have for this debate. For Wittgenstein, the question is not “Is this perception?” but “What do we mean by ‘perception' here?” and that question is answered by investigating the grammar of the relevant concepts. That investigation, however, reveals similarities and differences between what we call “perception” here and elsewhere. Hence, Wittgenstein's answer to the question “Can we perceive others' mental states?” is yes and no: Both responses can be justified by appeal to different concepts of perception. Wittgenstein, then, has much to contribute to our understanding of mindreading, but what he has to contribute is nothing like the view typically attributed to him here.     

Organizational factors and the perception of motion in depth

When two stationary, stereoscopically separated targets are viewed in a completely dark surround, and no cues concerning their egocentric distances from the observer are salient, the farther target tends to be seen at the same distance it would have assumed if it were by itself. The nearer target is seen as being closer than it would have been if seen alone. The present studies extend this previous finding (now termed thefar-anchor effect) into the domain of targets that move in stereoscopic space. Observers viewed two small illuminated targets, which began at either the same or different stereoscopic distances. One of the targets was moved in depth and the observers identified the target that appeared to move. Conditions varied according to the initial depth location of the moving target. Significantly more correct responses were reported when the nearer target moved than when the farther one moved, consistent with the hypothesis that the perception of motion in depth is affected by the aforementioned perceptual anchoring effect of the farther target.     

Pictorial depth interpretation: A prerequisite to pictorial space comprehension

One hundred and seventy-two perceptually untrained Grade 3 Shona school children, urban and rural, were presented with, and tested orally on, six pictures containing structured depth cues. Eighty per cent of the children achieved consistent (6/6) pictorial depth interpretation (p.d.i.) in response to the oral instruments, whereas only 69% mean p.d.i. had been attained by Grade 2 & 4 children in response to the non-verbal instruments of Jahoda and McGurk (1974). Of the 24% of the children who achieved consistent pictorial space comprehension (p.s.c.) all but two (less than 5%) were also capable of p.d.i. To establish that p.s.c. is preceded by p.d.i., and does not occur simultaneously with it, 86 children, trained perceptually for pictorial depth, were similarly tested. Of the 26% gain in consistent p.s.c., almost half occurred amongst children necessarily already capable of p.d.i. Further, it was noted that the inhibition of p.d.i., like that of p.s.c. (Leach, 1975, 1977), resulting from excessively abstract line drawings, was reduced by the use of more realistic materials such as photographs.     

Wittgenstein’s Peculiar Use of “Internal Relation” in Aspect-Seeing

“Internal relation” is a significant term in both Wittgenstein’s early and later philosophy. The term is used in relation to many problems, including our topic here, “aspect-seeing.” Some scholars have attempted to present a persuasive interpretation of this terminology; however, Wittgenstein’s remarks on “aspect-seeing” somehow thwart their approaches. The obstacle lies in the relata involved: Which terms are connected by an internal relation in the perception of an aspect? In this paper, I review the existing interpretations and present two proposals, one of which is conservative and the other slightly more radical. I argue that Wittgenstein makes divergent use of the distinction between “internal/external relations,” and that this may reveal the potential ambiguities of the words “internal” and “relation.”     

Thinking About a Word—Love,for Example

What is it we do when we philosophize about a word? How are we to act as we ask the philosophical question par excellence, “What is … ?” These questions are addressed here with particular focus on Troy Jollimore's Love's Vision and contemporary theories of love. Jollimore's rationalist account of love, based on a specific understanding of “reasons for love,” illustrates a particular philosophical mistake: When we think about a word, we are prone to believe that even though “the sense of the word” that we investigate may be up for grabs, the other words we use when we do these investigations are not. Jollimore's exploration of love is guided by specific conceptions of “reasons” and “rationality” that remain unquestioned. The article argues that we may have to rethink a great number of words as we embark on the task of uncovering the sense of one word.     

When less is more: Line drawings lead to greater boundary extension than do colour photographs

Is boundary extension (false memory beyond the edges of the view) determined solely by the schematic structure of the view or does the quality of the pictorial information impact this error? To examine this, colour photographs or line-drawings of 12 multi-object scenes (Experiment 1: N=64) and 16 single-object scenes (Experiment 2: N=64) were presented for 14 s each. At test, the same pictures were each rated as being the “same”, “closer-up”, or “farther away” (five-point scale). Although the layout, the scope of the view, the distance of the main objects to the edges, the background space and the gist of the scenes were held constant, line drawings yielded greater boundary extension than did their photographic counterparts for multi-object (Experiment 1) and single-object (Experiment 2) scenes. Results are discussed in the context of the multisource model and its implications for the study of scene perception and memory.     

Stability and Change in Psychosocial Resources during Caregiving and Bereavement in Partners of Men with AIDS

ABSTRACT This study examines the effects of caregiving and bereavement on psychosocial resources in HIV + and HIV? caregivers of men with AIDS. We explored three hypotheses regarding these effects: the “wear and tear” hypothesis, which asserts that the chronic stress of caregiving and bereavement diminishes resources; the “enhancement” hypothesis, which asserts that caregiver resources may increase in response to increased demands; and the “personality” hypothesis, which asserts that psychosocial resources reflect stable personality characteristics. We addressed four questions: (a) What are the effects of caregiving on resources? (b) How do these resources vary by the imminence of the partner's death? (c) What is the effect of the partner's death on these resources? and (d) How does the caregivers' HIV serostatus influence the effects of caregiving and bereavement on resources? Support for the personality hypothesis predominated, with some support for the wear and tear hypothesis, depending on the resource in question. In general, HIV seropositivity did not put people at additional risk for resource depletion.     

Das Traumgenerierungsmodell von Ulrich Moser und die Codierung von Traumprozessen

Under the conditions of sleeping, mental activity creates a psychic microworld “dream” experienced as the present, running predominantly in a pictorial and sensual way in a sequence of situations and sometimes containing verbal relations and cognitive processes. Together with Ilka von Zeppelin, Ulrich Moser has developed a model of the emergence of sleep dreams with the aim to reconstruct the dreaming process, which is normally concealed under the verbal structure of the dream report and to explain this sequence as the result of a cognitive affective regulatory process. In accordance with the theory of French, dreaming is seen as an attempt to cope in a simulative mode with unresolved neurotic conflicts and traumatic experiences. To make this process visible, the authors developed a very differentiated model-guided coding system, a form of operationalization of the “dream work” that records and describes all cognitive elements and all interactive behavior in the dream. This analysis provides the formal and structural characteristics of the dream that precede every interpretation of content or biographical meaning. In this way, dream series in a single person, as well as dreams in different groups, can be objectively studied and compared. A presentation of the dream model is followed by an introduction into the basic principles of the coding system. This dream process coding and the interpretation based on it are demonstrated on a specimen dream. This dream is Freud’s “Dream of Irma’s injection”, which he selected himself to demonstrate his method of dream interpretation in Die Traumdeutung and which was also used by Erikson to illustrate his “configurational analysis”.     

Forms of Our Life: Wittgenstein and the Later Heidegger

The paper argues that an internal debate within Wittgensteinian philosophy leads to issues associated rather with the later philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Rush Rhees's identification of the limitations of the notion of a “language game” to illuminate the relation between language and reality leads to his discussion of what is involved in the “reality” of language: “anything that is said has sense‐if living has sense, not otherwise.” But what is it for living to have sense? Peter Winch provides an interpretation and application of Rhees's argument in his discussion of the “reality” of Zande witchcraft and magic in “Understanding a Primitive Society”. There he argues that such sense is provided by a language game concerned with the ineradicable contingency of human life, such as (he claims) Zande witchcraft to be. I argue, however, that Winch's account fails to answer the question why Zande witchcraft can find no application within our lives. I suggest that answering this requires us to raise the question of why Zande witchcraft “fits” with their other practices but cannot with ours, a question of “sense” which cannot be answered by reference to another language game. I use Joseph Epes Brown's account of Native American cultures (in Epes Brown 2001) as an exemplification of a form of coherence that constitutes what we may call a “world”. I then discuss what is involved in this, relating this coherence to a relation to the temporal, which provides an internal connection between the senses of the “real” embodied in the different linguistic practices of these cultures. I relate this to the later Heidegger's account of the “History of Being”, of the historical worlds of Western culture and increasingly of the planet. I conclude with an indication of concerns and issues this approach raises, ones characteristic of “Continental” rather than Wittgensteinian philosophy.     

When is a picture?

Philosophical discussions of depiction sometimes suffer from a lack of differentiation between several questions concerning the ‘nature’ of pictorial representation. To provide a suitable framework I distinguish six such questions and several levels on which one might want to proceed in order to answer some of them. With this background, I reconstruct Goodman's and Elgin's answer to the specific question: ‘What distinguishes the pictorial from the verbal or linguistic?’ I try to reveal some major motivations behind their system-oriented approach and to indicate some reasons why a strategy of this kind is to a certain extent mandatory to grasp the ‘nature of the pictorial’. The system-relative and functional character of depiction has to be captured by every adequate theory.     

Using HyperCard to administer a figural test on the Apple Macintosh

To date, applications of automated assessment techniques in personality testing have largely been limited to objective personality instruments with text stimuli; few assessment applications have involved graphic stimuli. Although projective personality instruments generally include ambiguous graphic or pictorial stimuli, computer applications with these procedures have been limited to automated scoring and interpretation, administration of sentence completion devices employing text stimuli, and the use of mechanical methods rather than computer graphics to display visual stimuli. In the present report, we describe a Macintosh HyperCard application for administering an objective personality test with visual stimuli, the Barron-Welsh Revised Art Scale of the Welsh Figure Preference Test. This test consists of a series of figural stimuli and a binary “like”/“dislike” response format, and it thus represents an administration procedure between standard objective self-report inventories involving text stimuli and a “true”/“false” response or variant, and tests such as the Rorschach or TAT that are both figural and free-response. The HyperCard language provides a variety of promising techniques useful for microcomputer test administration.     

The Priority Principle from Kant to Frege

In a famous passage (A68/B93), Kant writes that “the understanding can make no other use of […] concepts than that of judging by means of them.” Kant's thought is often called the thesis of the priority of judgments over concepts. We find a similar sounding priority thesis in Frege: “it is one of the most important differences between my mode of interpretation and the Boolean mode […] that I do not proceed from concepts, but from judgments.” Many interpreters have thought that Frege's priority principle is close to (or at least derivable from) Kant's. I argue that it is not. Nevertheless, there was a gradual historical development that began with Kant's priority thesis and culminated in Frege's new logic.     

Pictorial and verbal encoding in a short-term memory task

The present research attempted to manipulate the encoding modality, pictorial or verbal, of schematic faces with well-learned names by manipulating S’s expectations of the way the material was to be used. On every trial, a single name or face was presented, followed by another one; the S was asked to respond “same” if the stimuli had the same name, and “different” otherwise. The majority of second stimuli of any session was either names or faces. It was hypothesized that if S had encoded the first stimulus in the modality of the second, his judgment would be faster than if he had not appropriately encoded the first stimulus. Significantly slower reaction times were obtained to stimulus pairs where the second stimulus modality was infrequent. Further evidence that encoding of the first stimulus was in the frequent second stimulus modality comes from the finding that “different” responses were shorter when the stimuli differed on more than one attribute in the encoding (second stimulus) modality, regardless of the modality of the stimuli. Thus, evidence is presented that not only can verbal material be pictorially encoded (and vice versa), but that whether either verbal or pictorial material is verbally or pictorially encoded depends on S’s anticipation of what he is to do with the material.     

“They Go Too Far”: Reply to Review Essays by Lewes and O'Connor

Kenneth Lewes and Noreen O'Connor share little common ground in their discussions of Lesbian Lives. They agree that it represents, in Lewes's words, “important trends in psychoanalysis and more general intellectual discourse” (“the developing discourse on homosexuality, the ascendancy of feminist ideas within psychoanalysis, … the shift … from classical drive theory to … more … relational approaches, and the influence of postmodern social and literary thought”). But whereas O'Connor welcomes a text she sees as offering “critiques of traditional psychoanalysis's binary theorising of gender and sexuality,” Lewes finds that Lesbian Lives presents “certain questions and difficulties, especially to those who, like myself, espouse theoretical and political allegiances quite different from them.” This article responds to several of Lewes's distortions and misreadings, including his allegations that the authors believe they can “conduct therapy without theory or value” and that they “insist on the essential sameness of people who are heterosexual and homosexual.” Lewes also wrongly attributes to the authors a simplistic belief in “sexual fluidity” and the “multiplicity of selves.” Instead, the text of Lesbian Lives in various ways encourages psychoanalysis to incorporate into its developmental models what it has learned clinically about the multiple dimensions of subjective experience.     

Visual illusions and direct perception: Elaborating on Gibson's insights

Gibson argued that illusory pictorial displays contain “inadequate” information (1966, p. 288) but also that a “very special kind of selective attention” (p. 313) can dispel the illusion–suggesting that adequate perceptual information could in fact be potentially available to observers. The present paper describes Gibson's treatment of geometrical illusions and reviews pertinent empirical evidence. Interestingly, Gibson's insights have been corroborated by recent findings of inter- and intra-observer variability in susceptibility to visual illusions as a function of culture, learning and task. It is argued that these findings require a modification of the general Gibsonian principle of perception as the detection of specifying information. Withagen and Chemero's (2009) evolutionary motivated reconceptualization of perception predicts observers' use of both specifying and non-specifying information and inter- and intra-observer variability therein. Based on this reconceptualization we develop an ecological approach to visual illusions that explains differential illusion effects in terms of the optical variable(s) detected.     

Finding the Cause: Verbal Framing Helps Children Extract Causal Evidence Embedded in a Complex Scene

In making causal inferences, children must both identify a causal problem and selectively attend to meaningful evidence. Four experiments demonstrate that verbally framing an event (“Which animals make Lion laugh?”) helps 4-year-olds extract evidence from a complex scene to make accurate causal inferences. Whereas framing was unnecessary when evidence was isolated, children required it to extract and reason about evidence embedded in a more complex scene. Subtler framing stating the causal problem, but not highlighting the relevant variables, was equally effective. Simply making the causal relationship more perceptually obvious did facilitate children's inferences, but not to the level of verbal framing. These results illustrate how children's causal reasoning relies on scaffolding from adults.     

FREEDOM AND THE SOURCE OF VALUE: KORSGAARD AND WOOD ON KANT'S FORMULA OF HUMANITY

Abstract: This essay examines two interpretations of Kant's argument for the formula of humanity. Christine M. Korsgaard defends a constructivist reading of Kant's argument, maintaining that humans must view themselves as having absolute value because their power for rational choice confers value on their ends. Allen Wood, however, defends a realist interpretation of Kant's argument, maintaining that humans actually are absolutely valuable and that their choices do not confer value but rather reflect their understanding of how the objects of their choices fulfill their needs and wants and contribute to their flourishing. Though Korsgaard's reading is more consistent with Kant's prioritizing of the right over the good, this essay raises a metaethical question regarding her constructivist position, namely, “What is meant by her claim that rational choice ‘confers’ value on objects?” In developing this question, it presents a realist account of goodness that is taken from Peter Geach's “Good and Evil.”     

Disability as Abject: Kristeva,Disability, and Resistance

In this essay, I develop an account of disability exclusion that, though inspired by Julia Kristeva, diverges from her account in several important ways. I first offer a brief interpretation of Kristeva's essays “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity and … Vulnerability” and “A Tragedy and a Dream: Disability Revisited” and, using this interpretation, I assess certain criticisms of Kristeva's position made by Jan Grue in his “Rhetorics of Difference: Julia Kristeva and Disability.” I then argue that Kristeva's concept of abjection, especially as developed by Sara Ahmed and Tina Chanter, offers important insights into disability oppression; Ahmed's and Chanter's contributions improve upon Kristeva's account. Understanding disability as abject helps to explain both resistances to interacting with disabled others and ways to resist disability oppression. Finally, I argue that understanding disability as abject is preferable to recent deployments of Lacanian theory in disability studies and that this account is compatible with social models of disability.