基于三参照点理论的薪酬差距与离职决策的分析

离职是组织管理研究中一个重要的课题, 但鲜有研究将其纳入风险决策的框架中。本文运用行为决策的研究方法, 将离职作为一种风险选择, 运用三参照点理论探讨个体薪酬差距与离职决策之间的关系。我们的理论分析和初步的预研究发现：(1)个体薪酬现状与底线的差距负向预测离职决策, 薪酬目标与现状的差距正向预测离职决策; (2)进一步推导出薪酬差距与离职决策间存在双拐点的非线性函数关系; (3)同行现状收入作为横向参照系, 在薪酬差距与离职决策两者之间起锚定作用; (4)组织中薪酬分布的差距大小作为纵向参照系, 在薪酬差距与离职决策两者之间起调节作用。本研究将离职作为一种风险决策进行研究, 不仅对于离职理论与决策理论的发展有一定意义, 而且为人力资源管理实践提供了指导与启示。     

得失框架下时间和风险对跨期选择的影响

本研究通过设置获得框架和损失框架下跨期选择情景,采用选择滴定法计算个体的主观值,分别探讨了跨期选择是否存在得损失框架效应,以及是否会受时间与风险的影响。结果发现:(1)跨期选择存在得损失框架效应,与损失框架相比,被试在获得框架下选择近期目标的概率更高、反应更快、主观值更小;(2)时间、风险会和得损失框架效应交互影响跨期选择。在获得框架下,随着时间点的延长,低风险时被试才更有可能做远期选择;在损失框架下,随着时间点的缩短,中高等风险时被试才更有可能做近期选择。结果表明框架效应、时间与风险可以影响跨期选择,支持了双系统评价理论。     

调节匹配对期望与绩效关系的影响

以往研究发现了调节定向、调节期望与绩效的关系。本研究基于调节匹配理论,以149名大学生为被试、通过与个体长期调节定向相一致或不一致的任务框架(收获/无收获vs无损失/损失)操作调节匹配性,进一步研究了调节匹配对期望与绩效关系的影响。结果显示,调节匹配会进一步加强以往研究中发现的调节定向对期望和绩效关系的调节模式,不匹配会起到削弱作用。当促进定向占主导的个体完成强调有无收获的任务时,高期望对绩效的促进作用显著高于完成强调有无损失的任务;而当预防定向占主导的个体完成强调有无损失的任务时,低期望对绩效的促进作用显著高于完成强调有无收益的任务。     

得失情境下的图形框架对跨期选择倾向的影响

为分离言语表述的干扰,实验采用简单选择任务,通过2(图形框架)×2(跨期选择)×2(得失情境)被试内实验设计探讨得失情境下图形框架对个体跨期选择的影响。结果发现:(1)在突出时间条件下,被试更倾向于选择小而即时的选项,而在突出金额条件下,被试选择小而即时和大而延时的概率没有差异;(2)收益情境中,个体更多地选择大而延时的选项,而在损失情境中,个体选择即时损失的概率更高。结果表明,跨期选择中个体的决策偏好会随着得失情境及决策选项描述方式的变化而变化。     

薪酬水平和薪酬差距对企业运营结果影响的元分析

以国内外113篇企业薪酬水平和薪酬差距领域的实证研究(254个效应值, 438880家企业)为样本, 采用基于结构方程模型的元分析方法检验了企业平均薪酬水平、垂直薪酬差距和水平薪酬差距对企业创新、绩效和离职等运营结果的影响。元分析结果显示, 平均薪酬水平不仅能够显著提升企业的创新和绩效水平, 也会抑制企业内部的离职水平; 垂直和水平薪酬差距对企业绩效的主效应并不显著, 但其对企业创新具有显著的抑制作用, 并能够显著提升企业的离职水平。进一步的调节效应检验表明, 国家地域因素调节了薪酬水平与企业绩效之间的关系, 即中国企业的平均薪酬水平对企业绩效的促进作用显著高于美国企业。研究结果对于企业的薪酬管理具有一定的借鉴意义。     

调节模式与社会参照点对延迟选择的影响

为进一步探讨延迟选择的影响因素,基于自我调节模式理论,以132名大学生为研究对象,通过问卷法和行为实验法探讨了预期后悔在调节模式对延迟选择影响的中介作用及社会参照点的调节效应.结果 显示:(1)不同调节模式个体的延迟选择倾向不同,相比于运动模式,评估模式的个体延迟选择倾向更高;(2)预期后悔在调节模式和延迟选择之间发挥...     

源于“反常”终于“常理”的禀赋效应

如果忽略收入影响和交易成本, 愿意为一样物品支付的价格应等于愿意出售的价格。而塞勒教授却发现, 现实生活中有一些“反常”现象, 个体会对自己所拥有的物品赋予更高的价值, 造成“愿意支付价格”和“愿意出售价格”的不一致。塞勒利用预期理论中的损失厌恶对这些反常现象进行解释, 并将该现象称为禀赋效应(endowment effect)。此后, 众多研究者从不同角度对该效应进行了探索和论证。文章详细梳理了禀赋效应的多种解释机制, 包括损失厌恶、心理所有权理论、偏差的认知过程以及进化的观点等, 论证了禀赋效应符合“常理”的原因, 同时也探讨了禀赋效应在商业销售策略和政府拆迁政策等方面的应用前景。     

奖励的价值导向对绩效反馈效果的影响

本研究探讨了奖励形式启动的价值框架效应在调节绩效反馈对绩效提升与行为塑造的效果中发挥的作用。对231名大学生的问卷调查结果表明,采用金钱奖励时,接受个人绩效反馈的个体效能感更高,也有更好的绩效和合作行为表现;采用荣誉奖励时,集体绩效反馈的效果更好。即奖励形式与绩效反馈的匹配会提高组织成员绩效,增加其合作行为。基于该结果,建议管理者关注奖励体系中的价值信息与组织的管理方式相匹配,以推进组织的可持续发展。     

薪酬预期与选择:基于三参照点理论的验证与探讨

两项实验研究对新近提出的风险决策的三参照点(TRP)理论进行了验证.实验就大学生对就业的薪酬制度的偏好和选择对三参照点理论的独特推断进行了检验.三参照点理论强调决策参照点对预期结果分布的界定作用.人们在决策时不仅会考虑现状(SQ)还会考虑最低要求(MR)和目标(G).MR,SQ和G三个参照点把结果空间分成了四个功能区域:成功、获益、损失和失败.根据三参照点理论,参照点的心理效应为MR＞>G＞SQ.当预期结果的平均值低于MR(或者G)的时候,人们会偏好风险高的选择以增加达到或者超过参照点的可能性;而当预期结果的平均值高于MR(或者G)的时候,人们会偏好风险低的选择以减少低于MR(或者(G)的可能性.实验1中,根据预先测定的大学生群体对第一份工资的最低要求,准确地预测了参与者在高稳定型、高弹性型和中间型三种工资类型的风险偏好和取舍.实验2进一步探讨了MR和G之间的权衡:实验发现当弹性型工资的浮动范围双向超出MR和G(而不是双向非临界)时,人们会优先考虑MR从而使超过G的可能性的吸引力相对降低;而不会为了追求达到G而忽略低于MR的风险.     

得失框架效应的分离—— 来自收益与损失型跨期选择的研究

本研究通过创设收益和损失跨期选择情境, 采用不同表征方式(得框架、失框架)的跨期选择任务, 分别探讨了收益和损失情境下的跨期选择是否存在得失框架效应, 及其是否会受任务难度的影响。结果发现：(1)收益型跨期选择只在任务容易时存在得失框架效应, 与失框架相比, 被试在得框架下选择即时获益的概率更高; 任务困难时得失框架效应消失(实验a); (2)损失型跨期选择中不存在得失框架效应(实验b)。结果表明, 得失框架效应在损、益型跨期选择中出现了分离, 收益型跨期选择中的得失框架效应的内在认知机制很可能与风险决策中的框架效应类似并且是一种较为初级的认知加工过程。     

EFFECTS OF AND PREFERENCE FOR PAY FOR PERFORMANCE: AN ANALOGUE ANALYSIS

We examined the effects of 2 payment systems on the rate of check processing and time spent on task by participants in a simulated work setting. Three participants experienced individual pay‐for‐performance (PFP) without base pay and pay‐for‐time (PFT) conditions. In the last phase, we asked participants to choose which system they preferred. For all participants, the PFP condition produced higher rates of check processing and more time spent on task than did the PFT condition, but choice of payment system varied both within and across participants.     

Factors Influencing Employee Beliefs That Pay Is Tied to Performance

The unique relationship of perceived pay level equity, perceived appraisal accuracy, merit increase satisfaction, trust in supervisor, and trust in top management to employee beliefs that pay is tied to performance was investigated in a sample of 658 managerial, professional, and clerical employees. Pay level equity, merit increase satisfaction, and trust in top management exhibited a significant unique relationship. Post hoc analysis found appraisal accuracy exhibited a significant unique relationship with belief that pay is tied to performance among employees receiving a lower or higher than expected performance appraisal, but not among employees receiving the expected performance appraisal.     

绩效薪酬对员工突破性创造力和渐进性创造力的影响

研究分别从认知评价理论和习得性努力理论视角考察了绩效薪酬对员工突破性创造力和渐进性创造力的影响及其作用机制, 并检验了变革型领导和交易型领导对上述两条路径的调节效应。基于24家企业的364对上下级匹配数据的研究结果表明：绩效薪酬对内在动机和突破性创造力没有显著的影响, 对外在动机和渐进性创造力有显著的正向影响。变革型领导调节绩效薪酬与突破性创造力的关系：高变革领导情境下, 绩效薪酬通过正向影响内在动机间接对突破性创造力产生正向影响; 低变革领导情境下, 绩效薪酬通过负向影响内在动机间接对突破性创造力产生负向影响。交易型领导调节绩效薪酬与渐进性创造力的关系：交易型领导通过强化绩效薪酬对外在动机的影响进而放大了绩效薪酬对渐进性创造力的正向效应。针对上述结果, 讨论了本文的理论与实践意义。     

绩效薪酬对雇员创造力的影响:人-工作匹配和创造力自我效能的作用

采用296对上下级匹配数据考察了绩效薪酬对创造力的影响以及人-工作匹配的调节效应和创造力自我效能的中介效应。研究结果表明:绩效薪酬对创造力有倒U形影响;创造力自我效能部分中介了绩效薪酬对创造力的倒U形影响;人-工作匹配调节绩效薪酬与创造力的关系,人-工作匹配度越高,中等强度绩效薪酬的正面效应越强,高强度绩效薪酬的负面效应越弱;绩效薪酬与人-工作匹配的交互效应通过创造力自我效能的完全中介效应影响创造力。     

组织中绩效压力的双刃剑效应

市场经济的复杂多变给组织生存与发展带来诸多挑战, 组织往往对员工提出高的绩效要求, 绩效压力已成为普遍现象。现有研究大多关注绩效压力的消极效应, 存在忽视其积极结果及理论视角较窄等不足。因此, 系统、全面地认识绩效压力的双刃剑效应, 有助于组织充分发挥绩效压力的积极效应及阻遏其消极效应。通过系统地回顾和梳理相关研究, 在将绩效压力影响效果的研究分为积极、消极和二者并存的曲线效应三个类别后, 引入压力认知评价理论、资源保存理论等理论厘清研究背后的解释机制。最后, 基于以上梳理分析, 未来研究应进一步拓展组织中绩效压力的双刃剑效应及其边界条件, 从而更全面地认识组织中绩效压力所产生的影响。     

Predictors of Participation in Performance Appraisal: A Voluntary System in a Blue-Collar Work Environment

Organisations have long acknowledged the value of performance appraisal in both administration decisions and in motivating employees. However, it would appear that most empirical research has focused on compulsory systems designed for use with executives and managers (Bannister and Balkin 1990; Ilgen, Fisher and Taylor 1979; Klein 1989). The reluctance to implement appraisal systems with lower level and base-grade employees may be due to several factors, including employee and union resistance to compulsory systems of appraisal (Nankervis 1990). Faced with this problem, appraisal can be viewed by appraisees and appraisers as an `innovation'. In a climate with growing emphasis on participative management styles, self-regulated or voluntary systems of performance appraisal may become increasingly prevalent and important. Thus, 476 base-grade (shop floor) employees of an Australian government business enterprise completed a survey regarding issues such as attitude to performance appraisal, source credibility, system satisfaction, anticipated feedback, perceived consequences of participation and intention to enter the system. Roger's (1983) innovation-decision model was utilised in the structure and analysis of the data and provided useful insights regarding the factors which are related to participation in a voluntary system of performance appraisal. Findings indicated that attitude towards, and support of, performance appraisal in general, perception of consequences of performance appraisal, satisfaction with the supervisor, anticipated feedback, and awareness and knowledge of the system in place in the organisation, were important in predicting the decision to adopt or reject the performance appraisal scheme.     

Variables Influencing the Perceived Relationship Between Performance and Pay in a Merit Pay Environment

The purpose of the study is to gain a better understanding of the pay-for-performance perception. Such a knowledge may allow for improvement in the effectiveness of incentive compensation plans. Sample comprises 406 employees whose salary changes were conditioned by a merit pay plan. Results suggest that pay-for-performance perception is related to the actual pay-for-performance link, their trust in decision-makers, their procedural justice perception, the size of their outcomes—that is, pay increase and performance rating—and their satisfaction with these outcomes.     

THE IMPACT OF PAY SECRECY ON INDIVIDUAL TASK PERFORMANCE

We generate and test a moderated mediation model of the effects of pay secrecy—a pay communication policy restricting employees’ access to information regarding the level of other employees’ pay in the organization—on individual task performance. According to this model, the effects of such a policy are posited to be mediated by informational fairness, procedural fairness, and performance-pay instrumentality perceptions, and moderated by tolerance for inequity. Using a lab-based simulation, our findings partially support this model, suggesting that perceived instrumentality mediates the adverse effect of pay secrecy on individual task performance but only for those low in inequity tolerance. For them, the instrumentality-mediated indirect effect accounted for over 20% of the total effect of pay secrecy on individual task performance. For those highly tolerant of inequity, a policy of pay secrecy was found to be directly associated with a higher level of individual performance than pay openness. The implications of the findings for research and practice are discussed.     

An under-met and over-met expectations model of employee reactions to merit raises

The authors developed a model of how raise expectations influence the relationship between merit pay raises and employee reactions and tested it using a sample of hospital employees. Pay-for-performance (PFP) perceptions were consistently related to personal reactions (e.g., pay raise happiness, pay-level satisfaction, and turnover intentions). Merit pay raises were strongly related to reactions only among employees with high raise expectations and high PFP perceptions. The interactive effects of under-met/over-met expectations and PFP perceptions were mediated by the extent to which participants saw the raise as generous and they were happy with the raises they received. The authors discuss the implications of these findings for expectation-fulfillment theories, merit pay research, and the administration of incentives.     

Between-Worker Variability in Output Under Piece-Rate Versus Hourly Pay Systems

This study re-examined the earlier conclusion by F. Schmidt and J. Hunter (1983) that incentive pay reduces between-worker differences in output, based on their finding that the standard deviation of employee output as a percentage of mean output (SDp) is smaller under piece-rate compensation than under hourly pay. Results of the present study indicate that while the average observed SDp is larger under hourly conditions, this difference disappears after correcting for unreliability in the output measures. It appears that the difference in mean observed SDp values is due to the fact that there is more measurement error in measures of output for employees working under nonincentive-based compensation conditions. This finding suggests that incentive pay may reduce random response variability in employee output but does not reduce differences between employees in work effort and motivation. This finding also suggests that type of compensation system does not affect the percentage output increases produced through improved selection. These findings have implications for theories of job performance.