THE PRICE OF VIRTUE

Abstract:   Aristotle famously held that there is a crucial difference between the person who merely acts rightly and the person who is wholehearted in what she does. He captures this contrast by insisting on a distinction between continence and full virtue. One way of accounting for the important difference here is to suppose that, for the genuinely virtuous person, the requirements of virtue "silence" competing reasons for action. I argue that the silencing interpretation is not compelling. As Aristotle rightly saw, virtue can have a cost, and a mark of the wise person is that she recognizes it.     

ON THE POSSIBILITY OF FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY

Abstract: In this article, I propose one way of understanding the expression "feminist epistemology." I begin from the premise that improper philosophical attention has been paid to the implications of what I call The Fact of Preconditions for Agency: that moral and rational agents become such only through a long, deliberate, and intensive process of intervention and teaching, a process that requires commitments of time, effort and emotion on the part of other agents. I contend that this is a sufficiently important aspect of what it is to be a person that accounting for its philosophical implications may have repercussions not only for moral and political theory, but for epistemology as well. I contend further that, given the current configuration of social possibilities, a theory that acknowledges this Fact might appropriately be deemed "feminist."
My argument is presented in four segments. In Section II, I show how such a theory could be feminist by providing a discussion of categories of social identity; in Section III, I show how such a theory could be epistemology by describing a strategy of argument from parity. In Section IV, I apply this strategy to a case from political philosophy to show why its counter-intuitive implications do not provide good grounds for rejecting the suggested redistricting. And in Section V, I apply the same strategy to a case from epistemology to bring out how it might lead to a theory that might legitimately claim to be feminist epistemology.     

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF INQUIRY

Abstract: In this paper I discuss Sextus Empiricus’ response to the dogmatists’ objection that the skeptics cannot inquire into philosophical theories and at the same time suspend judgment about everything. I argue that his strategy consists in putting the burden of proof on the dogmatists: it is they, and not the skeptics, who must justify the claim to be able to inquire into the nature of things. Sextus’ arguments purport to show that if we consider the dogmatists’ inquiry, we should conclude either that it is impossible or that it does not supply the skeptics with satisfactory starting‐points for further inquiry.     

TOWARDS THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPASSIBILIST PASTORAL CARE

Not a few scholars reject the notion of divine impassibility. Contemporary theodicists in particular often see impassibility as impotent in the face of evil and suffering. At best, it is assumed that impassibility has no contribution to make to pastoral practice. At worst, it is argued that impassibility has negative repercussions for sufferers and carers. The purpose of this article will be to argue that impassibility has the potential to positively impact pastoral practice. It will be proposed that a constructive ‘impassibilist pastoral care’ arises from a well defined understanding of impassibility and an awareness of the weaknesses of passibility. Consequently, five principles of pastoral care will be identified. Relationality engenders practice which is mutual. Particularity resists the tendency in much care towards ‘normalisation’. Equivalence challenges the passibilist by submitting that the incarnation provides an ontologically equivalent divine suffering which stands in contrast to the so‐called ‘suffering of God’ thesis. Arationality affirms that human reason is limited and therefore prevents the carer from over rationalising suffering. Otherness arises from the belief that God is ontologically distinct and therefore he alone is the source of salvation. In light of these principles, the proposed understanding of ‘impassibilist pastoral care’ is brought into dialogue with the questions sufferers ask and a positive and effective definition of impassibility is submitted. In sum, this article seeks to bring together philosophical and theological defences of impassibility in order to submit a fresh approach to the care of those who suffer.     

THE PRICE OF EXPERTISE:

Abstract— When shown a idled container, people often fail to appreciate that the surface of the liquid contained within should remain horizontal with respect to the ground. This study investigated how amenable this bias is to experience in relevant everyday situations. Surprisingly, liquid surfaces that waitresses and bartenders considered natural deviated even more from horizontal than was the case for comparison groups. This finding is, to our knowledge, the only documented case in which performance declines with experience. We suggest that practical experience promotes a functionally relative perspective, in which the orientation of the liquid's surface is evaluated relative to that of its container as opposed to being related directly to the surrounding environment. The container-relative perspective, in turn, evokes a perceptual bias that is responsible for the systematic errors observed on this task.     

ANTIFOUNDATIONALISM AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF MEDICINE

The problem of developing a moral philosophy of medicine is explored in this essay. Among the challenges posed to this development are the general mistrust of moral philosophy and philosophy in general created by post-modernist philosophical and even anti-philosophical thinking. This reaction to philosophical systematization is usually called antifoundationalism. I distinguish different forms of antifoundationalism, showing that not all forms of their opposites, foundationalism, are alike, especially with regards to claims made about the certitude of moral thought. I conclude that we are correct to mistrust absolutist principles in a moral philosophy of medicine, but can find some center within the practice of medicine itself for a moral foundation.     

ADAM SMITH AND THE POSSIBILITY OF SYMPATHY WITH NATURE

Abstract:  As J. Baird Callicott has argued, Adam Smith's moral theory is a philosophical ancestor of recent work in environmental ethics. However, Smith's "all important emotion of sympathy" (Callicott, 2001, p. 209) seems incapable of extension to entities that lack emotions with which one can sympathize. Drawing on the distinctive account of sympathy developed in Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments , as well as his account of anthropomorphizing nature in "History of Astronomy and Physics," I show that sympathy with non-sentient nature is possible within a Smithian ethics. This provides the possibility of extending sympathy, and thereby benevolence and justice, to nature.     

TWO KINDS OF POSSIBILITY

I defend a version of Kripke's claim that the metaphysically necessary and the knowable a priori are independent. On my version, there are two independent families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, neither stronger than the other. Metaphysical possibility is constrained by the laws of nature. Logical validity, I suggest, is best understood in terms of epistemic necessity.     

THE BLANK FACE OF LOVE: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOODNESS IN THE LITERARY AND PHILOSOPHICAL WORK OF IRIS MURDOCH1

This article explores the value of Iris Murdoch's metaphysical ethics for the theologian. Although, in many ways, Murdoch does appeal to the theologian, a subtle form of nihilism underlies her thought insofar as human goodness—in the form of loving attention—is only possible once the individual has overcome his/her ego by staring into the void and accepting the ultimate meaninglessness of reality. As this article demonstrates, Murdoch's replacement of transcendence with void rules out any form of real love or human goodness: only a dualistic exchange of gazes remains possible. Real, selfless love is only possible when the ego understands itself in the context of theological transcendence.