Human reasoning: Some possible effects of availability

This paper discusses some possible ways in which the availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973) may mediate subjects' responses to experimental ‘reasoning’ tasks. A brief review of some effects of availability in other areas is given and then the application of availability to reasoning data is considered with respect to problems employing both ‘thematic’ and ‘abstract’ content.In the case of thematic content, it is argued, with reference to a variety of studies, that to produce a differential effect (to abstract content), the content must provide available cues, resulting from the subjects' experience. Differential effects of content are thus interpreted as differential effects of availability. When abstract content is used, there are cues available from the experimental situation itself, and it is shown that several known error tendencies readily lend themselves to an explanation in terms of availability.In the final section, it is pointed out that a focus on available cues, rather than logical structure, provides a psychological, rather than logical, approach to human reasoning. It is argued that a bias may be psychologically, although not logically, optimal in that it may often produce correct responses in ‘real life’. Accordingly, the possible real life utility of availability is considered, and several ways in which the bias may lead to usually correct decisions are discussed. Given this, it is argued that availability is an effective heuristic and that observed biases on a range of experimental tasks may thus be interpreted as resulting from the application of a behavior that is optimal within the limits of human cognition. However, it is concluded that limitations in both deterministic and probabilistic problem solving may lead to a consistent, but erroneous, view of the world.     

Ease of Recall vs Recalled Evidence in Judgment: Experts vs Laymen

When major reasons of fault are presented in a pruned format, people fail to transfer the proportions of the omitted categories to the "all-other-problems" category. The present research investigated the underlying judgmental processes and the effect of domain knowledge on this phenomenon, known as pruning bias. In Experiment 1, although people with higher levels of domain knowledge failed to adjust completely for omission from the fault tree, they were more accurate and less biased than people with lower levels of domain knowledge. In Experiment 2, two hypothe ses are contrasted: The first, the availability explanation, sug gests that the underestimation of the "all-other-problems" category stems from its label being a less effective retrieval cue for specific fault reasons than the labels of major categories. The second hypothesis suggests that people judge by perceived ease of recall. The results suggest that people generating less failure reasons provide higher proportions to the "all-other-problems" category than people generating more reasons. The latter generation condition was perceived to be more difficult, signaling to people that the "all-other-problems" category is not so prevalent. The results of Experiments 3 and 4 indicate, as hypothesized, that the judgments of people with relatively low levels of domain knowledge are influenced by perceived ease of recall, whereas the judgments of people with higher levels of domain knowledge are influenced by recalled evidence. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.     

How to Reverse the Organ Shortage

Thousands of lives are lost each year because of a lack of organs available for transplant, but currently, in the UK and many other countries, organs cannot be taken from a deceased donor without explicit consent from the donor or his or her relatives. Switching to an ‘opt‐out’ (or ‘presumed consent’) system for organ donation could substantially increase the supply of organs, and save many lives. However, it has been argued in some quarters that there are serious ethical objections to an opt‐out policy, and that it would be better to adopt a different policy known as the ‘presumptive approach’, that requires explicit consent while also attempting to sway the choices of potential donors and family in the direction of donating, using various persuasive techniques. This article shows how reflection on the impact of a well‐known cognitive bias known as ‘status quo bias’ can explain (i) why moving from the status quo to an opt‐out policy might be effective in increasing organ availability, even without impinging on anyone's autonomous choices, (ii) why we might have overestimated the strength of the objections to an opt‐out policy, and (iii) why the presumptive approach is morally objectionable, while an opt‐out policy is not.     

Generalization of positive attitude as a function of subgroup and superordinate group identifications in intergroup contact

The role of category salience in mediating the effects of intergroup contact was examined. One theoretical model proposes that some psychological salience of subgroup categories is necessary to facilitate the generalization of attitude change beyond the immediate contact situation. Another argues that a re‐categorization of the subgroups into a new superordinate category is more beneficial, whilst a third suggests that de‐categorizing the situation entirely is optimal. An alternative view, which combines the first two models, proposes a Dual Identity strategy (simultaneous high superordinate and high subgroup categorization) as an important mediator of the relationship between contact variables and intergroup attitudes. In the study, participants (N = 114) undertook a cooperative intergroup task under four conditions of category salience: ‘subgroup’, ‘superordinate’, ‘superordinate and subgroup’, and ‘no group salience’. Evaluative ratings and symbolic reward allocations both for the groups encountered (contact) and those outside the situation (generalization) provided measures of intergroup bias. Bias within the contact situation was mainly eliminated in all conditions. However, on the more generalized bias measures, only the ‘superordinate’ and ‘superordinate and subgroup’ (Dual Identity strategy) conditions maintained this low level; in the other two conditions intergroup bias resurfaced. A combination of the first two models is proposed. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When a 12.86% mortality is more dangerous than 24.14%: implications for risk communication

Participants assessed the riskiness of 11 well-known causes of death. Each participant was presented with an estimation of the number of deaths in the population due to that particular cause. The estimates were obtained from a previous study of naive participants' intuitive estimations. For instance, based on the result of the previous study, the number of deaths due to cancer was presented as: ‘2,414 out of 10,000’, ‘1,286 out of 10,000’, ‘24.14 out of 100’ and ‘12.86 out of 100’. The estimates of deaths were presented in analogous ways for the remaining ten causes of death. It was hypothesized that the judged degree of riskiness is affected by the number of deaths, irrespective of the total possible number (such as 10,000 or 100). Results from Experiment 1 were consistent with this prediction. Participants rated cancer as riskier when it was described as ‘kills 1,286 out of 10,000 people’ than as ‘kills 24.14 out of 100 people’, and similar results were observed regarding the remaining 10 causes of death. Experiment 2 replicated this trend. Implications for risk communications are discussed. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

No expectation bias in elite-level cricket umpires’ leg-before-wicket (LBW) decisions according to batting order position

ObjectivesPrevious studies have shown that sport officials’ decisions can be impacted by biases associated with expectations. The aim of this study was to determine whether elite cricket umpires’ decisions are also influenced by expectations associated with batter skill.MethodsLBW decisions (n = 5578) from actual elite level cricket matches in Australia between 2009 and 2016 were analysed in a multi-level binomial logistic regression paradigm. In our first model, we predicted the likelihood that an umpire will answer ‘out’ for batters in the top order (1–4), middle order (5–7), and low order (8-11). In our second model, we controlled for the correctness of a decision.ResultsUmpires were more likely to respond ‘out’ as the batting order progressed, however this did not appear to be due to biased decision-making. Instead, as batting order progressed, batters were more likely to actually be ‘out’.ConclusionsCricket umpires do not seem to be impacted by expectation bias associated with batting order. This study highlights the importance of controlling for the correctness of a decision when exploring bias in sport officials’ decisions.     

Better or just different? Positive social identity by discrimination against,or by differentiation from outgroups

The object of this study is to explore to what degree the question of ingroup favouritism, brought to light in the framework of ‘social identity theory’, is dependent upon the methods used for measuring this variable. The influence of this factor on ingroup bias was tested under the following three conditions: ‘complementary assessment’, ‘separate assessment’ and ‘choice of dimensions’. This last condition gave the subjects the opportunity to choose which dimensions would be used for assessment. It was found that the degree of ingroup bias is different for each of the three conditions. The results indicate that it is only under certain circumstances that the ingroup distinguishes itself as ‘better’ at the expense of the outgroup. This occurs only if the subjects are not given the opportunity to assess both groups on non-corresponding dimensions, and therefore do not have the possibility to rate them ‘equally good’ but ‘different’.     

Asymmetries in predictive and diagnostic reasoning

In this article, we address the apparent discrepancy between causal Bayes net theories of cognition, which posit that judgments of uncertainty are generated from causal beliefs in a way that respects the norms of probability, and evidence that probability judgments based on causal beliefs are systematically in error. One purported source of bias is the ease of reasoning forward from cause to effect (predictive reasoning) versus backward from effect to cause (diagnostic reasoning). Using causal Bayes nets, we developed a normative formulation of how predictive and diagnostic probability judgments should vary with the strength of alternative causes, causal power, and prior probability. This model was tested through two experiments that elicited predictive and diagnostic judgments as well as judgments of the causal parameters for a variety of scenarios that were designed to differ in strength of alternatives. Model predictions fit the diagnostic judgments closely, but predictive judgments displayed systematic neglect of alternative causes, yielding a relatively poor fit. Three additional experiments provided more evidence of the neglect of alternative causes in predictive reasoning and ruled out pragmatic explanations. We conclude that people use causal structure to generate probability judgments in a sophisticated but not entirely veridical way.     

Category mistakes and figurative language

Category mistakes are sentences such as ‘The number two is blue’ or ‘Green ideas sleep furiously’. Such sentences are highly infelicitous and thus a prominent view claims that they are meaningless. Category mistakes are also highly prevalent in figurative language. That is to say, it is very common for sentences which are used figuratively to be such that, if taken literally, they would constitute category mistakes. (Consider for example the metaphor ‘The poem is pregnant’, the metonymy ‘The White House decided to change its policy’, or a fictional use of ‘The tree was happy’.) In this paper I argue that the view that category mistakes are meaningless is inconsistent with many central and otherwise plausible theories of figurative language. Thus if the meaninglessness view is correct, the theories in question must each be rejected, and conversely, if any of the theories in question is correct, the meaninglessness view must be wrong. The debates concerning the semantics of figurative language and concerning the semantic status of category mistakes are closely connected.     

A matter of time: novel nouns mark object categories when delays are imposed

In previous work, preschool-aged children have revealed a specific expectation that novel count nouns (but not adjectives) will refer to object categories (but not to object properties or to thematic relations). However, in these tasks, children have been permitted to extend a novel word immediately after it has been introduced. The current experiments test the hypothesis that the noun-category bias is sufficiently robust to hold up even when a delay is imposed between a naming episode and the child’s opportunity for extension. To capture this phenomenon experimentally, we imposed delays of 30 s (Experiment 1) and 1 h (Experiment 2). Across both delay conditions, children in a ‘novel noun’ condition revealed a strong inclination to consistently choose other members of the same object category as the (previously named) target. Children in either a ‘novel adjective’ or ‘no word’ condition revealed no taxonomic inclination. These results establish the power of the noun-category bias in situations that more closely approximate some of the very real challenges that children face in mapping and extending novel words.     

A Buddhist Take on Gilbert Ryle’s Theory of Mind

Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind (1949/2002. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press) is generally considered a landmark in the quest to refute Cartesian dualism. The work contains many inspirational ideas and mainly posits behavioral disposition as the referent of mind in order to refute mind–body dualism. In this article, I show that the Buddhist theory of ‘non-self’ is also at odds with the belief that a substantial soul exists distinct from the physical body and further point out similarities between the Buddhist outlook and Ryle’s ideas in three parts. First, I illustrate that Ryle’s ‘category mistake’ has certain points in common with the Buddhist refutation of ‘self’. Within the Buddhist framework, referents such as ‘mind’ and ‘self’ are merely imputed terms. The presumed existence of an independent substance such as a ‘soul’, when considered in isolation from the expedient usage of the term ‘mind’, can therefore also be viewed as a ‘category mistake’. Second, attempting to solve the questions of ‘what mind is’ and ‘how mind operates’ are two entirely different approaches to the study of mind. I argue that it is necessary to focus on ‘knowing-how’ rather than ‘knowing-that’, if we are to gain a more comprehensive understanding of mind and avoid any kind of category mistake such as those that follow from isolating the physical properties of brain or drawing inferences from a mystical soul. Third, I aim to show why investigating mind from the perspective of ‘dispositions’ of behavior is a valid approach. The Buddhist concept of karma-vāsanā elucidates the habitual tendency to act or not act in various situations. Based on this theory, I argue that the workings of the human mind bears strong links to the formation of karma and as such have important axiological implications that cannot be ignored. I conclude by pointing out that Ryle’s insightful ideas could in certain ways be complemented by the Buddhist theory of mind. In my view, his philosophy is not only a mediator between Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology, but could perhaps also be seen as a mediator between traditional Eastern systems of thought and contemporary philosophies of mind.     

Distinctiveness and the salience of social category memberships: Is there an automatic perceptual bias towards novelty?

It was hypothesized that the effects of novelty on social category membership salience may be mediated by perceivers' current tasks, rather than by an automatic perceptual bias (Taylor and Fiske, 1978). Subjects viewed tape-slide portrayals of mixed-sex groups (1 male—5 females, 2M—4F, 3M—3F, 4M—2F, 5M—1F) under ‘individual’ (focus on one target person) or ‘collective’ (focus on entire stimulus group) task conditions. Results on measures of sex stereotyping strongly supported the hypothesis, indicating that ‘individual’ task subjects tended to maximize stereotyping in the 1M—5F and 5M—1F conditions whilst ‘collective’ subjects did so in the 3M-3F condition. It is concluded that novel category memberships are not automatically prepotent in social perception, and the results are discussed in the context of a functional approach to the salience problem.     

Undoing Androcentric Explanations of Gender Differences: Explaining ‘The Effect to be Predicted’

Even if a social category contain women and men, men are often considered the default category members. Such androcentric thinking leads people to explain gender differences in such categories as being ‘about women’ rather than being ‘about men.’ In two experiments (N?=?102) this bias was reversed within the category ‘voters.’ Participants generalized data about women voters to men and data about men voters to women, and explained the resulting gender differences. Explanations always focused on the group whose attributes were predicted, whether such predictions were unconstrained (Experiment 1) or constrained by forced-choice items (Experiment 2). People can reason about gender differences by taking women as the default gender, even within categories that are traditionally normed on men. Implications for the communication of gender differences and the bases of androcentric thinking are discussed.     

Manipulation and Deception

This paper introduces the category of ‘non-deceptive manipulation that causes false beliefs’, analyzes how it narrows the traditional scope of ‘deception’, and draws moral implications.     

Being ‘Spiritual’ and Being ‘Religious’ in Europe: Diverging Life Orientations

The present study shows that being ‘spiritual’ and being ‘religious’ are becoming different life orientations for a large part of the population. As far as we know, for the first time, a sample from an European country shows that these orientations are reflected in two coherent clusters of beliefs, experiences, and practices of what we call ‘new spirituality’ on the one hand and ‘traditional, church-related religion’ on the other hand. In addition, it appears that ‘only spiritual’ (and not ‘religious’) people and ‘only religious’ (and not ‘spiritual’) people have less ‘intensive’ spiritual/religious lives than people who describe themselves as ‘both spiritual and religious’. The ‘both’ category is not homogenous, probably as a result of the different associations which its members have of the conceptions of ‘spiritual’ and ‘religious’. The people in this category can be sub-divided in two sub-groups which show different profiles.     

Functions and Mechanisms in Structural-Modelling Explanations

One way social scientists explain phenomena is by building structural models. These models are explanatory insofar as they manage to perform a recursive decomposition on an initial multivariate probability distribution, which can be interpreted as a mechanism. Explanations in social sciences share important aspects that have been highlighted in the mechanisms literature. Notably, spelling out the functioning the mechanism gives it explanatory power. Thus social scientists should choose the variables to include in the model on the basis of their function in the mechanism. This paper examines the notion of ‘function’ within structural modelling. We argue that ‘functions’ ought to be understood as the theoretical underpinnings of the causes, namely as the role that causes play in the functioning of the mechanism.     

Rules all the way down: Consumer behaviour from the standpoint of the ‘ONE behavioural’ research programme

This article sets out a unified behavioural research programme that integrates compatible elements of old, new and evolutionary behavioural approaches to economics as an alternative to the dominant unified approach to economics based on rational choice theory and a Walrasian view of market coordination. However, the proposed programme can also be viewed as a general framework for interdisciplinary research on consumer behaviour. It employs the view of scientific research programmes proposed by Lakatos, setting out groups of ‘hard-core’ propositions and their associated ‘do’ and ‘do not’ rules for the conduct of researchers. The unifying theme is that evolution in the economy (and in human systems more generally) entails the creation, adoption and abandonment of rules for dealing effectively with open-ended choice problems that are bedevilled by infinite regress problems and cognitive challenges that people seek to address via personal repertoires of hierarchically related rules. To anticipate behaviour, researchers need to develop knowledge of these rules (including heuristics and routines), their functionality and the processes by which they get changed or prove difficult to change even where they cause problems.     

Epistemic constraints on practical normativity

What is the relation between what we ought to do, on the one hand, and our epistemic access to the ought-giving facts, on the other? In assessing this, it is common to distinguish ‘objective’ from ‘subjective’ oughts. Very roughly, on the objectivist conception what an agent ought to do is determined by ought-giving facts in such a way that does not depend on the agent’s beliefs about, or epistemic access to, those facts; whereas on the subjectivist conception, what an agent ought to do depends on his beliefs. This paper defends the need for, and explicates, a third category of ‘ought’: ‘warranted oughts’. Section 1 introduces the distinction between objective and subjective ‘oughts’. Sections 2–3 draw attention to some serious problems with each. Section 4 examines, though rejects, a recent attempt to replace subjective ‘oughts’ with objective ‘wide-scope oughts’ operating on belief-action combinations. Section 5 explicates the notion of a warranted ‘ought’ and defends the account against some possible objections. The resulting a picture is one in which an adequate analysis of practical normativity requires both objective and warranted ‘oughts’. Section 6 concludes by responding to a worry about countenancing both.

     

Epistemic constraints on practical normativity

What is the relation between what we ought to do, on the one hand, and our epistemic access to the ought-giving facts, on the other? In assessing this, it is common to distinguish ‘objective’ from ‘subjective’ oughts. Very roughly, on the objectivist conception what an agent ought to do is determined by ought-giving facts in such a way that does not depend on the agent’s beliefs about, or epistemic access to, those facts; whereas on the subjectivist conception, what an agent ought to do depends on his beliefs. This paper defends the need for, and explicates, a third category of ‘ought’: ‘warranted oughts’. Section 1 introduces the distinction between objective and subjective ‘oughts’. Sections 2–3 draw attention to some serious problems with each. Section 4 examines, though rejects, a recent attempt to replace subjective ‘oughts’ with objective ‘wide-scope oughts’ operating on belief-action combinations. Section 5 explicates the notion of a warranted ‘ought’ and defends the account against some possible objections. The resulting a picture is one in which an adequate analysis of practical normativity requires both objective and warranted ‘oughts’. Section 6 concludes by responding to a worry about countenancing both.     

Contextual determinants of strategic choice: Some moderators of the availability bias

Three studies explored how the influence of the ‘availability heuristic’ on frequency judgement is mediated and moderated by the perceived meaning of the task, the perceived relevance of information for the task, and the salience of differential memorability of information. All studies adapted the ‘fumous names ’paradigm (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973) in which subjects are required to listen to a list of names of known personalities of both sexes and then judge the frequency of men and women. The availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973) posits that classes whose instances are easy to imagine or recall will be perceived as relatively frequent, so that when names of one sex are more famous and thus memorable this category will be rated as more numerous even when it occurs less frequently. Consistent with the notion that the use of availability is sensitive to task interpretation, we showed that the availability effect is eliminated over successive trials (Study 1) and moderated when task instructions render different categories salient (Study 2). In the third study it is shown that conditions which facilitate awareness of the biasing relationship between gender and fame (memorability), decrease the use of the availability heuristic by moderating frequency estimates of the more famous category. Results of these studies emphasize the context-bound and strategic aspects of judgement.