‘THE CRISIS IN PSYCHOANALYSIS’: WHAT CRISIS ARE WE TALKING ABOUT?

In this paper the author argues that the so-called crisis in psychoanalysis, often blamed on various external factors, is in fact an internal crisis brought about by intrinsic incongruities between the explicit intention of its educational model, which aspires to educate and train in a professional and scientific discipline, and its organisational structure, locally and internationally inextricable. Its isolated basic units of ecumenical control—its traditional 'societies/institutes of psychoanalysis'—implicitly and explicitly co-impose the monastic transmission of a preponderantly doctrinaire education and clinical practice. The dysfunctional elongation of our historical organisational syncretism continues to force us, one century later, to amalgamate in and superimpose on an endogamous supraordaining system (i.e. our International Psychoanalytic Association) prerogatives and functions so contradictory that they are ordinarily considered irreconcilable, such as: education and scientific research (tasks of universities); societal and political (tasks of an ordinary society of professionals and technicians); and 'as if' certification and accreditation (tasks of external, local, interinstitutional collegiate bodies and independent, multirepresentative, national coalitions and consortia, as well as of local governmental legislation). The pervasive collective regressive phenomena derived from this homogamous and secluding organisational and educational syncretism has had a retardatory impact along all the hierarchy of our institutional activities. The future of psychoanalysis as a science and a clinical discipline must be nothing other than one of evolution and transformation. The survival of its legendary psychoanalytic institutes and societies, as well as its local and international organisation, with its inherited but now untenable syncretism, is that which is being questioned (that is, psychoanalysis as a 'movement' and a 'cause').     

‘Who am I?’

The dreams and existential questions of those, who came into being in order to replace a dead person, pivot around a central cry: ‘Who am I?’ If conceived, born or designated as a replacement child, such an individual may suffer—even as an adult—from a rarely recognized unconscious confusion of identity, compounded by grief and survivors’ guilt. From before the child is born, the archetypal forces of death and life are joined in a fateful constellation; the soul of the replacement child bears the shadow of death from the very beginning of life. Hope for the replacement child lies in an emergence of true self as soul recreates original life. Analysis can help the replacement child experience a ‘rebirth into true life’, not as ‘the one who returned’, but as a psychologically newborn individual; the path of individuation countering the replacement child‘s identification with the dead. Jungian analysis offers unique concepts for understanding and healing the replacement child; C.G. Jung himself was born after two stillborn babies and an infant that lived only five days.     

Why ‘spiritism’?

Some of the early representatives of psychoanalysis had a lifelong interest in certain ‘occult’ phenomena. Although several theories were born for the purpose of understanding the interest of Sigmund Freud, Carl Gustav Jung or Sándor Ferenczi in spiritualism and related phenomena, interpreters usually ignore the changing cultural meaning and significance of modern occult practices like spiritualism. The aim of the present essay is to outline the cultural and historical aspects of spiritualism and spiritism in Hungary, and thus to shed new light on the involvement of Ferenczi – and other Hungarian psychoanalysts like Géza Róheim, István Hollós, and Mihály Bálint – in spiritualism and spiritism. The connections between spiritualism and the Budapest School of Psychoanalysis will be discussed, highlighting the cultural and scientific significance of Hungarian spiritualism and spiritism in the evolution of psychoanalysis. Taking into account the relative lack of the scientific research in the field of spiritism in Hungary, it can be pointed out that Ferenczi undertook a pioneering role in Hungarian psychical research.     

Whither ‘TRS’?

Books reviewed in this article:
Willi Braun and Russell T. McCutcheon (eds), Guide to the Study of Religion
J'annine Jobling and Ian Markham (eds), Theological Liberalism, Creative and Critical     

THE EFFECTS OF THE QUESTION “WHAT DO YOU WANT?” ON MAND TRAINING OUTCOMES OF CHILDREN WITH AUTISM

Mands sometimes are taught using the question “What do you want?” as a supplement to the required features of the mand relation: an establishing operation and a related consequence. Although verbal prompts have been used during mand training, they also may result in undesirable stimulus control. However, no direct empirical evidence exists to support this concern. The purpose of the present study was to compare mand training with and without supplemental questions on acquisition rate and maintenance when those questions were no longer presented. The 2 training conditions did not differ substantially in their outcomes for 2 children with autism.     

WHAT CONSTITUTES AN ‘APPROPRIATE PSYCHOLOGY’ FOR THE DEVELOPING WORLD?

The impact of psychology on the developing world has begun to receive some attention, but there is a need for theoretical concepts in order to provide a framework for critical discussion. Using the concepts ‘dual perception’ and ‘parallel growth’ (Moghaddam and Taylor 1985) as a framework, the concept of ‘appropriate psychology’ is introduced to assess the transfer of psychology from the developed to the developing world. Six criteria for evaluating appropriateness are discussed: self-reliance, needs responsiveness, cultural compatability, institutional feasibility, economic suitability and political practicality.     

SO YOU DIDN'T GET THE JOB … NOW WHAT DO YOU THINK? EXAMINING OPPORTUNITY‐TO‐PERFORM FAIRNESS PERCEPTIONS

Although the last 10 years have witnessed an increased recognition of the importance of procedural fairness in selection contexts, most empirical research has focused on job relevance as the primary influence on fairness perceptions. There is reason to believe, however, that "opportunity-to-perform" (OTP) perceptions are also an important aspect of fairness perceptions and become particularly important following negative feedback (i.e., not receiving a job offer). Using both qualitative and quantitative data from a large sample of applicants to an agency of the U.S. government ( N = 754), we examine (a) how OTP relates to fairness judgments, (b) how receiving negative feedback affects this relationship, (c) differences in OTP across a variety of different selection methods, and (d) determinants of OTP perceptions. Both qualitative and quantitative analyses confirmed that OTP was an important predictor of overall procedural fairness and was the single most important procedural rule after receiving negative feedback. Practical implications of this pattern, the obtained differences in OTP across assessments, and results regarding the determinants of OTP are discussed.     

What are ‘Universalizable Interests’?

Many of Habermas's critical commentators agree that Discourse Ethics fails as a theory of the validity of moral norms and only succeeds as a theory of the democratic legitimacy of socio-political norms. The reason they give is that the moral principle (U) is too restrictive to count as a necessary condition of the validity of norms. Other commentators more sympathetic to his project want to abandon principle (U) and remodel Discourse Ethics without it. Still others want to downplay the role of universalizing moral discourse and to make more of Habermas's less demanding, though still somewhat vague, conception of ethical discourse. Against this chorus of critical voices Habermas maintains that his conception of moral discourse and the moral principle (U) are central to Discourse Ethics in general, and to the normative heart of his political theory in particular. The conflict may have arisen in part because the concept of a 'universalizable interest' which is central to Habermas's understanding of moral discourse and of the moral principle (U) remains opaque even after nearly two decades of critical debate. Actually Habermas's concept of interest is pretty obscure too. But the obscurity surrounding the concept of interest is not the source of the confusion. For our present purposes we can simply stipulate that an interest is a reason to want. The notion of reason rests loosely on the notion of a need, and the concepts of need and desire are take left deliberately vague. The source of the current confusion lies in the notion of universalizability that is in play. Once we pay due attention to the conditions of the universalizability of interests contained in Habermas's formulation of the moral principle (U), we can distinguish between a weaker and a stronger version of the principle. I argue that only the weaker version is defensible. But I also want to show that Habermas is tempted into defending the stronger version, and to explain why he does so.     

‘What works?’ Therapeutic experience with grieving clients

This paper poses questions about the nature of the therapeutic process in general. Using a holistic and integrative perspective, the author argues that therapy has been influenced by considerations of therapist expertise, techniques aimed at solving problems, and a paternalistic model of doing things to the client. The paper proposes a contrasting approach involving a shared, conversational experience with clients which respects personal autonomy and encourages creative solutions. Throughout the whole paper weaves the underlying theme of unresolved grief, reflecting the author's philosophy that loss is a covert agenda for many people seeking therapeutic help. The author's thesis is that in defining the emotions associated with unresolved grief, exploring the contexts in which the losses occurred, and investigating future options and directions, therapeutic change can be effected. Finally, a quandary that therapy as conversation presents is addressed: how can we research our dialogue to ensure effective outcomes?     

‘SEEKE TRUE RELIGION. OH,WHERE?’

We precipitately express opinions about religion without reflecting critically on our conception of it, and may blame it for conduct that the religious traditions themselves judge unbecoming. A distinction can be drawn between the raw, natural self of the untrained person and the well‐tempered demeanour of a spiritually developed person. Such a distinction drives the appropriation of religious beliefs and can survive their demise. ‘Religious belief’ is not to be conflated with Abrahamic notions of ‘belief in God’ and ‘faith’. There are other versions of transcendence and other psycho‐dramas. One possible form of transcendence is available within the moral life of human beings.     

‘Does class count?’ Social class and counselling

This article explores the importance attached to social class by experienced practitioners taking part in a co‐operative inquiry group. A review of the literature from the last thirty years indicates that there is very little research on class in relation to counselling and psychotherapy reported in the UK. Both authors position themselves as coming from working class origins. Nine co‐researchers from both middle and working class origins joined the group. Eight meetings took place over a period of nine months. Extracts from the group's discussions are represented and integrated with ‘presentational knowing’ drawn from contemporary culture, including poetry and popular music. This study suggests that social class is a neglected aspect of diversity in the counselling field. Implications of the study have relevance for the language of counselling and psychotherapy and class based values; social class and its impact on initial education; and ongoing counselling practice and access to therapy for working class people.     

The Holy Spirit in the Trinitarian Communion: ‘Love’ and ‘Gift'?

Christians in the West often have become so accustomed to naming the Holy Spirit ‘Love’ and ‘Gift’ – or at least to associating the Holy Spirit particularly with these two dynamisms – that it can come as a surprise that Scripture nowhere explicitly names the Holy Spirit either ‘love’ or ‘gift’. Indeed, as Hans Urs von Balthasar points out, the Spirit is much more clearly associated with truth, knowledge and power. How then does Augustine arrive at the view that the Holy Spirit should be named ‘Love’ and ‘Gift'? I examine and evaluate the complex exegetical steps by which Augustine draws out these names.