Empathic forecasting: How do we predict other people's feelings?

When making affective forecasts, people commit the impact bias. They overestimate the impact an emotional event has on their affective experience. In three studies we show that people also commit the impact bias when making empathic forecasts, affective forecasts for someone else. They overestimate the impact an emotional event has on someone else's affective experience (Study 1), they do so for friends and strangers (Study 2), and they do so when other sources of information are available (Study 3). Empathic forecasting accuracy, the correlation between one person's empathic forecast and another person's actual affective experience, was lower than between-person forecasting correspondence, the correlation between one person's empathic forecast and another person's affective forecast. Empathic forecasts do not capture other people's actual experience very well but are similar to what other people forecast for themselves. This may enhance understanding between people.     

Characterizing sequence knowledge using online measures and hidden Markov models

What knowledge do subjects acquire in sequence-learning experiments? How can they express that knowledge? In two sequence-learning experiments, we studied the acquisition of knowledge of complex probabilistic sequences. Using a novel experimental paradigm, we were able to compare reaction time and generation measures of sequence knowledge online. Hidden Markov models were introduced as a novel way of analyzing generation data that allowed for a characterization of sequence knowledge in terms of the grammar that was used to generate the stimulus material. The results indicated a strong correlation between the decrease in reaction times and an increase in generation performance. This pattern of results is consistent with a common knowledge base for improvement on both measures. On a more detailed level, the results indicate that at the start of training, generation performance and reaction times are uncorrelated and that this correlation increases with training.     

Differential effects of aging on processes involved in mental imagery generation]

The purpose of this study was to measure the degree to which the deterioration of mental image generation processes observed in elderly subjects by Dror and Kosslyn (1994) depends on the nature of the processing (referential vs. representational) involved in performing the task at hand. In keeping with the results of research showing that processing resources diminish as normal aging occurs (Craik & Bird, 1982; Rabinowitz, Craik & Ackerman, 1982), we suggest that generation ability based on referential processing is affected to a greater extent in older adults than is the generation ability involving representational processing. Fifteen young adults and 15 elderly persons performed a generation task modeled on that used by Dror and Kosslyn (1994). Observations were based on two contrasting conditions. In the first instance, subjects were required to generate an image representation of numbers when instructed to do so by a graphic stimulus, e.g., "31" (representational generation). In the second case, generation was produced on the basis of a verbal stimulus, e.g., "thirteen" (referential generation). Results (response time and number of accurate answers) show that, compared to young adults, elderly adults have a diminished ability to generate images based on words rather than numbers and do so at a slower pace. Our results suggest, therefore, that the performance of the first type of generation is cognitively more demanding for elderly subjects than that which is founded on figurative stimuli. The deterioration of mental image generation processes observed in elderly subjects by Dror and Kosslyn (1994) is therefore dependent on the nature of processing (referential vs. In conclusion we suggest two complementary assumptions to explain the observed dissociation. The differential effect of age may be the result of a deficienness cy linked to the nature of processing (control vs. automatic). Our second assumption is that, more specifically, referential generation involves more processing resources than does representational generation because it requires an additional transcoding operation. In this instance, the differential effect of aging that we observed would be closely linked to the number of cognitive operations involved in mental image generation.     

Eye scanpaths during visual imagery reenact those of perception of the same visual scene

Eye movements during mental imagery are not epiphenomenal but assist the process of image generation. Commands to the eyes for each fixation are stored along with the visual representation and are used as spatial index in a motor‐based coordinate system for the proper arrangement of parts of an image. In two experiments, subjects viewed an irregular checkerboard or color pictures of fish and were subsequently asked to form mental images of these stimuli while keeping their eyes open. During the perceptual phase, a group of subjects was requested to maintain fixation onto the screen's center, whereas another group was free to inspect the stimuli. During the imagery phase, all of these subjects were free to move their eyes. A third group of subjects (in Experiment 2) was free to explore the pattern but was requested to maintain central fixation during imagery. For subjects free to explore the pattern, the percentage of time spent fixating a specific location during perception was highly correlated with the time spent on the same (empty) locations during imagery. The order of scanning of these locations during imagery was correlated to the original order during perception. The strength of relatedness of these scanpaths and the vividness of each image predicted performance accuracy. Subjects who fixed their gaze centrally during perception did the same spontaneously during imagery. Subjects free to explore during perception, but maintaining central fixation during imagery, showed decreased ability to recall the pattern. We conclude that the eye scanpaths during visual imagery reenact those of perception of the same visual scene and that they play a functional role.     

Seeing structure: Shape skeletons modulate perceived similarity

An intrinsic part of seeing objects is seeing how similar or different they are relative to one another. This experience requires that objects be mentally represented in a common format over which such comparisons can be carried out. What is that representational format? Objects could be compared in terms of their superficial features (e.g., degree of pixel-by-pixel overlap), but a more intriguing possibility is that they are compared on the basis of a deeper structure. One especially promising candidate that has enjoyed success in the computer vision literature is the shape skeleton—a geometric transformation that represents objects according to their inferred underlying organization. Despite several hints that shape skeletons are computed in human vision, it remains unclear how much they actually matter for subsequent performance. Here, we explore the possibility that shape skeletons help mediate the ability to extract visual similarity. Observers completed a same/different task in which two shapes could vary either in their skeletal structure (without changing superficial features such as size, orientation, and internal angular separation) or in large surface-level ways (without changing overall skeletal organization). Discrimination was better for skeletally dissimilar shapes: observers had difficulty appreciating even surprisingly large differences when those differences did not reorganize the underlying skeletons. This pattern also generalized beyond line drawings to 3-D volumes whose skeletons were less readily inferable from the shapes’ visible contours. These results show how shape skeletons may influence the perception of similarity—and more generally, how they have important consequences for downstream visual processing.

     

Misled subjects may know more than their performance implies

Many studies have demonstrated that subjects exposed to misleading postevent information are likely to report the misinformation with confidence on subsequent tests of memory for the event. The purpose of the present studies was to determine whether subjects exposed to misleading postevent information come to believe they remember seeing the misinformation at the original event. A second question addressed by the present studies is whether exposure to misinformation reduces subjects' ability to remember the source of items they witnessed at the original event. In two experiments, subjects viewed a slide sequence depicting an event, were subsequently exposed to misleading information or neutral information about selected aspects of the event, and were later tested on their memory for the source of original and misleading details. The results showed that exposure to misinformation did not lead subjects to believe they remembered seeing the misinformation, nor did it reduce subjects' ability to accurately identify the source of originally seen details. The same pattern of results was obtained whether subjects were tested immediately (Experiment 1) or after a 1-day delay (Experiment 2). Collectively, the results suggest that subjects may report misinformation even if they know they do not remember seeing it.     

Accurate step-hold tracking of smoothly varying periodic and aperiodic probability

Subjects observing many samples from a Bernoulli distribution are able to perceive an estimate of the generating parameter. A question of fundamental importance is how the current percept—what we think the probability now is—depends on the sequence of observed samples. Answers to this question are strongly constrained by the manner in which the current percept changes in response to changes in the hidden parameter. Subjects do not update their percept trial-by-trial when the hidden probability undergoes unpredictable and unsignaled step changes; instead, they update it only intermittently in a step-hold pattern. It could be that the step-hold pattern is not essential to the perception of probability and is only an artifact of step changes in the hidden parameter. However, we now report that the step-hold pattern obtains even when the parameter varies slowly and smoothly. It obtains even when the smooth variation is periodic (sinusoidal) and perceived as such. We elaborate on a previously published theory that accounts for: (i) the quantitative properties of the step-hold update pattern; (ii) subjects’ quick and accurate reporting of changes; (iii) subjects’ second thoughts about previously reported changes; (iv) subjects’ detection of higher-order structure in patterns of change. We also call attention to the challenges these results pose for trial-by-trial updating theories.     

Causal attributions for success and failure in relation to expectations of success based upon selective or manipulative control

Subjects worked at a 10-item Anagrams Test. In a manipulative control condition the prior performance of subjects on a set of practice anagrams was controlled so that half of these subjects began the test with high expectations of success and half with low expectations of success As a check on the manipulation, subjects provided ratings of how confident they were that they could pass the test (i e, solve five anagrams or more) In a selective control condition subjects were not given practice items but were subsequently assigned to high versus low expectation groups on the basis of their confidence ratings The difficulty level of the items in the Anagrams Test was manipulated so that half the subjects in each condition passed the test and half failed. Subsequently all subjects were required to rate the degree to which they considered ability (or lack of ability), effort (or lack of effort), task difficulty (easy or hard), and luck (good or bad) were causes of their performance outcome (success or failure). It was found that the expected success was attributed more to ability and less to good luck than was the unexpected success The expected failure was attributed more to lack of ability and less to bad luck than was the unexpected failure There was a greater tendency for subjects to appeal to task difficulty and effort as causes of their performance when they succeeded than when they failed. These results were discussed in terms of a structural balance model of attribution behavior and also in relation to Heider's naive analysis of the causes of action     

Tactile attention and the perception of moving tactile stimuli

Three experiments investigated the ability of subjects to identify the direction of movement of a pattern across the skin. In Experiments 1 and 2, subjects were required to identify the direction of movement of a pattern presented to one fingerpad while another moving pattern was being presented to an adjacent fingerpad. Subjects were instructed to attend only to the target location. The results showed that accuracy was consistently higher and reaction times were consistently faster when the two patterns moved in the same direction than when they moved in opposite directions. Both effects were largest when the two patterns were presented simultaneously. In Experiment 3, the nontarget location was the contralateral hand. In this case, performance was not affected by the presentation of the nontarget. Combined, the results suggest that movement information is processed across adjacent fingers even when subjects are explicitly instructed to attend only to one finger. Subjects do appear to be able to restrict attention to a single hand.     

Can people accurately estimate their own personality test scores?

This study examined the relationship between subjects' actual test derived scores and their estimates of what those scores would be. Fifty-six subjects completed three questionnaires (Morningness-Eveningness Questionnaire; FIRO-B; Myers—Briggs Type Indicator MBTI), and then estimated the scores on each dimension (15 in all) for themselves and another person that they knew well. The results showed significant positive correlations on 10 of the 15 dimensions for themselves. The dimensions that they were best at estimating were Morningness-Eveningness; Extraversion, and Thinking on the MBTI; and Wanted and Expressed Inclusion on the FIRO-B. Eight correlations reached significance concerning their ability to predict another known person's scores but were lower than for their own estimate-actual score correlations. Whereas subjects believed that they were like the other person they nominated (12 of the 15 correlations were significantly positive), in actual fact their test derived scores showed only five significant findings, two positive and the others negative. The results are discussed in terms of lay theories of personality and their relationship to personality assessment.     

Conditional reasoning, representation, and empirical evidence on a concrete task

This study examined interactions between empirical data, internal representations, and reasoning performance on a conditional reasoning task using a concrete apparatus. Subjects were asked an initial series of questions in order to determine the pattern of inferences they made after simple exposure to the apparatus. They were subsequently shown two different experimental manipulations designed to provide data about the internal structure of the apparatus without giving information about specific inferences. Some subjects did change their reasoning in response to the new data, although most remained stable throughout the experiment. These results are consistent with the idea that reasoning may require generation of an internal representation of a problem space. It was also concluded that the relation between reasoning and empirical evidence cannot be understood without supposing that evidence is often interpreted by subjects according to their reasoning patterns.     

判断预测的心理偏差及产生机制

心理学对判断预测的研究主要关注预测的偏差及产生机制。判断预测中的偏差有两类：偏见和不一致。偏见主要表现：趋势阻尼;提高效应;给预测结果增加随机噪音。不一致包括：信息获得导致的不一致;信息加工导致的不一致。偏差的出现一是与信息加工过程有关,二是与序列的特征与呈现方式有关。研究发现提供反馈、分解、组合和建议采纳等策略可以增进判断预测的准确性。     

The Effects of Subject-Defined Categories on Judgmental Accuracy in Confidence Assessment Tasks

The accuracy of confidence judgments can be determined using measures of discrimination and calibration. The present paper utilizes a new assessment methodology that decomposes the confidence assessment task, allowing us to investigate discrimination and calibration skills in greater depth than has been done in previous studies. Researchers investigating the goodness of confidence judgments have typically grouped forecasters' assessments into experimenter-defined categories, generally in equal widths of .10. In the present research, subjects created their own categories and later assigned confidence judgments to the categories, separating the tasks of discriminating categories (discrimination) and assigning numbers to categories (calibration). Further, the typical assessment procedure assumes that subjects are able to discriminate equally across the confidence scale. Since subjects in the present study defined their own assessment categories, they could locate those categories at any point on the scale. A final issue of interest was whether subjects were able to determine accurately the number of categories into which they could discriminate. Sixty subjects performed 1 of 2 tasks, general knowledge or forecasting, in both relatively easy and relatively hard conditions. Results showed a trade-off in performance: Calibration generally became worse as the number of categories increased, while discrimination generally improved. Overall accuracy was not affected by the number of categories used. Further, subjects partitioned categories more at the high end of the scale. Finally, measures showed that subjects were not accurate in their beliefs about their own discrimination ability.     

Developmental study of fair division and property

This paper attempts to describe how sharing behavior develops. Subjects were pairs of children aged 4 to 15. The experimental situation follows the pattern of a rich sharing with a poor, that is, subjects do not possess the same amount at the beginning of the experiment. Three stages emerge:

• — Up to 6–7 years the subjects do not compare the different sets (initial belongings, set to be shared) and proceed often by alternating actions (give and take).
• — From 6–7 to 11–12 years they even out their final belongings (what they possess after sharing). Initial belongings and objects to be shared are considered in the same way.
• — From 11–12 years on, there is a distinction between initial belongings and the set that is to be shared, based on the assumption that they are dealing with two different types of property.

     

Monitoring the future: object and source memory for real and imagined events

In these experiments a memory‐monitoring decision is made, whereby subjects must decide not only whether or not to‐be‐learned stimuli will be remembered—the focus of all of the past research into the Judgement of Learning (JOL)—but also whether they will be able to assess the source of those stimuli, as assessed by a new measure, Judgement of Source (JOS). In Experiment 1 subjects had to judge whether they would remember the occurrence and the source of items that were either seen or imagined. Although seen items were better remembered and sourced than imagined, subjects were unable to predict this outcome: they underestimated their ability to recall seen items and overestimated their ability to recall imagined items. In Experiment 2 subjects had to discriminate between self‐performed or other‐performed enacted or imagined events. We expected that the motor cues associated with overt performance should provide more sensory information than had the visual input in Experiment 1, and this should help subjects to discriminate between real and imagined items. As predicted, JOL magnitude showed that subjects were now able to predict accurately that they would recall more enacted events than imagined events. JOS magnitude showed that subjects incorrectly predicted that self‐enactment would assist source memory compared to imagination. However, it was the source of other‐focused events which was more accurately remembered. The results are discussed in terms of Koriat's (1997) view about cue utility in making JOLs. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

教师工作价值观与工作绩效的关系研究

目的 探讨教师工作价值观与工作绩效的关系。方法 采用教师工作价值观量表和工作绩效量表,对645名中小学教师进行了测量,运用SPSS17.0对数据进行统计分析。结果 教师工作价值观与工作绩效间存在显著的正相关,但相关水平较低;利他奉献、安全稳定及声望地位维度是任务绩效、工作奉献及总体绩效的预测指标,利他奉献、安全稳定及人际关系维度是人际促进绩效的预测指标。结论 教师工作价值观能在一定程度上预测其工作绩效。     

Agrammatism in a case-inflected language: Comprehension of agent-object relations

Yugoslav agrammatic aphasics and normal control subjects were tested for comprehension of agent-object relations in a series of simple Serbo-Croatian sentences consisting of two nouns (N) and a transitive action verb (V). The availability of nominative and accusative case inflections and a semantic contrast was systematically varied across sentences. Sentences were also varied with respect to the two sequences NVN and VNN. An analysis of subjects' agent-object assignments yielded the following results: While Broca's aphasics did show some sensitivity to case inflections, their ability to process such cues was greatly impaired relative to normal subjects, for whom morphological cues were almost completely deterministic. To a lesser degree, Broca's aphasics were impaired in their ability to employ a strategy of “choose the first noun as agent” when case inflections and semantic contrasts were not available. While Broca's aphasics showed no impairment in their ability to exploit semantic contrasts for agent-object assignment, there was no absolute compensatory increase in the degree to which they relied on semantic cues. Differences in word sequence had no effect on agent-object assignment in Broca's aphasics. Finally, Broca's aphasics frequently responded unsystematically when cues to agent-object relations occurred in isolation or in competition with one another, but when there was a convergence of cues their performance approached that of normal subjects. This result was interpreted in terms of an accessing hypothesis.     

Self-insight,Other-insight,and Their Relation to Interpersonal Conflict

The pessimistic conclusion that people have relatively poor insight into the weighting schemes they use when they make holistic judgements has been generally accepted among judgement researchers (e.g. Arkes, 1981; Balke, Hammond, & Meyer, 1973, Brehmer, 1984). The empirical research that supported this generalisation rested on indices of self-insight that were produced directly by the subjects. It was often the case that subjects were unable to correctly name even the single most important factor influencing their decisions, as indicated by a mathematical model of their judgement schemes. Using an alternate method of assessing self-insight, however, Reilly and Doherty (1989, 1992) found that subjects have far better self-insight than previously believed possible. The present paper employed the same methodology to investigate insight into the policy of another person as well as into oneself, and examined the relation of self-insight and other-insight to interpersonal conflict. Subjects were 50 dyads of university students. The results showed that: (1) subjects exhibited the expected high levels of self-insight via the recognition procedure; (2) subjects were able to identify the statistically generated policy of their roommate, thus exhibiting other-insight; (3) the ability to identify one's own policy is somewhat related to the ability to articulate one's own policy— that is, roommates with insight via recognition had higher indices of self-insight as measured by the traditional correlation method; (4) subjects who were able to identify their own policy were more likely to identify their roommate's policy and (5) individuals who possess self- and other-insight had less conflict in their roommate relationships.     

Do Maximizers Predict Better than Satisficers?

We examine the relationship between maximizing (i.e., seeking the best) versus satisficing (i.e., seeking the good enough) tendencies and forecasting ability in a real‐world prediction task: forecasting the outcomes of the 2010 FIFA World Cup. In Studies 1 and 2, participants gave probabilistic forecasts for the outcomes of the tournament and completed a measure of maximizing tendencies. We found that although maximizers expected themselves to outperform others much more than satisficers, they actually forecasted more poorly. Hence, on net, they were more overconfident about their relative performance. Decompositional analyses of overall accuracy revealed that differences in forecasting abilities were primarily driven by maximizers' tendency to give more noisy estimates. In Study 3, participants played a betting task where they could choose between safe and uncertain gambles linked to World Cup outcomes. Again, maximizers did more poorly and earned less, because of greater noise in their choice‐based responses. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Motor learning by observation: Evidence from a serial reaction time task

This study sought evidence of observational motor learning, a type of learning in which observation of the skilled performance of another person not only facilitates motor skill acquisition but does so by contributing to the formation of effector-specific motor representations. Previous research has indicated that observation of skilled performance engages cognitive processes similar to those occurring during action execution or physical practice, but has not demonstrated that these include processes involved in effector-specific representation. In two experiments, observer subjects watched the experimenter performing a serial reaction time (SRT) task with a six-item unique sequence before sequence knowledge was assessed by response time and/or free generation measures. The results suggest that: (1) subjects can acquire sequence information by watching another person performing the task (Experiments 1-2); (2) observation results in as much sequence learning as task practice when learning is measured by reaction times (RTs) and more than task practice when sequence learning is measured by free generation performance (Experiment 2, Part 1); and (3) sequence knowledge acquired by model observation can be encoded motorically--that is, in an effector-specific fashion (Experiment 2, Part 2).