Culture, temporal focus, and values of the past and the future

This article examines cultural differences in how people value future and past events. Throughout four studies, the authors found that European Canadians attached more monetary value to an event in the future than to an identical event in the past, whereas Chinese and Chinese Canadians placed more monetary value to a past event than to an identical future event. The authors also showed that temporal focus-thinking about the past or future-explained cultural influences on the temporal value asymmetry effect. Specifically, when induced to think about and focus on the future, Chinese valued the future more than the past, just like Euro-Canadians; when induced to think about and focus on the past, Euro-Canadians valued the past more than the future, just like Chinese.     

A wrinkle in time: asymmetric valuation of past and future events

ABSTRACT— A series of studies shows that people value future events more than equivalent events in the equidistant past. Whether people imagined being compensated or compensating others, they required and offered more compensation for events that would take place in the future than for identical events that had taken place in the past. This temporal value asymmetry (TVA) was robust in between-persons comparisons and absent in within-persons comparisons, which suggests that participants considered the TVA irrational. Contemplating future events produced greater affect than did contemplating past events, and this difference mediated the TVA. We suggest that the TVA, the gain-loss asymmetry, and hyperbolic time discounting can be unified in a three-dimensional value function that describes how people value gains and losses of different magnitudes at different moments in time.     

Temporal focus,temporal distance,and mind-wandering valence: Results from an experience sampling and an experimental study

When mind-wandering, people may think about events that happened in the past, or events that may happen in the future. Using experience sampling, we first aimed to replicate the finding that future-oriented thoughts show a greater positivity bias than past-oriented thoughts. Furthermore, we investigated whether there is a relation between the temporal distance of past- and future-oriented thoughts and the frequency of positive thoughts, a factor that has received little attention in previous work. Second, we experimentally investigated the relation between temporal focus, temporal distance, and thought valence. Both studies showed that future-oriented thoughts were more positive compared to past-oriented thoughts. Regarding temporal distance, thoughts about the distant past and future were more positive than thoughts about the near past and future in the experiment. However, the experience sampling study did not provide clear insight into this relation. Potential theoretical and methodological explanations for these findings are discussed.     

Automatic Optimism: Why People Assume Their Futures will be Bright

Why are people optimistic about their futures, continuously assuming that their futures will be full of the positive outcomes they desire and devoid of negative outcomes? This paper concerns the proposal that desire, represented as affective reactions to potential future events, causes optimism for the future. We propose that positive or negative affective reactions to future events innervate motivations to approach or avoid the events. These motivations can be satiated by judging that events that elicit positive affective reactions are likely to occur and events that elicit negative affective reactions are unlikely to occur. The tendency to be optimistic thus results from emotional processes that occur largely outside of conscious awareness. We discuss recent evidence that supports these propositions, the import of understanding optimism as the result of emotional processes for judgment and decision research as well as attempts to improve decision‐making, and remaining unresolved issues.     

The Tripartite Foundations of Temporal Psychological Distance: Metaphors,Ecology, and Teleology

What is psychological distance? Why do events sometimes seem “close” yet other times seem “ages away?” We propose a tripartite model of the foundations of psychological distance in which: (a) people use spatial distance as a metaphor for psychological distance; (b) the ecology of subjective experiences that coincide with changes in objective distance define, and hence, influence psychological distance; (c) psychological distance is shaped in the service of people's ultimate goals, or teleological considerations, of successfully navigating through time. This model implies that the subjective experiences that are typically associated with reductions in objective temporal distance should reduce temporal psychological distance–the subjective sense of how close or far away events are. We review evidence indicating that emotional arousal, attention, fluency, and motivational considerations all reduce psychological distance. This model also implies a temporal asymmetry in which people prioritize thinking about the future, which approaches in time, over thinking about the past, which recedes in time. Consequently, the future is psychologically closer than the past, people attend more to the future than to the past, and people feel more emotionally aroused about the future than about the past. These findings help advance understanding of psychological distance as a distinct psychological construct.     

Separating past and future autobiographical events in memory: Evidence for a reality monitoring asymmetry

After thinking about the past and imagining the future, how do people separate these real and imagined events in memory? We had subjects engage in past and future autobiographical elaboration, then later take memory tests that required them to recollect these earlier generated events. In Experiment 1, testing memory for previously generated past or future autobiographical events led to fewer source memory confusions than did an elaborative control task, suggesting that the distinctive features of autobiographical elaboration improved subsequent retrieval monitoring accuracy. In Experiment 2, we directly compared retrieval monitoring accuracy for previously generated past and future autobiographical events and found that subjects made fewer source confusions when searching memory for future events. This asymmetry suggests that the features characterizing future elaborations (e.g., cognitive operations) were used more effectively during reality monitoring than were the features characterizing past elaborations (e.g., perceptual details), and has implications for future-oriented theories of memory.     

Predicting premeditation: future behavior is seen as more intentional than past behavior

People's intuitions about the underlying causes of past and future actions might not be the same. In 3 studies, we demonstrate that people judge the same behavior as more intentional when it will be performed in the future than when it has been performed in the past. We found this temporal asymmetry in perceptions of both the strength of an individual's intention and the overall prevalence of intentional behavior in a population. Because of its heightened intentionality, people thought the same transgression deserved more severe punishment when it would occur in the future than when it did occur in the past. The difference in judgments of both intentionality and punishment was partly explained by the stronger emotional reactions that were elicited in response to future actions than in response to past actions. We consider the implications of this temporal asymmetry for legal decision making and theories of attribution more generally.     

Focalism: a source of durability bias in affective forecasting

The durability bias, the tendency to overpredict the duration of affective reactions to future events, may be due in part to focalism, whereby people focus too much on the event in question and not enough on the consequences of other future events. If so, asking people to think about other future activities should reduce the durability bias. In Studies 1-3, college football fans were less likely to overpredict how long the outcome of a football game would influence their happiness if they first thought about how much time they would spend on other future activities. Studies 4 and 5 ruled out alternative explanations and found evidence for a distraction interpretation, that people who think about future events moderate their forecasts because they believe that these events will reduce thinking about the focal event. The authors discuss the implications of focalism for other literatures, such as the planning fallacy.     

Distancing the present self from the past and the future: Psychological distance in anxiety and depression

Humans show a systematic tendency to perceive the future as psychologically closer than the past. Based on the clinical hypothesis that anxiety would be associated more with future threat life events, whereas depression with past loss events, here we explored whether people with anxiety- and depression-related personality traits perceive differently the psychological distance of temporal events. Results showed that the common tendency to perceive the future as psychologically closer than the past is exaggerated in individuals with anxiety-related personality traits, whereas this asymmetry drastically shrinks in individuals with depression-related personality traits. Beyond substantiating the hypothesis that the past and the future are differently faced by people with depression- and anxiety-related personality traits, the present findings suggest that temporal orientation of one’s self may be greatly altered in anxiety and depression.     

Spontaneous counterfactual thoughts and causal explanations

We report two Experiments to compare counterfactual thoughts about how an outcome could have been different and causal explanations about why the outcome occurred. Experiment 1 showed that people generate counterfactual thoughts more often about controllable than uncontrollable events, whereas they generate causal explanations more often about unexpected than expected events. Counterfactual thoughts focus on specific factors, whereas causal explanations focus on both general and specific factors. Experiment 2 showed that in their spontaneous counterfactual thoughts, people focus on normal events just as often as exceptional events, unlike in directed counterfactual thoughts. The findings are consistent with the suggestion that counterfactual thoughts tend to focus on how a specific unwanted outcome could have been prevented, whereas causal explanations tend to provide more general causal information that enables future understanding, prediction, and intervention in a wide range of situations.     

"It's not my fault--but only I can change it": counterfactual and prefactual thoughts of managers

In testing for the self-serving bias in performance evaluation, the authors propose that comparing managers' counterfactual and prefactual thoughts about subordinates' performance is more conclusive than the attributional approach and also offers practical advantages. In a study with 120 managers, a 4-way interaction of subordinate performance, temporal perspective, direction, and reference confirmed the predicted pattern. Managers' thoughts about how a weak performance could have been enhanced had external references, but thoughts about how such a performance could be enhanced in the future focused on the leader. This asymmetry was only observed for weak performance. Results are discussed with regard to biases in leaders' performance evaluations and to how counter- and prefactual thoughts could be used for leadership research and practice.     

Exploring the Use of Experience Sampling to Assess Episodic Thought

Mental time travel is the ability to mentally relive events in one's own past (episodic recall) and pre‐live potential personal future events (episodic foresight). Recent research has used experience sampling to reveal when and how often we think about the past and future in everyday life; however, it remains unclear how much of thought is episodic, involving the sense of self that underpins mental time travel. In this study, we investigate the use of experience sampling to assess the frequency of episodic past and future thought in everyday life. Participants (n = 214) were exposed to 20 short message service prompts over 1 or 2 days. Half of thoughts were sited in the present; of the remainder, future‐oriented thoughts were more frequent than past‐oriented thoughts. Participants reported 20% of thoughts as episodic. This study suggests that experience sampling methodology can provide a means of assessing episodic thought during everyday activities.Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Conceiving the past and future

The authors compared people's views of their histories and futures by asking them to recall and anticipate personally significant episodes. It was hypothesized and found in Study 1 that individuals spontaneously recall an affectively mixed past, containing both "highs" and "lows," whereas they anticipate homogeneously ideal futures. It was further hypothesized that people devote little thought to negative futures, and this was tested directly in Studies 2 and 3 by assessing how quickly past and likely future events came to mind. Asked to report positive and negative episodes from the past and future, participants took longer to generate future negative than positive events. Speed of recall was unaffected by the valence of past episodes. In Study 4, the response latency difference was again replicated for future events and it was demonstrated that people are slower in both generating negative future events and judging those events as likely.     

Self-defining future projections: exploring the identity function of thinking about the future

The act of projecting oneself into meaningful future events may significantly contribute to a person's sense of self and identity. Yet if the role of memories, in particular self-defining memories (SDMs), in grounding the self is now well established, the identity function of anticipated future events has received comparatively little attention. This article introduces the construct of self-defining future projection (SDFP) to address this issue. Two studies show that people can readily identify significant future events that they frequently think about and that convey core information about who they are as individuals. Furthermore, a person's particular style of constructing SDMs is similarly manifested in SDFPs, suggesting that both types of events can be used to ground the self. Notably, people who display a stronger tendency to extract meaning from their past experiences also reflect more about the potential implications of imagined future events. The results further demonstrate that SDMs and SDFPs both give rise to a strong sense of personal continuity over time and are meaningfully related to self-esteem. Together these findings lend support to the idea that a person's sense of self and identity is in part nourished by the anticipation of significant future events.     

Projecting the self into the future in individuals with schizophrenia: a preliminary cross-sectional study

The ability to project oneself into the future contributes to development and maintenance of a coherent sense of identity. If recent research has revealed that schizophrenia is associated with difficulties envisioning the future, little is known about patients’ future self-representations. In this study, 27 participants with schizophrenia and 26 healthy controls were asked to simulate mental representations of plausible and highly significant future events (self-defining future projections, SDFPs) that they anticipate to happen in their personal future. Main results showed that schizophrenia patients had difficulties in reflecting on the broader meaning and implications of imagined future events. In addition, and contrary to our hypothesis, a large majority of SDFPs in schizophrenia patients were positive events, including achievements, relationship, and leisure contents. Interestingly, patients and controls did not differ on the perceived probability that these events will occur in the future. Our results suggest that schizophrenia patients have an exaggerated positive perception of their future selves. Together, these findings lend support to the idea that past and future self-defining representations have both similar and distinct characteristics in schizophrenia.     

Eye movements during mental time travel follow a diagonal line

Recent research showed that past events are associated with the back and left side, whereas future events are associated with the front and right side of space. These spatial–temporal associations have an impact on our sensorimotor system: thinking about one’s past and future leads to subtle body sways in the sagittal dimension of space (Miles, Nind, & Macrae, 2010). In this study we investigated whether mental time travel leads to sensorimotor correlates in the horizontal dimension of space. Participants were asked to mentally displace themselves into the past or future while measuring their spontaneous eye movements on a blank screen. Eye gaze was directed more rightward and upward when thinking about the future than when thinking about the past. Our results provide further insight into the spatial nature of temporal thoughts, and show that not only body, but also eye movements follow a (diagonal) “time line” during mental time travel.     

Prevalence and determinants of direct and generative modes of production of episodic future thoughts in the word cueing paradigm

Recent research suggests that episodic future thoughts can be formed through the same dual mechanisms, direct and generative, as autobiographical memories. However, the prevalence and determinants of the direct production of future event representations remain unclear. Here, we addressed this issue by collecting self-reports of production modes, response times (RTs), and verbal protocols for the production past and future events in the word cueing paradigm. Across three experiments, we found that both past and future events were frequently reported to come directly to mind in response to the cue, and RTs confirmed that events were produced faster for direct than for generative responses. When looking at the determinants of direct responses, we found that most past and future events that were directly produced had already been thought of on a previous occasion, and the frequency of previous thoughts predicted the occurrence of direct access. The direct production of autobiographical thoughts was also more frequent for past and future events that were judged important and emotionally intense. Collectively, these findings provide novel evidence that the direct production of episodic future thoughts is frequent in the word cueing paradigm and often involves the activation of personally significant “memories of the future.”     

Pain in the Past and Pleasure in the Future: The Development of Past–Future Preferences for Hedonic Goods

It seems self-evident that people prefer painful experiences to be in the past and pleasurable experiences to lie in the future. Indeed, it has been claimed that, for hedonic goods, this preference is absolute (Sullivan, 2018). Yet very little is known about the extent to which people demonstrate explicit preferences regarding the temporal location of hedonic experiences, about the developmental trajectory of such preferences, and about whether such preferences are impervious to differences in the quantity of envisaged past and future pain or pleasure. We find consistent evidence that, all else being equal, adults and children aged 7 and over prefer pleasure to lie in the future and pain in the past and believe that other people will, too. They also predict that other people will be happier when pleasure is in the future rather than the past but sadder when pain is in the future rather than the past. Younger children have the same temporal preferences as adults for their own painful experiences, but they prefer their pleasure to lie in the past and do not predict that others' levels of happiness or sadness vary dependent on whether experiences lie in the past or the future. However, from the age of 7, temporal preferences were typically abandoned at the earliest opportunity when the quantity of past pain or pleasure was greater than the quantity located in the future. Past–future preferences for hedonic goods emerge early developmentally but are surprisingly flexible.     

Self-defining future projections: Exploring the identity function of thinking about the future

The act of projecting oneself into meaningful future events may significantly contribute to a person's sense of self and identity. Yet if the role of memories, in particular self-defining memories (SDMs), in grounding the self is now well established, the identity function of anticipated future events has received comparatively little attention. This article introduces the construct of self-defining future projection (SDFP) to address this issue. Two studies show that people can readily identify significant future events that they frequently think about and that convey core information about who they are as individuals. Furthermore, a person's particular style of constructing SDMs is similarly manifested in SDFPs, suggesting that both types of events can be used to ground the self. Notably, people who display a stronger tendency to extract meaning from their past experiences also reflect more about the potential implications of imagined future events. The results further demonstrate that SDMs and SDFPs both give rise to a strong sense of personal continuity over time and are meaningfully related to self-esteem. Together these findings lend support to the idea that a person's sense of self and identity is in part nourished by the anticipation of significant future events.     

Role of triggers and dysphoria in mind-wandering about past,present and future: A laboratory study

To bridge the related but separate areas of research on mind-wandering and Involuntary Autobiographical Memory (IAM), the frequency and temporal focus of task unrelated thoughts about past, present, and future was compared in 19 dysphoric and 21 non-dysphoric participants, using a modified laboratory method for studying IAMs. Participants were stopped 11 times during a 15-min vigilance task and recorded their thoughts at that moment. In both groups, most thoughts were spontaneous, task-unrelated, and triggered by irrelevant cue-words on the screen with negative words being more likely to trigger past memories and positive cues – thoughts about future. Both groups reported more past memories than current or future thoughts, but differences emerged in the type of future thought experienced: non-dysphoric participants reported more planning thoughts, and dysphoric participants more abstract hypothetical thoughts. The results suggest that some findings from IAM research regarding cues and the impact of dysphoria may be generalizable to mind-wandering.