Intuitions,theory choice and the ameliorative character of logical theories

Synthese - Anti-exceptionalists about logic claim that logical methodology is not different from scientific methodology when it comes to theory choice. Two anti-exceptionalist accounts of theory...     

Common sense and psychological theories: The historical nature of logical necessity

The importance of common sense for psychological theories is construed as a limiting condition that must be transcended if a particular psychological theory is expected to have generalizability across cultures and over history. Discussion on the pages of this journal, initiated by Jan Smedslund in 1978, has brought the common-sensical nature of the majority of psychological theories into psychologists' focus of attention. Smedslund has attempted to explicate 'theorems' of common sense that underlie thinking and activities of human beings in a culture—and that are shared by laypersons as well as by psychologists. This article approaches the issue of common sense in psychological theorizing from a developmental perspective. This perspective emphasizes the process of emergence of qualitatively new cognitive phenomena in the course of cultural history. It is argued that the 'logical necessity' based on the 'theorems' of common sense is itself 'historical necessity', as it results from the history of human cultures. Smedslund's 'theorems' of common sense can only be formal, but not substantive, analogues of theorems in geometry, since the latter are ahistorical, whereas the former constitute products of the history of cultures and individuals.     

Recall of logical and pragmatic implications in sentences with dichotomous and continuous antonyms

Thirty-six subjects recalled sentences containing dichotomous or continuous antonyms in affirmative or negative form. The subjects made a considerable number of meaning-preserving recall errors for both dichotomous antonyms (not alive recalled asdead) and continuous antonyms (not hot recalled ascold). The negation of a dichotomous antonym logically implies its antonym, whereas the negation of a continuous antonym only pragmatically implies its antonym. Thus, the results suggest that subjects hearing sentences containing a logical or pragmatic implication tend to make the logical or pragmatic inference involved. Then, in recall, they do not remember that this was an inference and make the error of recalling the logical or pragmatic implication in place of the presented sentence.     

Episodic effects on picture identification: implications for theories of concept learning and theories of memory

The effects of differences in study processing on free recall of picture names and on generalization in picture identification were investigated. Experience with degraded pictures produced poorer subsequent free recall of picture names than did naming intact pictures. For the test of picture identification, pictures that were identical to a studied picture, pictures that shared a name with a studied picture (same name), and new test pictures were presented, and the amount of clarification required to identify a picture was measured. Experience with degraded pictures produced better subsequent identification of identical test pictures but poorer later identification of same-name test pictures than did naming intact pictures. The importance of these episodic effects for theories of concept learning and theories of memory is discussed. It is argued that distinctions between memory systems (e.g., episodic-semantic) must be couched in terms of a theory of concept learning and that the data are inconsistent with a simple distinction.     

Measuring inaccuracy of uncertain doxastic states in many-valued logical systems

I will propose an alternative philosophical approach to the representation of uncertain doxastic states. I will argue that the current account of measuring inaccuracy of uncertain doxastic states is inadequate for Belnap's four-valued logic. Specifically, a situation can be found in which either an inaccuracy measure returns a completely wrong result or an agent's inaccuracy score is inadequate relative to the mistake in her doxastic attitude. This will motivate an alternative representation of uncertain doxastic states based on ordered pairs. I will describe a possible inaccuracy measure that is suitable for ordered pairs, and I will show that it has all the qualities that are required for an inaccuracy measure to be legitimate. Finally, I will introduce conditions of rationality for uncertain doxastic states represented by ordered pairs.