Polger on the Illusion of Contingent Identity

Abstract

Thomas Polger has argued in favour of the mind–brain type‐identity theory, the view that mental states or processes are type‐identical to states of the central nervous system. Acknowledging that the type‐materialist must respond to Kripke’s modal anti‐materialist argument, Polger insists that Kripke’s argument rests on dubious assumptions concerning the identity conditions of brain states. In brief, Polger claims that one knows that x and y are non‐identical when one knows the identity conditions for both x and y. Replace x and y with ‘brain states’ and ‘sensations’ and it follows that one can know that brain states and sensations are non‐identical only if one knows the identity conditions for brain states. But according to Polger, we do not know the identity conditions for brain states. Hence, we should not be so confident that brain states and sensations are non‐identical after all. But Polger’s account is terribly flawed. Ironically, if Polger’s scepticism is warranted, then Polger himself has no good reasons to be a type‐materialist. But more importantly, Polger’s scepticism regarding the identity conditions of brain states is deeply defective. We do, I submit, understand the identity conditions of brain states. In the end, I submit, Kripke is safe from Polger.     

Maternal cradling bias in baboons: The first environmental factor affecting early infant handedness development?

The most emblematic behavioral manifestation of human brain asymmetries is handedness. While the precise mechanisms behind the development of handedness are still widely debated, empirical evidences highlight that besides genetic factors, environmental factors may play a crucial role. As one of these factors, maternal cradling behavior may play a key role in the emergence of early handedness in the offspring. In the present study we followed 41 Papio anubis infants living in social groups with their mother for which direction (e.g., left- or right-arm) and degree of maternal cradling-side bias were available from a previous published study. We assessed hand preferences for an unimanual grasping task at three developmental stages: (A) 0–4, (B) 4—6, and (C) 9–10 months of age. We found that individual hand preferences for grasping exist as soon as the first months of age, with a population-level left-handedness predominance, being stable until 6 months; to wit the period during which juveniles are mainly carried by their mothers. More importantly, this early postnatal handedness is positively correlated with maternal cradling lateralization. Interestingly, hand preferences assessed later in the development, once juveniles are no longer carried (i.e., from 9 to 10 months of age), are less dependent from the maternal cradling bias and less consistent with the earlier developmental stages, especially in infants initially cradled on the right maternal side. Our findings suggest that the ontogenetic dynamics of the infant's hand preference and its changes might ultimately rely on the degree of infant dependence from the mother across development.     

Doctors with borders? An authority-based approach to the brain drain1

According to the brain drain argument, there are good reasons for states to limit the exit of their skilled workers (more specifically, healthcare workers), because of the negative impacts this type of migration has for other members of the community from which they migrate. Some theorists criticise this argument as illiberal, while others support it and ground a duty to stay of the skilled workers on rather vague concepts like patriotic virtue, or the legitimate expectations of their state and co-citizens. In this article, on the contrary, we suggest that the liberal conception of states’ legitimate political authority demands, and not just permits, that developing states from which migration of skilled workers occurs set up contractual mechanisms. These mechanisms will ensure that state-funded training in the health sector is provided against a commitment on the part of future professionals to reciprocate with their services for the benefits obtained. If one of the conditions for the state to maintain legitimate political authority is to provide basic services such as healthcare to its subjects (while respecting at the same time their autonomy and freedom), then this is what developing states affected by the brain drain ought to do. What we call the authority-based approach to the brain drain also helps to clarify the obligations that other states have not to interfere with these contractual mechanisms when they exist, and not to profit from their absence. Inspired by FIFA’s legal instruments of training compensation and solidarity mechanism for the transfer of players, we conclude by suggesting a plausible global policy to complement this authority-based approach.     

Early learning as ontogenetic adaptation for ingestion by rats

Ontogenetic adaptation is an “ecological” concept in which mammalian maturation is seen as a coordinated sequence of specializations (stages) that enables the infant to survive within a sequence of distinct niches created by the parent(s) and the rest of the environment. Natural selection is presumed to operate at each point in development. The development of ingestive behavior in the rat pup as a series of ontogenetic adaptations enabling the infant while in the nursing niche to obtain and utilize mother's milk and progress gradually into the feeding niche in which a variety of solid foods must either be obtained or avoided is discussed. Data to show that learning is an integral part of these ontogenetic adaptations for ingestion are reviewed and interpreted. Preweanling rats that are capable of learning and remembering toxiphobic food aversions do not display an aversion to a flavor conditioned stimulus (CS) paired with illness if the CS is presented during suckling. In contrast, 20-day-old pups (weanlings) trained identically do show conditioned taste aversions under these conditions. A perspective of ontogenetic adaptations to this phenomenon of “blockade of toxiphobia by suckling” and its dissolution at weaning is applied. The generality of the blockade phenomenon and its mechanisms are explored, and it is shown that feeding experience regulates the stage-appropriate learning strategies used by the pups.     

Synapses,Schizophrenia, and Civilization: What Made Homo Sapient?

Progress in technology has allowed dynamic research on the development of the human brain that has revolutionized concepts. Particularly, the notions of plasticity, neuronal selection, and the effects of afferent stimuli have entered into thinking about brain development. Here I focus on development from the age of four years to early adulthood, during which a 30 percent reduction in some brain synapses occurs that is out of proportion to changes in neuronal numbers. This corresponds temporally with changes in normal child behavior from the loose‐associative, almost schizoid, thinking and art of the four‐year‐old to the more trained, or disciplined, or acculturated—and restrained—personality of the young adult. I propose that the synaptic changes can best be thought of as a winnowing process likely subject to environmental influences. Acquisition of language and the ability to link linguistic cognition to the plastic development of the brain provide a potentially powerful means of explaining the evolutionally explosive development of human cognition and culture. Schizophrenia, a disease that can be envisioned as representing a derangement of synaptic maturation, may provide an entry into the search for genes controlling the processes mediating the unprecedented development of Homo sapiens over the past 40,000 to 70,000 years. The recently completed mapping of the genome of the chimpanzee provides a new frame of reference that may speed the search.     

Theoretic Note: The Relation of Embryology to Linguistic and Cognitive Process

This paper is a conceptual essay that views the unfolding or individuation from the ovum to mind/brain form and process as the outcome of a unitary highly conserved pattern of epigenetic growth. The principle question concerns the extent to which the cognitive process can be understood as an extension or replication of primordial trends in the growth of organism. There are several lines of embryological study, some with a clear relation to cognitive process, others perhaps merely analogous, but there are sufficient data to support the claim that fundamental patterns in development recur in a momentary act of thought or perception. Indeed, the Bauplan that accounts for brain maturation at the cellular level accounts for the generation of the mind/brain state in maturity. The specification of cells in fetal brain growth corresponds with the progressive individuation of psychic structures in the course of early development. Growth trends in epigenetic process that translate the genetic code to morphology and physiology persist in the brain or psyche as patterns of mental process. Psychic structure is temporal, not spatial, and the structure of the mind/brain is ongoing formative process, not the resultant stabilities. One can say that in the brain, morphology is the form that process takes early in development, while brain function is the form process takes once structure is relatively settled. Put otherwise, morphogenesis first lays down form as structure, then lays down form as function (see Goodwin in J Theor Biol 97:43–55, 1982). The structure of the mind/brain is not a circuit board that outputs function, but is a recurrent activity that actualizes in behavior. Cognition is a mode of growth that is carried over from embryonic to adult life.     

Functionalism and type-type identity theories

Conclusion Token-token identity theorists do not and need not deny that it may frequently be the same (kind of) brain state which on different occasions fills the functional rôle definitive of a given mental state. That is not at issue. What is at issue is whether functionally-oriented identity theorists should make two claims or three claims.The two claims they customarily make are, first, that each instance of a mental state is an instance of a brain state, and, secondly, that being in a mental state is having in one a state filling the relevant functional rôle. But to be in a mental state is to have that state in one. To be in pain is to have pain, to desire water is to have desire for water, and so on; just as to be poisoned is to have poison in you. (It is to have what is poison for you at the time, of course; and likewise for pain, desire and so on.)Our paper has been about a third sort of claim — relating particularly not to being in a mental state, nor to instances of that state, but to the mental state itself. We have argued that functionally-oriented identity theorists can and should make, in addition to the first two claims, the third type-type identity claim that mental states are brain states. Consequently a token brain state is a token of pain in a derivative sense. What makes it a token of pain is that it is a token of the type of brain state which realizes the pain-rôle for the organism at the time.     

Evaluating the evidence for multiple realization

Consider what the brain-state theorist has to do to make good his claims. He has to specify a physical–chemical state such that any organism (not just a mammal) is in pain if and only if (a) it possesses a brain of suitable physical–chemical structure; and (b) its brain is in that physical–chemical state. This means that the physical–chemical state in question must be a possible state of a mammalian brain, a reptilian brain, a mollusc’s brain (octopuses are mollusca, and certainly feel pain), etc. At the same time, it must not be a possible (physically possible) state of the brain of any physically possible creature that cannot feel pain. Even if such a state can be found, it must be nomologically certain that it will also be a state of the brain of any extraterrestrial life that may be found that will be capable of feeling pain before we can even entertain the supposition that it may be pain. It is not altogether impossible that such a state will be found... . But this is certainly an ambitious hypothesis. (Putnam 1967/1975, p. 436)

The belief that mental states are multiply realized is now nearly universal among philosophers, as is the belief that this fact decisively refutes the identity theory. I argue that the empirical support for multiple realization does not justify the confidence that has been placed in it. In order for multiple realization of mental states to be an objection to the identity theory, the neurological differences among pains, for example, must be such as to guarantee that they are of distinct neurological kinds. But the phenomena traditionally cited do not provide evidence of that sort of variation. In particular, examples of neural plasticity do not provide such evidence.     

Spontaneous performance of wild baboons on three novel food-access puzzles

Although the technical problem-solving expertise of nonhuman primates has been investigated extensively in captivity, few species have been tested in their natural habitats. Here I examine the physical cognition of wild savanna baboons (Papio anubis), a species that occupies an omnivorous foraging niche in which a variety of embedded food items are extracted and processed. Baboons were tested on three puzzles, each involving high-quality food that required removal from a novel obstruction: (1) a string-pulling puzzle in which food was hung from tree branches, (2) a twig-dipping puzzle in which food was embedded in a vertical tube, and (3) a stick-pushing puzzle in which food was contained in a horizontal conduit. The baboons failed to solve the second and third puzzles even when tools had been appropriately positioned in advance. And although they solved the first puzzle, their actions (running while holding food that was still attached to the string), suggested they did not fully comprehend the string’s connective property. The baboons’ performance might reflect the time constraints of life in the wild, which relative to captivity may provide fewer opportunities for the development of understanding about the physical properties of objects and their potential uses as tools. Further experiments on the physical cognition of baboons and many other primate species in their natural habitats would help test this ontogenetic hypothesis. Such field experiments would be especially fruitful if they continued to target extractive foragers like baboons: these experiments could simultaneously provide a test of phylogenetic hypotheses that invoke extractive foraging as the key stimulus for brain expansion in savanna-dwelling hominids. Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.     

Programing of the goal-directed behavior and association systems of the brain

The organism functions in surroundings which are organized according to probability and determine the development of the ability for probabilistic prognosis of goal-directed performance. Probabilistic programing of behavior is assumed to be based on dominant motivation, previous experience (genetic and ontogenetic), and the estimation of the current situation as stored in short-term memory. Association thalamocortical systems of the brain appear to possess basic structural-functional requisites to evaluate their role in the mechanisms of probabilistic prognosis. A hypothetical diagram is given to illustrate the functional structure of a goal-directed behavior based on the dominant mechanisms.     

Self–Other Relations in Biodiversity Conservation in the Community: Representational Processes and Adjustment to New Actions

This research explores the simultaneous role of two Self–Other relations in the elaboration of representations at the micro‐ and ontogenetic levels, assuming that it can result in acceptance and/or resistance to new laws. Drawing on the Theory of Social Representations, it concretely looks at how individuals elaborate new representations relevant for biodiversity conservation in the context of their relations with their local community (an interactional Other) and with the legal/reified sphere (an institutional Other). This is explored in two studies in Portuguese Natura 2000 sites where a conservation project calls residents to protect an at‐risk species. Study 1 shows that (i) agreement with the institutional Other (the laws) and meta‐representations of the interactional Other (the community) as approving of conservation independently help explain (at the ontogenetic level) internalisation of conservation goals and willingness to act; (ii) the same meta‐representations operating at the micro‐genetic level attenuate the negative relation between ambivalence and willingness to act. Study 2 shows that a meta‐representation of the interactional Other as showing no clear position regarding conservation increases ambivalence. Findings demonstrate the necessarily social nature of representational processes and the importance of considering them at more than one level for understanding responses to new policy/legal proposals. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Rethinking Neuroethics in the Light of the Extended Mind Thesis

The extended mind thesis is the claim that mental states extend beyond the skulls of the agents whose states they are. This seemingly obscure and bizarre claim has far-reaching implications for neuroethics, I argue. In the first half of this article, I sketch the extended mind thesis and defend it against criticisms. In the second half, I turn to its neuroethical implications. I argue that the extended mind thesis entails the falsity of the claim that interventions into the brain are especially problematic just because they are internal interventions, but that many objections to such interventions rely, at least in part, on this claim. Further, I argue that the thesis alters the focus of neuroethics, away from the question of whether we ought to allow interventions into the mind, and toward the question of which interventions we ought to allow and under what conditions. The extended mind thesis dramatically expands the scope of neuroethics: because interventions into the environment of agents can count as interventions into their minds, decisions concerning such interventions become questions for neuroethics.     

Different early rearing experiences have long‐term effects on cortical organization in captive chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)

Consequences of rearing history in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) have been explored in relation to behavioral abnormalities and cognition; however, little is known about the effects of rearing conditions on anatomical brain development. Human studies have revealed that experiences of maltreatment and neglect during infancy and childhood can have detrimental effects on brain development and cognition. In this study, we evaluated the effects of early rearing experience on brain morphology in 92 captive chimpanzees (ages 11–43) who were either reared by their mothers (n = 46) or in a nursery (n = 46) with age‐group peers. Magnetic resonance brain images were analyzed with a processing program (BrainVISA) that extracts cortical sulci. We obtained various measurements from 11 sulci located throughout the brain, as well as whole brain gyrification and white and grey matter volumes. We found that mother‐reared chimpanzees have greater global white‐to‐grey matter volume, more cortical folding and thinner grey matter within the cortical folds than nursery‐reared animals. The findings reported here are the first to demonstrate that differences in early rearing conditions have significant consequences on brain morphology in chimpanzees and suggests potential differences in the development of white matter expansion and myelination.     

Introspection and perception

Sydney Shoemaker argues that introspection, unlike perception, provides no identification information about the self, and that knowledge of one's mental states should be conceived as arising in a direct and unmediated fashion from one's being in those states. I argue that while one does not identify aself as the subject of one's states, one does frequently identify and misidentify thestates, in ways analogous to the identification of objects in perception, and that in discourse about one's mental states the self plays the role of external reality in discourse about physical objects. Discourse about any sort of entity or property can be viewed as involving a domain or frame of reference which constrains what can be said about the entities; this view is related to Johnson-Laird's theory of mental models. On my approach evidence, including sensory evidence, may be involved in decisions about one's mental states. I conclude that while Shoemaker may well be right about different roles for sense impressions in introspection and perception, the exact differences and their significance remain to be established.     

Does any aspect of mind survive brain damage that typically leads to a persistent vegetative state? Ethical considerations

Recent neuroscientific evidence brings into question the conclusion that all aspects of consciousness are gone in patients who have descended into a persistent vegetative state (PVS). Here we summarize the evidence from human brain imaging as well as neurological damage in animals and humans suggesting that some form of consciousness can survive brain damage that commonly causes PVS. We also raise the issue that neuroscientific evidence indicates that raw emotional feelings (primary-process affects) can exist without any cognitive awareness of those feelings. Likewise, the basic brain mechanisms for thirst and hunger exist in brain regions typically not damaged by PVS. If affective feelings can exist without cognitive awareness of those feelings, then it is possible that the instinctual emotional actions and pain "reflexes" often exhibited by PVS patients may indicate some level of mentality remaining in PVS patients. Indeed, it is possible such raw affective feelings are intensified when PVS patients are removed from life-supports. They may still experience a variety of primary-process affective states that could constitute forms of suffering. If so, withdrawal of life-support may violate the principle of nonmaleficence and be tantamount to inflicting inadvertent "cruel and unusual punishment" on patients whose potential distress, during the process of dying, needs to be considered in ethical decision-making about how such individuals should be treated, especially when their lives are ended by termination of life-supports. Medical wisdom may dictate the use of more rapid pharmacological forms of euthanasia that minimize distress than the de facto euthanasia of life-support termination that may lead to excruciating feelings of pure thirst and other negative affective feelings in the absence of any reflective awareness.     

On Traumatically Skewed Intersubjectivity

ABSTRACT

Beginning with his Interpersonal World of the Infant (1985), Daniel Stern suggested that the infant is driven from birth to connect intersubjectively with his caregivers. By the final three months of the first year of life, as the infant begins to use protodeclarative pointing and jointly attends to the outer world, he also begins to jointly attend with his caregiver to their respective intrapsychic worlds, the mental states of his caregiver and himself. Clinically, analysts observe at this crucial point of development of secondary intersubjectivity mothers who, more often than not, respond only selectively and often unpredictably to their infants. In many instances, this may be motivated out of a mother’s own need for regulation of emotion and arousal as we have shown in our empirical research. This article elaborates on clinical observations that, for the infant or young child to feel his traumatized mother’s affective presence, he must try to enter mother’s state of mind, while simultaneously, mother is seeking to self-regulate in the wake or the revival of trauma-associated memory traces, this at the expense of mutual regulation of emotion and arousal. We call this phenomenon traumatically skewed intersubjectivity. We find that children coconstruct with their traumatized mothers a new, shared traumatic experience by virtue of the toddler’s efforts to share an intersubjective experience with a mother who is acting in response to posttraumatic reexperiencing. The problem is that the infant or young child has no point of reference to decipher the traumatized mother’s social communication. And so, what is enacted leads to a new, shared traumatic event. Both the child’s anxiety and aggression can, in this setting, easily become dysregulated, further triggering mother’s anxiety and avoidance, leading thus to a vicious cycle that contributes to intergenerational transmission of trauma. Clinical examples and implications for psychoanalytically-oriented parent-infant psychotherapy will be discussed.     

A.R. Luria's role in the development of soviet psychology

Summary A.R. Luria is one of the most outstanding Soviet psychologists. He played a great role in the development of Soviet psychology and in the formulation of psychological problems on the basis of dialectical materialism. Together with L.S. Vygotskij and A.N. Leont'ev, he put forward a theory of the socio-historical genesis of higher, specifically human, mental functions. Luria carried out numerous investigations into the ontogenetic and historical development of these functions, as well as their disturbance with local brain lesions. As the founder, in the Soviet Union, of the new discipline of neuropsychology, he made a very significant contribution to the study of the cerebral mechanisms of mental activity.Originally published in Voprosy Psichologii 28 (4), 106–115 (1978), and translated by E. Scheerer. The translator gratefully acknowledges the help of Eunice and Josef Broek and Sonia Argyle