Automaticity and preattentive processing.

The characteristics of automatized performance resemble those of preattentive processing in some respects. In the context of visual search tasks, these include spatially parallel processing, involuntary calling of attention, learning without awareness, and time-sharing with other tasks. However, this article reports some evidence suggesting that extended practice produces its effects through different mechanisms from those that underlie preattentive processing. The dramatic changes in search rate seem to depend not on the formation of new preattentive detectors for the task-relevant stimuli, nor on learned abstracted procedures for responding quickly and efficiently, but rather on changes that are very specific both to the particular stimuli and to the particular task used in practice. We suggest that the improved performance may depend on the accumulation of separate memory traces for each individual experience of a display (see Logan, 1988), and we show that the traces differ for conjunction search in which stimuli must be individuated and for feature search where a global response to the display is sufficient.     

Automaticity in clinical psychology.

The authors provide an overview of the literature on the ability of response expectancies to elicit automatic responses in the form of self-fulfilling prophecies and link it to the broader psychological investigation of automatic processes. The authors review 3 areas of research in which response expectancies have been shown to affect experience, behavior, and physiology: placebo effects, the effects of false biofeedback on sexual arousal, and the alteration of perceptual and cognitive functions by hypnotic and nonhypnotic suggestion. Also reviewed are data suggesting that all behavior, including novel and intentional behavior, is initiated automatically. Following this review, the authors summarize some of the ways in which knowledge of response expectancy effects and other automatic processes that influence experience and behavior can enhance clinical practice.     

Automaticity and the detection of speech

The development of automatic perceptual responses to speech stimuli was examined. In the first experiment, phoneme-monitoring performance for speech syllables was examined under conditions in which stimulus-to-response mapping and memory load were manipulated. The results indicated that automaticity develops under consistent-mapping conditions. In the second experiment, a dual-task procedure was combined with mapping and selective attention manipulations in order to examine the development of automaticity across single- and multiple-channel conditions. The results indicated that performance under consistently mapped training conditions was interfered with by dividing attention across multiple channels of input. It is concluded that there may be differences in the way that automaticity develops across visual and auditory modalities and that these differences need to be examined more closely.     

Educated intuitions. Automaticity and rationality in moral judgement

Moral judgements are based on automatic processes. Moral judgements are based on reason. In this paper, I argue that both of these claims are true, and show how they can be reconciled. Neither the automaticity of moral judgement nor the post hoc nature of conscious moral reasoning pose a threat to rationalist models of moral cognition. The relation moral reasoning bears to our moral judgements is not primarily mediated by episodes of conscious reasoning, but by the acquisition, formation and maintenance – in short: education – of our moral intuitions.     

Habitual Virtuous Actions and Automaticity

Dual process theorists in psychology maintain that the mind’s workings can be explained in terms of conscious or controlled processes and automatic processes. Automatic processes are largely nonconscious, that is, triggered by environmental stimuli without the agent’s conscious awareness or deliberation. Automaticity researchers contend that even higher level habitual social behaviors can be nonconsciously primed. This article brings work on automaticity to bear on our understanding of habitual virtuous actions. After examining a recent intuitive account of habitual actions and habitual virtuous actions, the author offers her own explanation in terms of goal-dependent automaticity. This form of automaticity provides an account of habitual virtuous actions that explains the sense in which these actions are rational, that is, done for reasons. Habitual virtuous actions are rational in the sense of being purposive or goal-directed and are essentially linked with the agent’s psychological states. Unlike deliberative virtuous actions, the agent’s reasons for habitual virtuous actions are not present to her conscious awareness at the time of acting.

Automaticity and interference in bilinguals

Summary In an experimental study with 40 English-German and 40 German-Swedish bilingual high school students, automaticity and interference were analyzed on the basis of Shiffrin and Schneider's theory of controlled and automatic processing. Confirming the assumptions inferred from the theory, dominant bilinguals reacted significantly faster to pictured objects in their dominant language than did balanced bilinguals in either of their two languages. Interaction effects with frequency indicated less experience with rare words in the balanced groups. Matched on the basis of reaction time scores, the balanced groups continued to show a higher error rate in recall, but not in recognition when compared with the dominant groups. It was concluded that training alone could not account for the differences in recall. A congenitally determined mental speed factor was suggested for which the theory makes no direct commitment. The strong interrelation between automaticity and interference was shown; their significance for bilinguals in highly speeded and unstructured tasks was also shown. The results reveal high cross-cultural consistency.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 3rd Nordic Symposium on Bilingualism, held in Umea, Sweden, June 4 to 5, 1980     

Automaticity in rule-based and information-integration categorization

Three experiments studied the effects of category structure on the development of categorization automaticity. In Experiment 1, participants were each trained for over 10,000 trials in a simple categorization task with one of three category structures. Results showed that after the first few sessions, there were no significant behavioral differences between participants who learned rule-based versus information-integration category structures. Experiment 2 showed that switching the locations of the response keys after automaticity had developed caused a similar highly significant interference, regardless of category structure. In Experiment 3, a simultaneous dual task that engaged executive functions did not interfere with either rule-based or information-integration categorization. These novel results are consistent with a theory assuming separate processing pathways for initial rule-based and information-integration category learning but a common processing pathway after the development of automaticity.     

Activation and Automaticity of Colonial Mentality

Among Filipino Americans, colonial mentality (CM) is characterized by automatic preference for anything American and automatic rejection of anything Filipino that may be manifested overtly and covertly. Thus, 3 studies were conducted to test CM's theorized covertness and automaticity. Study 1 attempted to activate and capture the existence of CM‐consistent cultural knowledge schemas; Study 2 investigated whether CM may be automatically activated using a lexical decision task; and Study 3 tested whether Filipino Americans have associated pleasantness with anything American, and unpleasantness with anything Filipino using the Implicit Association Test. The results suggest that many Filipino Americans hold a CM‐consistent cultural knowledge schema, and that CM may be conceptualized as a set of automatic associations that cannot be consciously controlled.     

Experiments on the Automaticity of Political Beliefs and Attitudes

Political science has long relied on explicit responses in order to understand what and how people think. New research in the cognitive sciences suggests that this reliance on conscious considerations provides but a partial picture of how citizens think and reason. Given the limitations of conscious working memory and the growing evidence that much of human cognition occurs outside of awareness, the defining empirical assumption of modern public opinion research—that citizens can tell us what is on their minds—seems increasingly suspect. Moreover, social science is particularly challenged by the sensitivity of their topics, which in turn raises social and personal desirability concerns about self-report data. In order to overcome these limitations, we propose an implicit experimental approach. We contend that implicit measures enable us to measure some of the automatic and affective responses and predispositions that influence thoughts and behaviors outside of conscious awareness.     

Aging and the Development of Automaticity in Feature Search

A training experiment was conducted to investigate age differences in the learning that occurs when observers search for an orientation-defined target among a homogeneous set of distractors (i.e., feature search). Eighteen young (M age = 26 years) and seventeen old (M age = 62 years) participants completed seven practice sessions (3,024 trials), followed by a single session of full reversal. Training involved consistent mapping, varied mapping, or nonsearch, in which a precue predicted the target location with 100% validity. Younger and older observers demonstrated equivalent learning rates and equivalent disruption following reversal in all training conditions. Results are interpreted within models of visual attention and search.     

Automaticity: a theoretical and conceptual analysis

Several theoretical views of automaticity are discussed. Most of these suggest that automaticity should be diagnosed by looking at the presence of features such as unintentional, uncontrolled/uncontrollable, goal independent, autonomous, purely stimulus driven, unconscious, efficient, and fast. Contemporary views further suggest that these features should be investigated separately. The authors examine whether features of automaticity can be disentangled on a conceptual level, because only then is the separate investigation of them worth the effort. They conclude that the conceptual analysis of features is to a large extent feasible. Not all researchers agree with this position, however. The authors show that assumptions of overlap among features are determined by the other researchers' views of automaticity and by the models they endorse for information processing in general.     

Automaticity and the Amygdala: Nonconscious Responses to Emotional Faces

The human face is an evolved adaptation for social communication. This implies that humans are genetically prepared to produce facial gestures that are automatically decoded by observers. Psychophysiological data demonstrate that humans respond automatically with their facial muscles, with autonomic responses, and with specific regional brain activation of the amygdala when exposed to emotionally expressive faces. Attention is preferentially and automatically oriented toward facial threat. Neuropsychological data, as well as a rapidly expanding brain-imaging literature, implicate the amygdala as a central structure for responding to negative emotional faces, and particularly to fearful ones. However, the amygdala may not be specialized for processing emotional faces, but may instead respond to faces because they provide important information for the defense appraisal that is its primary responsibility.     

Automaticity and the capture of attention by a peripheral display change

The proposal that peripheral visual changes (cues) tend to summon attention automatically was tested by studying the effect of peripheral cueing on simple detection latency. Delay between cue onset and target onset, the contingent relationship between cue location and target location, and instructions to subjects were manipulated. Results showed that a peripheral display change could capture attention even when the target was far more likely to appear at an uncued location. When subjects were explicitly informed that targets were likely to appear away from the cued location they were able to suppress this effect, but were unable completely to reverse it by rapidly orienting attention towards the uncued side. Hence the process appears to be automatic in the sense that it occurs unless there are explicit instructions to the contrary. With explicit instructions the processing operation can be suppressed, but not completely reversed. This work was supported by the U.K. Admiralty Research Establishment (Research Agreement No. 53482).     

Toward an Integration of Goal Setting Theory and the Automaticity Model

Two laboratory experiments were conducted to assess the extent to which goal setting theory explains the effects of goals that are primed in the subconscious on task performance. The first experiment examined the effect on performance of three primes that connote the difficulty levels of a goal in the subconscious. Participants (n = 91) were randomly assigned to one of three conditions where they were primed with either a photograph of a person lifting 20 pounds (easy goal), 200 pounds (moderately difficult goal), or 400 pounds (difficult goal). Following a filler task, participants were asked to “press as hard as you can” on a digital weight scale. Participants who were primed with the difficult goal exerted more effort than those who were primed with the moderate or easy goal. The second experiment examined whether choice of goal difficulty level can be primed. Participants (n = 133) were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. Those primed with a difficult goal consciously chose to set a more difficult goal on a brainstorming task than those who were primed with an easier goal. Similarly, their performance was significantly higher. Conscientiousness moderated the subconscious goal–performance relationship while the self‐set conscious goal partially mediated the subconscious goal–performance relationship.     

Automaticity versus timesharing in timing and tracking dual-task performance

Two experiments investigated the interfering effects of a manual tracking task on timing performance. Subjects generated a series of 5-s temporal productions under control (timing only) and experimental (timing + pursuit rotor tracking) conditions. Timing was more variable under experimental conditions, a finding consistent with attentional models which argue that timing tasks compete with concurrent distractor tasks for limited processing resources. A pretest-posttest paradigm was employed to evaluate the hypothesis that practice on the tracking task would lessen its attentional demands and thereby attenuate the interference effect. Experiment 1 involved single-task practice (tracking alone). Single-task practice leads to automaticity, the ability to perform a skilled task using fewer processing resources. Pretest-posttest comparisons showed that such practice reduced interference in timing. Experiment 2 involved dual-task practice (timing + tracking). Dual-task practice promotes the development of timesharing, the ability to efficiently switch attention between multiple tasks. In this case, practice failed to reduce the interference effect in timing. The results suggest that effective strategies for timing in dual-task situations must allow one to closely monitor the ongoing flow of temporal events. Received: 11 November 1996 / Accepted: 6 May 1997     

Driving on familiar roads: Automaticity and inattention blindness

This paper describes our research into the processes that govern driver attention and behavior in familiar, well-practiced situations. The experiment examined the effects of extended practice on inattention blindness and detection of changes to the driving environment in a high-fidelity driving simulator. Participants were paid to drive a simulated road regularly over 3 months of testing. A range of measures, including detection task performance and driving performance, were collected over the course of 20 sessions. Performance from a yoked Control Group who experienced the same road scenarios in a single session was also measured. The data showed changes in what drivers reported noticing indicative of inattention blindness, and declining ratings of mental demand suggesting that many participants were “driving without awareness”. Extended practice also resulted in increased sensitivity for detecting changes to road features associated with vehicle guidance and improved performance on an embedded vehicle detection task (detection of a specific vehicle type). The data provide new light on a “tandem model” of driver behavior that includes both explicit and implicit processes involved in driving performance. The findings also suggest reasons drivers are most likely to crash at locations very near their homes.     

儿童空间观点采择的自动性及其发展

使用空间观点采择任务,探究7~11岁儿童的空间观点采择的自动性和发展趋势。结果发现：（1）在他人任务中,正确率随着角度的增长而减小;（2）在自我任务中,相比于空间关系不一致时,一致时的正确率更高,且反向的一致性效应出现在150°~180°间。本研究结果显示：本项空间观点采择任务对儿童有效;7~9岁的儿童可以自动进行空间转换;11岁的儿童可以自动进行需要判断左右位置的空间观点采择。本研究首次证明,11岁是儿童自动进行需要判断左右位置的空间观点采择的相对年龄转折点。