Can Counterfactuals Really Be about Possible Worlds?

The standard view about counterfactuals is that a counterfactual (A > C) is true if and only if the A‐worlds most similar to the actual world @ are C‐worlds. I argue that the worlds conception of counterfactuals is wrong. I assume that counterfactuals have non‐trivial truth‐values under physical determinism. I show that the possible‐worlds approach cannot explain many embeddings of the form (P > (Q > R)), which intuitively are perfectly assertable, and which must be true if the contingent falsity of (Q > R) is to be explained. If (P > (Q > R)) has a backtracking reading then the contingent facts that (Q > R) needs to be true in the closest P‐worlds are absent. If (P > (Q > R)) has a forwardtracking reading, then the laws required by (Q > R) to be true in the closest P‐worlds will be absent, because they are violated in those worlds. Solutions like lossy laws or denial of embedding won't work. The only approach to counterfactuals that explains the embedding is a pragmatic metalinguistic approach in which the whole idea that counterfactuals are about a modal reality, be it abstract or concrete, is given up.     

Can Levinson's Intentional‐Historical Definition of Art Accommodate Revolutionary Art?

In this article, I examine whether Jerrold Levinson's intentional‐historical definition of art can successfully accommodate revolutionary art. For Levinson, an item is art if it was intended to be regarded as some prior art was regarded. But revolutionary art involves a regard that is “completely distinct” from preexisting art regards. I consider and reject Levinson's proposed solutions to the problem of accommodating revolutionary art. I then defend an alternative account of transgressive art regard. Unfortunately for the intentional‐historical definition, the acceptance of transgressive art regard in conjunction with some recent theories of the development of human behavioral modernity may commit the definition to including nonart, prehistoric tools.     

Can the Simultaneous Experience of Opposing Emotions Really Occur?

Various investigators have proposed that people may feel simultaneous positive and negative affect. However, experimental evidence from tests of a recent theory about the intensity of emotion (J. W. Brehm, 1999) suggests that even when they are invited by the experimental design, positive and negative emotions do not occur at the same time. When people have been instigated to feel a particular emotion, such as happiness, and then are given a reason (e.g., sad news) for not feeling happy, they report continued happiness but no increase in sadness unless the reason for feeling sad is very great, in which case sadness replaces happiness. The present paper briefly reviews the underlying theory and evidence, and discusses implications.

Can SMART Training Really Increase Intelligence? A Replication Study

A burgeoning research stream supports the efficacy of a novel behavior-analytic intervention, known as SMART training, in raising general intelligence by training a set of crucial cognitive skills, referred to as relational skills. A sample of Irish secondary school students (n?=?26) was divided into two IQ matched groups, with the experimental group receiving 12 weeks of SMART training delivered in bi-weekly 45-min sessions. WASI IQ assessments were administered at baseline and follow-up to all participants by blind testers. For each of the three WASI IQ indices and the four IQ subtests, significant follow-up rises were found for the experimental group only. Analyses of variance indicated a significant effect of training on Verbal IQ, Matrix Reasoning and Vocabulary scores. Results lend further support for the efficacy of the SMART training program in enhancing intellectual skills.     

End of 2016: Can We Save Research from Predators in 2017?

At the beginning of every year, we expect to see worthwhile improvements on the past. The end of 2016 showcased many important issues in the scientific world, ranging from criticisms of research misconduct and fraud to the introduction of new scientometrics. Despite the scientific community’s continuing efforts, predatory journals and publishers are still on the rise, and the Beall’s list calls attention to the need to take a firm action across the board. This short opinion piece highlights research conducted by the scholarly community on research publication predators during 2016, and offers suggestions as to how to bring about future improvements.     

Can We Really Have It All? The Attainment of Work and Family Values

We discuss the role values and value attainment play in the complex and dynamic process of balancing work and family demands. We contend that an individual experiences conflict between work and family demands because of value incongruence between that individual and a pivotal family member (i.e., lack of value similarity) or because of the incongruent values between that individual and the organization (i.e., lack of value congruence). We further argue that work-family conflict leads to job and life dissatisfaction for individuals because this conflict frustrates the attainment of important work and family values. We develop and propose a conceptual model, capturing both work and family values as they relate to work-family conflict, value attainment, and outcomes.     

Is Relativism Really Self-Refuting?

Philosophical Studies -     

Is Stand-Up Comedy Art?

Stand-up so closely resembles—and is meant to resemble—the styles and expectations of everyday speech that the idea of technique and technical mastery we typically associate with art is almost rendered invisible. Technique and technical mastery is as much about the understanding and development of audiences as collaborators as it is the generation of material. Doing so requires encountering audiences in places that by custom or design encourage ludic and vernacular talk—social spaces and third spaces such as bars, coffee houses, and clubs. Cultivating uncultivated speech and cultivating real audiences in found settings form the background of developing the stand-up comedian, neither of which lend themselves to the conservatory tradition we think of when we think of the development of artists. This article addresses two areas of the overall question of stand-up as art, starting with the ontological question of stand-up comedy: if it is an art where is it located, and what we may mean by “artworks” and “artworld” in stand-up comedy? Then I consider whether stand-up comedy as practiced can be reconciled with several recent definitions for art and note some of the special conditions and contexts for stand-up.     

Aesthetic Testimony: What Can We Learn from Others about Beauty and Art?1

The thesis that aesthetic testimony cannot provide aesthetic justification or knowledge is widely accepted–even by realists about aesthetic properties and values. This Kantian position is mistaken. Some testimony about beauty and artistic value can provide a degree of aesthetic justification and, perhaps, even knowledge. That is, there are cases in which one can be justified in making an aesthetic judgment purely on the basis of someone else's testimony. But widespread aesthetic unreliability creates a problem for much aesthetic testimony. Hence, most testimony about art does not have much epistemic value. The situation is somewhat different with respect to aesthetic testimony about nature, proofs, and theories. And yet he realizes clearly that other people's approval in no way provides him with a valid proof by which to judge beauty; even though others may perhaps see and observe for him, and even though what many have seen the same way may serve him, who believes he saw it differently, as a sufficient basis of proof for a theoretical and hence logical judgment, yet the fact that others have liked something can never serve him as a basis for an aesthetic judgment. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment     

Is There Really Mental Disorder?

Proponents of the reality of mental disorder claim that mental disorder is ontologically real in the same sense that the variola virus and smallpox are ontologically real. The chief architect of the DSM-III revolution, Robert Spitzer (Zimmerman & Spitzer, 2005 Zimmerman , M. , & Spitzer , R. , L. ( 2005 ). Psychiatric classification . In B. J. Sadock & V. A. Sadock (Eds.), Comprehensive textbook of psychiatry (pp. 1003 – 1033 ). Philadelphia , PA : Lippincott, Williams, and Wilkins . [Google Scholar]), candidly admits that a diagnosis of primary mental disorder present must be arbitrary because the distress or social impairment under consideration could well be a normal-range reaction to stressful events. Based on Jerome Wakefield's harmful dysfunction thesis, Spitzer hopes that research in evolutionary psychology can solve the perennial “false positive” problem in psychiatric diagnosis. Interestingly, in 1988 Wakefield , J. ( 1988 ). Hermeneutics and empiricism . In S. B. Messer , L. A. Sass & R. L. Woolfolk (Eds.), Hermeneutics and psychological theory (pp. 131 – 150 ). New Brunswick , CT : Rutgers University Press . [Google Scholar] Wakefield argued that the study of meaning (i.e., human behavior and the products of human behavior, such as art and literature) could not be assimilated to empiricism (science), but evidently he subsequently changed his mind. The present paper sides with the 1988 Wakefield , J. ( 1988 ). Hermeneutics and empiricism . In S. B. Messer , L. A. Sass & R. L. Woolfolk (Eds.), Hermeneutics and psychological theory (pp. 131 – 150 ). New Brunswick , CT : Rutgers University Press . [Google Scholar] Wakefield. It is an illusion to hope that research in evolutionary psychology will reveal how people are supposed to react to stressful events and thereby rescue psychiatric diagnosis from the false positive problem. The identification of mental disorder will remain akin to the identification of pornography, i.e., a case of reification based on interpretation and moral reasoning. The fiction that mental disorder is real turns attention away from past and present conditions of living. This may serve some interests, but it is not likely to serve the patient's interests.     

How Really Real Is Real?

This paper takes issue with a number of family therapists who appear to hold that reality is entirely constructed out of our beliefs and that different views of reality can only be discriminated between on the basis of their usefulness for a particular purpose. Rather this paper argues for a co-constructivist position, that is, that the knower's beliefs and constructs are in an interpenetrating relationship with reality and that different views of reality can be discriminated between on the basis of their adequacy in describing that reality and that it is this adequacy that will determine their usefulness. These issues are not just of theoretical interest but have important implications for the practice of therapy.     

Can Young Children Distinguish Abstract Expressionist Art From Superficially Similar Works by Preschoolers and Animals?

While it is sometimes claimed that abstract art requires little skill and is indistinguishable from the scribbles of young children, recent research has shown that even adults with no training in art can distinguish works by abstract expressionists from superficially similar works by children and even elephants, monkeys, and apes (Hawley-Dolan & Winner, 2011). We presented 4-7- and 8-10-year-olds with 18 paired images, one in each pair by an abstract expressionist and the other by a child or animal, and asked which they preferred and which was better. Each participant viewed the first third of the pairs unlabeled and the rest either with correct or reversed labels (artist, and child, monkey, or elephant). Three unexpected findings emerged. First, even 4-7-year-olds can distinguish works by artists from superficially similar works by children and animals when there are no labels to guide them. Second, children’s aesthetic responses are not aligned with those of adults: children often chose works labeled child or animal whether or not this label was correct, and sometimes justified their choices by crediting the effort the child or animal had made (e.g., “it’s really good for an elephant”). Finally, children, like adults, were more likely to select artist images when making quality judgments than when indicating preferences, showing that they make a distinction between intuitive preference responses and more cognitive quality judgment responses. That even preschoolers can discriminate between works by abstract expressionists and works by children and animals underscores what is wrong with the oft-heard statement, “My kid could have done that.”