The basis of shared intentions in human and robot cognition

There is a fundamental difference between robots that are equipped with sensory, motor and cognitive capabilities, vs. simulations or non-embodied cognitive systems. Via their perceptual and motor capabilities, these robotic systems can interact with humans in an increasingly more “natural” way, physically interacting with shared objects in cooperative action settings. Indeed, such cognitive robotic systems provide a unique opportunity to developmental psychologists for implementing their theories and testing their hypotheses on systems that are becoming increasingly “at home” in the sensory--motor and social worlds, where such hypotheses are relevant. The current research is the result of interaction between research in computational neuroscience and robotics on the one hand, and developmental psychology on the other. One of the key findings in the developmental psychology context is that with respect to other primates, humans appear to have a unique ability and motivation to share goals and intentions with others. This ability is expressed in cooperative behavior very early in life, and appears to be the basis for subsequent development of social cognition. Here we attempt to identify a set of core functional elements of cooperative behavior and the corresponding shared intentional representations. We then begin to specify how these capabilities can be implemented in a robotic system, the Cooperator, and tested in human–robot interaction experiments. Based on the results of these experiments we discuss the mutual benefit for both fields of the interaction between robotics and developmental psychology.     

Collaboration in young children

Humans accomplish much of what they do in collaboration with others. In ontogeny, children's earliest abilities to collaborate develop in two basic steps. First, 1- and 2-year-olds learn to form with others joint goals and joint attention--which include an understanding of the individual roles and perspectives involved. Second, as they approach their third birthdays, children's collaborative interactions with others take on a more normative dimension involving obligations to the partner. In addition, their cognitive abilities to conceptualize simultaneously both their own role and perspective along with those of the other develop considerably as well. This form of collaborative interaction is underlain by species-unique skills and motivations for shared intentionality that make possible, ultimately, such things as complex cultural institutions.     

Triadic interactions support infants’ emerging understanding of intentional actions

Infants’ understanding of the intentional nature of human action develops gradually across the first year of life. A key question is what mechanisms drive changes in this foundational social‐cognitive ability. The current studies explored the hypothesis that triadic interactions in which infants coordinate attention between a social partner and an object of mutual interest promote infants’ developing understanding of others as intentional agents. Infants’ spontaneous tendency to participate in triadic engagement was assessed in a semi‐structured play session with a researcher. Intentional action understanding was assessed by evaluating infants’ ability to visually predict the goal of an intentional reaching action. Study 1 (N = 88) revealed that 8‐ to 9‐month‐olds who displayed more bouts of triadic engagement showed better concurrent reasoning about the goal of an intentional reaching action. Study 2 (N = 114) confirmed these findings using a longitudinal design and demonstrated that infants who displayed more bouts of triadic engagement at 6–7 months were better at prospectively reasoning about the goal of an intentional reaching action 3 months later. Cross‐lagged path analyses revealed that intentional action understanding at 6–7 months did not predict later triadic engagement, suggesting that early triadic engagement supports later intentional action processing and not the other way around. Finally, evidence from both studies revealed the unique contribution of triadic over dyadic forms of engagement. These results highlight the importance of social interaction as a developmental mechanism and suggest that infants enrich their understanding of intentionality through triadic interactions with social partners.     

Intentional action arises from early reciprocal exchanges

Intentionality is defined as the cognitive ability to represent goals beyond the here and now of perception. First signs of intentionality appear by the second month after birth. A major mechanism responsible for such development might be the unique reciprocal and intentional ways humans communicate with each other, particularly their young progenies. I argue that starting in the second month, reciprocal exchanges, affective mirroring, and mutual imitations with others provide infants with the unique opportunity to differentiate as well as to compare and conjugate first (self) and third (others') person perspectives. This ability is a prerequisite not only for referential communication but also of intentionality. It corresponds to the emergence of a new contemplative and "meta" stance toward the world. An argument is made that the developmental origins of this stance are primarily social, not to be found in the individual infant interacting solely with physical objects.     

ANTISTRUCTURE AND THE ROOTS OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

The cognitive and evolutionary sciences of religion offer a standard model of religious representations, but no equivalent paradigm for investigating religiously interpreted altered states of consciousness (religious ASCs). Here, I describe a neo-Durkheimian framework for studying religious ASCs that centralizes social predictive cognition. Within a processual model of ritual, ritual behaviors toggle between reinforcing normative social structures and downplaying them. Specifically, antistructural ritual shifts cognitive focus away from conventional affordances, collective intentionality, and social prediction, and toward physical affordances and behavioral motivations that make few references to others’ intentional states. Using synchrony and dance as paradigmatic examples of antistructural ritual that stimulate religious ASCs, I assemble literature from anthropology, cognitive neuroscience, and philosophy of language to offer fruitful empirical predictions and opportunities for testing based on this framework. Among the empirical predictions is that antistructural ritual may provide for cultural change in religions when religions are construed as complex adaptive systems.     

Prospects of enactivist approaches to intentionality and cognition

We discuss various implications of some radical anti-representationalist views of cognition and what they have to offer with regard to the naturalization of intentionality and the explanation of cognitive phenomena. Our focus is on recent arguments from proponents of enactive views of cognition to the effect that basic cognition is intentional but not representational and that cognition is co-extensive with life. We focus on lower rather than higher forms of cognition, namely the question regarding the intentional and representational nature of cognition found in organisms simpler than human beings, because enactivists do not deny that more sophisticated cognitive phenomena are representational and involve content. After introducing the debate on the naturalization of intentionality (Sect. 2), we briefly review different varieties of enactivism and introduce their central claims (Sect. 3). In Sect. 4 we turn to radical enactivism in order to focus on the arguments for a thoroughly non-representational, enactive account of perception and basic cognition. In particular, we discuss three major issues: First, what is supposed to replace the representational analysis of perception in a radical-enactive explanation of perception? How does the enactive explanation of perception compare to the best scientific work on the neuroscience of perception? Second, what is—on an enactive account—the function of neural processing in the brain for the generation of perception if not to produce representations? This question is especially pressing since one implication of autopoietic enactivism (accepted by radical enactivists) is that even the simplest organisms, i.e. single-celled organisms, have cognitive capacities (Sect. 5). Since they lack brains and nervous systems, enactivists must specify the (possibly) unique contribution of the brain and nervous system in those animals who have them. In Sect. 5, we evaluate the advantages of an autopoietic–enactive approach to the naturalization of intentionality and end with a suggestion how cognition may relate to intentionality and representation.

     

Explaining early moral hypocrisy: Numerical cognition promotes equal sharing behavior in preschool‐aged children

Recent work has documented that despite preschool‐aged children's understanding of social norms surrounding sharing, they fail to share their resources equally in many contexts. Here we explored two hypotheses for this failure: an insufficient motivation hypothesis and an insufficient cognitive resources hypothesis. With respect to the latter, we specifically explored whether children's numerical cognition—their understanding of the cardinal principle—might underpin their abilities to share equally. In Experiment 1, preschoolers’ numerical cognition fully mediated age‐related changes in children's fair sharing. We found little support for the insufficient motivation hypothesis—children stated that they had shared fairly, and failures in sharing fairly were a reflection of their number knowledge. Numerical cognition did not relate to children's knowledge of the norms of equality (Experiment 2). Results suggest that the knowledge–behavior gap in fairness may be partly explained by the differences in cognitive skills required for conceptual and behavioral equality.     

Autonomous agency,we-agency,and social oppression

Theories of collective intentionality and theories of relational autonomy share a common interest in analyzing the social dynamics of agency. However, whereas theories of collective intentionality conceive of social groups primarily as intentional and voluntarily willed, theories of relational autonomy claim that autonomous agency is both scaffolded and constrained by social forces and structures, including the constraints imposed by nonvoluntary group membership. The question raised by this difference in view is whether social theorizing that overlooks the effects of nonvoluntary social group membership on individual and joint agency overlooks crucial aspects of the social dynamics of agency. To explore this question, this article first evaluates Michael Bratman's planning analysis of individual agency from the perspective of relational autonomy theory and compares it with a narrative self-constitution account of temporally extended agency. It then evaluates Bratman's analysis of shared agency and discusses Shaun Gallagher and Deborah Tollefsen's concept of we-narratives, which extends the notion of narrative construction to shared agency. Overall, the argument aims to show that if we are interested in understanding the social dynamics of agency, it is critical to attend to the way that agents exercise their intentional agency in relation to internalized and external social constraints.     

Continuity in social cognition from infancy to childhood

Research examining the development of social cognition has largely been divided into two areas: infant perception of intentional agents, and preschoolers’ understanding of others’ mental states and beliefs (theory of mind). Many researchers have suggested that there is continuity in social cognitive development such that the abilities observed in infancy are related to later preschool ability, yet little empirical evidence exists for this claim. Here, we present preliminary evidence that capacities specific to the social domain contribute to performance in social cognition tasks both during infancy and in early childhood. Specifically, looking time patterns in an infant social cognition task correlated with preschool theory of mind; however, no such relationship was found for infants in a nonsocial cognition task.     

The hand of God or the hand of Maradona? Believing in free will increases perceived intentionality of others’ behavior

The question of whether free will actually exists has been debated in philosophy for centuries. However, how belief in free will shapes the perception of our social environment still remains open. Here we investigate whether belief in free will affects how much intentionality we attribute to other people. Study 1a and 1b demonstrate a weak positive relation between the strength of belief in free will and the perceived intentionality of soccer players committing handball. This pattern even holds for behavior that is objectively not intentional (i.e., when the player touches the ball accidentally). Going one step further, in Study 2 we find a weak correlation between belief in free will and perceiving intentions in very abstract geometrical shapes. These findings suggest that whether individuals believe in free will or not changes the way they interpret others’ behavior, which may have important societal consequences.     

The Effect of Individual Difference Variables on Information Sharing in Decision‐Making Groups

We examined need for cognition, social desirability, and communication apprehension for their influence on the mention and repetition of shared and unshared information in 8‐person decision‐making groups. Both need for cognition and social desirability influenced the discussion of shared and unshared information in decision‐making groups. The findings indicate that increasing motivation to participate in group discussions may not help overcome the bias favoring shared over unshared information. Additionally, there are indications that social desirability increases the repetition of shared information. This finding is consistent with the idea of mutual enhancement (i.e., the idea that group members discuss shared information because it enhances their position with other group members).     

Finding a home: Developmental and neurobiological perspectives on cultural models

This article looks at cultural models in the light of human development, and neurobiological findings in motivation, learning, and cognition. It is argued that at the individual level, the acquisition of cultural models relies on several innate, neurobiologically based motivational, learning, and cognitive systems. These are: (a) a primary motivation to form social bonds which is driven by affect; (b) highly specialized social learning circuits, involving, but not limited to, mirror neuron systems, that facilitate the encoding of social information through implicit, embodied, imitational learning processes; and (c) the formation of culturally based templates for behavior and cognition centered around structures, collectively known as the “default mode network,” which is essential to self‐understanding, autobiographical memory, social cognition, prospection, and theory‐of‐mind. Cultural models, it is argued, are acquired through innate motivational processes that tie the individual emotionally to a secure base of familiar people and customs. This instinctual desire for proximity to others facilitates the efficient, largely implicit, patterning of knowledge and expectations. Shared knowledge and expectations, in turn, create a common, mostly implicit or unconscious, experience of subjectivity within groups. This allows each individual to automatically and effortlessly interact with similarly enculturated others.     

Cognitive reserve and cognitive function in healthy older people: a meta-analysis

The associations between proxy measures of cognitive reserve (CR) and cognition vary across studies and cognitive domains. This meta-analysis aimed to assess the relationship between CR and cognition in multiple domains (memory, executive function, visuospatial ability, and language). CR was considered in terms of three key proxy measures – educational level, occupational status, and engagement in cognitively stimulating activities – individually and in combination. One-hundred and thirty-five studies representing 128,328 participants were included. Of these, 109 used a measure of education, 19 used a measure of occupation, 31 used a measure of participation in cognitively stimulating activities, and 6 used a combination of these. All three proxy measures had a modest positive association with cognition; occupational status and cognitive activities showed the most variation across cognitive domains. This supports the view that the commonly used proxy measures of CR share an underlying process but that each additionally provides a unique contribution to CR.     

社会互动视角下的有意识情绪感染

随着超扫描技术的兴起,研究者们开始关注社会互动情境中有意识情绪感染的脑间神经同步问题。研究发现,脑间神经同步可能是有意识情绪感染在神经层面的指标。“发送者-接收者”模式的应用使得研究者们思考自我-他人重叠理论是否可作为有意识情绪感染脑间神经同步的心理解释机制。未来研究可采用基于自然情境的“发送者-接收者”模式以及“自然讨论”模式来探究不同社会因素对有意识情绪感染及其脑间同步机制的影响;未来还应构建有意识情绪感染的多模态超扫描平台,以此拓展相关研究。     

Primate Culture and Social Learning

The human primate is a deeply cultural species, our cognition being shaped by culture, and cultural transmission amounting to an “epidemic of mental representations” (Sperber, 1996). The architecture of this aspect of human cognition has been shaped by our evolutionary past in ways that we can now begin to discern through comparative studies of other primates. Processes of social learning (learning from others) are important for cognitive science to understand because they are cognitively complex and take many interrelated forms; they shape traditions, cultures and nonsocial aspects of cognition; and in turn they may be shaped by their cultural context. The study of primate social learning and culture has in recent years enjoyed a renaissance, providing a wealth of new findings, key aspects of which are reviewed. The focus is on cognitive issues, including learning about the consequences, sequential structure and hierarchical organization of actions; relating stored knowledge to the assimilation of new social knowledge; feedback guiding the construction of imitations; conceptual grasp of imitation; and the reciprocal relationship between social learning and culture.     

The attribution of intentionality: the role of skill and morality

The present study contributes to the discussion on the different components which constitute the intentionality concept about an undesired side effect, focusing on the morality and the skill. Two hundred and forty participants were asked to read a brief story about a car accident, in which it was explained the motivation of the high speed and objective and subjective skill of the agent to drive the car, and to fill in six questions about intentionality, objective risk, mental representation of risk, risk acceptance and blameworthiness for the outcome. The principal results showed that when the motivation is morally negative, people judge the side effect more intentional, also because they make more severe judgments about risk and blameworthiness. Moreover, when people are objectively proficient to perform the action (objective skill) the side effect is considered less risky and intentional and, in the case of a negative outcome, they are judged less severely than if they have a poor ability. Finally, a self-assessment of low skill to make the action (subjective skill) leads people to assess higher risks and, consequently, more intentionality for the side effect. The results are discussed on the basis of the literature about some specific components that make up the intentionality concept.     

Husserl on Intentionality as an Essential Property of Consciousness

In the phenomenological tradition intentionality is considered to be an essential property of consciousness. Philosophers from this tradition （Brentano, Husserl, Sartre, etc.） generally share the following two commitments： （i） intentionality is an essential property of consciousness; and （ii） all intentional states are directed at, and are intentionally related to, objects. This view of consciousness has two pressing problems. Firstly, philosophers such as John Searle and David Rosenthal have suggested raw feelings and some forms of seemingly undirected and thus non-intentional feelings as counterexamples to the essential intentionality of conscious states. Secondly, some analytical philosophers and Husserlian scholars inspired by Frege, such as Smith and Follesdal, deny that every intentional state is related to a correlative object. This paper presents a Husserlian view concerning the essential intentionality of consciousness. It will be shown that both problems can be successfully dealt with from an essentially Husserlian and phenomenological perspective.     

Beyond cognitive deficits: how social class shapes social cognition

Lower social class is thought to contribute to poorer executive functioning and working memory. Nevertheless, lower social class individuals consistently outperform their higher-class counterparts on social cognitive tasks that rely on similar underlying cognitive processes (e.g., working memory and executive functioning). Why would lower social class inhibit such processes in one domain, but promote them in another? We argue that features of lower-class communities (e.g., resource scarcity) promote social cognition via cultural processes. We then argue that social cognition involves partially unique task and neural demands that are separate from nonsocial cognition. We conclude that unique task and neural demands, together with the distinctive cognitive proclivities of lower- and higher-class cultures, can explain variable associations between social class and cognitive functioning.     

镜像神经元系统的研究回顾及展望

镜像神经元系统的发现使得研究者从一个较为统一的神经机制层面了解人类多个层次的社会认知活动。在猕猴大脑F5区发现的镜像神经元可以在抽象的层面上帮助猕猴理解他人行为的意图。利用脑成像技术,研究发现人类的镜像神经元系统能够匹配外界的知觉表征和内在的动作表征从而通过“居身模仿”这一过程来进行模仿、语言理解、理解他人的意图及情绪这些重要的社会认知活动。另外,镜像神经元系统在社会交往中也起着重要作用,最后,就镜像神经元系统在心理理论中的作用、了解自我-他人问题和镜像神经元系统的关系、动机、经验等因素对镜像神经元系统活动的调控等问题对未来的研究方向进行了展望