The Influence of Ease of Retrieval on Judgment as a Function of Attention to Subjective Experience

The ease with which information comes to mind can impact judgment. We examine whether the influence of ease of retrieval is moderated by situational factors that call it to attention before judgment and by individual differences in experiential processing style, as measured by the rational experiential inventory scale (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). An ease of retrieval effect, indicated by less favorable evaluations of a proposal following the retrieval of many reasons advocating the proposal than following the retrieval of only a few, was found for high‐experiential style processors regardless of situational factors that made ease of retrieval salient. However, the effect was found among low‐experiential style processors only when ease of retrieval was explicitly called to their attention prior to judgment.     

Implicit Affect Primes Effort: Basic Processes,Moderators, and Boundary Conditions

This article informs about the implicit‐affect‐primes‐effort (IAPE) model – a theory on the impact of implicit affect on resource mobilization – and research testing this account. Beside basic influences of implicitly processed affective stimuli on behavior, this article highlights moderators and boundary conditions of this process. The IAPE model posits that affect primes implicitly activate mental representations of affective states containing information about performance ease and difficulty. This influences subjective task demand during performance, which determines effort. A series of experiments assessing implicit affect's impact on effort‐related cardiovascular response in cognitive tasks revealed replicated support for the IAPE model. Moreover, objective task difficulty and incentive moderated the effect of implicit affect on effort, and especially controlled processing of affect primes and activated concepts turned out to be boundary conditions.     

Contextual influences of emotional speech prosody on face processing: How much is enough?

The influence of emotional prosody on the evaluation of emotional facial expressions was investigated in an event-related brain potential (ERP) study using a priming paradigm, the facial affective decision task. Emotional prosodic fragments of short (200-msec) and medium (400-msec) duration were presented as primes, followed by an emotionally related or unrelated facial expression (or facial grimace, which does not resemble an emotion). Participants judged whether or not the facial expression represented an emotion. ERP results revealed an N400-like differentiation for emotionally related prime-target pairs when compared with unrelated prime-target pairs. Faces preceded by prosodic primes of medium length led to a normal priming effect (larger negativity for unrelated than for related prime-target pairs), but the reverse ERP pattern (larger negativity for related than for unrelated prime-target pairs) was observed for faces preceded by short prosodic primes. These results demonstrate that brief exposure to prosodic cues can establish a meaningful emotional context that influences related facial processing; however, this context does not always lead to a processing advantage when prosodic information is very short in duration.     

Ease‐of‐retrieval effects on procedural justice judgements under conditions of informational and personal uncertainty

This study tests whether individuals' reliance on ease‐of‐retrieval processes when forming procedural justice judgements are moderated by informational and personal uncertainty. In Studies 1 and 2 we examined the predicted effects of informational uncertainty. Results indicated that participants in information‐uncertain conditions relied on ease‐of‐retrieval, whereas those in information‐certain conditions relied on content information to make procedural justice judgements. In Study 3 we examined the combined effects of informational uncertainty and personal uncertainty on reliance on ease‐of‐retrieval when forming procedural justice judgements. The findings of Study 3 indicated that personal uncertain participants who were in informational certain conditions based their procedural justice judgements on content information, whereas all other participants based their procedural justice judgements on ease‐of‐retrieval. This is the first paper to demonstrate that the joint effect of informational uncertainty and personal uncertainty on reliance on ease‐of‐retrieval is different from the two uncertainties acting alone.     

When Arousal Influences Ad Evaluation and Valence Does Not (and Vice Versa)

This research examines, across 2 studies, the interplay between the valence and arousal components of affective states and the affective tone of a target ad. In the first study, music was used to induce a pleasant or unpleasant mood, while controlling for arousal. Participants were subsequently exposed to an ad that either had a positive‐affective tone or was ambiguous in its affective tone. As predicted, the valence of the affective state colored the evaluation of the ad in a mood‐congruent direction, but this coloring effect occurred only when the ad had an ambiguous‐affective tone. In the second study, the target ad had a clear positive or negative affective tone, and the valence and arousal dimensions of the mood state were manipulated independently. As predicted, the arousal dimension, but not the valence dimension, influenced ad evaluation. Ad evaluations were more polarized in the direction of the ad's affective tone under high arousal than under low arousal. This effect was more pronounced for self‐referent evaluations (e.g., “I like the ad”) than for object‐referent evaluations (e.g., “The ad is good”), favoring an attributional explanation—the excitation transfer hypothesis—over an attention‐narrowing explanation—the dynamic complexity hypothesis. Taken together, the results of the 2 studies stress the important contingency of the affective tone of the ad, when examining the effects of the valence and arousal dimensions of a person's affective state on ad evaluation. The results also provide additional insights into how and when affect serves as information in judgment processes.     

Conflicting emotions: The connection between affective perspective taking and theory of mind

The relation between theory of mind and affective perspective taking was examined in a study with 42 three‐ to five‐year‐olds. Children completed tasks measuring affective perspective taking, theory of mind, and receptive language abilities. Significant positive correlations existed between overall affective perspective taking and theory of mind performance, independent of age and language. The relation between theory of mind and affective perspective taking was strongest for those scenarios in which there was a conflict between the child and the friend's emotional responses. These findings indicate that the abilities to understand conflicting emotions and to understand false beliefs are related aspects of social development.     

Adults’ self-reported attachment influences their savoring ability

Positive affect is important for well-being, yet little is known about individual differences in the ability to up-regulate (savor) positive emotions. In a sample of 120 adults (ages 18–94; 62.5% female), this study extends correlational work by examining how attachment relates to self-reported savoring and to an experimentally-induced behavioral savoring task where participants were randomly assigned to reflect on a positive event (or complete a control task). Avoidance was related to lower trait savoring, and the effects of attachment on experimentally-induced savoring differed by the type of event participants savored. Avoidance was related to poorer affective outcomes after savoring interpersonal events but was unrelated to affective outcomes for non-interpersonal events. Anxiety was related to better outcomes after savoring non-interpersonal events but was unrelated to savoring interpersonal events. Overall, effects suggest that more insecurely attached adults may not savor as often, and may have difficulty savoring interpersonal events but not non-interpersonal events.     

The Impact of Modality on Mind Wandering during Comprehension

The executive resource hypothesis assumes a positive relationship between resource availability and mind wandering. Under the assumption that different modalities of information delivery differentially tax resources, we compared mind wandering across different modalities during the presentation of The Red Headed League (Experiment 1 and 2) and Walden (Experiment 3). An Audio only condition produced the most mind wandering. Two conditions that presumably consumed more executive resources than the Audio Only condition (i.e. Audio + Text and Self‐paced Reading) produced equivalent amounts of mind wandering during Experiments 1 and 2. In Experiment 3 the reading time of the Self‐paced readers moderated the effect of mind wandering in that the fast readers mind wandered more than those in the Audio + Text condition. Results are discussed in the context of the demands of different modes of information delivery methods and mind wandering as well as the potential effects of material type. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Affect intensity and processing fluency of deterrents

The theory of emotional intensity (Brehm, 1999) suggests that the intensity of affective states depends on the magnitude of their current deterrents. Our study investigated the role that fluency—the subjective experience of ease of information processing—plays in the emotional intensity modulations as reactions to deterrents. Following an induction phase of good mood, we manipulated both the magnitude of deterrents (using sets of photographs with pre-tested potential to instigate an emotion incompatible with the pre-existent affective state—pity) and their processing fluency (normal vs. enhanced through subliminal priming). Current affective state and perception of deterrents were then measured. In the normal processing conditions, the results revealed the cubic effect predicted by the emotional intensity theory, with the initial affective state being replaced by the one appropriate to the deterrent only in participants exposed to the high magnitude deterrence. In the enhanced fluency conditions the emotional intensity pattern was drastically altered; also, the replacement of the initial affective state occurred at a lower level of deterrence magnitude (moderate instead of high), suggesting the strengthening of deterrence emotional impact by enhanced fluency.     

Metacognitive Experiences and Human Judgment: The Case of Hindsight Bias and Its Debiasing

ABSTRACT— Theories of judgment have emphasized the influence of what comes to mind—the content of people's thoughts. But recent research shows that metacognitive experiences accompanying thinking, like a sense of the ease or difficulty with which information comes to mind, qualify the conclusions that people derive from thought content. The case of hindsight bias and attempts to remove that bias (debiasing) illustrate this. After an event outcome is known, people display hindsight bias by exaggerating its inevitability, believing they "knew it all along." The magnitude of hindsight bias varies with the ease or difficulty that known or alternative outcomes come to mind; the usually observed hindsight bias may even reverse when outcomes are difficult to bring to mind or increase when alternatives are difficult to bring to mind. Implications of metacognitive experiences can extend to other biases and their debiasing, as well as to how people make sense of the past more generally.     

Ease of imagination moderates reactions to differently framed health messages

Three studies test the hypothesis that the subjective ease of symptom imagination moderates the impact of differently framed messages on attitudes toward performing health behaviours. By drawing on the simulation heuristic, it is argued that the vividness of information is reflected in the subjective ease with which people can imagine having symptoms of an illness. This state of mind can be more or less congruent with the theme of a message, accentuating certain health‐related outcomes more than others. The results show that negatively framed messages are more persuasive when symptom imagination is relatively easy and that positively framed messages are more effective when symptom imagination is relatively difficult. Consistent with a dual‐process view, Study 3 showed a stronger impact of ease of imagination when relevance was low rather than high. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Concern-induced negative affect is associated with the occurrence and content of mind-wandering

Previous research has shown that the content and frequency of mind-wandering episodes—the occurrence of thoughts that are both stimulus-independent and task-unrelated—are closely related to an individual’s future-related concerns. Whether this relationship is shaped by the affective changes that are usually associated with future-related concerns still remains unclear, however. In this study, we induced the anticipation of a negatively valenced event and examined whether the ensuing affective changes were related to the occurrence and content of mind-wandering during an unrelated attentional task. We found that the increase in negative affect following concern induction predicted the general frequency of mind-wandering episodes. Furthermore, mind-wandering episodes specifically directed at the induced concern were related to a lower decrease in negative affect during the attentional task. These results suggest that the negative emotional impact of future-related concerns is an important factor to be taken into consideration for the subsequent occurrence of mind-wandering episodes, which might in turn be involved in the maintenance of negative affect over time.     

The influence of aging on preferences for sequences of mixed affective events

Research on preferences among sequences of mixed affective events has mostly used young adults as participants. Given differences due to aging in people's ability to regulate emotion, one could expect differences due to aging in preferences for different sequences. Study 1 demonstrated age‐related differences in how older adults (age 65 and older) versus young adults (age 18–25) choose to order mixed affective events that will occur over time. The tendency to choose sequences in which the final event is positive was greater among older adults versus young adults. And, more so than young adults, older adults preferred that the positive and negative events in a sequence be separated in time by a neutral event. Studies 2–3 investigated age‐related differences in overall retrospective evaluations of presented sequences of mixed affective events. In contrast to young adults, older adults' retrospective evaluations were not affected by: (1) whether the final trend of the sequence improved monotonically; (2) whether the last event in the sequence was positive; or (3) the temporal proximity of positive and negative events in the sequence. Results of Study 3 suggest that these age‐related differences are due to differences in older (vs. young) adults' ability to regulate emotion. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The impact of perceived experience on likelihood judgments for self and others: an experimental approach

This study examines the effect of an experimental manipulation of perceived experience on self and others' likelihood ratings for a set of relatively commonplace misfortunes. Participants were randomly assigned to a condition in which they were asked whether they had ever experienced the events (designed to induce higher perceived experience) or whether they had done so frequently, typically, etc. (designed to induce lower perceived experience). The manipulation led to increases in ratings of both perceived self‐likelihood and others' likelihood, in ease of imagining the outcome and recall of a past occurrence, and to decreases in perceived control over the events in the higher perceived experience condition. The increases in ease of imagining mediated the impact of manipulated experience on comparative likelihood whereas the decreases in perceived control did not. There was little evidence that event controllability moderated the impact of experience on comparative likelihood for these events. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Predicting Happiness: How Normative Feeling Rules Influence (and Even Reverse) Durability Bias

Consumers’ purchase decisions are often influenced by a simple assessment of how long they expect an anticipated purchase (e.g., buying a sports car or a new outfit) will make them happy. Unfortunately, affective forecasts are prone to durability bias (i.e., the overes‐timation of the duration of felt emotions in response to a future event). Here, this article suggests that normative beliefs, or “feeling rules,” often underlie emotion forecasts. This account suggests that affective forecasts can be influenced by external normative communications and that conditions exist where affect duration may be underestimated rather than overestimated—thus demonstrating a reversal of durability bias. Such reversals occur when existing norms advocate attenuated emotional responses (e.g., one should not be overly impacted by minor setbacks or small imperfections). This article discusses how marketers can influence consumers’ happiness forecasts by modifying salient norms for consumer groups or product categories.     

Comparative Optimism and Event Skewness

Comparative judgment biases—wherein a majority of people report being above‐ or below‐average in their abilities, traits, or future events—are a robust phenomenon in psychology. A recent explanation for these biases has focused on people's awareness that many comparative judgment domains form skewed distributions, and, hence, a majority of people can feasibly be above or below average. Indeed, this prior research found that comparative biases for abilities emerged more for skewed (vs. normal) distributions. In the current research, we attempted to (i) conceptually replicate this finding in a comparative likelihood context and (ii) provide evidence of an alternative explanation for the prior results. Replicating prior research, three correlational studies and one experimental study found that event skewness was related to direct comparative likelihood judgments for health events, such that comparative optimism emerged more for events judged or manipulated to come from positively skewed distributions than from negatively skewed distributions. However, event skewness was unrelated to indirect comparisons (absolute self minus absolute other). Moreover, consistent with an egocentric‐processes account, absolute self‐judgments were more predictive of direct comparisons than were absolute other judgments and showed the same association with event skewness as direct comparisons. Implications for explaining and interpreting comparative judgment biases are discussed. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Emotional after‐effects on the P3 component of the event‐related brain potential

Agrowing body of literature indicates that affective states can influence cognitive processes. The core assumption of Ellis and Ashbrook's (1988) model explaining these emotional after‐effects on cognition is that the emotional state regulates the allocation of processing resources. A negative emotional state is supposed to pre‐empt capacity normally allocated to the cognitive task at hand. This is assumed to occur because the negative emotional state leads to an increase in intrusive, irrelevant thoughts, which compete with relevant cognitive activities and thus result in a lack of attention given to relevant features of the task to be performed. In the present study, the hypothesis that negative emotions lead to a reduced information‐processing capacity and that this is observable on a very basic level of information processing is tested. Therefore, 102 participants were assigned to three independent groups, each inducing one of a negative, a positive, or a neutral mood by means of a 3‐minute video‐clip. Shortly after the video‐clip, two acoustical stimuli with increasing information were presented, while the P3 component of the event‐related brain potential on these stimuli was measured as a psychophysiological indicator of cognitive resource allocation. In addition, the expenmental manipulation was checked by assessing subjective and external mood ratings as well as cortical alpha activity. Results show that the videos did in fact induce positive, neutral, or negative mood. Moreover, even when controlling for video‐related unspecific cortical arousal, a significant emotional after‐effect was found on the P3 component of the event‐related brain potential, indicating reduced information‐processing capacity, particularly in the negative mood condition. The reported data support Ellis and Ashbrook's model of emotional after‐effects on cognitive processes. As those effects were observable after an event that did not demand a high amount of cognitive resources, this suggests that even tasks that do not heavily engage central processing resources and are not likely to be influenced by cognitive strategies, seem to be affected by a negative emotional state.     

Of private talk and public print: General pre-trial publicity and juror decision-making

The term ‘general pre-trial publicity’ refers to trial-related information that is prominently in the news, and that affects jurors in wholly unrelated cases. Two experiments explored the impact of general pre-trial publicity on juror decision-making. In Experiment 1 mock jurors who earlier read a newspaper article about a defendant mistakenly identified and subsequently convicted of a crime he did not commit were less likely to convict the defendant in an unrelated case than were jurors who read instead about a series of heinous crimes or who had no pre-trial publicity. Experiment 2 demonstrated that this effect is somewhat stronger when the general pre-trial publicity concerns a case that closely resembles the one jurors must decide than when the two cases are dissimilar. These data are discussed in terms of the availability of relevant information in memory. People may evaluate the probability of a defendant's guilt by the ease with which similar or relevant examples come to mind.     

How children narrate happy and sad events: does affective state count?

The influence of induced affective states on children's narratives of personal events was investigated. The affective state of 5‐to‐6‐year‐old children, 128 in number, was manipulated by way of winning or losing a game. They were then asked to narrate happy or sad personal events. A self‐report instrument indicated that a different affective state was indeed induced by the two game conditions. Narratives were coded for agency, affective aspects and structural complexity (antecedents). The negative condition influenced attribution of causality and intention to agent and addressee, according to a self‐serving bias and affected number of antecedents. Moreover, in the negative condition, global intensity revealed a congruency effect, in line with the Affect Infusion Model. However, mental states varied with event valence, independent of affect‐inducing condition. Results are discussed in terms of the complexity of the relation between emotional event narratives and children's affective state. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Three‐year‐olds express suspense when an agent approaches a scene with a false belief

Research on early false belief understanding has entirely relied on affect‐neutral measures such as judgments (standard tasks), attentional allocation (looking duration, preferential looking, anticipatory looking), or active intervention. We used a novel, affective measure to test whether preschoolers affectively anticipate another's misguided acts. In two experiments, 3‐year‐olds showed more expressions of suspense (by, e.g. brow furrowing or lip biting) when they saw an agent approach a scene with a false as opposed to a true belief (Experiment 1) or ignorance (Experiment 2). This shows that the children anticipated the agent's surprise and disappointment when encountering reality. The findings suggest that early implicit knowledge of false beliefs includes anticipations of the affective implications of erring. This vital dimension of beliefs should no longer be ignored in research on early theory of mind.