心理学能从自身的历史发展中学到什么？

本文在将心理学视为一门学科同时也是一种职业的前提下,超越各种具体条件和内容之上对心理学进行了总结。为此,考察了心理学在其发展中所体现的规律性,为了更好地表达,可以称之为从心理学历史所归纳出的“经验教训”。首先,从心理学作为一门科学的历史,可以总结出6条规律：1）心理学具有双重学科的地位。心理学既是一门科学,也是一门综合了生物学、社会学和文化学研究方法的“桥梁”学科;2）必须以实验学作为方法学的指南;3）基础研究和应用研究成果的整合利用;4）需要接受各方面的启发;5）全球化和本土化的相互补充;6）心理学在科学发展史中的学科力量。从将心理学视为一种职业来考察心理学发展史,还可以看到3条普遍的规律：1）职业化的快速发展;2）需要科学研究与实际应用之间的双向交流;3）跨学科专业知识的相互启发     

西方心理学中的现代主义、后现代主义及其超越

当代西方心理学中存在着现代主义取向和后现代主义取向的对立和冲突。冯特以来的西方心理学流派大多属于现代主义的范畴。现代主义的特征是：(1)重视科学的价值,强调科学的方法;(2)信奉经验主义;(3)个体的中心地位。后现代主义取向的核心是社会建构主义,其主要特征为：(1)批判的倾向,对现代心理学的理论基础进行解构;(2)把社会建构论作为认识论的基础;(3)促进心理学实践的四个转变。尽管两种倾向形成鲜明的对照,但两者也存在着一些共同的方面,从而构成了超越两者的基础。两种取向的超越需要以科学实在论作为元理论的基础,并需要双方互补、合作和开放的态度。     

建立心理学学科门类及学位类别的分析与展望

摘 要 为了促进中国本土化心理学体系建设和心理学学科的整体发展,从中国与发达国家心理学学科管理制度的比较中发现中国心理学学科归属所存在的问题,并在反思中探讨形成问题的原因。通过心理学在现有学科归属中的局限性,心理学成为独立学科门类的可能性,心理学成为独立学科门类后学科新体系的系统性,心理学成为独立学科门类的社会性四个方面的分析与讨论,研究了使心理学成为独立学科门类与学位类别的必要性与可行性。特别是从建设和谐社会的角度对心理学的学科归属、心理学的未来发展、现代社会发展及心理学与其它学科的广泛联系等需要的讨论中,指出中国心理学在专业设置方面隶属于理学和教育学的不足之处,认为这种隶属关系将会制约心理学的发展和学科成熟。提出应该在现有学位体系中增加心理学学科门类与学位类别,使心理学作为一个与理学和教育学并列的独立学科门类。通过改进学位体系让心理学在更大的学科背景中,建设中国本土心理学自身体系,使心理学研究方法更加多样化,为产生众多边缘学科和更好地发挥社会应用功能创造条件,也为今后心理学发展带来许多发展机遇,并在此基础上为展望心理学未来发展提供新的视角。     

Shifting Loyalties: Reconsidering Psychology’s Subject Matter

Schwarz (IPBS: Integrative Psychology & Behavioral Science 43:3, 2009) cogently demonstrates that in conjunction with scientific conventionalism psychology has developed a rather deficient view of their subject matter: the human being. Psychology based on an impoverished notion of empirical has rendered subjectivity or ‘the measuring apparatus man’ invisible. As his story implicitly demonstrates, psychologists supported by a positivistic view of science (in part to be empirical) and notion of ‘objectivity’ have learned to trust their ‘rigorous’ methods instead of their participants as capable of revealing important and interesting phenomena. If we are going to take subjectivity and experience seriously there should be a cultivation of a new attitude or orientation regarding psychology’s subject matter (i.e., the human being) and science. This commentary discusses Mark Freeman’s (2007) argument that the first requirement of science should be ‘fidelity to the phenomena’ and elaborates on the implications for psychology grounded in this view of science.     

再论我国心理学的分化现象

我国心理学正处于分化过程之中,其中两个明显的例证就是:基础心理学与应用及人文心理学的分化,以及对心理学研究和服务成果的评价标准摆脱SCI的束缚.这背后深层的原因在于,若以科学哲学认识论的视角,人类的知识大致可分为可靠有用的知识和无用虚幻(伪科学)的知识,可靠知识又可进一步分为科学的知识和非科学的知识.心理学从诞生之日起...     

Understanding ‘relevance’ in psychology

Since the 1970s, psychologists around the world have questioned the ‘social relevance’ of psychology in their societies. Curiously, the matter of ‘social relevance’ is under-theorized in the discipline, a state of affairs this paper attempts to correct. First, it describes how disagreements about psychology's cognitive interest – and subject matter – create an environment in which accusations of ‘social irrelevance’ can flourish. Second, it asserts that applied psychology's reliance on basic psychology for its scientific authority makes debates about ‘social relevance’ inevitable. And third, it claims that the discipline's longstanding antithesis to the social domain leaves it vulnerable to these debates – particularly in recent decades that have witnessed rapid social change. The paper reflects further on the rise of ‘market relevance’ in the global academy and its significance for psychology today.     

The orientation of evolution and the intellect

Prediction has been central in the development of both science and society. Chaos theory, however, has given rise to the widespread belief that in all but the most stable situations prediction of the future is impossible. But this belief is contradicted by theory and findings over many years of the psychology of prediction as well as by the findings of the new field of chaos psychology and the experience of entrepreneurs in business and political leaders. At stake is a belief central to an enormous body of “law” in all scientific fields as well as to business, political, and governmental managers and leaders concerned with governance of economic and political systems in a time of global social chaos. At its core, the problem is a critical one for the development of a General Evolution Theory that can span the findings of natural science and social science to find “laws” consonant with systems requirements at both pre‐human and human evolutionary levels. This paper analyzes the problem in terms of chaos theoretical views of the limits of predictability, evidence from the fields of psychology and brain research of human predictive abilities that transcend these limits, and the practical consequence of a resolution of this conflict for science and society.     

Applying the Psychology of Science to the Science of Psychology: Can Psychologists Use Psychological Science to Enhance Psychology as a Science?

ABSTRACT— Added to the already tremendous diversity of subdisciplines of psychological science is the psychology of science. Although research on the psychology of science began in 1874, the field has seen a substantial expansion of activity in recent years. One particular subset of this research literature has special importance: namely, inquiries into the psychology of doing great science. These investigations may be assigned into four groups: cognitive, differential, developmental, and social. Each of these deal with critical questions that can, if answered, contribute directly to the improvement of psychology as a science. Potential applications include (a) the identification of scientific talent in psychology, (b) the education of future investigators in psychological science, and (c) the evaluation of psychology's progress as a scientific endeavor.     

科学心理学的观念及其范畴含义解析

关于心理学作为科学的观念或理想普遍兴起于19世纪下半叶,正是对这个观念或理想的百余年历史的追求和实践,塑造了现代意义上的科学心理学及其历史作为整体的基本面貌,并决定了科学心理学观念的两种范畴含义及其差异,具体表现为在心理学作为科学的整体背景中它的现象学传统或道路与它的科学主义传统或道路之间的对峙关系。历史分析表明,对科学心理学观念的范畴含义的理解和实现,与关于科学观念的范畴含义的探索和理解是密切关联、相互制约的。以人类思维的理论形态的历史转换为背景,我们发现,关于心理学作为科学的观念,只有实现为现象学意义上的科学,才能真正实现它自身;但主流的科学主义传统则要把心理学实现为自然科学,由此实现的科学心理学,只能是对心理学作为科学的观念的异化。     

B. F. Skinner and G. H. Mead: on biological science and social science.

Skinner's contributions to psychology provide a unique bridge between psychology conceptualized as a biological science and psychology conceptualized as a social science. Skinner focused on behavior as a naturally occurring biological phenomenon of interest in its own right, functionally related to surrounding events and, in particular (like phylogenesis), subject to selection by its consequences. This essentially biological orientation was further enhanced by Skinner's emphasis on the empirical foundations provided by laboratory-based experimental analyses of behavior, often with nonhuman subjects. Skinner's theoretical writings, however, also have affinity with the traditions of constructionist social science. The verbal behavior of humans is said to be subject, like other behavior, to functional analyses in terms of its environment, in this case its social context. Verbal behavior in turn makes it possible for us to relate to private events, a process that ultimately allows for the development of consciousness, which is thus said to be a social product. Such ideas make contact with aspects of G. H. Mead's social behaviorism and, perhaps of more contemporary impact in psychology, L. Vygotsky's general genetic law of cultural development. Failure to articulate both the biological and the social science aspects of Skinner's theoretical approach to psychology does a disservice to his unique contribution to a discipline that remains fragmented between two intellectual traditions.     

Biology and Awe: Psychology's Critical Juncture

Psychology stands at a crossroads. Even more than in the time of Rollo May, psychology faces a dilemma of alarming moral and scientific proportions. On the one hand, psychology is about to become a "biologism." This is a discipline-led by the high tech, consumerist model for living-that emphasizes measurement, materialism, and efficiency. On the other hand, psychology still has a chance-mainly through humanistic and depth orientations-to be a vibrant discipline. The question is, will we take this path to become the "queen of the sciences," as Nietzsche put it, or will we jeopardize 5,000 years of arts and humanities, centuries of depth analyses, and decades of awe-inspired practice. In this article, which echoes the spirit of my great friend and mentor, Rollo May, as well as my new book, Rediscovery of Awe, I will outline the stakes in this dilemma, the players involved-from biopsychology to humanism-and an alternative, conciliatory vision that I call "awe-based" psychology. The dilemma we face today is whether we will approach our subject matter with a sense of the magnificence and mystery of living (awe) or whether we will persist in making mole-hills of mountains, as Rollo once put it, and succumb to the glib, the well-packaged, and the instrumental; whether we will find the terms and resources to reflect life's profundity; or whether we will skirt its edges, resort to the commercial, and bow to the expedient. I will illustrate further how this dilemma need not be solved by an "us-them," "either-or" mentality but can be addressed dialectically with practical as well as visionary implications for our profession. Finally, I will summarize a few of these implications, both for our practices and contemporary lives.     

试论心理学研究的人文视野

自1879年科学心理学诞生以来,心理学研究的唯科技取向越来越彰显,并且导致了心理学研究视野的窄化。本文提出心理学研究的人文视野．以拓宽心理学研究的范围,使心理学真正成为一门关注人的心灵成长的“一幅具有人的面孔的心理学。”     

Development of psychology in Bulgaria after the political changes in 1989

This article outlines the significant organizational and scientific changes that occurred in Bulgarian psychology after the fall of the totalitarian regime in 1989. These included the establishment of new university and research centers in psychology, the abolition of ideological censorship in psychology publications, free choice of research methodology and methods, free communication, and exchange of ideas with foreign psychologists, and the development of psychoanalytic practice and psychological services. The liberalization of the social conditions for the development of science, in general, made psychology a much sought-after science and practice. In this time of social transition, its authority grew significantly due to the fact that its calling was to study and solve, above all, the problems of the people, especially as they were faced with new social conditions. In the last 30 years, psychological science in Bulgaria has been significantly humanized. These changes allowed scientists to propose new methodological approaches not only to the study of the psyche, but also to the study of both Bulgarian and foreign history of psychology. Although in the last 30 years not all measures taken in the institutional management of the psychological science were positive, Bulgarian psychology was given a new opportunity to join the international scientific community.     

Public skepticism of psychology: why many people perceive the study of human behavior as unscientific

Data indicate that large percentages of the general public regard psychology's scientific status with considerable skepticism. I examine 6 criticisms commonly directed at the scientific basis of psychology (e.g., psychology is merely common sense, psychology does not use scientific methods, psychology is not useful to society) and offer 6 rebuttals. I then address 8 potential sources of public skepticism toward psychology and argue that although some of these sources reflect cognitive errors (e.g., hindsight bias) or misunderstandings of psychological science (e.g., failure to distinguish basic from applied research), others (e.g., psychology's failure to police itself, psychology's problematic public face) reflect the failure of professional psychology to get its own house in order. I offer several individual and institutional recommendations for enhancing psychology's image and contend that public skepticism toward psychology may, paradoxically, be one of our field's strongest allies.     

In memoriam: Remembering Rollo May: An interview with Irvin Yalom

We note first of all that the full title of Mary Shelley's book is Frankenstein or The Modern Prometheus. If we take this title as a cryptic introduction to its subject matter, we come to understand the novel as exploring the consequences of an Enlightenment project that sought to replace the classical Greek Prometheus, who was the founder of Greek religion, with a modern surrogate representing modern industrial techno-science. The ancient Greek Prometheus had sought to liberate his people by separating mortals from immortals and thereafter reuniting them by means of a festive, religious ritual. By contrast, the modern pseudo-Prometheus promised to liberate humanity by effacing the division between heaven and earth and by seeking to make the natural scientific universe the ultimate object of all cultural activity. Modern human science, including academic and scientific psychology, should be counted among the offspring of this modern and progressive Prometheus. Mary Shelley's masterpiece describes the dangers inherent in blindly following this modern techno-scientific Prometheus, thereby indirectly evoking the possibility of building a different psychology and human science that remains in close alliance with the antique Prometheus.     

Reglobalizing Realism by Going Local, or (How) Should Our Formulations of Scientific Realism be Informed about the Sciences?

In order to examine the fit between realism and science, one needs to address two issues: the unit of science question (realism about which parts of science?) and the contents of realism question (which realism about science?). Answering these questions is a matter of conceptual and empirical inquiry by way local case studies. Instead of the more ordinary abstract and global scientific realism, what we get is a doubly local scientific realism based on a bottom-up strategy. Representative formulations of the former kind are in terms of the truth and reality of the posits of current science, in terms of warranted belief, in terms of mind-independent unobservable entities. Using illustrations mainly from the social sciences, doubly local scientific realism denies the global applicability of such formulations and seeks to make adjustments in their elements in response to information about local units of science: It is sufficient for a realist to give the existence of an entity (and the truth of a theory) a chance, while in some areas we may be in s position to make justified claims about actual existence (and truth). Logical inquiry-independent existence is sufficient for the social and human sciences, while mind-independence will be fine for many other domains. It should not be insisted that the theoretical posits of realist science be strict unobservables in all areas: most theoretical posits of the social sciences are idealized commonsensibles, such as elements in folk psychology. Unsurprisingly, this sort of local strategy will create space for realism that is able to accommodate larger areas of science without sacrificing traditional realist intuitions.     

Psychology as a Science of Subject and Comportment,beyond the Mind and Behavior

The turn of qualitative inquiry suggests a more open, plural conception of psychology than just the science of the mind and behavior as it is most commonly defined. Historical, ontological and epistemological binding of this conception of psychology to the positivist method of natural science may have exhausted its possibilities, and after having contributed to its prestige as a science, has now become an obstacle. It is proposed that psychology be reconceived as a science of subject and comportment in the framework of a contextual hermeneutic, social, human behavioral science. Thus, without rejecting quantitative inquiry, psychology recovers territory left aside like introspection and pre-reflective self-awareness, and reconnects with traditions marginalized from the main stream. From this perspective psychology might also recover its credibility as a human science in view of current skepticism.     

Political goals versus scientific truths: a response to Jackson (2003)

Three fundamental issues separate Jackson's (2003) methodological views from mine. One, whereas he believes an absolute moral view can prevail in a democracy, I assume moral pluralism is an inevitable byproduct of an open society. Two, Jackson feels that psychology can identify a correct moral position, whereas I postulate natural science psychology is only capable of revealing the empirical consequences of competing social policies and their moral implications. Three, Jackson espouses a politically active psychology that from my perspective is antithetical to a democratic and scientific ethic. In sum, Jackson's coupling of science with political advocacy will lead to a mistrust of psychology that will deny a democracy the opportunity to base its social policies on reliable psychological information.