Human action and virtue in Descartes and Spinoza

In this paper, I argue that despite undeniable fundamental differences between Descartes’ and Spinoza’s accounts of human action, there are some striking similarities between their views on right action, moral motivation, and virtue that are usually overlooked. I will argue, first, that both thinkers define virtue in terms of activity or freedom, mutatis mutandis, and thus in terms of actual power of acting. Second, I will claim that both Descartes and Spinoza hold a non-consequentialist approach to virtue, by which human actions are evaluated as virtuous or good on the basis of their motivational forces rather than their consequences. I will show further that both philosophers identify virtue qua free action with the highest good (summum bonum), and thus with that which is to be sought for its own sake and not as a means to anything preferable to it.     

Aligning Spinoza with Descartes: An informed Cartesian account of the truth bias

There is a bias towards believing information is true rather than false. The Spinozan account claims there is an early, automatic bias towards believing. Only afterwards can people engage in an effortful re‐evaluation and disbelieve the information. Supporting this account, there is a greater bias towards believing information is true when under cognitive load. However, developing on the Adaptive Lie Detector (ALIED) theory, the informed Cartesian can equally explain this data. The account claims the bias under load is not evidence of automatic belief; rather, people are undecided, but if forced to guess they can rely on context information to make an informed judgement. The account predicts, and we found, that if people can explicitly indicate their uncertainty, there should be no bias towards believing because they are no longer required to guess. Thus, we conclude that belief formation can be better explained by an informed Cartesian account – an attempt to make an informed judgment under uncertainty.     

In homage to Descartes and Spinoza: A cosmo‐ontological case for God

Integrating cosmological and ontological lines of reasoning, I argue that there is a self‐necessary being that (a) serves as the sufficient condition for everything, that (b) has the most perfect collection of whatever attributes of perfection there might be, and that (c) is an independent, eternal, unique, simple, indivisible, immutable, all‐actual, all‐free, all‐present, all‐powerful, all‐knowing, all‐good, and personal creator of every expression of itself that everything is. My cosmo‐ontological case for such a being, an everything‐maker with the core features ascribed to the God of classical theism, addresses the standard worries plaguing these lines of reasoning: (1) the richness required of such a being dissolves it into many beings; (2) the metaphysical possibility of such a being is assumed on insufficient grounds; (3) the features we ascribe to such a being are mere human‐all‐too‐human projections.     

Revisiting rapprochement in the light of contemporary developmental theories

Margaret Mahler's thinking, revolutionary for its time, led to the observational study of mother-infant pairs, followed almost day by day as the preverbal infant developed into a toddler whose increasing cognitive capacities made new demands on the mother's presence and emotional availability. The rapprochement crisis, as formulated based on these observations, is reexamined in the light of contemporary theory, and the concept of co-construction is used to show how mother and toddler repair misunderstandings and inevitable conflicts. With the growth of new verbal capacities during rapprochement, the toddler moves from early, sensorimotor interactions to interactions governed by language, in the process gaining new understanding of his or her emotional life.     

Descartes on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities

ABSTRACT

Descartes did not use the terms ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ qualities, but a similar distinction emerges from his texts: certain qualities of objects (such as size and shape) are intrinsic properties of matter, whereas others (like colours and smells) are products of the interaction with a perceiver. A common interpretation states that the division between primary and secondary qualities is explained by the way in which we are acquainted with them: an idea of a primary quality is similar to its physical causes, and it is clearly and distinctly perceived by the intellect. An idea of a secondary quality is dissimilar to its physical causes and it is obscurely and confusedly perceived by the senses. This view receives the name of ‘bifurcation reading’ (Simmons, A. ‘Descartes on the Cognitive Structure of Sensory Experience’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXVII, no. 3 (November 2003)). While it integrates well some textual occurrences, it creates a problematic fragmentation within single acts of perception. This paper contends that this reading is incorrect. It presents several arguments for the claim that the distinction of qualities is due to the different ways in which our ideas of them misrepresent their physical causes. Then, Descartes’ dissimilarity thesis between physical objects and our ideas of them remains a structural feature of his theory of sensory perception and not a local phenomenon affecting only ideas of secondary qualities.     

斯宾诺莎与预定论

“预定论”是新教神学中的基本教义,也是新教神学家解决恩典、救赎等问题的根本途径。作为一个与新教颇具渊源的哲学家,斯宾诺莎构建了一种与预定论多有相似之处的决定论理论。以这些相似性为契机,有研究者认为斯宾诺莎是在新教预定论的基础上提出了他的决定论思想,有人甚至把他视为一个新教哲学家。然而,通过对这两种理论进行对比,我们发现,无论在精神气质、思想前提,还是在具体内涵等方面,二者均有深刻差异。斯宾诺莎所坚持的并非预定论思路上的决定论,也不以新教的预定论作为其直接的理论渊源。     

The presence of Spinoza in the exchanges between Sigmund Freud and Romain Rolland1

Although Freud recognized his profound affinity with Spinoza, we seldom find explicit and direct references to the philosopher in his works. The correspondence between Romain Rolland, the ‘Christian without a church’, and Freud, the ‘atheist Jew’, is full of Spinozian reminiscences that nourish their works of this period and are underpinned by their mutual transference. The Future of an Illusion is written according to a Spinozian blueprint and aims at replacing religion, qualified as superstition, by psychoanalysis. A quotation from Heine, ‘brother in unbelief’, is a direct reference to Spinoza. Concurring with Freud’s critiques of dogmas and churches, Rolland proposes an analysis of the ‘oceanic feeling’ as a basis of the religious sentiment. Freud replies with Civilization and Its Discontents. In 1936, on the occasion of Rolland’s 70th birthday, Freud sends him an open letter, A disturbance of memory on the Acropolis, where the strange feeling that he has experienced in front of the Parthenon refers inter alia to his double culture: Jewish and German. In the light of this correspondence, the creation of psychoanalysis turns out to be a quest for the sacred that has disappeared in modernity; Freud, though, was able to find it inside man’s unconscious.     

Excommunication and the philosophy of Spinoza

This paper is an attempt to probe the connection between Spinoza's philosophy and his excommunication from the Synagogue in 1656. It seeks, first, to show the decisive influence of the 1656 excommunication on Spinoza's life and thought, and to demonstrate that this event is the single most important key to understanding his entire philosophy. With this key, the paper seeks, secondly, to illustrate the development and transformation of Spinoza's thought through specific reference to his three major works, Korte Verhandeling, De Emendatione, and Ethica. Underlying these two points is a third, namely, that the inherently dynamic and positive elements of ‘experience’, which have not been fully appreciated thus far, should be given greater attention in the evaluation of Spinoza's philosophy.     

Method and the Structure of Knowledge in Spinoza

It is argued, first, that although Spinoza's early Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect does show evidence of a foundationalist approach to the justification of knowledge, there are good reasons to think he came to find such an approach unsatisfactory; and second, that the Ethics notion of certainty as adequate knowledge of one's knowledge is a justificational concept which is holistic in that any instance of such certainty depends on knowledge of the entire basic metaphysical system. Finally it is shown that Spinoza's having come to hold a nonlinear view regarding the justificational structure of knowledge explains why he chose to present his philosophy in the geometric form, and why he never succeeded in formulating a method of discovery.