On Video Games,Culture, and Therapy

The increasing presence of video games in modern culture requires psychoanalysts' attention not only to better understand the world their clients live in, but to also directly aid their patients in their difficulties. Many of the real world symptoms with which a person presents to the office may be reflected in the virtual worlds in which they play, grow, or take refuge. Understanding and inquiring into these worlds and their patients' experience of them allows analysts to help them recognize their potentials as transitional spaces. By viewing video games as virtual spaces and patients' own unique methods of using them, psychoanalysts see the game worlds as having a capacity for either harnessing or hindering various paths and aspects of development.     

Reasoning About Games

A mixture of propositional dynamic logic and epistemic logic that we call PDL + E is used to give a formalization of Artemov??s knowledge based reasoning approach to game theory, (KBR), [4, 5]. Epistemic states of players are represented explicitly and reasoned about formally. We give a detailed analysis of the Centipede game using both proof theoretic and semantic machinery. This helps make the case that PDL + E can be a useful basis for the logical investigation of game theory.     

Rules and Games

Philosophia - We have taken a look at the rules of games in order to acquire some knowledge concerning constitutive rules and, probably, institutional phenomena in general. In this paper we tried...     

Games with Zero-knowledge Signaling

We observe that in certain two-player repeated games of incomplete information, where information may be incomplete on both sides, it is possible for an informed player to signal his status as an informed player to the other without revealing any information about the choice of chance. The key to obtaining such a class of games is to relax the assumption that the players’ moves are observable. We show that in such cases players can achieve a kind of signaling that is “zero-knowledge”, in the sense that the other player becomes convinced that her opponent is informed without ever learning the choice of chance. Moreover, such “zero-knowledge signaling” has all of the statistical properties associated with zero-knowledge proofs in intereactive protocols. In particular, under the general assumption that moves are unobservable, such signaling leads to a class of equilibria in repeated games that are separatingin regard to the status of player 1–informed or uninformed–but only for player 2; any other player in a network, being unable to observe the moves of player 2, remains uncertain as to the status of player 1. Special Issue Formal Epistemology II. Edited by Branden Fitelson     

First-Order Dialogical Games and Tableaux

We present a new proof of soundness/completeness of tableaux with respect to dialogical games in Classical First-Order Logic. As far as we know it is the first thorough result for dialogical games where finiteness of plays is guaranteed by means of what we call repetition ranks.     

Manipulating Games by Sharing Information

We address the issue of manipulating games through communication. In the specific setting we consider (a variation of Boolean games), we assume there is some set of environment variables, the values of which are not directly accessible to players; the players have their own beliefs about these variables, and make decisions about what actions to perform based on these beliefs. The communication we consider takes the form of (truthful) announcements about the values of some environment variables; the effect of an announcement is the modification of the beliefs of the players who hear the announcement so that they accurately reflect the values of the announced variables. By choosing announcements appropriately, it is possible to perturb the game away from certain outcomes and towards others. We specifically focus on the issue of stabilisation: making announcements that transform a game from having no stable states to one that has stable configurations.     

暴力电子游戏对攻击行为及相关变量的影响

文章综述了暴力电子游戏对攻击行为及相关变量影响的测量方法和实证研究结果,分析了这种影响的心理机制和特点,文章认为对这种心理机制的理论探讨经历了四个阶段,元分析表明暴力电子游戏增加了游戏者的攻击行为、攻击认知、攻击情感、生理唤醒,最后文章指出以往研究中存在的问题和未来可能的发展方向     

Designing Games to Teach Ethics

This paper describes a teaching methodology whereby students can gain practical experience of ethical decision-making in the engineering design process. We first argue for the necessity to teach a 'practical' understanding of ethical issues in engineering education along with the usual theoretical or hypothetical approaches. We then show how this practical understanding can be achieved by using a collaborative design game, describing how, for example, the concept of responsibility can be explored from this practical basis. We conclude that the use of games in design education can provide an excellent basis for discussing practical and ethical reasoning during the process of design.     

古代奥运会的伦理精神及其对现代奥运的启示

古代奥运会的伦理精神包括效忠国家、身心和谐、公平竞争、追求和平等,同时有其时代和阶级的局限性,在伦理方面主要表现为阶级歧视、性别歧视、极其残酷、走入职业化等。古代奥运会的伦理精神对现代奥林匹克运动产生深远的影响,现代奥运的起源与发展是对古代奥运会伦理精神的继承与超越,古代奥运会伦理精神对北京奥运会的筹办也具有启示性的意义。     

古希腊哲学家与奥运会

中国哲学界对2008年北京奥运会不著一字,似乎哲学与体育有天遥地远的隔阂。其实古希腊许多著名哲学家都参加奥运会,甚至还是奥运会的冠军;包括奥运会在内的各种赛会的公开、公正、公平的传统,尼采认为是优良政制的一种政治伦理;而且,奥运会曾是巴门尼德和芝诺宣示自身哲学的一个影响深远的舞台。另外学园与浴池实际上都可以在赛会的竞技馆中得到统一的解释。对于奥运会,哲学家作为参加者而不仅仅是旁观者的地位,“看”到了许多超越时代超越民族的普世价值,使之升华,也许正因为如此,才有了现代奥运的今天。     

Games,Rules, and Practices

We present and defend a view labeled “practiceism” which provides a solution to the incompatibility problems. The classic incompatibility problem is inconsistency of: 1. Someone who intentionally violates the rules of a game is not playing the game.

2. In many cases, players intentionally violate the rules as part of playing the game (e.g. fouling to stop the clock in basketball).

The problem has a normative counterpart: 1’. In normal cases, it is wrong for a player to intentionally violate the rules of the game.

2’. In many normal cases, it is not wrong for a player to intentionally violate the rules of the game (e.g. fouling to stop the clock in basketball).

According to both formalism and informalism, the rules of the game include the formal rules of the game. Both traditional positions avoid the incompatibility problems by rejecting 1 and 1'. Practiceism rejects 2 and 2’: it maintains that the rules are the rules manifested in playing the game, not the formal rules.

Practiceism presents two theses: (a) the real rules of the game are the rules players follow: the practice determines the rules, and not vice versa. (b) the (first order) rules of a game determine what is legitimate within the game.     

Legal Facts in Argumentation-Based Litigation Games

This paper analyzes legal fact-argumentation in the framework of the argumentation-based litigation game (ALG) by Xiong (Leg Sci 370(9):16–19, 2012). Rather than as an ontological one, an ALG treats a legal fact as a fact-qua-claim whose acceptability depends on the reasons supporting it. In constructing their facts-qua-claims, parties to an ALG must interact to maintain a game-theoretic equilibrium. We compare the general interactional constraints that the civil (a.k.a. ‘continental’) and common law systems assign, and detail what the civil, administrative, and criminal codes of mainland China require of the suitor (S), the respondent (R), and the trier (T) to establish their respective S-, R- and T-facts. We also offer an improved version of the legal syllogism.     

The Incompleteness of Theories of Games

We first state a few previously obtained results that lead to general undecidability and incompleteness theorems in axiomatized theories that range from the theory of finite sets to classical elementary analysis. Out of those results we prove several incompleteness theorems for axiomatic versions of the theory of noncooperative games with Nash equilibria; in particular, we show the existence of finite games whose equilibria cannot be proven to be computable.