The detection model of recognition using know and remember judgments

The signal detection model forknow andremember recognition judgments was tested in two experiments. In Experiment 1, two predictions of the model were tested: (1) that measures of memory sensitivity,A′, are equivalent in value when based on either the recognition (know or remember) criterion or on the remember criterion; and (2) that there is a positive correlation between recognition bias and the proportion of know judgments that are hits, but no correlation between recognition bias and proportion of remember hits (Donaldson, 1996). Both predictions were supported by the data. In Experiment 2, the context of test items was manipulated to make it more or less similar to learning context. The detection model requires that memory sensitivity be the same for both recognition and remember judgments, regardless of test context. Alternatively, if remember judgments reflect only the retrieval of episodic information from memory, the two measures of memory sensitivity should become more disparate in value as learning and test context are made more similar. Memory sensitivity was generally the same in value for recognition and remember criteria but different across context conditions, thus supporting the detection model. The nature of the memory continuum used in detection theory is also discussed.     

Response speeding mediates the contributions of cue familiarity and target retrievability to metamnemonic judgments

Metamnemonic judgments are influenced by the retrievability of the target memory in question, but also by the familiarity of the cue used to elicit such judgments. However, there have been few suggestions as to what factors mediate the influence of these different sources of information on metamnemonic judgments. In this experiment, I examined the interactions between prediction time pressure and variables that promote either cue familiarity or target retrievability. The data reveal that target retrievability plays a larger role than does cue familiarity in fostering predictions of future recall made under unpressured conditions, but that cue familiarity influences predictions that are speeded. This pattern is interpreted by analogy with recognition memory: Mnemonic evidence based on familiarity is more impervious to the demands of time pressure than are the products of deliberative retrieval. Several explanations for this effect are suggested.     

The contribution of recollection and familiarity to recognition and source-memory judgments: a formal dual-process model and an analysis of receiver operating characteristics

A formal dual-process model that assumes that memory judgments can be based on a threshold recollection process and a signal-detection-based familiarity process is proposed to account for both recognition and source-memory performance. The model was tested in 4 experiments by examining recognition and source-memory receiver operating characteristics (ROCs). In agreement with the predictions of the model, recognition and source memory dissociated in certain conditions. Recognition ROCs were curvilinear in probability space and relatively linear in z-space, as expected if recollection and familiarity contributed to performance. In contrast, source ROCs typically were linear and exhibited a pronounced U shape in z-space, as expected if performance primarily relied on recollection. However, in conditions in which familiarity was clearly indicative of an item's source, the source ROC became curvilinear, suggesting that participants could use familiarity as a basis for source judgments. Several alternative models, including the unequal-variance signal-detection model, were found to be inconsistent with the ROC data.     

Affective judgments,common sense,and Zajonc's thesis of independence

Zajonc (1980) argued that, contrary to what is commonly believed, an affective judgment about a stimulus may be independent of the cognitive processes through which we know what that stimulus is. The evidence Zajonc offered (the exposure effect in the absence of recognition) does not entail this claim. An example of the sort of experiment that could do so is offered. When carried out, however, this study indicated the opposite: An affective judgment about a stimulus depended on how it was cognitively interpreted. We argue that what is commonly believed in this area is presumptively correct: Affective judgments about a stimulus depend on whatever information is possessed about that stimulus.     

Test context affects recollection and familiarity ratings: implications for measuring recognition experiences

The binary remember/know task requires participants to dichotomize their subjective recognition experiences into those with recollection and those only with familiarity. Many variables have produced dissociative effects on remember/know judgments. In contrast, having participants make independent recollection/familiarity ratings has consistently produced parallel effects, suggesting the dissociations may be artifacts of using binary judgments. Bodner and Lindsay (2003) reported a test-list context effect with binary judgments: Increased remembering but decreased knowing for a set of critical items tested with a set of less-memorable (vs. more-memorable) items. Here we report a parallel effect of test-list context on recollection and familiarity ratings, induced by a shift in response bias. We argue that independent ratings are preferable to binary judgments because they allow participants to directly report the co-occurrence of recollection and familiarity for each item. Implications for the measurement of self-reported recognition experiences, and for accounts of recognition memory, are discussed.     

Familiarity and retrieval processes in delayed judgments of learning

Two processes are postulated to underlie delayed judgments of learning (JOLs)--cue familiarity and target retrievability. The two processes are distinguishable because the familiarity-based judgments are thought to be faster than the retrieval-based processes, because only retrieval-based JOLs should enhance the relative accuracy of the correlations between the JOLs and criterion test performance, and because only retrieval-based judgments should enhance memory. To test these predictions, in three experiments, the authors either speeded people's JOLs or allowed them to be unspeeded. The relative accuracy of the JOLs in predicting performance on the criterion test was higher for the unspeeded JOLs than for the speeded JOLs, as predicted. The unspeeded JOL conditions showed enhanced memory as compared with the speeded JOL conditions, as predicted. Finally, the unspeeded JOLs were sensitive to manipulations that modified recallability of the target, whereas the speeded JOLs were selectively sensitive to experimental variations in the familiarity of the cues. Thus, all three of the predictions about the consequences of the two processes potentially underlying delayed JOLs were borne out. A model of the processes underlying delayed JOLs based on these and earlier results is presented.     

Familiarity and recollection in fictitious face recognition: implications for recognition models

Using the paradigm, participants were engaged in a fictitious face recognition experiment in which three between-subject conditions were manipulated by either adding or not adding wrinkles on the faces between the study and the recognition tasks (no change, single change, double change). Our hypothesis was that this procedure would maximize judgments based on familiarity, thus determining whether data provided better fit to the models based on the signal detection theory or to predictions of dual models. In global terms, our results support the signal detection model predictions, although we discuss whether these models better fit tasks based on familiarity or tasks based on recollection.     

Individual differences in forced-choice recognition memory: Partitioning contributions of recollection and familiarity

In forced-choice recognition memory, two different testing formats are possible under conditions of high target–foil similarity: Each target can be presented alongside foils similar to itself (forced-choice corresponding; FCC), or alongside foils similar to other targets (forced-choice noncorresponding; FCNC). Recent behavioural and neuropsychological studies suggest that FCC performance can be supported by familiarity whereas FCNC performance is supported primarily by recollection. In this paper, we corroborate this finding from an individual differences perspective. A group of older adults were given a test of FCC and FCNC recognition for object pictures, as well as standardized tests of recall, recognition, and IQ. Recall measures were found to predict FCNC, but not FCC performance, consistent with a critical role for recollection in FCNC only. After the common influence of recall was removed, standardized tests of recognition predicted FCC, but not FCNC performance. This is consistent with a contribution of only familiarity in FCC. Simulations show that a two-process model, where familiarity and recollection make separate contributions to recognition, is 10 times more likely to give these results than a single-process model. This evidence highlights the importance of recognition memory test design when examining the involvement of recollection and familiarity.     

Similarity, global matching, and judgments of frequency

In the test-pair similarity effect, forced-choice recognition is more accurate for similar test pairs, such as leopard-cheetah, than it is for unrelated test pairs, such as leopard-turnip. According to global matching models, this occurs because the retrieved familiarities of similar items are correlated. In the Minerva 2 model, global matching underlies frequency judgments as well as recognition memory. One implication of this model is that judged frequencies of similar items should be correlated. Another implication is that judgments of summed frequency for pairs of words (how many presentations were there of word1 and word2 combined?) should have higher variance when word1 and word2 are similar than when they are unrelated. These predictions were tested and confirmed in two experiments. A review of these and other results suggests that theories of recognition memory should also be applicable to frequency-judgment tasks.     

Recognition memory ROCs for item and associative information: The contribution of recollection and familiarity

Receiver-operating characteristics (ROCs) were examined in three recognition memory experiments. ROCs for item information (i.e., was this word presented?) were found to be curvilinear. However, ROCs for associative information (i.e., were these two words presented together?) were found to be linear. The results are in agreement with the predictions of a dual-process model that assumes that recognition judgments are -based on familiarity and recollection. Familiarity reflects the assessment of a continuous strength dimension and is well described as a signal detection process, whereas recollection reflects the retrieval of qualitative information about the study episode and behaves like a discrete threshold process. The results showed that memory judgments about items relied on a combination of recollection and familiarity, but that judgments about associations relied primarily on recollection. Further examination of the associative ROCs suggested that subjects were able to recollect that old pairs of items were in the study list, and, under some conditions, that new pairs were not in the study list.     

Recollection can be weak and familiarity can be strong

The remember-know procedure is widely used to investigate recollection and familiarity in recognition memory, but almost all of the results obtained with that procedure can be readily accommodated by a unidimensional model based on signal-detection theory. The unidimensional model holds that remember judgments reflect strong memories (associated with high confidence, high accuracy, and fast reaction times), whereas know judgments reflect weaker memories (associated with lower confidence, lower accuracy, and slower reaction times). Although this is invariably true on average, a new 2-dimensional account (the continuous dual-process model) suggests that remember judgments made with low confidence should be associated with lower old-new accuracy but higher source accuracy than know judgments made with high confidence. We tested this prediction--and found evidence to support it--using a modified remember-know procedure in which participants were first asked to indicate a degree of recollection-based or familiarity-based confidence for each word presented on a recognition test and were then asked to recollect the color (red or blue) and screen location (top or bottom) associated with the word at study. For familiarity-based decisions, old-new accuracy increased with old-new confidence, but source accuracy did not (suggesting that stronger old-new memory was supported by higher degrees of familiarity). For recollection-based decisions, both old-new accuracy and source accuracy increased with old-new confidence (suggesting that stronger old-new memory was supported by higher degrees of recollection). These findings suggest that recollection and familiarity are continuous processes and that participants can indicate which process mainly contributed to their recognition decisions.     

I’d know that face anywhere!

Mandler (1980) provided the classic “butcher on the bus” example illustrating the feeling of familiarity without recollection that may arise when an acquaintance is encountered in an unusual context. We studied this phenomenon by pairing photos of faces with photos of distinctive contexts at study and later testing recognition memory andremember/know judgments for faces presented with studied, switched, or new contexts. Estimates of recollection and familiarity, based on the assumption that these processes are independent, showed that switching contexts significantly lowered recollection while leaving familiarity intact, just as Mandler described. False alarm rates were higher with old contexts, suggesting that subjects tended to misattribute memories of contexts to memories of faces. These results provide the first evidence of context effects on the subjective experience of recognizing faces. One-dimensional signal-detection models fit the data, but such models do not explain the difference in remember responses between studied and switched items, whereas dual-process models (which also fit the data) do while also capturing the phenomenology of the butcher-on-the-bus experience in an intuitively appealing way.     

The use of cue familiarity during retrieval failure is affected by past versus future orientation

Cue familiarity that is brought on by cue resemblance to memory representations is useful for judging the likelihood of a past occurrence with an item that fails to actually be retrieved from memory. The present study examined the extent to which this type of resemblance-based cue familiarity is used in future-oriented judgments made during retrieval failure. Cue familiarity was manipulated using a previously-established method of creating differing degrees of feature overlap between the cue and studied items in memory, and the primary interest was in how these varying degrees of cue familiarity would influence future-oriented feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgments given in instances of cued recall failure. The present results suggest that participants do use increases in resemblance-based cue familiarity to infer an increased likelihood of future recognition of an unretrieved target, but not to the extent that they use it to infer an increased likelihood of past experience with an unretrieved target. During retrieval failure, the increase in future-oriented FOK judgments with increasing cue familiarity was significantly less than the increase in past-oriented recognition judgments with increasing cue familiarity.     

Context-dependent repetition effects on recognition memory

One widely acknowledged way to improve our memory performance is to repeatedly study the to be learned material. One aspect that has received little attention in past research regards the context sensitivity of this repetition effect, that is whether the item is repeated within the same or within different contexts. The predictions of a neuro-computational model (O’Reilly & Norman, 2002) were tested in an experiment requiring participants to study visual objects either once or three times. Crucially, for half of the repeated objects the study context (encoding task, background color and screen position) remained the same (within context repetition) while for the other half the contextual features changed across repetitions (across context repetition). In addition to behavioral measures, event-related potentials (ERP) were recorded that provide complementary information on the underlying neural mechanisms during recognition. Consistent with dual-process models behavioral estimates (remember/know-procedure) demonstrate differential effects of context on memory performance, namely that recognition judgements were more dependent on familiarity when repetition occurs across contexts. In accordance with these behavioral results ERPs showed a larger early frontal old/new effect for across context repetitions as compared to within context repetitions and single presentations, i.e. an increase in familiarity following repetition across study contexts. In contrast, the late parietal old/new effect, indexing recollection did not differ between both repetition conditions. These results suggest that repetition differentially affects familiarity depending on whether it occurs within the same context or across different contexts.     

Affective modulation of recognition bias

A correspondence of processing on the familiarity-novelty and positive-negative dimensions, particularly in the earliest processing stages, is proposed. Familiarity manipulations should, therefore, not only influence affective evaluations (e.g., the mere exposure effect), but affective manipulations should also bias familiarity judgments (e.g., in recognition). In Experiment 1, both previously presented and new recognition test words were primed by matching, nonmatching, positive, or negative context words. In Experiment 2, more diffuse affective states were induced during recognition test trials by contracting facial muscles that corresponded to positive and negative expressions. Particularly when participants were less aware of the familiarity and affective manipulations, corresponding effects were found. Positive affect led to a more liberal recognition bias, and negative affect led to more cautious tendencies.     

Some observations upon perceptual organization and the mere exposure effect

The mere repetition of events tends to enhance subjective familiarity and subjective preference for those events. It has been shown that the enhancement of subjective preference is neither contingent upon a feeling of familiarity nor an awareness of the physical identity of the stimulus during learning. This finding is surprising since the weight of existing theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that subjective preference is derivative of familiarity. An experiment was conducted to test the hypothesis that at least one preattentive/preconscious product, figure-ground organization, is shared between the processes responsible for preference enhancement and those responsible for the enhancement of recognition memory. There were two significant findings. First, subjects were able to discriminate between objectively familiar stimuli and objectively unfamiliar stimuli on the basis of preference judgments but were unable to do so on the basis of familiarity judgments. Second, preference enhancement occurred only for those objectively familiar stimuli for which the figure-ground aspects had not been phenomenally reversed. The significance of these findings is discussed.     

Effects of context on recollection and familiarity experiences are task dependent

The influence of test context on reports of recollection and familiarity depends on how these subjective recognition experiences are conceptualized and measured. Bodner and Lindsay (2003) found that critical items elicited more remember judgments but fewer know judgments in a less (vs. more) memorable context. In contrast, Tousignant and Bodner (2012) found that independent ratings of recollection and familiarity were both higher in a less memorable context. We replicated the dissociative pattern with judgments using recollect/familiar labels (Experiment 1), and in a novel R/F/B task that added a “both” option to eliminate the mutual exclusivity between the recollect and familiar options (Experiment 2). Adding a “guess” option eliminated these context effects (Experiment 3), however whether allowing guesses “cleans up” or “desensitizes” recollection and familiarity judgments remains unclear. Determining which task variants provide appropriate measures of subjective recognition experiences will require an examination of additional dissociations and triangulation with other measures.     

Recognition memory for source and occurrence: The importance of recollection

Previous recognition memory studies indicate that when both recollection and familiarity are expected to contribute to recognition performance (e.g., discriminating studied items from nonstudied items) the dual-process and the unequal-variance signal detection models provide comparable accounts of performance. When familiarity is not expected to be useful (e.g., when items from two equally familiar sources are discriminated between), the dual-process model provides a significantly better account of performance. In the present study, source recognition was tested under conditions in which familiarity could have been used to perform a list-discrimination task; participants were required to discriminate between strong studied items, weak studied items, and new items. The dual-process model provided a better account of performance than did the unequal-variance model. Moreover, the results indicated that the unequal-variance assumption in a single-process signal detection model was not a valid substitution for recollection and that recollection was used to make recognition judgments even when assessments of familiarity were useful.     

Associative recognition: A case of recall-to-reject processing

Two-process accounts of recognition memory assume that memory judgments are based on both a rapidly available familiarity-based process and a slower, more accurate, recall-based mechanism. Past experiments on the time course of item recognition have not supported the recall-to-reject account of the second process, in which the retrieval of an old item is used to reject a similar foil (Rotello & Heit, 1999). In three new experiments, using analyses similar to those of Rotello and Heit, we found robust evidence for recall-to-reject processing in associative recognition, for word pairs, and for list-discrimination judgments. Put together, these results have implications for two-process accounts of recognition.     

Critical importance of exposure duration for affective discrimination of stimuli that are not recognized

Previous research has found that repeated exposure to briefly presented visual stimuli can increase the positive affect for the stimuli without enhancing their recognition. Subjects could discriminate target and distractor shapes by affective preference in the absence of recognition memory. This study examined this phenomenon as a function of stimulus exposure duration. Over exposure durations of 0, 2, 8, 12, 24, and 48 ms, the functions for affect and recognition judgments exhibited different temporal dynamics. Target selection by affect was possible at very brief exposures and was influenced little by increasing durations; target selection by recognition required longer stimulus exposures and improved with increasing durations. Affective discrimination of stimuli that are not recognized is a reliable phenomenon, but it occurs only within a narrow band of time. This parametric study has specified the relationship between exposure duration and affect and recognition judgments and has located that temporal window.